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Abstract 
Corporate social responsibility (CSR) refers to the voluntary integration of social and 
environmental concerns into business practice. It is of increasing importance to utilities, 
with commercial pressure to be socially responsible coming from, inter alia, consumers, 
investors and employees. One way in which utilities can integrate CSR into their business 
is in their procurement. However, the potential scope for the inclusion of CSR 
considerations in procurement regulated by the EU is uncertain, with some policies 
clearly restricted but the legality of others being less clear. 
This thesis examines the practical impact of the EU procurement regulation on the use of 
CSR policies in utilities procurement, focusing specifically on the inclusion of labour 
concerns. 7KHSURMHFWDLPVWRGLVFRYHUSUDFWLWLRQHUV¶RSLQLRQVRIWKH(8ODZLQWKLVDUHD
and their experience in applying it, looking at positive and negative aspects of the law. 
In order to do so, a qualitative study was completed, with semi-structured interviews 
conducted with a sample of procurement practitioners based in UK utilities. The study 
covers the level of use of labour policies in procurement, the types of labour policy 
commonly included and the means by which those policies are integrated into 
procurement, with emphasis on the impact of the EU regulation on each issue. 
The thesis concludes that the impact of the EU regulation was relatively low, with most 
practitioners feeling that the procurement rules did not generally restrict their inclusion 
of labour policies. Instead, practical concerns governed the choice of labour policy and 
the means by which those policies were integrated into procurement. The major 
exception to this was in the area of policies which favoured local labour or firms, where 
practitioners felt that the EU regulation was very restrictive and prevented them from 
achieving their commercial aims.  
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Chapter 1 - Introduction 
I. Introduction 
This thesis examines the impact of the European Union (EU) rules on public procurement 
on the use of corporate social responsibility (CSR) policies in utilities procurement. This 
chapter will begin by setting out an introduction both to utilities procurement and the 
concept of CSR (Section II). It will then set out the aims of this research and the main 
research questions (Section III). Section IV will offer an introduction to the methodology 
of the study. The chapter will conclude with an overview of the whole thesis structure 
(Section V).   
II. Public Procurement and Corporate Social Responsibility 
7KH(XURSHDQ&RPPLVVLRQKDVGHILQHG&65DV³DFRQFHSWZKHUHE\FRPSDQLHVLQWHJUDWH
social and environmental concerns in their business operations and in their interaction 
ZLWKVWDNHKROGHUVRQDYROXQWDU\EDVLV´1 The concept of CSR has risen in importance in 
recent years and the EU now has an official CSR strategy which calls on businesses to 
integrate CSR into their practical application of EU policies wherever possible.2 
This growth in the importance of CSR is partly due to the argument made by many 
commentators that socially responsible companies will in fact be more profitable than 
WKHLUOHVVHWKLFDOFRPSHWLWRUVNQRZQDVWKH³EXVLQHVVFDVH´IRU&657KLVEXVLQess case 
LV VXSSRUWHG E\ WKH (8ZKLFK QRWHV ³>W@KHUH LV D JURZLQJ SHUFHSWLRQ WKDW VXVWDLQDEOH
business success and shareholder value cannot be achieved solely through maximising 
short-term profits but instead through market-oriented yet responsible behaviRXU´3 
Following this position, companies face pressure to be more socially responsible from 
WKHLU VWDNHKROGHUV ZLWK WKH PDLQ VRXUFHV RI SUHVVXUH EHLQJ LQYHVWRUV WKH FRPSDQ\¶V
                                          
1 European Commission, Communication from the Commission concerning Corporate Social Responsibility: A 
business contribution to Sustainable Development &20³&RPPLVVLRQ&RPPXQLFDWLRQFRQFHUQLQJ
&RUSRUDWH6RFLDO5HVSRQVLELOLW\´DWS 
2 Ibid. 
3 Ibid, at p.5. 
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employees, and consumers, and it is argued that a company which satisfies the demands 
of these stakeholders will gain more custom than a company which does not.4 
It has been suggested that the utilities sector may be particularly sensitive to such public 
pressure due to its historical position as part of the public sector and the belief that 
private utilities are still subject to state influence.5 In addition to these pressures, 
companies may also be influenced by the desire to avoid the stricter regulation which 
might result if they do not regulate themselves.6 In support of this, Arrowsmith and 
Maund note the increase in CSR reporting amongst large corporations, which has led to 
the creation of detailed statistical reports which are now often independently audited.7 
The authors also note the recent action by utilities to be listed in social investment 
indices such as FTSE4Good and the increased use of CSR policies by many utilities to 
protect their brand image.8 
One of the possible methods by which utilities can integrate CSR concerns into their 
business is through including CSR requirements in their procurement contracts. Public 
and utilities procurement refers to the process of awarding contracts for the goods, 
works and services the public and utilities sector needs. It is potentially a powerful way 
of influencing compDQLHV¶SROLFLes due to the size and the high visibility of the contracts 
awarded by the public and utilities sector.9 By choosing to purchase goods and services 
which are socially and environmentally responsible, utilities can have a substantial 
influence on CSR issues. 
Utilities in the UK are not totally free to determine their procurement process, however. 
The public and utilities procurement market often poses significant barriers to 
international trade, with public bodies favouring national suppliers for a variety of 
                                          
4 Vogel, D. The Market for Virtue: The Potential and Limits of Corporate Social Responsibility (2005, 
Washington DC: Brookings Institution Press), Ch. 3. 
5 $UURZVPLWK6DQG0DXQG&µ&65LQWKHXWLOLWLHVVHFWRUDQGWKHLPSOLFDWLRQVRI(&SURFXUHPHQWSROLF\D
IUDPHZRUNIRUGHEDWH¶&KLQ Arrowsmith, S. and Kunzlik, P. (eds), Social and Environmental Policies in EC 
Procurement Law: New Directives and New Directions (2009, Cambridge: CUP), at p.440. 
6 Ibid, at p.438. 
7 Ibid, at p.439. 
8 Ibid, p.440. 
9 $UQRXOG-µ6HFRQGDU\3ROLFLHVLQ3XEOLF3URFXUHPHQWWKH,QQRYDWLRQVRIWKH1HZ'LUHFWLYHV¶ (2004) 13 PPLR 
187 at 187. 
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reasons, ranging from intentional favouritism to support national industry to 
unintentional factors such as a lack of knowledge of foreign suppliers.10 Due to this 
tendency towards national favouritism and the size of the market, it is common for 
public procurement to be subject to international regulation to ensure the liberalisation 
of the market. 
Within the EU, public procurement has been regulated in some form to ensure 
competition and prevent national discrimination since the 1970s. The main EU rules 
governing utilities procurement currently come from the free movement provisions of the 
Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU), supported by secondary 
OHJLVODWLRQLQWKHIRUPRIWZRGLUHFWLYHV'LUHFWLYH(&³WKH8WLOLWLHV'LUHFWLYH´11 
and Directive 92/13/EEC ³WKH 8WLOLWLHV 5HPHGLHV 'LUHFWLYH´12 These regulations, 
consistent with the overall aim of opening up the procurement market to competition, 
focus on the commercial aspects of the procurement process. The procurement rules 
both limit the possible use of certain social and environmental policies in procurement 
and also lack clarity as to the legality of some policies, creating legal risks for utilities 
that wish to use procurement to support their CSR objectives. The combination of this 
restrictive and confusing regulation with the pressures on utilities to include CSR in their 
business could potentially cause some difficulties for utilities. 
III. Aims and Objectives of this Study 
The main aim of this research is to examine the practical impact of the EU procurement 
regime on the use of CSR policies in procurement. The project aims to discover 
SUDFWLWLRQHUV¶ RSLQLRQV RI WKH ODZ DQG WKHLU H[SHULHQFHV LQ DSSO\LQJ LW LGHQWLI\LQJ DQ\
positive and negative aspects of the law. This will enable an analysis of whether the 
                                          
10 For more information, see Arrowsmith, S. The Law of Public and Utilities Procurement, (2nd Ed), (2005, 
London: Sweet and Maxwell), at pp.121-122. 
11 Directive 2004/17/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council coordinating the procurement 
procedures of entities operating in the water, energy, transport and postal services sectors, OJ 2004 No. 
L134/1. 
12
Council Directive 92/13/EEC of 25.2.92 coordinating the laws, regulations and administrative provisions 
relating to the application of Community rules on the procurement procedures of entities operating in the 
water, energy, transport and telecommunications sectors, [1992] O.J. L76/7. 
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procurement law as it is on the books is influencing behaviour as the EU legislators 
intended. It will also help to identify certain problems with the law.  
While CSR covers both social and environmental issues, this thesis will focus only on the 
social side. It was felt that attempting to investigate both aspects of CSR in one project 
would lead to a more superficial examination of the topic given the time restraints of the 
research, whereas focusing on one allowed much deeper analysis. In recent years, 
environmental issues have been seen as increasingly important, and the possibility of 
including environmental issues in procurement has been examined by several authors.13 
Social policies, covering a range of issues such as promoting gender and race equality, 
supporting the local community and promoting core labour standards, do not appear to 
have been researched at the same level of detail. Labour policies in particular are of 
increasing importance for utilities which are more commonly outsourcing to developing 
countries where they cannot be sure of the employment standards. For this reason, this 
research focuses in particular on labour-related policies, which aim to improve the 
working conditions of the workforce of the XWLOLW\DQGWKDWXWLOLW\¶VVXSSOLHUVIXUWKHUGRZQ
the supply chain. The research aims to identify issues which might provide guidance as 
to current practice in this area and the legal issues surrounding it. 
While the EU procurement regime covers both the public sector and the utilities sector, 
the vast majority of academic research focuses on the public sector regime. In the 
specific field of social and environmental concerns in procurement, there have been 
several legal studies into the impact of the EU regime on the public sector, but very little 
examination of the issues relating to the utilities sector.14 Equally, the official guidance 
on social and environmental issues in procurement produced by the Office of 
                                          
13 See, for exaPSOH.XQ]OLN3µ7KHSURFXUHPHQWRIµJUHHQ¶HQHUJ\¶Ch. 9 in Arrowsmith and Kunzlik, above n. 
5.; :HVWSKDO7µ*UHHQLQJ3URFXUHPHQW$Q$WWHPSWWR5HGXFH8QFHUWDLQW\¶33/51LMKROW+
µ(QYLURQPHQWDO3URYLVLRQVLQ3XEOLF3URFXUHPHQW'LUHFWLYH(&¶,&/5 
14 For previous studies into social and environmental concerns in public sector procurement, see Caranto, R. 
and Trybus, M. (eds), The Law of Green and Social Procurement in Europe, (2010, Copenhagen: DJØF 
Publishing); Arrowsmith, S. and Kunzlik, P. (eds), Social and Environmental Policies in EC Procurement Law: 
New Directives and New Directions (2009, Cambridge: CUP); McCrudden, C., Buying Social Justice: Equality, 
Government Procurement, and Legal Change, (2007, Oxford: OUP); Kunzlik, P. (ed.), The Environmental 
Performance of Public Procurement (2003, OECD); 0F&UXGGHQ&³6RFLDO3ROLF\,VVXHVLQ3XEOLF3URFXUHPHQW
a Legal OverYLHZ´&KLQ$UURZVPLWKDQG'DYLHVHGVPublic Procurement: Global Revolution (1998, 
London: Kluwer Law International) .   
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Government Commerce deals only with the public sector rules.15 The most recent 
guidance produced by the European Commission fares slightly better, giving references 
to the utilities legislation, but still focuses on the public sector requirements.  It has no 
discussion of the parts of the utilities regulation which differs from the public sector.16 
However, the utilities rules vary significantly from the public sector rules in some places, 
making the public sector research and guidance of limited use to the utilities sector. This 
gives bodies in the utilities sector very little direction when looking to include social and 
environmental policies into procurement and one of the aims of this thesis is to remedy 
this, focusing on the problems specific to the utilities regulation in this area. 
In addition to potentially providing valuable information on the impact of the EU regime 
on utilities procurement in the specific area of social procurement, the thesis aims to 
provide information on the more general procurement practice of the utilities sector, 
which has also been little researched. The research will offer an insight into the practical 
methods used by practitioners, looking at collaborative procurement within utilities and 
the use in practice of some utility-specific procurement options, such as supplier lists.17 
As well as analysing issues relating specifically to utilities procurement, the research also 
aims, through the specific case study of labour policies, to shed some light on the more 
general issue of how those who apply the law deal with regulation which is either 
commercially restrictive or lacks clarity. Building on research looking at compliance 
theory, this thesis will examine some of the factors which impact on procurement 
SUDFWLWLRQHUV¶GHFLVLRQVRYHUZKHWKHURUQRWWRWDNHDFWLRQZKLFKPLJKW be legally risky. It 
also aims to examine whether the current form of procurement regulation is the most 
effective, looking at academic theories on compliance and deterrence approaches to 
UHJXODWLRQLQOLJKWRISUDFWLWLRQHUV¶H[SHULHQFHVZLWKWKHSURFXUHPent regulation. 
                                          
15 See Office of Government Commerce, Buy Green and Make a Difference: How to address environmental 
issues in public procurement (2008), available at http://www.ogc.gov.uk/documents/Environmental_Issues.pdf 
[accessed 18/05/2011] and Office of Government Commerce, Social Issues in Purchasing (2006), available at 
http://www.ogc.gov.uk/documents/Social_Issues_in_Purchasing.pdf [accessed 18/05/2011]. 
16 European Commission, Buying Green! A Handbook on Environmental Public Procurement (2004) and 
European Commission, Buying Social: A Guide to Taking Account of Social Considerations in Public 
Procurement, SEC(2010) 1258.  
17 For more information on supplier lists, see Chapter 5, Section IV. 
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In order to accomplish the aims set out above, the thesis focuses on four main areas. 
Firstly, the thesis aims to investigate the level of use of labour policies in procurement. It 
will examine the factors which impact on procurement practiWLRQHUV¶ GHFLVLRQ RYHU
whether or not to include labour policies in procurement, with special focus on the 
impact of the EU legal regime in this area. Secondly, the thesis aims to investigate which 
types of labour policy are most commonly included in utilities procurement and if the 
requirements of the EU legal regime impact on the choice of policy in any way.  Thirdly, 
the thesis aims to determine how labour policies are integrated into procurement given 
the requirements of EU law. Finally, the thesis looks at general regulatory and 
compliance issues linked to the use of labour policies in procurement, with a focus on the 
impact of the grey areas in the law on compliance.  
IV. Overview of Methodology 
The thesis takes a socio-legal approach, involving an empirical study of procurement 
practitioners in the regulated utilities sector and focusing on the effects of legal 
regulation in practice. The thesis is split into two parts. Part I consists of a literature 
review giving the background to the issues covered in the thesis along with a doctrinal 
study of the law governing the use of labour policies in EU utilities procurement. Part II 
sets out the results of the empirical study, examining how the legal requirements as 
identified in Part I are interpreted in practice. This section sets out an overview of the 
methodology of the two parts, with more detail of the methodology for the empirical 
study being set out in Chapter 8.  
Part I of the thesis primarily uses doctrinal legal analysis, examining the law on the 
books to examine the possibility for including labour policies in procurement under the 
EU legal regime. The analysis examines the law as set out in both the requirements in 
TFEU and the Utilities Directive, as interpreted by the Court of Justice of the European 
Union (CJEU). In order to get a more complete picture of the legal situation, the analysis 
also considers the interpretation of the law given in the official guidance by both the 
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European Commission and the Office of Government Commerce (OGC). This doctrinal 
analysis sets out both the areas in which the law clearly restricts the use of labour 
policies and areas where the law lacks clarity on that issue. 
The doctrinal analysis of the EU procurement regime in Part I is supported by socio-legal 
analysis examining the law in light of business research and regulatory theory. The 
thesis examines both the business concept of CSR and the requirements of commonly-
used labour codes to determine possible commercial needs for utilities in their 
procurement related to labour. The procurement law is analysed in light of those 
commercial needs to determine any areas in which there is conflict. Finally, the EU legal 
regime is examined in light of regulatory theories on compliance and deterrence to 
determine whether the approach taken by the EU to procurement regulation is the most 
DSSURSULDWHZD\RIDFKLHYLQJWKH(8¶VDLPV 
The issues raised in Part I of the thesis form the basis of the main part of the research, 
the empirical study in Part II. The study is qualitative in nature, involving semi-
structured interviews with a sample of procurement practitioners from UK utilities. 
Qualitative research was deemed appropriate for this research given the lack of detailed 
research and theory which currently exists in this area, making it difficult to define the 
relevant issues with enough clarity for a quantitative statistical study. It was also felt 
that qualitative research was appropriate given the focus of this project on the 
experiences and opinions of the practitioners involved, an area more suited to in-depth 
interviews than to statistical research. 
The sample of procurement practitioners was chosen on the basis of theoretical 
sampling, a non-statistical method of sampling whereby interviewees are chosen on the 
basis of their relevance to the research questions.18 The sample for this research covered 
twenty-two utilities, including all of the regulated utility sectors (water, energy, transport 
and postal services), and was chosen so as to ensure number of key factors were met, 
                                          
18 For more on theoretical sampling, see Mason, J, Qualitative Researching, (2nd Ed), (2002, London: SAGE 
Publishing), at p. 137. 
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including variance in company size and coverage of both public and private sector bodies 
(see Chapter 8, Section III.2 for full details). 
Once data collection was complete, the interview data were analysed by coding for 
themes. Analysis was done inductively, with codes being driven by the data rather than 
pre-existing theory. Themes were coded until the point of theoretical saturation was 
reached, i.e. when the analysis no longer revealed new theoretical insights.19 
V. Overview of Conclusions 
This section offers a brief overview of the conclusions of the thesis in the four main 
research areas identified in Section III above. 
V.1 Use of Labour Policies 
The thesis will show that the overall impact of the EU legal regime on the use of labour 
policies in procurement was minimal, with most interviewees feeling that the regime 
neither prevented nor promoted the use of labour policies. One important exception to 
this, however, is in the area of local labour policies, where the EU law was felt to have a 
very noticeable effect, as discussed further in Chapter 9, Section IV.1. In practice, labour 
policies were included by those practitioners who had motives outside of the EU 
procurement system to include them, and neither the decision to include labour policies 
nor the content of those policies was greatly affected by EU law constraints. The main 
motives for those who included labour policies in procurement were moral, with 
interviewees feeling they had a duty to ensure that workers on their contracts had a 
good working environment. There was also a strong desire amongst interviewees to 
avoid the bad publicity which might arise if a contractor was found to have poor labour 
standards, leading to interviewees requiring minimum labour standards in their 
procurement contracts. By contrast, the main concerns of those interviewees who did 
not include labour policies were commercial, with the cost of introducing labour issues 
into the procurement process being considered too high.  
                                          
19
Charmaz, K. Constructing Grounded Theory, (2006, London: SAGE Publications), at p.113. 
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V.2 Type of Labour Policies 
The thesis will show that the types of labour policy used in utilities procurement are 
varied, ranging from simply requiring compliance with national employment law to 
detailed requirements relating to health and safety or discrimination. While for the most 
part the EU legal regime again had only a minimal impact, the regime was significant 
when it came to the use of local labour policies. It will be shown that the issue of 
favouring local labour or firms was considered highly important by interviewees and was 
the area where the restriction of the legal regime was felt most keenly. The research will 
show that majority of interviewees stated that they had considered favouring local labour 
or firms in some manner in their procurement but did not do so due to the restrictions of 
the EU legal regime, and a minority attempted to favour local labour despite the legal 
restrictions. 
V.3 Structure of Labour Policies 
It will be shown that there are three main methods for including labour policies in 
procurement: contract conditions setting labour requirements to be completed during 
the contract, prequalification criteria setting minimum labour standards for a firm to 
meet to be entitled to participate in the procurement process, and including labour 
related award criteria in the tender evaluation requirements. Of these, prequalification 
criteria were the most commonly used by interviewees since this method was the easiest 
to ensure compliance with minimum requirements, the main concern of most 
interviewees. Overall, as with the findings above, the impact of the EU legal regime in 
this area was relatively low. Where the correct interpretation of the law was unclear, 
interviewees tended to assume that their approach was legal, taking a flexible view of 
the law. This meant that practical, rather than legal, concerns were the main factor 
behind the choice of structure. 
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V.4 Regulatory and Compliance Issues 
The thesis will show that interviewees were generally happy with the EU procurement 
regime, believing it to be fair and to improve competition in procurement. Linked to this, 
WKHUH LVQR UHDOHYLGHQFHRI ³FUHDWLYHFRPSOLDQFH´RUGHOLEHUDWHEUHDFKRI WKH(8 OHJDO
regime by utilities, with interviewees generally doing their best to comply with what they 
thought the legal requirements were. Any breach of the law was generally down to 
ignorance rather than malice. There was, however, a relatively low level of knowledge of 
the actual requirements of the law, which meant that interviewees often did not feel the 
need to evade the legal restrictions partly due to a lack of awareness that the 
restrictions existed. Given this lack of deliberate breach of the regulation, the thesis will 
show that a compliance approach to regulating procurement where utilities are helped to 
understand and comply with the law rather than being subject to punitive sanctions 
when they breach the law might be preferable to the current deterrence approach for 
dealing with compliance with this area of the law by companies within the UK.  
VI. Overview of Thesis Structure 
Excluding this introductory chapter, Part I of this thesis consists of Chapters 2-7. 
Chapter 2 sets out an introduction to the concept of CSR. It looks at the difficulty of 
setting out a precise definition of CSR and examines the most common features of the 
concept. The development of the concept and the main reasons behind its growth in 
UHFHQW\HDUVDUHDQDO\VHG IRFXVLQJRQ WKHQRWLRQRI WKH ³EXVLQHVVFDVH´ IRU&657KH
chapter also examines the importance of the concept of CSR for the EU, examining the 
(8¶V&65UHTXLUHPHQWV 
Chapter 3 builds on the general discussion of CSR, taking a closer look at labour issues 
in particular. The chapter examines the background to the use of labour codes in 
business, setting out the growth in the use of such codes and the reasons behind them. 
The various possible types of labour codes are analysed, looking at the different focuses 
of codes designed at company level as opposed to international codes and the reasons 
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behind that focus. The chapter finishes by examining the specific requirements of the 
most-commonly used labour codes in detail, giving an insight into the types of labour 
policies which might be used by utilities in procurement. 
Chapter 4 sets out an overview of the UK utilities sector, examining the sectors 
regulated by the Utilities Directive. The chapter sets out the operation of utilities in each 
area, examining the regulation and amount of competition in each sector and providing a 
background to the procurement regulation. 
Chapters 5 and 6 set out the doctrinal analysis of the EU procurement regime. Chapter 5 
gives a general overview of the EU procurement regime, providing the background to 
Chapter 6, which examines the specific issue of the use of labour policies in 
procurement. The possible methods for including labour policies in procurement are 
analysed, based on the types of policy examined in Chapter 3. Chapter 6 then sets out 
the risk of challenge associated with each method and analyses the areas in which the 
law lacks clarity. 
Chapter 7 concludes Part I of the thesis with a discussion of regulatory theory, focusing 
on compliance with and enforcement of regulation. The chapter first sets out the 
background to the theory with a discussion of the types of regulation available to 
regulatory bodies. The issue of indeterminacy in the law is covered, examining the 
problems which might be caused by the lack of clarity in the EU legal regime. The 
chapter then discusses compliance theories, looking at factors which might impact on 
SURFXUHPHQWSUDFWLWLRQHUV¶GHFLVLRQRYHUZKHWKHURUQRWWRFRPSO\ZLWKWKHODZ)LQDOO\
the chapter examines theories on enforcement of regulation and evaluates the 
effectiveness of the EU regime in this area. 
Part II of the thesis covers Chapters 8 and 9, excluding the conclusions chapter (Chapter 
10). Chapter 8 provides a detailed explanation of the methodology and conduct of the 
empirical research in this project. Chapter 9 sets out the results of that research, 
detailing the practical impact of the EU legal regime on the use of labour policies in 
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SURFXUHPHQW7KHGDWDDQDO\VLVFRYHUVLQWHUYLHZHHV¶YLHZVRIERWK&65DQGWKH(8OHJDO
regime generally, factors which impact on the use of labour policies in utilities 
procurement, the types of labour policy commonly used by interviewees, and the 
methods which interviewees used to structure labour policies in EU procurement. 
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Chapter 2 - Corporate Social Responsibility 
I. Introduction 
This chapter will examine the business concept of corporate social responsibility (CSR). 
The chapter aims to describe the concept of CSR and examine the reasons why the 
phenomenon may affect the business decisions of the utilities sector. In order to do so, a 
general overview of CSR will first be given in Section II, offering a definition of CSR and 
discussing the common qualities of CSR before looking at its development in the EU 
context in more detail. Section III will then examine some of the factors which have 
driven the development of CSR, focusing on the link between CSR and increased 
profitability. The chapter will conclude with an examination of some common criticisms 
of the concept of CSR in Section V.  
II. Overview of Corporate Social Responsibility 
II.1. Definition of Corporate Social Responsibility 
Companies have been considering their social responsibilities for as long as they have 
been operating. The Industrial Revolution created wide-spread urban migration and a 
subsequent loss of social cohesion.20 In response many of the early industrialists took a 
paternal approach to their workers, taking measures ranging from simple corporate 
philanthropy to creating better living conditions for their workers, even setting up whole 
villages.21 While some of these social capitalists may have been driven by moral or 
religious reasons, often self-interest was the main cause. The reformers wished to avoid 
revolt in their labour force and to avoid trade unions being established, along with 
hoping to attract new workers.22 Equally, as today, they may have wished to protect 
their reputation and avoid negative media attention from activists.23 
                                          
20 Van Tulder, R. and van der Zwart, A. International Business-Society Management: Linking Corporate 
Responsibility and Globalisation, (2006, London: Routledge), at p.133. 
21 Ibid, at p.134. 
22 Ibid, at p.134. 
23 Waddock, S.The Difference Makers: How Social and Institutional Entrepreneurs Created the Corporate 
Responsibility Movement, (2008, Sheffield: Greenleaf Publishing), at p.22.  
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CSR today goes beyond philanthropy to cover all social and environmental policies 
adopted by companies. The concept, however, appears to mean different things to 
different people. There is no generally accepted definition of CSR, with most companies 
and international organisations using their own definition of the concept, emphasising 
different aspects.24  The term CSR itself is also not generally accepted, being used 
interchangeably with corporate responsibility, corporate accountability, corporate 
citizenship and sustainable business.25 Businesses often also refer to their CSR policies 
DVD³WULSOHERWWRPOLQH´DSSURDFKDWHUPSRSXODULVHGE\(ONLQJWRQ¶VERRNCannibals with 
Forks.26 This section aims to offer a description of the main elements of CSR by 
presenting and analysing the EU definition, which has the benefit of covering many of 
the most commonly included elements of CSR definitions and is also the definition most 
relevant to the impact of the concept on EU law, the focus of this thesis. 
Within the EU, CSR is defined as: 
A concept whereby companies integrate social and environmental concerns in 
their business operations and in their interaction with stakeholders on a voluntary 
basis.27 
7KH (8 GHILQLWLRQ GRHV QRW PDNH LW FOHDU ZKR WKH µVWDNHKROGHUV¶ RI D FRPSDQ\ DUH
Stakeholders may generally be said to be anyone with an interest in the business of the 
firm. Stakeholders may be either internal to the firm, such as employees or 
shareholders, or external, such as consumers or the local community in which the firm 
operates. A distinction is also sometimes made between primary stakeholders, the group 
³ZLWKRXW ZKRP WKH FRPSDQ\ FDQQRW UHDOLVH LWV REMHFWLYHV´ FRYHULQJ HPSOR\HHV
shareholders, investors, consumers and suppliers, and secondary stakeholders such as 
                                          
24 For an overview of common definitions, see Blowfield, M. and Murray, A. Corporate Responsibility: A Critical 
Introduction (2008, Oxford: OUP), at p.13. 
25 For a detailed examination of various terms and definitions of CSR, see Hopkins, M. Corporate Social 
Responsibility and International Development: Is Business the Solution?, (2007, London: Earthscan), Ch. 2. 
26 Elkington, J. Cannibals with Forks: The Triple Bottom Line of 21st Century Business, (1999, Oxford: 
Capstone). 
27 European Commission, Communication from the Commission concerning Corporate Social Responsibility: A 
business contribution to Sustainable Development &20³&RPPLVVLRQ&RPPXQLFDWLRQFRQFHUQing 
&RUSRUDWH6RFLDO5HVSRQVLELOLW\´DWS 
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trade unions and environmental or social activist groups.28 One of the aspects of CSR 
which is often emphasised in definitions is the move away from focusing on the needs of 
shareholders alone to considering the needs of all the stakeholders of the company. 
The first thing to note about the EU definition is that while it emphasises that CSR is 
concerned with environmental issues as well as purely social ones, it does not mention 
HFRQRPLF UHVSRQVLELOLW\ D FRPSDQ\¶V UHVSRQVLELOLW\ WR LWV VKDUHKROGHUV WR LQFUHDVH LWV
profit), which is included in several other definitions. For example, economic, social and 
environmental issues togethHU IRUP (ONLQJWRQ¶V ³WULSOH ERWWRP OLQH´ DQG +RSNLQV¶
GHILQLWLRQVWDWHVWKDWWKHµVRFLDO¶LQFRUSRUDWHVRFLDOUHVSRQVLELOLW\³LQFOXGHVHFRQRPLFDQG
HQYLURQPHQWDOUHVSRQVLELOLW\´29 This raises the issue of the correct balance between CSR 
concerns and economLFFRQFHUQV'HILQLWLRQVVXFKDV(ONLQJWRQ¶VDQG+RSNLQV¶UDQNVRFLDO
and environmental concerns as equal to the usual economic concerns of businesses. The 
Commission Communication which sets out the EU CSR definition, on the other hand, 
notes that the maiQ DLP RI EXVLQHVV LV JHQHUDOO\ ³WR FUHDWH YDOXH´ VXJJHVWLQJ WKDW
economic issues will be dealt with in normal business with social and environmental 
issues being extras that an enterprise would not normally be concerned with.30 Later in 
the Communication, KRZHYHUWKH&RPPLVVLRQVWDWHVWKDWEXVLQHVVHV³QHHGWRLQWHJUDWH
WKHHFRQRPLF VRFLDODQGHQYLURQPHQWDO LPSDFW LQ WKHLURSHUDWLRQV´DQGPDNHV LW FOHDU
WKDW³&65LVQRWDQRSWLRQDO µDGG-RQ¶WREXVLQHVVFRUHDFWLYLWLHV´31 It is thus somewhat 
unclear how the EU views the appropriate balance between economic concerns and other 
CSR issues. It is notable, however, that the EU does seem to place a lot of value in the 
argument that being socially responsible will itself lead to greater economic returns (see 
further below, Section III.1), suggesting perhaps that economic issues are key and CSR 
is relevant mostly for improving those issues.  
It was noted above that the EU definition covers both social and environmental aspects 
of CSR. These categories were expanded on in the CSR Chapter of the 2008 European 
                                          
28 Van Tulder and van der Zwart, above n.20, at pp.136-138. 
29 Hopkins, above n.25, at p.16. 
30 Commission Communication concerning Corporate Social Responsibility, above n.27, at p.5. 
31 Ibid, at p.5. 
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Competitiveness Report.32 This report divides CSR into four main categories: workplace, 
marketplace, environment and community.33 Workplace CSR relates to labour issues, 
looking at how the company (and, from the procXUHPHQW SHUVSHFWLYH WKH FRPSDQ\¶V
suppliers) treats its employees. Marketplace CSR covers more economic issues, relating 
to the way the company interacts with its customers, suppliers and competitors, looking 
at issues such as anti-corruption measures and fair advertising. Environmental CSR 
covers green issues, looking at matters such as carbon-reduction and energy efficiency. 
Finally, community CSR relates to how the company affects the communities it operates 
in, including human rights issues. As explained in Chapter 1, this thesis is concentrating 
on the area of workplace CSR, an area which has been researched less than other CSR 
issues but which is of increasing importance for utilities which are outsourcing more of 
their work to suppliers in developing countries in recent years, and may struggle to 
ensure their desired labour standards are met. A more detailed examination of the 
particular issues relating to workplace CSR will be set out in the following chapter, 
Chapter 3. 
The next aspect of the EU CSR definition to consider is the reference to CSR being 
FRPSOHWHGRQD³YROXQWDU\EDVLV´7KLV LVRQHRIWKHPRUHFRQWURYHUVLDODVSHFWVRIDQ\
definition of CSR.  Many non-governmental organisations (NGOs) argue that voluntary 
initiatives are not enough to make companies responsible and regulation is also 
necessary for CSR to be effective. The most obvious possible problem with making CSR 
voluntary is that companies may choose not to undertake CSR at all. McBarnet notes 
that while the practice is common amongst large multinational companies, CSR is much 
more rarely used by small and medium sized companies, limiting its power.34 It has also 
been argued that relying on voluntary measures alone will let companies set the 
standards for CSR rather than the stakeholders CSR should be benefiting, giving 
                                          
32 µ2YHUYLHZRIWKH/LQNVEHWZHHQ&RUSRUDWH6RFLDO5HVSRQVLELOLW\DQG&RPSHWLWLYHQHVV¶&KLQ(XURSHDQ 
Competitiveness Report 2008, available at http://ec.europa.eu/enterprise/policies/sustainable-
business/files/csr/documents/csrreportv002_en.pdf [accessed 19/06/11] ³&RPSHWLWLYHQHVV5HSRUW´ 
33Ibid, p. 107. 
34 0F%DUQHW'µ&RUSRUDWHVRFLDOUHVSRQVLELOLW\EH\RQGODZWKURXJKODZIRUODZWKHQHZFRrporate 
DFFRXQWDELOLW\¶&KLQ0F%DUQHW'9RLFXOHVFX$DQG&DPSEHOO7HGVThe New Corporate Accountability: 
Corporate Social Responsibility and the Law, (2007, Cambridge, CUP), at p.26 
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companies too much power to determine the issues.35 There are also issues with 
monitoring and enforcing voluntary CSR policies, with CSR policies sometimes seeming 
to be simple PR, with no real consequences.  
Companies argue in response to this that it is important for CSR policies to remain 
voluntary, claiming regulation in this area would stifle innovation and would be hard to 
formulate to cover all situations and all types and sizes of corporation.36 Generally 
speaking, WKH FRPSDQLHV¶ YLHZ KDV ZRQ RXW DQG &65 LV VWLOO WDNHQ WR EH YROXQWDU\
Importantly for this thesis, the EU Multi-stakeholder Forum, examining this issue in the 
EU definition, made it clear that, for the EU, CSR is about policies which are not legally 
or FRQWUDFWXDOO\ UHTXLUHG RI WKH FRPSDQ\ ³&65 LV DERXW JRLQJ EH\RQG WKHVH QRW
UHSODFLQJRUDYRLGLQJWKHP´37 This research will thus focus on the inclusion of voluntary 
CSR issues in procurement. It should be noted, however, that one of the most common 
policies included in CSR codes is compliance with legal requirements relating to social 
and environmental standards (see further Chapter 3), blurring the line between the law 
and CSR. These legal compliance standards will also be considered by this thesis. 
II.2. Corporate Social Responsibility in the EU 
The EU has been considering the role of business from as early as 1993, when the 
President of the European Commission Jacques Delors appealed to European businesses 
to combat social exclusion.38 In response to this appeal the European Business 
Declaration against Social Exclusion was signed in 1995 and a business network was 
formed from its signatories in 1996, originally called the European Business Network for 
Social Cohesion but renamed CSR Europe in 2000.39 &65 (XURSH¶V PHPEHUVKLS QRZ
covers 70 multinational corporations and the network is linked with 25 national CSR 
organisations. 
                                          
35 Murray, A. Corporate Social Responsibility in the EU, (2003, London: Centre for European Reform), at p.9. 
36 Commission Communication concerning Corporate Social Responsibility, above n.27, at p.4. 
37 European Multi-stakeholder Forum on CSR, Final Report, 29 June 2004, available at  
http://ec.europa.eu/enterprise/csr/forum_2002_04_documents.htm [accessed 21/10/08], at p.3. 
38 Murray, above n.35, at p.25. 
39 Source: http://www.csreurope.org/pages/en/history.html [accessed 20/10/08]. 
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CSR has increased in importance for the EU since 2000, when it was made a specific EU 
policy commitment at the Lisbon summit.40 In 2001, the Commission published a Green 
Paper on CSR, designed to open a debate on the possible ways the EU could promote 
CSR.41 The Commission felt that a European approach would complement other existing 
&65DFWLYLWLHVE\SURYLGLQJDQ³RYHUDOO(XURSHDQIUDPHZRUN´ZKLFKZRXOGLPSURYHWKH
VWDQGDUG DQG FRKHUHQFH RI H[LVWLQJ &65 SUDFWLFHV DQG E\ VXSSRUWLQJ ³EHVW-practice 
approaches to cost-HIIHFWLYH HYDOXDWLRQ DQG LQGHSHQGHQW YHULILFDWLRQ´ RI &65
approaches.42 
This Green Paper was followed by the Commission Communication regarding Corporate 
Social Responsibility in 2002.43 Here it was argued that there were two main reasons for 
Community action in this field. The first was the possibility that CSR could be useful in 
furthering Community policies, especially the JRDO VHW LQ /LVERQ WR EH ³the most 
competitive and dynamic knowledge-based economy in the world´E\44 The second 
was the need for Community action to create a common standard, given the wide range 
of existing CSR instruments.45 The Commission stated in this Communication that the 
European Union was committed to integrate CSR in all its policies, an indication of the 
importance attached to CSR in the EU.46 
This Communication also established the EU Multi-stakeholder Forum on CSR. This 
Forum delivered its final report in 2004, reaffirming the possible benefits of CSR in 
Europe and also identifying possible obstacles and future initiatives. The Forum 
recommended that the EU raise awareness of CSR and help improve the capacity of 
business to mainstream CSR policies in their everyday business.47 The Forum also 
emphasised that the right environment was key to the success of CSR and recommended 
WKDW WKH ³(8 LQVWLWXWLRQV DQG JRYHUQPHQWV VWHS XS WKHLU HIIRUWV WRZDUGV D PRUH FR-
                                          
40 Murray, above n.12, at p.25. 
41 Commission of the European Communities, Promoting a European Framework for Corporate Social 
Responsibility, COM(2001) 366. 
42 Ibid, at p.6. 
43 Above n.27. 
44 Ibid, at p.3. 
45 Ibid, at p.8. 
46 Ibid, at p.18. 
47 EU Multi-stakeholder Forum, above n.37, at pp.12-14. 
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RUGLQDWHG SROLF\ DSSURDFK´ DQG DOVR HPphasised the need for transparency in CSR 
practices.48 
The most recent EU policy document on CSR is the Commission Communication of 
2006.49 In this Communication, the Commission: 
calls on the European business community to publicly demonstrate its 
commitment to sustainable development, economic growth and more and better 
jobs, and to step up its commitment to CSR, including cooperation with other 
stakeholders.50 
The Commission argues that the uptake and integration of CSR policies in EU businesses 
should be enhanced, and the role of both internal stakeholders such as employees and 
trade unions, and external stakeholders such as NGOs should be stronger. Equally, it 
argues that public authorities should also improve their supporting policies.51 
The Commission also states that it accepts that voluntary measures are the most 
effective way of promoting CSR and that the best way for the EU to encourage CSR is 
thus to work with business. To accomplish this, the Communication establishes a 
European Alliance on CSR, in addition to re-convening the Multi-stakeholder Forum.52 
The Alliance is coordinated by three business organisations; CSR Europe, BusinessEurope 
and UEAPME (European Association of Craft, Small and Medium-Sized Enterprises). It 
works primarily as a business network which helps businesses exchange CSR knowledge, 
but there are also high-level meetings around once a year with the Commission, where 
the Alliance and the Commission discuss how CSR policies could be better integrated in 
EU policy.53 
                                          
48 Ibid, at p.15. 
49 European Commission, Implementing the Partnership for Growth and Jobs: Making Europe a Pole of 
Excellence on Corporate Social Responsibility, COM(2006) 136 ³&RPPLVVLRQ&RPPXQLFDWLRQRQ*URZWKDQG
-REV´ 
50 Ibid, at p.2. 
51 Ibid, at p.5. 
52 Ibid, at p.3. 
53 Source: http://www.csreurope.org/pages/en/european_dialogue.html [accessed 28/07/11]. 
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Murray states that some business groups and European governments were concerned by 
WKH(8¶VFRPPLWPHQWWRGHYHORSDQ(8ZLGHDSSURDFKWR&65DUJXLQJWKDWDVHSDUDWH
EU approach was not necessary in addition to national policies, and fearing that it was 
simply an attempt by the Commission to re-introduce failed social legislation.54 The 
Commission seems to have dismissed the second concern through its commitment to a 
voluntary business-led approach. As for the first, Murray argues that an EU level 
approach will benefit CSR, noWLQJ WKDW WKH (8 SURYLGHV D ³QDWXUDO DUHQD´ IRU 0HPEHU
States to share their CSR experiences. Also, the EU already has power to make laws in 
many areas which CSR might cover while EU laws may themselves make it hard for 
Member States to adopt national law in CSR areas.55 A European approach is intended to 
complement existing policies, not to replace them. 
III. What Drives the Development of CSR? 
Vogel states three main factors which drive the development of the CSR movement: (1) 
investors; (2) consumers; and (3) employees.56 Other secondary drivers may include 
public authorities, NGOs, trade unions and other businesses.57 These factors are also 
linked to the so-FDOOHG³EXVLQHVVFDVH´IRU&65ZKLFKOLQNVVRFLDOUHVSRQVLELOLW\WRSURILW
All these drivers may haYH PRUH LQIOXHQFH RQ FRPSDQLHV ZKLFK RSHUDWH LQ ³KLJK-ULVN´
areas, such as the oil/gas and energy industries. Equally, more focus will usually be on 
the market leaders in each sector. This section will first give an overview of the business 
case for CSR in Section III.1, as this general factor is affected by all the other driving 
factors discussed. The following sections will then examine the individual factors driving 
the development of CSR and forming part of the business case in more detail. 
 
 
                                          
54 Murray, above n.35, at p.25. 
55 Ibid, at pp.26-27. 
56 Vogel, D. The Market for Virtue: The Potential and Limits of Corporate Social Responsibility (2005, 
Washington DC: Brookings Institution Press), at p.46. See also Van Tulder and van der Zwart, above n.20 
pp.207-213. 
57 EU Multi-stakeholder Forum, above n.37, at p.9. 
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III.1. The business case for CSR 
The early reformers did not suggest that their actions would make their company more 
profitable. Their donations and social work helped the general community rather than 
the firm, who received only indirect benefits such as a stable social environment in which 
to do business.58 7RGD\KRZHYHUPRVWDGYRFDWHVRI&65VWUHVVWKH³EXVLQHVVFDVH´RI
VRFLDO UHVSRQVLELOLW\ DUJXLQJ WKDW&65GLUHFWO\ LPSURYHV D FRPSDQ\¶V SURILWDELOLW\59 In 
the words of the European Commission: 
There is a growing perception that sustainable business success and shareholder 
value cannot be achieved solely through maximising short-term profits but 
instead through market-oriented yet responsible behaviour.60 
Vogel offers two reasons for this recent focus on the link between CSR and profits. The 
first is the nature of the modern firm: increased competition, the power of institutional 
investors and the financial markets and the risk of takeover mean that directors must 
now be much more focused on short-term rewards for their shareholders than they used 
to. While this has not stopped companies including social and environmental policies in 
their business, it has required them to show a financial basis for those policies.61 
The second reason is a change in the way people viewed the social role of business. In 
the 1980s and 1990s the number of people going into business grew, and many of these 
people had social values which they wished to include in their business.62 They instilled 
their ethical views on the business world, and the business case for CSR allowed them to 
make money while doing so. Such social entrepreneurs have left a lasting impression on 
the business world.63 
CSR policies most obviously have an impact on profitability if those policies are overt. If 
consumers aQGFDPSDLJQJURXSVDUHDZDUHRIWKHILUP¶V&65DFWLRQVLWPD\ERRVWWKH
                                          
58 Vogel, above n.56, at p.19. 
59 For examples of literature citing this link between CSR and profit, see Vogel, above n.56, at p.20. 
60 Commission Communication concerning Corporate Social Responsibility, above n.27, at p.5. 
61 Vogel, above n.56, at pp.24-26. 
62 Ibid, at pp.26-28. 
63 See Waddock, above n.23, for an in-depth examination of the effect of such social reformers. 
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ILUP¶VUHSXWDWLRQDQGKHOSSXEOLFUHODWLRQV&DXVH-related marketing works on this basis, 
making the social aspects of the firm and its products a key aspect of the marketing and 
advertising programme of the firm. Cause-related marketing has grown significantly in 
recent years, from $125 million in 1990 to $991 million in 2004 and is discussed further 
below in Section III.3.64 
The argument is also made, however, that CSR may make a company more profitable 
even if the CSR policies are not made public. In the 2001 Green Paper on CSR, the 
European Commission gave examples of several direct and indirect benefits of CSR such 
DVDPRUHSURGXFWLYHZRUNIRUFHDQG VDYLQJVPDGH IURP ³PRUH HIILFLHQW use of natural 
UHVRXUFHV´65  It has also been argued that CSR not only aids profitability, it is now 
required for a company to be profitable. One example is given in an article by Lovins, 
Lovins and Hawken, who state that companies who make no effort towards sustainability 
³ZRQ¶WEHDSUREOHPEHFDXVHXOWLPDWHO\WKH\ZRQ¶WEHDURXQG´66 The sections below on 
the various factors which drive CSR will examine their possible links to the success of the 
company in more detail. 
This relationship between CSR and profits has been examined in many academic studies 
and the results are often contradictory.67 Orlitzky, Schmidt and Rynes conducted a meta-
analysis of the previous literature and concluded that the overall relationship was 
positive, with increased CSR leading to increased profitability.68 Margolis and Walsh also 
found a general positive relationship reported in the literature, but argued that the 
results were unsatisfactory due to the different measurements for CSR and profitability 
used in the various studies.69 A recent study by Margolis and Anger Elfenbein examining 
167 previous studies concluded that there was a small correlation between positive 
                                          
64 Vogel, above n.56, at p.21. 
65 European Commission, Green Paper, above n.41, at p.7. 
66 /RYLQV$%/RYLQV/+DQG+DZNHQ3µ$5RDG0DSIRU1DWXUDO&DSLWDOLVP¶0D\-June 1999) Harvard 
Business Review 145 at 158. 
67 See Margolis, J.D. and Walsh, J.P., People and PURILWV"7KH6HDUFKIRUD/LQN%HWZHHQD&RPSDQ\¶V6RFLDO
and Financial Performance, (2001, Mahwah, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates) for the most comprehensive 
review of these studies. 
68 Orlitzky06FKPLGW)DQG5\QHV6µ&RUSRUDWH6RFLDODQG)LQDQFLDO3HUIRUPDQFH$0HWD-$QDO\VLV¶
24 Organisation Studies 403, at 415. 
69 Margolis and Walsh, above n.67, at p.13. 
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corporate behaviour and increased profits, which they noted could equally be explained 
by the fact that more profitable firms are simply more able to engage in CSR.70 Margolis 
and Anger Elfenbein also note that CSR policies, while not increasing profits, also do not 
appear to increase costs, suggesting that CSR is effectively neutral.71 Vogel, however, 
argues that whiOHLWPD\EHWUXHWKDW&65ZLOOQRWFRVWDILUP³VRPHPRUHUHVSRQVLEOH
ILUPVPLJKWEHHYHQPRUHSURILWDEOHLIWKH\ZHUHOHVVUHVSRQVLEOH´72 
The EU has generally seemed to support the concept of the business case for CSR, as 
seen by the argument in the ComPLVVLRQ¶V&RPPXQLFDWLRQWKDWWKHUHLVD³EURDG
consensus among businesses about the expectation that CSR will be of strategic 
importance to ensure the long-WHUP EXVLQHVV VXFFHVV´73 In recent years it has 
researched into the concept more deeply, examining the criticisms of the concept set out 
above. The CSR chapter of the 2008 European Competitiveness Report examined the 
impact of CSR on six indicators of competitiveness: cost structure, human resource 
performance, customer perspective, innovation, risk and reputation management, and 
financial performance.74 The report concluded that CSR impacted positively on all areas, 
having the most impact in the areas of human resource performance, risk and reputation 
management and innovation. It also noted that, while the strength of the business case 
depended very much on the competitive positioning of the company, CSR was fast 
becoming a competitive necessity, with companies which did not meet certain minimum 
standards falling behind competitively.75 Overall, it was argued that CSR did indeed 
positively impact on competitiveness and should be promoted at EU level for that 
reason.76 This focus by the EU on the economic benefits of CSR may impact on the 
interpretation of the law relating to CSR, as will be seen in Chapter 6. 
III.2. Investors 
                                          
70 0DUJROLV-'DQG$QJHU(OIHQEHLQ+µ'R:HOOE\'RLQJ*RRG"'RQ¶W&RXQWRQ,W¶-DQHarvard 
Business Review 19, at 19. 
71 Ibid, at 20. 
72 Vogel, above n.56, at p.33. 
73 Commission Communication concerning Corporate Social Responsibility, above n.27, at p.9. 
74 Competitiveness Report, above n.32, at p.107. 
75 Ibid, at p.118-119. 
76 Ibid, at p.119. 
Page 24 of 300 
 
Socially responsible investment (SRI) has been defined by the European Social 
Investment Forum (Eurosif) as: 
a generic term covering DQ\W\SHRILQYHVWPHQWSURFHVVWKDWFRPELQHVLQYHVWRUV¶
financial objectives with their concerns about Environmental, Social and 
Governance (ESG) issues.77 
It has seen a growth in popularity in recent years. According to Eurosif, the total SRI 
assets managed in Europe ZDV¼WULOOLRQDVRIst December 2009RIZKLFK¼1.2 trillion 
ZDV ³FRUH´ 65, VFUHHQLng using more than two negative criteria, e.g. screening for 
WREDFFR RU GHIHQFH FRPSDQLHV DQG DOVR XVLQJ SRVLWLYH FULWHULD DQG ¼3.8 trillion was 
³EURDG´65, IHZHU than two negative criteria used).78 To aid such investment several 
social indexes have been created. The best-known are the FTSE4Good, the Dow Jones 
Sustainability Index (DJSI), and the Domini 400 Social Index (DSI400). With such a 
massive amount of funds at stake, companies wish to become more socially responsible 
in order to be listed on social indexes and qualify for investment under SRI. 
Vogel critically examines the effect of social investing on the overall market. He notes 
that the demand of SRI investors for responsible shares cannot lower the overall cost of 
capital for responsible firms given the small market share of SRI and the varying criteria 
used.79 However, the prestige of some SRI indexes means that some firms are willing to 
change their SRI policies in order to join, so social investing may lead to some change in 
individual firms.80 
III.3. Consumers 
Consumers often state they prefer socially and environmentally sound products, and 
would even be willing to pay more for them, suggesting that becoming more socially 
                                          
77 Eurosif, European SRI Study 2010, available at http://www.eurosif.org/research/eurosif-sri-study/2010 
[accessed 28/07/11], at p.8. 
78 Ibid, at p.11. 
79 Vogel, above n.56, at p.62. 
80 Ibid, at p.64. 
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responsible could be a good move to increase sales.81 Nevertheless, as Hawkins notes, 
while consumers may indeed want companies to be responsible, they also want good 
quality goods for the best possible value, and it is these factors which have the most 
actual impact on sales.82 Vogel presents several statistical studies in this area and the 
gap between what consumers tell researchers they would be willing to do and what they 
actually do is striking: while some studies have reported that up to 75% of people would 
be willing to pay more for a responsible product, the number of people who actually do 
so appears to be somewhere between 3 and 5%.83 
$ ODFN RI DZDUHQHVV DPRQJ FRQVXPHUV DERXW FRPSDQLHV¶ &65 SROLFLHVPD\ OLH EHKLQG
this discrepancy. Firms which directly link their CSR policies to their products in their 
marketing, such as WKH %RG\ 6KRS RU %HQ DQG -HUU\¶V PD\ KDYH PRUH VXFFHVV LQ
attracting sales from consumers who wish to buy ethical products because that ethical 
aspect to their products is the integral part of their brand which distinguishes them from 
other companies in the field.84 Equally, a well-known social label such as Fairtrade or 
Rugmark may be able to attract a price-premium to products they are attached to since 
people know precisely what the label means. For those firms, however, which do not 
make their CSR policies clear explicitly to the public in their marketing, those policies are 
unlikely to affect their sales.85 
&RQVXPHUV¶YDOXHVKRZHYHUPD\KDYHDQHIIHFWQRWRQO\E\ERRVWLQJVDOHVEXWDOVRE\
causing them to fall. Negative actions such as a consumer boycott may cause a company 
to change its CSR policies. The classic examples of a consumer boycott affecting 
company policy are the Nike labour standards case and the Shell Brent Spar case.86 
)ROORZLQJKDUVKFULWLFLVPRIWKHZRUNLQJFRQGLWLRQVRI1LNH¶VVXSSOLers by several NGOs in 
the late 1990s and a Global Alliance report on working conditions in Indonesia in 2001 
                                          
81 Ibid, at p.47. 
82 Hawkins, D. &RUSRUDWH6RFLDO5HVSRQVLELOLW\%DODQFLQJ7RPRUURZ¶V6XVWDLQDELOLW\DQG7RGD\¶V3URILWDELOLW\, 
(2006, Houndmills: Palgrave Macmillan), at p.147. 
83 Vogel, above n.56, at pp.47-48. 
84 Ibid, at p.50. 
85 Ibid, at p.49. 
86 Extended examinations of both cases can be found in Vogel, above n.56, at Ch.4 and Ch.5, and in van Tulder 
and van der Zwart, above n.20, at Ch.14 and Ch.15. 
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many consumers boycotted the firm, leading to a decrease in sales, especially in the 
United States.87 In response, Nike created a code of conduct which is monitored by both 
Nike and outside consulting firms, and cancels contracts with suppliers which do not 
comply with that code.88 Equally, a boycott of Shell petrol stations after the 
announcement of its intention to sink the Brent Spar oil rig in 1995 was instrumental in 
WKHFRPSDQ\¶VXOWLPDWHGHFLVLRQWRGLVSRVHRIWKHULJRQODQG89 Vogel argues, however, 
that these cases are exceptional. Most boycotts have little, if any, effect on sales and 
what impact they do have does not last long.90 
III.4. Employees 
(PSOR\HHV PD\ DIIHFW D FRPSDQ\¶V &65 SROLFLHV HLWKHU WKURXJK WKH RSHUDWLRQ RI WKH
labour market, or through pressure on the company while working there. The reputation 
of a company may be a factor in attracting new employees, with many business 
graduates saying they would prefer to work for a socially and environmentally sound 
firm.91 However, no follow-up studies appear to be done, making it impossible to tell 
whether the graduates stuck to these values, or whether these findings are as suspect as 
the consumer surveys mentioned above.92 Employees may have more effect on a 
company through internal pressure while working for that firm. Employees worried by 
the social and environmental actions of their company may bring it to the attention of 
their superiors, or even to NGOs, and external actions against the company may affect 
company morale and so drive employees to take action.93 
III.5 Secondary drivers 
Public authorities may drive the development of CSR by promoting its use at the 
government level. For example, in the UK the Department for Business, Innovation and 
                                          
87 Van Tulder and van der Zwart, above n.20, at p.284. 
88 Vogel, above n.56, at p.80. 
89 Van Tulder and van der Zwart, above n.20, at p.297. 
90 Vogel, above n.56, at p.52. 
91 Van Tulder and van der Zwart, above n.20, at p.213. 
92 Vogel, above n.56, at p.58. 
93 Ibid, at p.59. 
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Skills works to raise the awareness of CSR issues among businesses.94 Equally, public 
authorities may promote CSR through their own purchasing habits, choosing to buy only 
socially and environmentally sound products, and it is this aspect of CSR that this thesis 
will focus on. In DGGLWLRQWRWKLVUROHRI³H[DPSOH-VHWWLQJ´LWZDVDUJXHGDWDFRQIHUHQFH
on CSR held jointly by the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development 
(OECD) and the International Labour Organisation (ILO) that public authorities should 
also promote CSR through embracing the notion of transparency and through constant 
dialogue with business, supported by appropriate social legislation.95 
NGOs are often strong supporters of CSR and their campaigns against companies which 
they consider to be performing badly in this area can often lead to changes in company 
policy, especially where their action leads to consumer boycotts (see the section on 
FRQVXPHUVDERYH&HUWDLQ1*2VDUHGHGLFDWHGWRPRQLWRULQJDQGH[SRVLQJFRPSDQLHV¶
social and environmental failings, see, for example, CorpWatch.96 This bad publicity is 
RIWHQDIDFWRULQDFRPSDQ\¶VGHFLVLRQWREHFRPHPRUHVRFLDOO\UHVSRQVLEOH 
Business networks may also help to develop CSR by sharing good practice and raising 
awareness of the demands and benefits of CSR. One of the major CSR business 
networks in the UK is the Corporate Responsibility Group, which offers a means for CSR 
experts from various different sectors to exchange information.97 
These secondary drivers are not linked as strongly to increasing profit as the primary 
GULYHUVVHHPLQJWREHEDVHGPRUHRQWKHLGHDWKDW&65LVWKH³ULJKW´WKLQJIRUEXVLQHVV
to do. This research will examine the main factors which utilities feel drive their use of 
CSR in procurement, determining whether it is these moral concerns or the more 
commercial concerns examined above which are the more relevant. As will be shown in 
discussed in Chapter 6, this may be relevant for the interpretation of the EU law 
                                          
94 HM Government, Corporate Responsibility Report (2009), available at 
http://www.bis.gov.uk/files/file50312.pdf [accessed 14/06/11] 
95 OECD, Employment and Industrial Relations: Promoting Responsible Business Conduct in a Globalising 
Economy, 23-24 June 2008, available at http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/56/11/41484109.pdf [accessed 
28/07/11] 
96 www.corpwatch.org 
97 www.crguk.org 
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governing procurement, with commercial concerns seeming to be emphasised by the 
European Commission and possibly more acceptable in procurement than policies 
undertaken for purely moral reasons.  
IV. Criticisms of CSR 
CSR has been criticised both by people who think it is too liberal and distracts business 
from its true purpose of making money, and by groups which believe it does not go far 
enough to protect social and environmental issues. Both arguments will be considered. 
7KHFODVVLFVWDWHPHQWFULWLFLVLQJ&65FRPHVIURP0LOWRQ)ULHGPDQ¶VDUWLFOHZKHUH
KH VWDWHV WKDW ³WKHUH LVRQHDQGRQO\RQH VRFLDO UHVSRQVLELOLW\RIEXVLQHVV ± to use its 
resources and engage in activities designed to increase LWV SURILWV´98 The argument is 
that companies which include CSR policies in their business lose sight of their true aim, 
making a profit, which in turn damages the corporate sector and the overall economy.99 
This argument was also made more recently by Martin Wolf, drawing on work by David 
Henderson.100 :ROI DUJXHV WKDW &65 LV ³QRW PHUHO\ XQGHVLUDEOH EXW SRWHQWLDOO\ TXLWH
GDQJHURXV´+HFODLPVWKDWWKHFRQFHSWLVEDVHGRQDPLVWDNHQYLHZRIERWKWKHPDUNHW
economy and the powers of companies, arguing that it is through seeking new 
opportunities for profit that business aids social development, and that globalisation and 
increased competition has in fact reduced corporate power rather than increasing it as 
CSR supporters claim. He also argues that CSR risks increasing regulation throughout 
WKHZRUOGUHTXLUHVFRUSRUDWLRQVWRPDNHSROLWLFDOGHFLVLRQVDQGFUHDWHVDIRUPRI³JOREDO
neo-FRUSRUDWLVP´ ZKLFK JLYHV WRR PXFK SRZHU WR FRPSDQLHV DFWLYLVW JURXSV DQG
international organisations. 
It is the possibility of giving too much power to companies which also concerns those 
who believe that CSR is not enough to protect social and environmental issues. As 
                                          
98 )ULHGPDQ0µ7KHVRFLDOUHVSRQVLELOLW\RIEXVLQHVVLVWRLQFUHDVHLWVSURILWV¶New York Times Magazine, 
September 13th 1970. 
99 Murray, above n.35, at p.11. 
100 WROI0µ6OHHS-walking with the enemy: Corporate social responsibility distorts the market by deflecting 
EXVLQHVVIURPLWVSULPDU\UROHRISURILWJHQHUDWLRQ¶Financial Times, May 16th 2001; Henderson, D. Misguided 
Virtue: False Notions of Corporate Social Responsibility, (2001, London: Institute of Economic Affairs). 
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mentioned above when examining the definition of CSR in Section II.1, the fear is that a 
purely voluntary approach to CSR will allow business to simply focus on the social and 
environmental issues which it feels are important, not those that other stakeholders wish 
to address. It has been argued that without government regulation to support CSR, it 
may be nothing more than a public relations exercise for companies.101 
V. Conclusion 
This chapter has shown the importance of CSR both globally and specifically in the EU. 
From its beginnings as simple corporate philanthropy, CSR has grown to become a global 
business phenomenon, driven by a wide variety of interest groups, especially investors, 
consumers and employees, and recently also driven by the supposed link between CSR 
and profit. The EU has seen in CSR a useful way to help achieve its social and 
environmental aims and has pushed for CSR to be included throughout its policies in 
recent years. This recent pressure from so many sources has led to many companies 
paying more attention to their social and environmental responsibilities than in the past. 
The chapter has also shown the factors most commonly cited as the driving force behind 
the growth of CSR, focusing on the business case for CSR which sets out the economic 
benefits of CSR and appears to have been accepted by the EU. The chapter has also 
discussed common criticisms of CSR and the problems which might face companies 
which choose to include CSR policies in their business practice. The following chapter will 
use this discussion of CSR as a base, building on it to look at the specific issues relating 
to workforce CSR and setting out the precise workforce CSR policies utilities might 
include in their procurement. 
  
                                          
101 Murray, above n.35, at p.12. 
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Chapter 3 - Corporate Social Responsibility: Labour Policies 
I. Introduction 
This chapter gives an overview of commonly used corporate labour policies. The term 
³ODERXU SROLFLHV´ LV KHUH XVHG WR FRYHU DQ\ YROXQWDU\ ODERXU-related policy, including 
corporate codes of conduct, certification standards and product labelling schemes. Given 
that this thesis is looking at voluntary corporate social responsibility policies,102 the 
chapter does not include legal requirements, except where those voluntary policies 
themselves make reference to legal requirements. 
The chapter will first look at the background to and development of labour policies, 
including the various forms those policies can take. The chapter will then examine some 
of the most commonly used policies, examining their development, their requirements 
and how they are monitored, if at all. The analysis will start with an overview of internal 
company policies before considering the major externally designed policies in more 
detail. The analysis will then be applied in Chapter 6, which will examine how these 
specific policies might be included in procurement under the Utilities Directive. 
II. Background to Corporate Labour Policies 
II.1. General Background 
As with corporate social responsibility (CSR) more generally, the use of labour policies 
has increased dramatically since the 1970s.103 The rise of voluntary labour codes is 
generally seen as a response to globalisation. Many corporations take advantage of the 
lower prices offered by foreign suppliers, with these low prices often due to poor 
employment conditions at the relevant factory. This leads to a situation in which 
suppliers compete to offer ever lower prices, worsening the labour conditions in the so-
FDOOHG³UDFHWRWKHERWWRP´7KLVVLWXDWLRQFDQEHGLIILFXOWWROHJLVODWHIRUVLQFHWKHJRRGV
may be manufactured in many different countries, meaning that employers are not 
                                          
102 See Chapter 2, Section II.1. 
103 For discussion of the rise of CSR generally, see Chapter 2, Section II.1. 
Page 31 of 300 
 
bound to the labour conditions of any one jurisdiction.104 As Bercusson and Estlund note, 
this both undermines the use of national labour standards and weakens the control of 
governments over market activity.105 Given these problems in regulating labour 
standards, and given the general pressures on companies to be socially responsible as 
discussed in Chapter 2 on Corporate Social Responsibility, many companies choose to 
adopt codes of conduct to self-regulate their labour conditions and the labour conditions 
of their suppliers. 
Labour policies may be formulated and monitored purely internally, with the relevant 
company responsible for all aspects of that particular policy, or the policy may have 
external aspects, with design and/or monitoring done by an external organisation. 
Closely related to simple company policies, a policy may be adopted with other 
companies based in the same industry. Policies known as International Framework 
Agreements may also be adopted by companies or industry with a Global Union 
Federation as a signatory. Finally, a company may adopt a policy designed solely by an 
external body, usually a Non-Governmental Organisation (NGO) such as the 
International Labour Organisation (ILO). 
Labour policies may take a variety of forms. Liubicic lists two main types of voluntary 
social measures: codes of conduct and product labelling measures.106 Codes of conduct 
set out a certain level of labour standards which the company agrees to uphold in its 
business. Often the company also agrees to ensure that the standard is upheld in the 
business of its suppliers. Product labelling schemes affix a certain label (the most well-
known, for example, being the Fairtrade label) to a product to show that the workforce 
producing that product operated under certain minimum labour standards.107 To these 
policies we may also add certification policies, which operate in a similar way to product 
                                          
104 %HUFXVVRQ%DQG(VWOXQG&µ5HJXODWLQJ/DERXULQWKH:DNHRI*OREDOLVDWLRQ¶LQ%HUFXVVRQ%DQG(VWOXQG
C. (eds) Regulating Labour in the Wake of Globalisation: New Challenges, New Institutions (2007, Oxford: Hart 
Publishing), at p.2. 
105 Ibid, at p.2. 
106 /LXELFLF5-µ&RUSRUDWH&RGHVRI&RQGXFWDQG3URGXFW/DEHOLQJ6FKHPHs: The Limits and Possibilities of 
3URPRWLQJ,QWHUQDWLRQDO/DERU5LJKWV7KURXJK3ULYDWH,QLWLDWLYHV¶Law and Policy in International 
Business 111, at 113. 
107Ibid, at 113. 
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labelling schemes. In this case, however, rather than the product produced being 
awarded a level, the supplier making that product receives a certificate to show that all 
products are produced by them under certain specified minimum labour conditions. 
II.2 The ILO Declaration on Fundamental Principles and Rights at Work 1998108 
Many of the labour schemes discussed below refer to or draw requirements from the 
,/2¶V'HFODUDWLRQon Fundamental Principles and Rights at Work. The Declaration 
FRPPLWVPHPEHUFRXQWULHVWRXSKROGWKHSULQFLSOHVRIFHUWDLQ³FRUH´FRQYHQWLRQVLQWKH
areas of recognition of the right to collective bargaining, the elimination of forced or 
compulsory labour, the abolition of child labour and the elimination of discrimination.  
The core ILO Conventions are:109 
x Convention (No. 29) concerning Forced or Compulsory Labour 
x Convention (No. 87) concerning Freedom of Association and Protection of the 
Right to Organise 
x Convention (No. 98) concerning the Application of the Principles of the Right to 
Organise and to Bargain Collectively 
x Convention (No. 100) concerning Equal Remuneration for Men and Women 
Workers for Work of Equal Value 
x Convention (No. 105) concerning the Abolition of Forced Labour 
x Convention (No. 111) concerning Discrimination in Respect of Employment and 
Occupation 
x Convention (No. 138) concerning Minimum Age for Admission to Employment 
x Convention (No. 182) concerning the Prohibition and Immediate Action for the 
Elimination of the Worst Forms of Child Labour 
                                          
108 Full text of the Declaration may be found on the ILO website at 
http://www.ilo.org/declaration/thedeclaration/textdeclaration/lang--en/index.htm [accessed 04/07/11]. 
109 ILO, 7KH,QWHUQDWLRQDO/DERXU2UJDQLVDWLRQ¶V)XQGDPHQWDOConventions, (2nd Ed), (2003), available at 
http://www.ilo.org/wcmsp5/groups/public/---ed_norm/---
declaration/documents/publication/wcms_095895.pdf [accessed 04/07/11]. 
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Countries are bound whether or not they have ratified the relevant conventions. Any 
country which has not ratified a convention is required to produce an annual report 
setting out the national laws in this area.110 This report is then reviewed by the 
&RPPLWWHHRI,QGHSHQGHQW([SHUW$GYLVRUVDQGWKH,/2¶V*RYHUQLQJ%RG\ 
III. Internal Policies 
This section will briefly examine codes of conduct designed by individual companies and 
codes designed by groups of businesses from within an industry. It has been argued that 
these codes are much less likely to reflect the real concerns of workers and to change 
working conditions in practice than codes developed by external organisations.111 The 
content of these codes can vary significantly from one code to another given the 
diversity of the corporations designing them and their varying needs, but this section 
aims to offer an overview of the most commonly included aspects. 
The most comprehensive review of corporate codes was completed by the Organisation 
for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) in 2001.  This examined 246 total 
codes, including 118 company codes and 92 codes issued by industry associations.112 
7KH UHYLHZ QRWHG WKDW ³IDLU HPSOR\PHQW DQG ODERXU ULJKWV´ ZDV D FRPPRQ VXEMHFW LQ
corporate codes, with over half of the codes including at least a reference to employment 
issues.113 Within those codes dealing with labour issues, the most common requirement 
ZDVVLPSO\WRSURYLGHD³UHDVRQDEOH´ZRUNLQJHQYLURQPHQWLQFOXGHGLQRIFRGHV
The next most common requirement is compliance with national law.114 These are very 
minimal requirements for a company to meet. Even for those requirements mentioned 
expressly there was a high degree of variation in the way in which the codes dealt with 
those requirements, e.g. in the minimum age set for child labour to be acceptable and 
the methods for dealing with the employment of underage children. 
                                          
110 Follow-Up to the Declaration 1998, II.B. 
111 .RON$YDQ7XOGHU5DQG:HOWHUV&µ,QWHUQDWLRQDO&RGHVRI&RQGXFWDQG&RUSRUDWH6RFLDO5HVSRQVLELOLW\
&DQ7UDQVQDWLRQDO&RUSRUDWLRQV5HJXODWH7KHPVHOYHV"¶Transnational Corporations 143. 
112 OECD, Codes of Corporate Conduct: Expanded Review of their Contents (2001), available at 
http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/57/24/1922656.pdf [accessed 04/07/11], at p.4. 
113 Ibid, at p.9. 
114 Ibid, at p.10. 
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In a study relating corporate codes of conduct to the core labour rights under the 1998 
ILO Declaration, Jenkins noted the varying concerns of company codes compared to 
codes developed by international organisations. The most common requirement in 
international codes is the freedom of association, mentioned in 95% of the international 
codes examined by Jenkins. In comparison, it is the least frequently mentioned 
requirement in company and industry codes, mentioned in less than a quarter of 
cases.115 Jenkins also noted that corporate codes generally go into much less detail 
about precise requirements when compared to external policies. For example, only 11% 
of company codes and no industry codes set maximum working hours, as compared to 
42% of international codes.116 These facts may be due to the fact that many corporate 
codes are created as a response to campaigns against the company by NGOs and are 
designed to deal only with the particular problem highlighted in that campaign.117 
IV. International Framework Agreements 
An International Framework Agreement (IFA) is a code of conduct agreed between a 
company and a trade union. As of 2011, 72 IFAs had been signed.118 Generally, an IFA 
should fulfil six criteria:119 
1. It should be a global agreement. 
2. It should refer to ILO Conventions in the agreement. 
3. It must require the company to influence its suppliers to also comply with the 
agreement. 
4. A Global Union Federation must be a signatory to the agreement. 
5. There should be trade union involvement in the implementation of the 
agreement. 
                                          
115 -HQNLQV5µ7KH3ROLWLFDO(FRQRP\RI&RGHVRI&RQGXFW¶&KLQ-HQNLQV53HDUVRQ5DQG6H\IDQJ*
(eds), Corporate Responsibility and Labour Rights: Codes of Conduct in the Global Economy, (2002, London: 
Earthscan), at p.19. 
116Ibid, at p.20. 
117OECD, above n.112, at p.9. 
118 A full list may be obtained at http://www.imfmetal.org/main/index.cfm?n=47&l=2&c=10266 [accessed 
04/07/11]. 
119 +DPPHU1µ,QWHUQDWLRQDO)UDPHZRUN$JUHHPHQWVJOREDOLQGXVWULDOUHODWLRQVEHWZHHQULJKWVDQG
EDUJDLQLQJ¶Transfer 511, at 518. 
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6. Workers and other parties must be able to bring complaints to the company 
relating to the implementation of the agreement. 
Hammer notes that IFAs are useful for protecting core labour rights given their reference 
to the core ILO conventions.120 However, he also notes that when the agreements move 
RQWRRWKHUHPSOR\PHQWULJKWVVXFKDVZDJHVRUKRXUVRIZRUN³WKHLUSKUDVLQJWHQGVWR
EHPRUH RSDTXH´DQG RIWHQ UHIHUV RQO\ WR FRPSOLDQFHZLWKQDWLRQDO OHJDO DQG LQGXVWU\
standards.121 They generally also declare compliance with the UN Universal Declaration 
of Human Rights and the codes of conduct developed by the ILO, OECD and United 
Nations discussed in the next section. There is no consensus on health and safety, 
training or restructuring issues, with the standards set varying by company. As Hammer 
notes, IFA seem to focus more heavily on trade union rights than other employment 
issues, perhaps inevitably given their design by Global Union Federations.122 
V. External Policies 
V.1. Codes of Conduct 
Several international bodies have created voluntary codes of conduct for multinational 
companies, aiming to minimise the possible effects of globalisation on social issues. This 
section will examine the largest of those codes, the ILO Tripartite Declaration of 
Principles Concerning Multinational Enterprises and Social Policy, the UN Global Compact, 
WKH2(&'*XLGHOLQHVIRU0XOWLQDWLRQDO(QWHUSULVHVDQGWKH(WKLFDO7UDGLQJ,QVWLWXWH¶V%DVH
Code. Outside of codes designed by international bodies, it will also examine the scheme 
operated by the World Fair Trade Organisation. 
V.1.1. ILO Tripartite Declaration of Principles Concerning Multinational Enterprises and 
Social Policy 
The ILO Tripartite Declaration of Principles Concerning Multinational Enterprises and 
6RFLDO3ROLF\³WKH'HFODUDWLRQ´ZDV first established in 1977 and was revised in 2000 
                                          
120 Ibid, at 520. 
121 Ibid. 
122 Ibid, at 522. 
Page 36 of 300 
 
DQG  7KH 'HFODUDWLRQ LV DQ DJUHHPHQW EHWZHHQ JRYHUQPHQWV HPSOR\HUV¶
RUJDQLVDWLRQV DQG ZRUNHUV¶ RUJDQLVDWLRQV ZKLFK DLPV WR ³HQFRXUDJH WKH SRVLWLYH
contribution that multinational enterprises can make to economic and social progress 
DQGUHVROYH WKHGLIILFXOWLHV WRZKLFK WKHLUYDULRXVRSHUDWLRQVPD\JLYHULVH´123 To fulfil 
this aim it sets out certain labour principles which companies and governments are 
recommended to follow. While the principles in the Declaration were designed with 
developing countries in mind, they are equally applicable when the member companies 
are operating in their home countries. The Declaration is completely voluntary.124 
The Declaration first sets out certain general principles which all relevant parties should 
abide by in their operations. Parties are required first to comply with national laws and to 
consider the local practices. They should also comply with the Universal Declaration of 
Human Rights. The Declaration then refers WRWKH³FRUH´,/2&RQYHQWLRQVDVVHWRXWLQ
the 1998 ILO Declaration on Fundamental Principles and Rights at Work, discussed 
above. Governments are urged to ratify these conventions if they have not done so and 
companies should aim to comply with them in their business, regardless of the state of 
ratification in the country in which they are operating.125 
The ILO Declaration then moves on to principles in the areas of employment, training, 
conditions of work and life and industrial relations. The principles do not generally set 
out specific standards to be met but aim to set out more general suggestions on how 
companies could operate in a socially responsible manner. For example, one employment 
SULQFLSOH VWDWHV WKDW FRPSDQLHV ³VKRXOG KDYH UHJDUG WR WKH LPSRUtance of using 
WHFKQRORJLHVZKLFKJHQHUDWHHPSOR\PHQWERWKGLUHFWO\DQGLQGLUHFWO\´126 
Within the area of employment, companies agree to promote employment opportunities, 
with priority given to the nationals of the state in which they are operating. The 
                                          
123 International Labour Organisation Tripartite Declaration of Principles Concerning Multinational Enterprises 
and Social Policy (2006), available at 
http://www.ilo.org/wcmsp5/groups/public/@ed_emp/@emp_ent/@multi/documents/publication/wcms_094386
.pdf [accessed 04/07/11], at p.2. 
124 Ibid, at p.2. 
125 Ibid, at p.3. 
126 Ibid, at p.4. 
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Declaration states that this should include concluding supply contracts with national 
operators, though this may not be done in order to avoid the other responsibilities of the 
Declaration.127 Companies are also required to avoid discrimination in every area of their 
EXVLQHVV )LQDOO\ FRPSDQLHV PXVW SURPRWH ³VWDELOLW\ RI HPSOR\PHQW´ GLVFXVVLQJ
possible changes in operations with workers and avoiding arbitrary dismissal of 
workers.128 
In the area of training, companies should participate in any training schemes which are 
organised by the national government and help to administer those programs where 
practicable. Companies should ensure that all their workers receive relevant training, 
aiming to enhance their skills and career opportunities.129 
Within the area of conditions of work and life, it is stated that companies should offer the 
best possible wages and conditions of work and, in any case, no less than those offered 
by comparable employers in the area and enough to satisfy the basic needs of the 
worker. Companies must comply with the minimum age for workers as set out in 
Convention No. 138.130 &RPSDQLHVVKRXOGDOVRHQVXUH³WKHKLJKHVWVWDQGDUGVRIKHDOWK
DQG VDIHW\´ LQ WKHLU RSHUDWLRQV DQG FRRSHUDWH ZLWK QDWLRQDO KHDOWK DQG VDIHW\
authorities.131 
Within the area of industrial relations, companies must ensure that workers have the 
right to establish and join any union without requiring prior authorisation. Companies 
VKRXOG SURPRWH QHJRWLDWLRQV EHWZHHQ HPSOR\HUV¶ RUJDQLVDWLRQV DQG ZRUNHUV¶
organisations for the purposes of collective bargaining and provide for regular 
consultation between those organisations.132 Companies must ensure that workers have 
                                          
127 Ibid, at p.4. 
128 Ibid, at p.5. 
129 Ibid, at p.6. 
130 The age of completion of compulsory schooling or 15, whichever is higher. ILO Convention 138, Art.2(3). 
131 Ibid, at p.7. 
132 Ibid, at p.8. 
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a method to have grievances examined by the employers without suffering any 
prejudice.133 
The ILO does not monitor compliance with the Declaration and cannot enforce its 
provisions. However, the Declaration does include a procedure under which parties may 
bring a dispute about the meaning of the Declaration principles before the International 
Labour Office. The dispute must be based on an actual situation.134 Applications should 
be brought by the government of an ILO member State, either on its own initiative or at 
the request of an organisation of workers or employers. Where it can be shown that the 
government has refused to bring an application, or three months have elapsed since the 
organisation requested the government submit an application and no reply has been 
made, the organisation may make the application itself.135 The Office will then prepare a 
reply to the query with the Officers of the Committee on Multinational Enterprises.136 
V.1.2. UN Global Compact 
The UN Global Compact was launched in 2000 following an address by UN Secretary 
General Kofi Annan at the Davos World Economic Forum in which he called on business 
leaders to MRLQD³JOREDOFRPSDFWRIVKDUHGYDOXHVDQGSULQFLSOHV´137 The Global Compact 
is currently the largest CSR initiative, having over 8000 participants, including over 5300 
businesses as of 2011.138 
The Global Compact has two stated aims: to mainstream its ten principles throughout 
business and to help inspire action in support of broader UN goals.139 The Global 
Compact sets out general principles which the corporate members agree to abide by in 
their business. Originally covering nine principles in the fields of human rights, labour 
and the environment, it was decided in 2004 to add a tenth principle in the field of 
                                          
133 Ibid, at p.9. 
134 Ibid, at p.17, para. 1 
135 Ibid, at p.17, para. 6. 
136 Ibid, at p.17, para. 7. 
137 .RIL$QQDQ³%XVLQHVVDQGWKH81$*OREDO&RPSDFWRI6KDUHG9DOXHVDQG3ULQFLSOHV´-DQXDU\
'DYRV:RUOG(FRQRPLF)RUXPTXRWHGLQ:LOOLDPV2µ7KH81*OREDO&RPSDFW7KH&KDOOHQJHDQGWKH3URPLVH¶
(2004) 14(4) Business Ethics Quarterly 755, at 755. 
138 Source: http://www.unglobalcompact.org/ParticipantsAndStakeholders/index.html [accessed 04/07/11]. 
139 Source: http://www.unglobalcompact.org/AboutTheGC/index.html [accessed 04/07/11] 
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corruption.140 For the purposes of this thesis, the relevant principles are the labour 
principles. These are: 
x Principle 3: Businesses should uphold the freedom of association and the effective 
recognition of the right to collective bargaining. 
x Principle 4: The elimination of all forms of forced and compulsory labour. 
x Principle 5: The effective abolition of child labour. 
x Principle 6: Elimination of discrimination in respect of employment and 
occupation. 
7KHVH SULQFLSOHV DUH WDNHQ IURP WKH ,/2¶V 'HFODUDWLRQ RQ )XQGDPHQWDO 3ULQFLSOHV DQG
Rights at Work 1998, meaning that the Global Compact principles overlap to a great 
extent with the general principles contained in the ILO Tripartite Declaration. The Global 
Compact does not set out any more specific principles or require companies to meet 
certain standards in their business to show compliance with the general principles. 
Companies signed on to the Global Compact are required to include a communication on 
their progress in applying Compact principles in their business in their annual report, 
giving specific examples. Any company which does not comply with this may be delisted 
from the Global Compact. 
The Global Compact is completely voluntary and has no monitoring system. Because of 
this, it has been often been seen as ineffective and used as a simple PR tool by its 
signatories.141 Many of its members, such as Nike and Shell, have been subject to heavy 
criticism in the past for poor labour standards. In 2004, several of the NGOs associated 
ZLWKWKH*OREDO&RPSDFW LVVXHGDVWDWHPHQWWKDWWKH\IHOW WKH&RPSDFWKDG³IDOOHQIDU
VKRUW RI H[SHFWDWLRQV´ DQG FDOOHG IRU WKH FUHDWLRQ RI DQ LQGHSHQGHQW FRPSODLQWV
mechanism in order to boost the integrity of the code.142 
                                          
140 The principles are set out in full on the UN Global Compact website: 
http://www.unglobalcompact.org/AboutTheGC/TheTenPrinciples/index.html [accessed 06/07/11]. 
141 Wick, I. :RUNHUV¶7RRORU353OR\"$*XLGHWR&RGHVRI,QWHUQDWLRQDO/DERXU3UDFWLFH, (4th Ed), (2005, Bonn: 
Friedrich-Ebert-Siftung), at p.98. 
142 Statement by NGO Participants in the Global Compact Summit, (2004), available at http://www.un-
ngls.org/orf/cso/cso3/statement.html [accessed 04/07/11]. 
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V.1.3. OECD Guidelines on Multinational Enterprises 
7KH2(&'*XLGHOLQHVIRU0XOWLQDWLRQDO(QWHUSULVHV³WKH*XLGHOLQHV´ZHUHILUVWSXEOLVKHG
in 1976. These original guidelines focused on ensuring that multinational enterprises 
complied with the relevant national law and were limited in operation to the OECD area 
itself.143 Because of this, the Guidelines had limited impact and were substantially 
revised in 2000. The Guidelines now apply to any multinational enterprise which 
operates in or from any adhering country, acknowledging the growth in global supply 
and extending the reach of the Guidelines to developing countries.144 There is also a 
much greater emphasis on compliance with international standards and going beyond 
national legal requirements.145 
As with the ILO Tripartite Declaration, the Guidelines start by setting out general 
principles before moving onto more specific principles. The Guidelines set out principles 
in the areas of disclosure, employment and industrial relations, the environment, 
combating bribery, consumer interests, science and technology, competition, and 
taxation. This section will examine the general principles and those related to 
employment and industrial relations. The general principles do not set out any minimum 
standards to be met but, similar to the ILO Tripartite Declaration, set out general aims.  
Several general principles deal with labour issues. Companies should encourage local 
employment and local capacity building, working with the community in the area.146 The 
Guidelines also state that companies should refrain from taking disciplinary action 
against any employees who report any breach of the law, the Guidelines or the 
FRPSDQ\¶VRZQFRGHWRHLWKHUPDQDJHPHQWRUWKHUHOHYDQt authorities.147 Importantly in 
UHODWLRQ WR VXSSO\ FKDLQ LVVXHV *HQHUDO 3ULQFLSOH  UHTXLUHV FRPSDQLHV ³ZKHUH
SUDFWLFDEOH´ WR HQFRXUDJH WKHLU VXSSOLHUV DQG VXE-contractors to also follow all the 
principles of the Guidelines. 
                                          
143 )RUDQH[DPLQDWLRQRIWKHSUHYLRXVUHJXODWLRQVVHH0XUUD\-µ$1HZ3KDVHLQWKH5HJXODWLRQRI
0XOWLQDWLRQDO(QWHUSULVHV7KH5ROHRIWKH2(&'¶Industrial Law Journal 255 at 256-261. 
144 OECD Guidelines 2000, at p.12. 
145 Murray, above n.42, at 262. 
146 OECD Guidelines 2000, p.19, at General Principles 3 and 4. 
147 OECD Guidelines 2000, p.19, at General Principle 9. 
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The principles on employment and industrial relations are found in Section IV of the 
Guidelines, and these principles do set out minimum standards to be met. Emphasis is 
placed on promoting a good relationship between the business and its workers. 
Companies must allow trade unions and collective bargaining in their organisation, and 
WKH\VKRXOGFRQVXOWZRUNHUV¶JURXSVEHIRUHXQGHUWDNLQJDQ\PDMRUFKDQJHLQEXVLQHVV148 
Linked to this requirement, companies should provide any necessary facilities and 
information to workers in order to promote negotiation on terms of employment.149 The 
Guidelines also expressly forbid a company from threatening to transfer employees away 
from the site in order to influence the results of any collective bargaining.150 
Beyond issues of industrial relations, compDQLHV PXVW ³FRQWULEXWH´ WR WKH DEROLWLRQ RI
child and forced labour, though no more specific requirements are given relating to 
this.151 Discrimination amongst employees on the grounds of race, sex, religion or other 
similar grounds is expressly forbidden. There is an exception to this where the 
discrimination either follows a government policy of positive discrimination to ensure 
JUHDWHU HTXDOLW\ WKURXJKRXW WKHZRUNIRUFH RUZKHUH WKH GLVFULPLQDWLRQ ³UHODWHV WR WKH
LQKHUHQWUHTXLUHPHQWVRIDMRE´152 There should also be positive discrimination in favour 
of local employees wherever possible and the company should train those employees to 
improve their skills and future employment prospects.153 As regards general employment 
standards, the standards must be no less favourable than those of comparable 
HPSOR\HUV LQ WKH KRVW FRXQWU\ DQG ³DGHTXDWH VWHSV´ VKRXOG EH WDNHQ WR HQVXUH JRRG
health and safety standards throughout the workplace.154 
Under the OECD Guidelines, each adhering country must set up a National Contact Point 
(NCP).155 These NCPs are responsible for promoting awareness of the Guidelines in the 
relevant country and for handling inquiries or complaints regarding the implementation 
                                          
148 OECD Guidelines 2000, at pp.21-22, Employment and Industrial Relations Principles 1(a), 6 and 8. 
149 Ibid, Principle 2. 
150 Ibid, Principle 7. 
151 Ibid, Principles 1(b) and (c). 
152 Ibid, Principle 1(d). 
153 Ibid, Principle 5. 
154 Ibid, Principle 4. 
155 OECD Guidelines 2000, at p.32. 
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of the Guidelines. In the UK, the NCP is currently based within the Department for 
Business, Innovation and Skills (BIS).156 8QGHUWKH8.SURFHGXUHDQ\³LQWHUHVWHGSDUW\´
may make a complaint to the NCP if they feel that a company registered in or operating 
from the UK has breached the Guidelines in any way. There is no set definition of 
³LQWHUHVWHGSDUW\´ZLWKH[DPSOHVFRYHULQJZRUNHUVORFDOFRPPXQLWLHVDQGWUDGHXQLRQV
making the only limitation on bringing a case the ability to collect the information the 
NCP will need to deal with the complaint.157 If a complaint is accepted, the NCP will first 
try to deal with the complaint through a mediation procedure. If this fails, the NCP will 
examine the complaint itself before preparing a report which will set out the relevant 
breaches of the Guidelines, if any, and offer suggestions as to how the company may 
bring its conduct in line with those Guidelines.158 These suggestions are voluntary with 
no further action taken against a company in breach. This weakness has been criticised 
by NGOs, especially Oxfam, who call for much stricter monitoring and penalties for 
breach.159 
V.1.4. Ethical Trading Institute Base Code 
The Ethical Trading Institute (ETI) was established in 1998. Composed of NGOs, trade 
union representatives and corporate members, it aims to set out good labour practice 
and to work with companies to improve labour standards throughout their supply chain. 
The main platform for the ETIs work is the Base Code, a code of conduct which aims to 
set out key labour principles which must be adhered to by all corporate members of the 
ETI. The Base Code is accompanied by the Principles of Implementation, which set out 
                                          
156 Source: http://www.bis.gov.uk/policies/business-sectors/low-carbon-business-opportunities/sustainable-
development/corporate-responsibility/uk-ncp-oecd-guidelines [accessed 04/07/11] . 
157 BIS, UK NCP Procedures for Dealing with Complaints Brought Under the OECD Guidelines for Multinational 
Enterprises, (2011), available at http://www.bis.gov.uk/assets/biscore/business-sectors/docs/u/11-651-uk-
ncp-procedures-for-complaints-oecd.pdf [accessed 04/07/11] at p.4. 
158 Ibid, sec. 5.1. 
159 Oxfam, Rigged Rules and Double Standards? Trade, Globalisation and the Fight against Poverty, (2002), 
available at http://www.maketradefair.com/assets/english/report_english.pdf [accessed 22/08/11] at p.205. 
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the responsibilities of the ETI members relating to the Base Code, focusing on 
monitoring requirements.160 
Companies who become members of the ETI must make a public commitment to adopt 
the Base Code and to implement it in their supply chain.161 Members must submit annual 
progress reports on their code implementation activities to the ETI and must commit not 
only to transparent reports on their own business but also to encouraging their own 
suppliers to be transparent about their ethical trading standards.162 The annual progress 
UHSRUWVDLPWRVHWRXWWKHHWKLFDO WUDGLQJULVNVLQKHUHQW LQWKHFRPSDQ\¶VEXVLQHVVDQG
how those risks are being mitigated, how the company is working on its ethical trade 
strategy and how the company is delivering improvements to the companies and 
individuals in the area in which it is operating, and must show how the company is 
meeting set benchmarks.163 The ETI Secretariat conducts random validation visits to at 
least 20% of the companies submitting reports annually to determine that the systems 
for preparing the annual report are valid. Where companies fail to make sufficient 
progress in improving their business or breach the membership obligations of the ETI 
Base Code their membership is terminated.164 
The ETI Base Code has nine main principles, each of which contains several sub-
principles which set out certain specific standards which must be reached. In common 
with most codes, the Base Code prohibits totally the use of forced labour.165 Both 
discrimination against employees on any grounds and physical or mental abuse of 
employees are also completely prohibited.166 In contrast, however, child labour is not 
prohibited outright. The recruitment of new child labour is forbidden, but a company may 
continue to employ any child labourers currently working for them so long as they 
                                          
160 The ETI Base Code and Principles of Implementation may be accessed on the ETI website at 
http://www.ethicaltrade.org/resources/key-eti-resources [accessed 04/07/11] 
161 Principle 1, Principles of Implementation. 
162 Principle 6, Principles of Implementation. 
163 Ethical Trading Initiative, Ethical Trading Initiative Management Benchmarks (2010), available at 
http://www.ethicaltrade.org/sites/default/files/resources/ETI%20Management%20benchmarks.pdf [accessed 
04/07/11] 
164 Source: http://www.ethicaltrade.org/about-eti/what-companies-sign-up-to [accessed 04/07/11] 
165 Principle 1, ETI Base Code. 
166 Principles 7 and 9, ETI Base Code. 
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³GHYHORSRUSDUWLFLSDWHLQDQGFRQWULEXWHWRSROLFLHVDQGSURJUDPPHV which provide for 
the transition of any child found to be performing child labour to enable her or him to 
attend and remain in quality education until no longer a child´167 As is usual, compliance 
with national labour law is required and the code notes that a company may not attempt 
to evade any responsibilities owed to workers under the national law by engaging 
workers under any arrangements such as home-working or labour-only contracting.168 
In the field of industrial relations, the Base Code states that companies must allow 
workers to form trade unions and permit collective bargaining.169 Where freedom of 
association and collective bargaining are restricted under national law, the company 
must facilitate the development of a parallel means for bargaining by workers.170 More 
JHQHUDOO\ LW LV VWDWHG WKDW FRPSDQLHV PXVW DGRSW DQ ³RSHQ DWWLWXGH´ towards the 
activities of the trade unions and their representatives.171 
The Base Code deals with health and safety in Principle 3. Along with providing that a 
safe and hygienic workplace should be ensured, the Base Code also sets out some 
specific standards to be met, requiring clean toilet facilities, potable water and sanitary 
conditions for food storage.172 Workers must receive health and safety training and the 
company must assign responsibility for ensuring health and safety throughout the 
business to a senior management representative.173 
Principles 5 and 6 set out the standards for wages and working hours and set out very 
specific aims. Wages and working hours must, as a minimum, comply with national law 
or the industry benchmark wage (whichever is higher).174 In addition, wages must 
DOZD\VEHHQRXJKWRPHHWDZRUNHU¶VEDVLFQHHGVDQGDOVR³SURYLGHVRPHGLVFUHWLRQDU\
LQFRPH´ZKLFKPD\LQVRPHFDVHVUHTXLUHDKLJKHUZDJHWKDQWKHQDWLRQDOODZSURYLGHV
                                          
167 Principle 4.2, ETI Base Code. 
168 Principle 8, ETI Base Code. 
169 Principle 2.1, ETI Base Code. 
170 Principle 2.4, ETI Base Code. 
171 Principle 2.2, ETI Base Code. 
172 Principles 3.1 and 3.3, ETI Base Code. 
173 Principles 3.2 and 3.5, ETI Base Code. 
174 Principles 5.1 and 6.1, ETI Base Code. 
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for.175 Workers must be provided with accurate information about their wages before 
they begin work and must also be provided with the details of their wages at each pay 
period.176 7KH FRPSDQ\ PD\ QRW PDNH GHGXFWLRQV IURP D ZRUNHU¶V ZDJHV DV D
disciplinary measure and any other deductions not provided for in national law may not 
be made without permission of the worker concerned.177 Workers should not be required 
to work more than 48 hours per week and must be entitled to at least one day off for 
every seven day period.178 Overtime must be completely voluntary and should be 
compensated at a premium rate, and in any case, should not exceed 12 hours work for 
any worker in any one week.179 
V.1.5. World Fair Trade Organisation180 
The World Fair Trade Organisation (WFTO) is one of several fair trade initiatives (for fair 
trade product labelling, see the next section). The organisation is composed of 
FRPSDQLHVZKLFK IROORZ LWV ³7HQ 3ULQFLSOHV RI )DLU 7UDGH´ZKLFK FRYHU ERWK VRFLDO DQG
environmental aspects though the emphasis is on labour conditions.181 The organisation 
publishes a list of the companies which meet its requirements on its website. Member 
companies which have completed the auditing process may use the WFTO logo to prove 
this. To complete the audit, a company must complete a self-assessment examining 
their business in light of the ten principles every two years and this assessment will be 
reviewed by the Registration Sub-Committee of the WFTO.182 
Under the labour principles set out by the WFTO, a company must create opportunities 
for the economically disadvantaged producers it uses in its business. The company 
VKRXOGKHOSEXLOGWKHFDSDFLW\RIWKHSURGXFHUVLWXVHVDQGKHOSWRGHYHORSWKHSURGXFHUV¶
independence. As regards employment standards, the company must pay a fair price 
                                          
175 Principle 5.1, ETI Base Code. 
176 Principle 5.2, ETI Base Code. 
177 Principle 5.3, ETI Base Code. 
178 Principle 6.2, ETI Base Code. 
179 Ibid. 
180 For more info, see www.wfto.com [accessed 04/07/11]. 
181 7KHSULQFLSOHVDUHVHWRXWRQWKH:)72¶VZHEVLWHDW
http://www.wfto.com/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=2&Itemid=14 [accessed 04/07/11].  
182 Source: http://www.wfto.com/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=21&Itemid=302 [accessed 
04/07/11] 
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(agreed through dialogue with the producer), ensure gender equality in the workplace, 
make sure the workplace is safe to work in and comply with local law regarding child 
labour along with the UN Convention on the Rights of the Child. In any case, child labour 
should not adversely affect the well-being or educational requirements of the child. 
Finally, fair trade organisations should endeavour to build long-term relationships with 
their suppliers.  
V.2. Certification Standards 
While there are many CSR certification standards, very few relate to labour issues 
directly, concentrating instead on environmental and sustainability issues. A major 
exception to this is the SA 8000 certification scheme, which will be examined in detail 
below.  
V.2.1. SA 8000 
SA 8000 is a labour standard accreditation scheme produced by Social Accountability 
International (SAI) under which a company meeting the standards set in the scheme will 
receive a certificate to prove this. It was first published in 1997 and was revised in 2001 
and 2008. Unlike the codes of conduct discussed above, the scheme is independently 
monitored. The code is designed not only to be used internally but also to be used as a 
WRRO WR PDQDJH WKH ODERXU VWDQGDUGV RI D FRPSDQ\¶V VXSSO\ FKDLQ183 Despite the 
VFKHPH¶VJHQHUDOO\SRVLWLYHUHFHSWLRQFHUWLILFDWLRn does have significant costs and so the 
scheme has been criticised for disadvantaging smaller suppliers.184 
As with the codes previously discussed, SA 8000 first requires that a company comply 
with the relevant national law in its operations.185 It also requires compliance with the 
core ILO Conventions, along with several other ILO Conventions covering matters such 
as maternity protection and home work and international standards including the 
                                          
183 5RKLWUDWDQD.µ6$7RROWR,PSURYH4XDOLW\RI/LIH¶>@Managerial Auditing Journal 60, at 60.  
184 Ibid, at 61. 
185 SA 8000 (2008), at p.4. 
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Universal Declaration of Human Rights.186 SA 8000 then sets out requirements in the 
areas of child labour, forced and compulsory labour, health and safety, freedom of 
association, discrimination, disciplinary practices, working hours, remuneration, and 
management systems. Unlike most of the codes of conduct, these set out very specific 
minimum requirements, such as a maximum 48 hour working week.   
 For a company to be certified to SA 8000 standard it must undergo an independent 
audit by an SAI-accredited certification body to test its labour standards against those 
set out in SA 8000. Certification lasts for three years and certified companies are audited 
on a semi-annual basis.187 The company may choose which body audits its operations so 
long as the body is certified by the SAI.  
V.3. Product Labelling 
Product labels have been developed to deal with a variety of issues over a variety of 
products, most often covering environmental issues such as sustainability and labour 
standards in the production of the product. This wide variety of labels has been criticised 
by some commentators as the different requirements for each label and the lack of 
publicity for the requirements of each label makes it difficult for consumers to know 
precisely what a label means.188 Labels denoting products which have been made under 
labour conditions guDUDQWHHGWRDFHUWDLQOHYHODUHJHQHUDOO\NQRZQDV³IDLUWUDGH´ODEHOV
The fair trade business is swiftly developing, growing by 92% in the UK in 2004.189 There 
are in fact several fair trade initiatives and the work of the World Fair Trade Organisation 
was examined previously. This section will examine the work of Fairtrade Labelling 
Organisations International, an umbrella organisation for 20 fair trade labelling initiatives 
DQGSURGXFHURIWKH³)DLUWUDGH´ODEHOXVHGLQWKH8. 
                                          
186 Ibid. 
187 Source: http://www.saasaccreditation.org/certprocess.htm [accessed 04/07/11] 
188 Liubicic, above n.106, at 131. 
189 Wick, above n.141, at p.15. 
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V.3.1. Fairtrade Labelling190 
The Fairtrade label on a product allows consumers to be sure that that product was 
produced according to the labour (and some environmental) standards of Fairtrade 
Labelling Organisations International (FLO). The standards are developed by the FLO 
Standards Committee and reviewed on a regular basis. FLO has been operating since 
1997, when the organisation was created to standardize the requirements for the various 
fair trade labels used on products globally. In 2002 the international Fairtrade label was 
launched and is now used in all but two of the countries who are a member of FLO.191 
)RUDSURGXFW WREH FHUWLILHGDV )DLUWUDGH WKHSURGXFHUPXVWPHHWERWK)/2¶VJHQHULF
standards and also certain product specific standards. This limits the number of products 
which the Fairtrade label may be used on to those that have had specific standards 
developed, although this number is rapidly expanding as new standards are developed. 
Standards have currently been developed for 18 product categories, mostly covering 
food products but also covering cotton and sports balls production.192 
Generic standards exist for both trade and production. The relevant generic production 
VWDQGDUGVYDU\GHSHQGLQJRQZKHWKHU WKHSURGXFW LVEHLQJSURGXFHGE\D ³VPDOO-scale 
SURGXFHU´ SURGXFHUV who are organised in co-operatives), contract production (small 
producers not currently organised in a co-operative) or by producers operating in a hired 
labour situation. For hired labour, in addition to several environmental requirements 
relating to sustainable production, the producer must also meet specific labour 
conditions in several areas.193 Employment must be non-discriminatory and forced or 
compulsory labour is forbidden. As regards the general standards of employment, as a 
minimum the standards must be in line with or exceed the relevant national law or 
                                          
190 For more information, see the website of Fairtrade Labelling Organisations International: www.fairtrade.net. 
[accessed 04/07/11]. 
191 Source: http://www.fairtrade.net/about_the_mark.0.html [accessed 04/07/11]. The exceptions are Canada 
and the USA, who use the Fair Trade Certified mark. 
192 Full list available at: 
http://www.fairtrade.net/fileadmin/user_upload/content/2009/standards/documents/2011-06-
28_LIST_OF_FLO_Standards.pdf [accessed 04/07/11]. 
193 Fair Trade Labelling Organisations International, Generic Fairtrade Standards for Hired Labour (2011), 
available at http://www.fairtrade.net/fileadmin/user_upload/content/2009/standards/documents/generic-
standards/2011-05-11-HL_EN_01.pdf [accessed 04/07/11] 
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regional agreements. Express minimum standards are set out in a range of employment 
areas including, inter alia, working hours and leave entitlement. Minimum standards are 
also set out to ensure health and safety in the workplace. Finally, it must be shown that 
the relationship between the buyer and the producer helps the producer to develop their 
workforce and to build the capacity of their company. Where the product is produced by 
a small-scale producer, all the previous conditions must be complied with and there are 
also further conditions relating to the social development of the organisation.194 Contract 
production again requires all the conditions set out for hired labour but also sets out 
requirements intended to develop the workers into a small-scale producer.195  The 
generic trade standards are aimed at companies which buy the Fairtrade products and, 
inter alia UHTXLUH WKH SD\PHQW RI WKH ³)DLUWUDGH 0LQLPXP 3ULFH´ DQG D ³)DLUWUDGH
3UHPLXP´ WR WKH Sroducers.196 The minimum price covers the costs of sustainable 
production and the premium should give the producer money to invest into improving 
their livelihood. 
Certification is monitored by an independent company, FLO-CERT GmbH.197 The 
company employs a team of around 60 independent inspectors who regularly visit all 
Fairtrade producers to investigate the conditions there. FLO-CERT also conducts a trade 
audit, checking that Fairtrade certified products sold to consumers have in fact been 
produced by a Fairtrade certified producer. 
VI. Conclusion 
This chapter has offered an overview of labour codes of conduct, certification schemes 
and product labelling schemes. It has been shown that the requirements included in 
labour codes vary depending on whether or not the code has been designed internally by 
                                          
194  Fair Trade Labelling Organisations International, *HQHULF)DLUWUDGH6WDQGDUGVIRU6PDOO3URGXFHUV¶
Organisations (2011), available at 
http://www.fairtrade.net/fileadmin/user_upload/content/2009/standards/documents/2011-05-
11_new_CP_EN_final.pdf [accessed 04/07/11] 
195 Fair Trade Labelling Organisations International, Generic Fairtrade Standard for Contract Production (2011) 
available at http://www.fairtrade.net/fileadmin/user_upload/content/2009/standards/documents/2011-05-
11_new_CP_EN_final.pdf [accessed 04/07/11] 
196 Fair Trade Labelling Organisations International, Generic Fairtrade Trade Standard (2011), available at 
http://www.fairtrade.net/fileadmin/user_upload/content/2009/standards/documents/generic-standards/2011-
06-08_GTS_EN.pdf [accessed 04/07/11] 
197 For more info, see www.flo-cert.net [accessed 04/07/11]. 
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the company or designed by an external international organisation, with internally 
designed codes having fewer precise requirements. The largest and most commonly 
used externally designed labour codes have then been examined to determine the 
requirements of each. This analysis has revealed the many common concerns of such 
labour codes, including a focus on compliance with the core ILO conventions, maximum 
working hours and minimum wage rates and, importantly for the EU regime, a focus on 
promoting the use of local labour. These common requirements will provide a base for 
the legal analysis in Chapter 6 of this thesis, which will examine the possibility of 
including such requirements under the EU procurement regime in more detail.  
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Chapter 4 - Overview of the UK Utilities Sector 
I. Introduction 
This chapter will give an overview of those utilities sectors in the UK that are regulated 
by Directive 2004/17/EC198 ³WKH8WLOLWLHV'LUHFWLYH´HQHUJ\FRPSRVLQJRLODQGJDV
extraction, coal mining and gas/electricity supply); (2) water; (3) transport (airport, 
port, bus and rail) and; (4) postal services. Telecommunications will not be considered in 
this overview due to its removal from the EU procurement regime in the 2004 reforms 
(see Chapter 5 on the EU procurement regime). This chapter aims to examine the 
operation of the various firms in the sectors, looking at what they do, how they are 
regulated and the extent of the competition they are exposed to, all of which are factors 
which may affect their procurement and corporate social responsibility practices. Each 
section aims set out the state of liberalisation in the sector and to offer an overview of 
the relevant regulation, including, where appropriate, the licensing regime. Finally, an 
overview of the relevant bodies in the sector will be given. 
II. Energy 
II.1. Oil and Gas Extraction 
The UK oil and gas extraction sector is fully open to competition. Licences to extract oil 
and gas are awarded by the Department of Energy and Climate Change (DECC) under 
section 3 of the Petroleum Act 1998. Licensees may be a single company or a group of 
companies working together.199 All licences are for a limited period of time. DECC 
currently awards four main  types of licence:200 
                                          
198 Directive 2004/17/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council coordinating the procurement 
procedures of entities operating in the water, energy, transport and postal services sectors, OJ 2004 No. 
L134/1. 
199 Source:https://www.og.decc.gov.uk/upstream/licensing/overview.htm [accessed 05/07/11]. 
200 Source: https://www.og.decc.gov.uk/upstream/licensing/lictype.htm [accessed 05/07/11]. 
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(1) Seaward Production Licences, which allow exclusive exploration and extraction in a 
small geographical area in the UK continental shelf. These operate over three terms, 
whereby a company may extend their licence into the second and third terms if their 
work programmes have been satisfactorily completed. There are four forms of Seaward 
Production Licence. The first type is the Traditional Licence, which is the most commonly 
granted licence, requiring technical and environmental capacity to be proved prior to the 
licence being granted. The second type is the Promote Licence, which is designed for 
start-up companies and allows the licence to be granted without the technical and 
environmental capacity being proved, so long as the capacity can be shown by the 
second year of operation of the licence. The remaining two types of Seaward Production 
Licences are Frontier Licences which are designed for areas with particularly challenging 
terrain and differ in the lengths of the first term, with Frontier Licences having first terms 
of either six or nine years as compared to the four years of Traditional and Promote 
licences.  
(2) Seaward Exploration Licences, which allow exploratory surveys over any area of the 
UK continental shelf, except those areas covered by a production licence. The licences 
last for three years.  
(3) Petroleum Exploration and Development Licences, which are onshore production 
licences and operate in a similar manner to offshore production licences. As with those 
licences, they operate over three terms. 
(4) Supplementary Seismic Survey Licences, which allow a company with an onshore 
production licence to survey an area up to one kilometre adjacent to the area covered by 
the production licence. The licence lasts for one year. 
Licences must be awarded using certain objective and non-discriminatory criteria set out 
in Directive 94/22/EC201 and implemented into UK law in the Hydrocarbons Licensing 
                                          
201 Directive 94/22/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 30 May 1994 on the conditions for 
granting and using authorisations for the prospection, exploration and production of hydrocarbons, OJ L 164. 
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Directive Regulations 1995202. This sets out certain criteria, such as technical and 
financial capability and the price the applicant is willing to pay for the licence, which 
must be used when determining whether to award the licence.203 DECC awards licences 
through competitive Licensing Rounds, with companies bidding for the licences. The 
department runs one offshore and one onshore Licensing Round each year.204 DECC has 
awarded over a thousand licences in total.205 
II.2. Coal Mining 
Following the recent focus on oil and gas, the UK coal industry is no longer such a major 
part of the economy.206 In hopes of revitalising the industry, the UK coal industry was 
privatised in 1994 by the Coal Industry Act 1994, which also created the regulatory body 
the Coal Authority. The sector is now open to competition, with the Coal Authority 
responsible for awarding licences to companies to operate coal mines. The Authority 
awards three main types of licence:  
(1) Underground and opencast operating licences, which grant a company the right to 
operate either a deep mine or an opencast mine (mining from an open pit);  
(2) Exploration licences, giving a company the right to explore an area of land for coal; 
(3) Coal methane access agreements, which grant a company the right to use a site for 
the extraction of methane from coal.207 
Written agreement is also need from the Coal Authority for a company to drill through a 
coal mine for non-coal mining business and to dig and carry away coal in the course on 
non-mining activities (incidental coal) 
                                          
202 SI 1995 No.1434. 
203 Reg. 3, Hydrocarbons Licensing Directive Regulations 1995. 
204 Source: https://www.og.decc.gov.uk/upstream/licensing/licawards.htm [accessed 05/07/11] 
205 $GDWDEDVHRIDOORLODQGJDVH[WUDFWLRQOLFHQFHVFDQEHDFFHVVHGRQ%(55¶VZHEVLWHDW
https://www.og.decc.gov.uk/information/licensing.htm [accessed 13/11/09] 
206 Newbery, D. and Pollit, 0µ7KH5HVWUXFWXULQJDQG3ULYDWLVDWLRQRI%ULWDLQ¶V&(*%± :DVLW:RUWKLW"¶
45(3) Journal of Industrial Economics 269, at 271. 
207 Model licences may be found at 
http://coal.decc.gov.uk/en/coal/cms/services/licensing/license_apps/license_apps.aspx [accessed 05/07/11] 
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As of 2011, The Coal Authority reports that there were 51 sites with 52 licences 
operating throughout the UK, with 36 of those sites being opencast and 15 being 
underground mines.208 
II.3. Gas and Electricity 
The energy market in the UK comprises of both the gas market and the electricity 
market. The energy market is an area where there has been substantial influence from 
the EU, with the intention of introducing competition throughout the sector and creating 
a functioning internal energy market. In the UK, both the gas and electricity markets 
have been substantially opened to competition in the last ten years and the country now 
has the most developed market in Europe. While there are certain differences between 
the operation of the electricity and gas markets, there are also many similarities. 
Following a general overview of the various activities in both the gas and electricity 
markets, the section will also examine the bodies operating in each area. Finally, the 
state of competition and the regulatory controls over the sector will be examined.  
II.3.1. Electricity: Activities and Companies 
The electricity market may be divided into four separate stages; (1) Generation, the 
original production of electricity through a power station, wind farm etc; (2) 
Transmission, the transport of electricity over nation-wide high tension cables; (3) 
Distribution, the transport of electricity over local low tension cables; (4) Supply, the 
sale and delivery of electricity to the final user.209 In the UK the operation of these 
stages has been fully separated with separate licences necessary and different 
companies operating in each stage. 
 
 
                                          
208 The Coal Authority, Production and Manpower Returns for 3 Month Period January 2011-March 2011, 
available at http://coal.decc.gov.uk/assets/coal/Production-and-Manpower-Returns-Jan-Mar-2011-Q1.pdf 
[accessed 05/07/11] 
209 .RWORZVNL$µ7KLUG-Party Access Rights in the Energy Sector: A CRPSHWLWLRQ/DZ3HUVSHFWLYH¶>@
16(3) Utilities Law Review 101, at 101. 
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1. Generation 
Generation accounts for 50% of the cost of electricity to final users.210 The UK electricity 
generation sector is fully open to competition. Under section 6(1)(a) Electricity Act 1989, 
a licence from the Office of Gas and Electricity Markets (Ofgem) is required for a 
company to operate as an electricity generator. These licences are available without limit 
on number to any company who satisfies certain basic requirements covering issues 
such as criminal convictions.211 Ofgem currently lists over 100 companies with electricity 
generation licences.212 
2. Transmission 
Energy transmission is generally regarded as a natural monopoly given the fact that the 
national network of wires needed for transmission cannot be replicated by another 
company in a commercially viable manner, and the fact that scale economies mean that 
a transmission network can be more economically run by a single company than by 
several competing companies.213 In the UK, the transmission systems are operated by 
National Grid Electricity Transmission plc (National Grid). The transmission assets are 
owned by regional monopoly Transmission Owners. For England and Wales, the 
Transmission Owner is National Grid. For northern Scotland, the Transmission Owner is 
Scottish Hydro-Electric Transmission Ltd, and for southern Scotland, the Transmission 
Owner is Scottish Power Transmission Ltd.214 Under section 6(1)(b) Electricity Act 1989, 
an electricity transmission licence must be granted to the company by Ofgem, which also 
monitors and regulates the performance of the monopoly companies. 
 
                                          
210 0F+DUJ$µ5HVKDSLQJWKH(OHFWULFLW\*HQHUDWLRQ0DUNHWLQ(QJODQGDQG:DOHV¶>@Utilities Law 
Review 34, at 34. 
211 Ofgem, Guidance for Gas and Electricity Licence Applications (2010), available at 
http://www.ofgem.gov.uk/Licensing/Work/Documents1/SupplementaryAppendix2-
Guidanceforgasnd0electricityapplications.pdf [accessed 05/07/11], at pp.25-27. 
212 A list of all electricity licensees in the UK is available at 
http://www.ofgem.gov.uk/Licensing/Work/Documents1/external_electricity_list_excel1.pdf [accessed 
05/07/11] 
213 Kotlowski, above n.209, at 102. 
214 Source: http://www.ofgem.gov.uk/Networks/Trans/Pages/Trans.aspx [accessed 05/07/11]. 
Page 56 of 300 
 
3. Distribution 
As with electricity transmission, distribution is seen as a natural monopoly.215 The UK is 
split into 14 regional monopoly regions, each run by a Distribution Network Operator 
(DNO). These 14 monopoly regions are currently controlled by seven separate 
companies; Central Networks (part of the E.ON group), Electricity North West, CE 
Electric UK, Western Power Distribution, EDF Energy Networks, Scottish Power Networks 
and SSE Power Distribution.216 In addition to the DNOs, there are also six licensed 
independent distribution network operators, who operate in a similar manner to DNOs 
but do not have a specific service area.217 Licences for electricity distribution are granted 
under section 6(1)(c) by Ofgem and, as with transmission, the distribution companies 
are monitored and regulated by Ofgem. 
4. Supply 
As with generation, the electricity supply market has been fully opened to competition. 
The market has been unregulated since 2002 when Ofgem judged that the market was 
sufficiently competitive to remove the previous system of price controls.218 Domestic 
customers are mainly served by six large suppliers (British Gas, E.ON, Npower, EDF 
Energy, Scottish and Southern Electric (SSE), and Scottish Power), though there are also 
several smaller suppliers.219 In addition to these companies, there are also several 
suppliers who serve non-domestic customers exclusively.220 Electricity supply licences 
are awarded by Ofgem under section 6(1)(d) Electricity Act 1989. They are awarded 
without limit on number to any company who satisfies the same general requirements as 
are required for generation licences, and who can also satisfy certain other requirements 
                                          
215 6DSODFDQ5µ&RPSHWLWLRQLQHOHFWULFLW\GLVWULEXWLRQ¶Utilities Policy 231, at 231. 
216 Ofgem, Electricity Distribution Annual Report for 2008-9 and 2009-10 (2011), available at 
http://www.ofgem.gov.uk/Networks/ElecDist/PriceCntrls/DPCR5/Documents1/Electricity_Distribution_Annual_R
eport_for_2008-09_and_2009-10v2%5b1%5d.pdf [accessed 05/07/11], at p.3. 
217 Ofgem Licence Database, above n.212. 
218 Ofgem, Domestic Retail Report ± June 2007, available at 
http://www.ofgem.gov.uk/Markets/RetMkts/Compet/Documents1/DRMR%20March%202007doc%20v9%20-
%20FINAL.pdf [accessed 05/07/11]. 
219 Ibid, at p.3. 
220 Ofgem Electricity Licence Database, above n.212. 
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such as ensuring security of supply and certain obligations to vulnerable customers.221 A 
single company cannot hold both a supply licence and a distribution licence.222 
II.3.2. Gas: Activities and Companies 
The gas market operates in approximately the same stages as the electricity network, 
though the licences use slightly different terminology. Transmission and distribution are 
UHIHUUHG WRDV ³WUDQVSRUW´ WKRXJK WKHUHDUHVWLOO WZRGLVWLQFW VWDJHV LQYROYHGZLWKKLJK
pressure transport through national pipes and low pressure transport through local 
pipes. Gas is not generated in the same manner as electricity; the comparable stage is 
³VKLSSLQJ´WKHLQWURGXFWLRQRIJDVLQWRWKHQHWZRUN 
1. Shipping 
Gas shipping, like electricity generation, is fully open to competition. A gas shipper 
licence may be awarded to a company by Ofgem under section 7A(2) of the Gas Act 
1986. Licences are available without restriction on number to any company who can 
satisfy the same general requirements as are relevant for electricity generation.223 
Ofgem currently lists over 200 companies with a gas shipping licence.224 
2. High pressure transport 
As with electricity transmission, the gas transport infrastructure is a natural monopoly. 
7KH8.¶VKLJKSUHVVXUHJDV WUDQVSRUWassets are owned and operated by National Grid 
Gas plc. Gas transport licences are granted by Ofgem under section 7 of the Gas Act 
2IJHPDOVRPRQLWRUDQGUHJXODWH1DWLRQDO*ULG*DV¶SHUIRUPDQFH 
3. Low pressure transport 
There are eight low pressure gas transport networks in the UK, owned by four 
companies; National Grid Gas, Northern Gas Networks, Scotia Gas Networks and Wales 
                                          
221 Ofgem, Guidance for Licence Applications, above n.211, at p.5. 
222 Section 6(2) Electricity Act 1989. 
223 Ofgem, above n.211, at pp.25-27. 
224 $IXOOOLVWRIDOOJDVOLFHQVHHVLVDYDLODEOHRQ2IJHP¶VZHEVLWHDW
http://www.ofgem.gov.uk/Licensing/Work/Documents1/external_gas_list_excel1.pdf [accessed 05/07/11] 
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& West Utilities.225 As with high pressure gas transport, companies distributing gas 
require a gas transport licence under section 7 of the Gas Act 1986. The performance of 
the gas distributors is monitored and regulated by Ofgem. 
4. Supply 
Gas supply has been fully opened up to competition. Most domestic customers are 
supplied by the same six suppliers as previously mentioned in electricity supply, though 
again there are also several smaller suppliers available and the non-domestic market 
also has several other suppliers available to it.226 Gas supply licences are awarded by 
Ofgem under section 7A(1) of the Gas Act 1986 under the same terms as apply to 
electricity suppliers. 
II.3.3. Regulation and Competition 
In those sectors where the market has not been fully opened to competition (gas 
transport DQGHOHFWULFLW\WUDQVPLVVLRQDQGGLVWULEXWLRQ2IJHPUHJXODWHVWKHFRPSDQLHV¶
performance. The UK is currently the only market in Europe which has opened its 
PDUNHWV WKURXJK WKH PHWKRG RI ³WKLUG SDUW\ DFFHVV´ 8QGHU WKLV PHWKRG LQGHSHQGHQW
companies operating in the shipping, generation or supply markets have a legally 
enforceable right to access and use the network facilities owned by the transmission and 
distribution companies.227 Ofgem regulates the terms and prices charged under these 
access arrangements to ensure that all firms can reasonably gain access to the network 
and to prevent discrimination among the firms.  
Because of the absence of comparator firms, especially in the transmission sector, the 
method of comparative competition used in the water sector (see below) is not available. 
The predecessors to Ofgem, the Office of the Gas Regulator (Ofgas) and the Office for 
Electricity Regulation (Offer) experimented with comparing the gas network with the 
                                          
225 Ofgem, Gas Distribution Quality of Service Report 2007-2008, (2008), available at 
http://www.ofgem.gov.uk/Networks/GasDistr/QoS/Documents1/2007%20to%2008%20QoS%20report.pdf 
[accessed 05/07/11], at p.6. 
226 $IXOOOLVWRIDOOJDVVXSSOLHUVFDQEHIRXQGRQ2IJHP¶VZHEVLWHDERYHQ224. 
227 Kotlowski, above n.209, at 101. 
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electricity network, but the two systems were too technologically different for meaningful 
comparison, and the option was in any case removed in 2002 by the merger between 
Transco plc (the previous gas network operator) and National Grid Company plc.228 
Recent price caps appear to be based on a combination of methods, including 
econometric analysis by independent consultants and financial data such as cost 
projections from the companies themselves.229 
III. Water 
Water management in the UK is a devolved issue. This means that the water market has 
developed in different ways and at a different rate in England and Wales as compared to 
Scotland. England and Wales are unusual in having privatised their water sector. Water 
is often seen as a public right, making water supply a controversial issue, and globally 
around 95% of water supply and sewerage services are provided by the public sector.230 
This is the case in Scotland, where water remains under the control of the public sector, 
though competition for the business supply market has recently been introduced. In 
FRQWUDVW WKH(QJOLVKDQG:HOVKZDWHU VHFWRU LV FKDUDFWHULVHGE\ ³YHUWLFDOO\-integrated, 
equity-financed, monopoly provision RIZDWHUVXSSO\E\SULYDWHFRUSRUDWLRQV´231 There is 
also an unusual regulatory framework in place to ensure competition between these 
monopoly suppliers, relying on price caps set by an independent regulatory body and so-
FDOOHG³FRPSDUDWLYHFRPSHWLWLRQ´232 This section will examine both the Scottish and the 
English and Welsh regimes. 
III.1. Water Sector Activities 
The water sector covers two distinct activities; (1) the operation of a network which 
supplies drinking water to the public, and (2) the treatment and disposal of sewage. 
                                          
228 'DVVOHU73DUNHU'DQG6DDO'µ0HWKRGVDQGWUHQGVRIperformance benchmarking in UK utility 
UHJXODWLRQ¶Utilities Policy 166, at 169. 
229 Ibid, at 170. 
230 +DOO'DQG/RELQD(µ,QWHUQDWLRQDODFWRUVDQGPXOWLQDWLRQDOZDWHUFRPSDQ\VWUDWHJLHVLQ(XURSH-
¶Utilities Policy 64, at 67. 
231 Bakker, K.J. An Uncooperative Commodity: Privatising Water in England and Wales, (2003, Oxford: OUP), at 
p.3. 
232 Ibid, at p.3. 
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Historically, these two branches developed separately. Both were natural monopolies, 
having distinct distribution and collection networks.233 It was also impossible originally to 
create and operate a national network given the difficulty and high cost of transporting 
the necessary chemicals over long distances.234 However, as technology progressed the 
two fields began to merge and currently the main companies in the UK provide both 
water and sewerage facilities, though there remain a number of smaller water-only 
companies. 
Water supply takes place in four main stages; (1) collection and abstraction, the process 
by which water is removed from the source of supply (rivers, streams etc); (2) 
treatment, the process by which the water is made suitable for human consumption; (3) 
distribution from the treatment plant into the network; (4) final supply to the consumer. 
Sewerage disposal takes place in three main stages; (1) collection from the customer 
and transport to the treatment plant; (2) treatment of the sewage; (3) disposal of the 
sewage. While it is possible in theory for these various stages to be completed by 
different entities, in practice the companies throughout the UK complete all stages 
(vertical integration). 
III.2. England and Wales 
III.2.1. England and Wales: History 
Throughout the twentieth century, water supply was run as a public monopoly, with the 
infrastructure owned and operated by the government (originally local governments and 
then later national government).235 Water pricing was linked to property value.236 The 
first major reform in the water sector was created by the Water Act 1973, which 
consolidated the various local water and sewerage companies into 10 Regional Water 
Authorities (RWAs) which were able to provide both water and sewerage services and 29 
                                          
233 6DZNLQV-:µ7KH'HYHORSPHQWRI&RPSHWLWLRQLQWKH(QJOLVKDQG:HOVK:DWHUDQG6HZHUDJH,QGXVWU\¶
(2001) 22(2) Fiscal Studies 189, at 190.  
234 Ibid, at 190. 
235 Bakker, above n.231, at pp.4-5. 
236 Ibid, at p.5. 
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private statutory companies which could provide water-only services as agents of the 
RWAs. Even after this, however, the system was very inefficient, with major problems 
EHLQJ ³D KLJK OHYHO RI GHEW YDULDEOH TXDOLW\ RI PDQagement (particularly of sewage 
ZRUNVDQGVXVWDLQHGZDWHUSROOXWLRQ´237 These inefficiencies and a wide conception of 
state failure led to the move to privatisation. The Water Act 1989 was passed and in 
December 1989 the RWAs and the water-only companies were privatised by flotation on 
the London Stock Exchange. 
III.2.2. England and Wales: Competition 
In addition to privatising the water companies, the Water Act 1989 also created a 
regulatory body designed to facilitate competition in the water market, the Office of 
Water Services (Ofwat). The water sector operates on the basis of comparative 
competition, whereby each company, while having a regional monopoly and so not 
competing directly against the other water companies, has its performance compared to 
and targets set by the standards achieved by the other water companies. 
In order to operate as a water and sewerage company or water-only company, the 
company must obtain a licence from Ofwat. The current water and sewerage companies 
obtained their licence when they were privatised. As Hall and Lobina note, this means 
they gained their business through a sale without competition.238 In addition, the 
possibility of competition while they are operating is minimal given the length of their 
concessions (the current licences are due to expire in 2014), and the fact that their 
concessions can only be ended by the government with 25 years notice.239 It was to 
combat this limited competition that the method of comparative competition was 
introduced. 
                                          
237 Ibid, at p.5. 
238 Hall and Lobina, above n.230, at 68. 
239 Ibid, at 68. 
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Under the terms of their licence, a company must supply annual information on their 
operations to Ofwat.240 Ofwat has certain measures available to it which it may take 
against any company it feels is not performing satisfactorily, but as Sawkins notes, the 
main way Ofwat facilitates competition in the sector is simply by publishing the 
comparative information to allow companies to see how their performance rates against 
other companies.241 
Ofwat also uses the information it receives from the companies to assess how efficient 
the companies are and so to set price caps on the amount charged by the companies for 
their services. The aim of these price caps is to provide an incentive to companies to 
improve their efficiency and to create price benefits for the customers.242 Ofwat rates 
each company against the water company judged to be the most efficient in that period 
to create an efficiency improvement incentive target for the company.243 Ofwat also 
makes an estimate of the likely improvement in efficiency that the sector as a whole 
might make and creates targets for a company based on that estimate.244 A company 
SURILWVLILWRXWSHUIRUPV2IZDW¶VWDUJHWVDQGWKHEHQHILWVLQHIILFLHQF\VKRXOGEHSDVVHG
on to the consumer in the long-term.245 
In addition to this system of comparative competition for the whole water sector, there is 
also a limited system of competition for water supply to businesses. Introduced in 
December 2005, this allows companies to apply for a licence to supply water and gives 
any business consumer who uses at least 50 megalitres of water a year the option to 
choose their water supplier. The system has, however, been very unsuccessful in 
                                          
240 Source:  http://www.ofwat.gov.uk/regulating/junereturn/ [accessed 05/07/11].  
241 Sawkins, above n.233, at 195. 
242 $OODQ*µ$VVHVVLQJFDSLWDOHIILFLHQF\LQWKHZDWHUDQGVHZHUDJHLQGXVWU\LQ(QJODQGDQG:DOHV2IZDW¶V
DSSURDFK¶Utilities Policy 224, at 224. 
243 Ofwat, Setting Price Limits for 2010-2015: framework and approach (2009), available at 
http://www.ofwat.gov.uk/pricereview/pap_pos_pr09method080327.pdf [accessed 05/07/11], at p.41. 
244 Ibid. 
245 Allan, above n.242, at 225. 
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SUDFWLFH ,Q2IZDW¶V UHYLHZRIFRPSHWLWLRQ LQ WKHZDWHU VHFWRU WKH\ UHSRUWHG WKDW
the system had not resulted in any business customer switching supplier.246 
III.2.3. England and Wales: Water and sewerage companies 
As noted above, the original privatisation created 10 water and sewerage companies 
with a regional monopoly over the area previously covered by the RWAs, in addition to 
29 small water-only companies. There are currently 10 companies licensed as water and 
sewerage undertakers, operating in the original 10 monopoly regions, and 11 companies 
licensed as water-only undertakers.247 These companies own and operate the network 
infrastructure in their monopoly region and complete all stages of water supply from 
abstraction from the original water source to final supply to the consumer. 
The opportunities for merger were restricted for five years after privatisation, though 
during that period some water companies merged with electricity companies and many 
of the water-only companies also merged.248 Even after the restriction ended mergers 
between the larger companies have been rare. Under section 32 of the Water Industry 
Act 1991, any merger between companies each with a turnover of over £10 million per 
annum must be referred to the Competition Commission. Ofwat presents evidence at 
these decisions and it is traditionally sceptical of such mergers, believing they damage 
the competitive market by diminishing the number of possible comparator companies. 
The water companies are, like all companies, open to acquisition at any time. While 
Ofwat cannot block an acquisition, they do review any proposed sale to ensure that the 
firm will be able to provide the required water services.249 
 
 
                                          
246 Ofwat, 2IZDW¶V5HYLHZRI&RPSHWLWLRQLQWKH:DWHUDQG6HZHUDJH,QGXVWULHV3DUW,,, (2008), available at 
http://www.ofwat.gov.uk/competition/pap_con_reviewmrktcomp.pdf?download=Download# [accessed 
05/07/11], at p.16.  
247 A full list of the licensees caQEHIRXQGRQ2IZDW¶VZHEVLWHDW
http://www.ofwat.gov.uk/industrystructure/licences/ [accessed 05/07/11] 
248 Hall and Lobina, above n.230, at 68. 
249 Source:  http://www.ofwat.gov.uk/industrystructure/ownership/ [accessed 05/07/11].  
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III.3. Scotland 
III.3.1. Scotland: History 
Scotland has historically resisted any privatisation of its water sector. When, in 1994, the 
government was consulting on possible options for the Scottish water and sewerage 
industry, a referendum was called in Strathclyde in which 97% voted against 
privatisation.250 Ultimately, the decision was made to maintain public sector provision 
and three regional authorities (North, East and West) were established by the Local 
Government etc (Scotland) Act 1994. These authorities remained in operation until the 
Water Industry (Scotland) Act 2002 which established the current national monopoly 
supplier, Scottish Water. 
III.3.2. Scotland: Scottish Water 
Scottish Water is the fourth largest water and sewerage company in the UK, supplying 
2.3 million households throughout Scotland, and with an average annual turnover of £1 
billion.251 The company is a publicly owned statutory corporation. As with the English and 
Welsh companies, Scottish Water is vertically integrated, completing all stages of the 
water supply and sewerage disposal process. The company set their water charges for 
domestic customers based on the council tax band of that customer, and the water rates 
are collected with that council tax.252 6FRWWLVK :DWHU¶V SHUIRUPDQFH LV PRQLWRUHG DQG
regulated by the Water Industry Commission for Scotland (WICS), a regulatory body set 
up by section 9 of the Water Industry Act 1999. As with Ofwat in England and Wales, 
WICS sets certain price caps which Scottish Water must abide by. 
III.3.3. Scotland: Competition 
                                          
250 +HQGU\6µ:DWHUIRU6DOH"0DUNHWOLEHUDOLVDWLRQDQGSXEOLFVHFWRUUHJXODWLRQLQ6FRWWLVK:DWHU6HUYLFHV¶
[2006/2007] 16(4) Utilities Law Review 153, at 153. 
251 Source: 
http://www.scottishwater.co.uk/portal/page/portal/SWE_PGP_ABOUT_US/SWE_PGE_ABOUT_US/SWE_AU_KEY
_FACTS [accessed 05/07/11]. 
252 Hendry, above n.250, at 156. 
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While Scottish Water has a monopoly over water and sewerage services in the domestic 
market, Scotland has recently opened up the business supply market to competition. The 
Water Services etc (Scotland) Act 2005 established a licensing scheme for water and 
sewerage suppliers. Since 1 April 2008 any non-domestic consumer in Scotland may 
choose their water and/or sewerage supplier from any of the licensed companies. 
Scottish Water continues to own and operate the water distribution network in Scotland.  
Licences are granted by WICS and come in three forms; (1) General licences, which 
allow a company to supply water and/or sewerage services to any non-domestic 
customer in Scotland; (2) Specialist licences, which allow a company to supply any 
business which has a discount to their wholesale charge; (3) Self-supply licence, which 
allows a company to supply itself with water.253 Licences are available without limit on 
number to any applicant who accepts the licence terms and conditions (setting out, inter 
alia, the required services to be provided and including operational terms setting out the 
interaction between the supplier and the network operator Scottish Water), and who 
satisfies certain technical checks.254 
When the licensing framework was introduced, Scottish Power was required to separate 
its retail services to businesses from its other operations. This created a separate 
business company, now known as Scottish Water Business Stream Ltd. In addition to 
this company, there are currently four other licensed business suppliers in Scotland; 
Aimera Ltd, Wessex Water Enterprises Ltd, Osprey Water Services Ltd (part of the 
Anglian Water Group), and Satec Ltd.255 
IV. Transport 
IV.1. Airport Authorities 
The UK airport sector was privatised in 1987 by the Airports Act 1986. Prior to this, 
airports in the UK were owned through local or central government, either directly or 
                                          
253 Source: http://www.watercommission.co.uk/view_Types_of_licence.aspx [accessed 05/07/11]. 
254 Source: http://www.scotlandontap.gov.uk/view_Water_Suppliers.aspx [accessed 05/07/11]. 
255 Source: http://www.watercommission.co.uk/view_Register_of_licenses.aspx [accessed 05/07/11]. 
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through the British Airport Authority. The 1986 Act dissolved the British Airport Authority 
and its assets were vested in the successor company BAA plc which was floated on the 
stock exchange. The seven airports under its control (Heathrow, Gatwick, Stansted, 
Prestwick, Aberdeen, Edinburgh and Glasgow) were established as private companies 
owned by BAA.256 The Act also required any municipal airports with an annual turnover 
of over £1 million to be registered as private companies, with the local authorities 
owning the shares in those companies.257 The Civil Aviation Authority (CAA) was 
established to regulate the sector. 
The majority of UK airports are now privately owned. BAA (now owned by Spanish 
company Ferrovial) remains the largest company in the sector, currently owning and 
operating six airports in the UK. All airports with an annual turnover of over £1 million 
must gain permission from the CAA in order to levy charges to use the airport from 
airlines.258 Under section 40 of the Airports Act 1986 the Government may designate 
certain airports for detailed economic regulation. This has been done for Heathrow, 
Gatwick, Manchester and Stansted, and so for these companies the CAA sets a price cap 
on the charges levied by the airports for a five year period.259 
IV.2. Port Authorities 
As with the airport sector, ports in the UK are generally owned and operated by private 
companies. Privatisation of the UK port sector began in 1982 under the Transport Act 
1981, which converted the British Transport Docks Board into a private company, known 
as Associated British Ports.260 This company was set up as a subsidiary of Associated 
British Port Holdings plc, which was originally held by the Government but was later 
floated on the stock market, with 49% of the shares being sold in 1983 and the rest in 
                                          
256 +XPSKUH\V,µ3ULYDWLVDWLRQDQG&RPPHUFLDOLVP&KDQJHVLQ8.DLUSRUWRZQHUVKLSSDWWHUQV¶
Journal of Transport Geography 121, at 124. 
257 Sections 13-14 Airports Act 1986. 
258 Section 37 Airports Act 1986. 
259 Section 40(3) Airports Act 1986. 
260 Section 5 Transport Act 1981. 
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1984.261 The second stage of privatisation took place under the Ports Act 1991, which 
gave trust ports the right to establish themselves as companies.262 This privatisation was 
not generally compulsory though the Secretary of State had the power, beginning two 
years after the Act came into force, to issue a direction to any port with an annual 
turnover of over £5 million to require them to privatise.263 This Act led to the 
privatisation of seven trust ports; Clydeport, Dundee, Forth, Ipswich, Sheerness, 
Teesport and Tilbury. Of these, Ipswich was the only port forced to privatise by the 
Secretary of State.264 
There are currently around 100 commercially active ports in the UK, of which 36 handle 
over two million tonnes annually.265 The Department for Transport classifies ports in 
three different types; (1) Company owned ports; (2) Trust ports and; (3) Municipal 
ports.266 The majority of ports are owned by companies and operate in a fully 
competitive market, competing with other ports for custom. The largest of these 
companies is still Associated British Ports Holdings, which currently owns 21 ports in the 
UK.267 Trust ports are independent bodies created by statute for the purpose of 
administering a port. There are 28 trust ports in the UK which register an annual 
turnover of over £500,000, and the sector includes some important ports such as 
Dover.268 The remaining ports are owned by local government, the largest of which are 
Portsmouth, Ramsgate, Sunderland, Weymouth and Workington.269 
IV.3. Bus services 
Under section 108 of the Transport Act 2000, every local transport authority in England 
and Wales PXVW GHYHORS SROLFLHV IRU WKH SURPRWLRQ RI ³VDIH LQWHJUDWHG HIILFLHQW DQd 
                                          
261 Cullinane, K. and Song, D-.µ3RUWSULYDWLVDWLRQSROLF\DQGSUDFWLFH¶Transport Reviews 55, at 
70. 
262 Section 1 Ports Act 1991. 
263 Sections 10 and 11 Ports Act 1991. 
264 Department for Transport, Modern Ports: A UK Policy, (2000), available at 
http://www.dft.gov.uk/pgr/shippingports/ports/modern/modernportsaukpolicy [accessed 05/07/11], at p.29.  
265 Ibid at p.5. 
266 Ibid, at p.28. 
267 A list of the ports owned by the company can be found at http://www.abports.co.uk/index.htm [accessed 
20/01/09]. 
268 Department for Transport, above n.264, at p.29. 
269 Ibid, at p.29. 
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HFRQRPLF WUDQVSRUW IDFLOLWLHV´ LQ WKHLU ORFDO DUHD 7KH\PXVW SXEOLVK WKHVH SROLFLHV LQ D
Local Transport Plan (LTP) every five years and keep the plan under review.270 Each 
county council within England and Wales (outside London) is classed as a local transport 
authority.271 For London, the relevant body is Transport for London. Similar regional 
transport strategies are required in Scotland under the Transport (Scotland) Act 2005, 
where the strategies are the responsibility of regional Transport Partnerships. While bus 
transport is the most commonly used method for ensuring such transport facilities, 
trams and light railways (such as underground systems) are also used. As these fall 
under the jurisdiction of the Office of Rail Regulation along with national rail services, 
they will be discussed in the following section. 
Under section 110 of the Transport Act 2000, every LTP in England and Wales must 
currently contain a bus strategy. This strategy must set out how bus services in the area 
will meet the needs of local residents, those services are provided to the standard that 
the authority considers appropriate and how any additional facilities the authority feels 
are necessary will be provided. The requirement for a bus strategy has been repealed by 
section 10 of the Local Transport Act 2008, though this section is not yet in force. While 
this reform will remove the need to prepare a separate bus strategy, bus policy will likely 
UHPDLQDPDMRUSDUWRIPRVWORFDODXWKRULWLHV¶/73V 
The bus sector in the UK was privatised and fully deregulated in 1985.272  Private 
commercial bus operators are subject to two main licensing and registration 
requirements. Firstly, the operator must obtain a Public Service Vehicle (PSV) operator 
licence from the Vehicle and Operator Services Agency (VOSA) under the Public Services 
9HKLFOHV 2SHUDWRUV¶ /LFHQFHV 5HJXODWLRQV  7KHVH DUH DZDUGHG ZLWKRXW OLPLW RQ
number to any operator satisfying certain financial and technical requirements. 
Secondly, the operator must register the services he wishes to operate under the Public 
Service Vehicles (Registration of Local Services) Regulations 1986. Services are 
                                          
270 Section 108(3) Transport Act 2000. 
271 Section 108(7) Transport Act 2000. 
272 )RUWKHKLVWRU\DQGLPSDFWRIWKHGHUHJXODWLRQVHH:KLWH3µ'HUHJXODWLRQRIEXVVHUYLFHVLQ*UHDW%ULWDLQ
DQLQWURGXFWRU\UHYLHZ¶Transport Review 185. 
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registered with the Traffic Commissioner so long as there are no planned stops in 
London, in which case a London Service Permit must be obtained from Transport for 
London. The Traffic Commissioner must accept all properly completed registration 
applications from a company with a valid PSV operator licence.273 
Despite this privatisation, the Transport Act 2000 provides a number of mechanisms for 
a local authority to work with a transport operator, including quality partnership schemes 
(QPS) and quality contracts schemes (QCS).274 Under a QPS, a local authority agrees to 
provide certain bus facilities, in return for which the bus operator agrees to meet certain 
standards set by the authority in their services.275 Under a QCS, the right to provide bus 
services in a certain area may be given exclusively to one operator in return for an 
agreement to meet certain standards in the service.276 A QCS may only be made where 
LW LV WKH RQO\ SUDFWLFDEOH ZD\ RI LPSOHPHQWLQJ WKH DXWKRULW\¶V EXV VWUDWHJ\ DQG WKH
DXWKRULW\ LV VDWLVILHG WKH VFKHPH ZLOO EH ³HFRQRPLF HIILFLHQW DQG HIIHFWLYH´277 These 
options offer local authorities a measure of control over the operation of bus services in 
their area. 
Transport for London 
Transport for London is the public sector body responsible for all transport within 
London, which covers bus services, the London Underground, Docklands Light Railway, 
London Overground, Tramlink, London River Services and Victoria Coach Station.278 
London Buses Ltd, the organisation within Transport for London with specific 
responsibility for bus services, plans the bus routes, sets the required service levels and 
                                          
273 VOSA, Local Bus Service Registration ± Guide for Operators, (2008), available at 
http://www.vosa.gov.uk/vosacorp/publications/manualsandguides/busserviceregistrationguides.htm [accessed 
05/07/11], at p.5. 
274 Sections 114 and 124 Transport Act 2000. 
275 Section 114(2) Transport Act 2000. 
276 Section 124(4) Transport Act 2000. 
277 Section 124(1) Transport Act 2000. 
278 Source: http://www.tfl.gov.uk/corporate/about-tfl/4510.aspx [accessed 05/07/11]. 
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monitors that service quality. Bus services within London are put out to tender, with 
each route being tendered separately.279 
IV.4. National rail, tram and light railway services 
IV.4.1. Mainline rail 
Prior to 1994, all rail infrastructure and assets were owned and operated by the public 
sector through British Rail. Under the Railways Act 1993 this was changed, with the 
privatisation of the UK rail system, undertaken with the aim of improving the quality of 
the rail service and providing better value for money.280 Under these reforms, the UK rail 
system was split into various parts, with the infrastructure being put under the control of 
one company (originally Railtrack plc, now Network Rail) and the routes being run by 
private companies under a franchise system. The Railways Act 1993 also established the 
regulatory body, the Office of Rail Regulation (ORR).281 The Transport Act 2000 
established a second regulatory body, the Strategic Rail Authority (SRA), with 
responsibility for the franchising process.282 The SRA was, however, abolished in 2006 
and its responsibilities split between ORR and the Department for Transport.283 
x Infrastructure: Network Rail 
At privatisation, the company Railtrack was formed to manage and maintain the rail 
infrastructure previously owned by British Rail, including all the track, signalling 
equipment and stations. Railtrack was run as a public company, aiming to provide a 
financial return to its investors through profit made from leasing track to the train 
operating companies (TOCs).284 The company struggled, however, often failing to meet 
its targets and the rail infrastructure deteriorated throughout the country. In April 2001 
the company was forced to seek a financial bailout from the government and falling 
                                          
279 Source: http://www.tfl.gov.uk/businessandpartners/busoperators/9470.aspx [accessed 05/07/11]. 
280 *ODGGLQJ5µ5DLO5HJXODWLRQLQWKH8.7KH5ROHRI4XDOLW\LQWKH3DVVHQJHU5DLO)UDQFKLVHV¶>@
14(4) Utilities Law Review 151, at 151.  
281 Section 4 Railways Act 1993. 
282 Section 201 Transport Act 2000. 
283 The Railways (Abolition of the Strategic Railway Authority) Order 2006, SI 2006 No.2925. 
284 /H\ODQG3µ7KH Railtrack &DVH0DLQO\RQWKH:URQJ7UDFN"¶>@Utilities Law Review 213, at 
213. 
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share prices meant that a further £3.6 billion had to be requested later in 2001.285 In 
October 2001 the Secretary of State for Transport placed Railtrack into administration, 
and in October 2002 the current body responsible for the rail infrastructure, Network 
Rail, was created. 
Unlike Railtrack, Network Rail is a not-for-profit company limited by guarantee. 
Technically a private company separate from the government, the company is primarily 
financed by debt from the capital markets.286 The company inherited ownership of the 
rail infrastructure from Railtrack, and also owns and operates 18 of the largest stations 
throughout the UK (the remaining stations are leased from Network Rail and operated by 
franchisee TOCs as part of their franchise).287 The company operates on the basis of a 
network licence granted by ORR, which sets out the conditions under which Network Rail 
must operate and the standards it must meet.288 255 PRQLWRUV 1HWZRUN 5DLO¶V
performance and has various enforcement powers at its disposal should it feel that 
performance has been unsatisfactory, including enforcement orders and fines. 
x Train Operating Companies 
The TOCs operate the passenger and freight train services over the UK rail system. 
Passenger services may either be operated by franchisees or by open access operators. 
In order to operate, all TOCs must apply for an access agreement with Network Rail to 
use the rail infrastructure. There is a right of appeal to ORR for any company who feels 
access has been unfairly refused or that the terms are unfairly onerous.289 
 
 
                                          
285 Ibid at 213. 
286 Source: http://www.networkrail.co.uk/aspx/1385.aspx [accessed 05/07/11]. 
287 Birmingham New Street, Cannon Street, Charing Cross, Edinburgh Waverley, Euston, Fenchurch Street, 
*DWZLFN$LUSRUW*ODVJRZ&HQWUDO.LQJ¶V&URVV/HHGV/LYHUSRRO/LPH6WUHHW/LYHUSRRO6WUHHW/RQGRQ%ULGJH
Manchester Piccadilly, Paddington, St. Pancras, Victoria, and Waterloo. Source:  
http://www.networkrail.co.uk/aspx/765.aspx [accessed 05/07/11]. 
288 $FRS\RIWKHOLFHQFHLVDYDLODEOHIURP255¶VZHEVLWHDWhttp://www.rail-
reg.gov.uk/upload/pdf/netwrk_licence.pdf [accessed 05/07/11]. 
289 The Railways Infrastructure (Access and Management) Regulations 2005, SI 2005 No. 3049. 
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1. Freight 
Freight trains move goods by rail. All freight companies must obtain a licence from ORR 
under Reg. 5 of the Railway (Licensing of Railway Undertakings) Regulations 2005290. 
Licences are available without limit on number to any operator satisfying certain financial 
and technical criteria.291 
2. Franchisees 
Franchisees run the majority of the passenger services in the UK. When British Rail was 
privatised, the routes the company ran were split into various regional franchise routes. 
These franchise routes are awarded to companies under competitive tendering 
procedures run by the Department of Transport. The franchising process was chosen in 
order to introduce competition into the sector but also to maintain the possibility of 
government subsidies to keep rural unprofitable services operating.292 
As with freight services, a licence is necessary from ORR under Reg. 5 of the Railway 
(Licensing of Railway Undertakings) Regulations 2005 and an access agreement must be 
made with Network Rail for access to the infrastructure network. The franchisee leases 
their trains from rolling stock companies (ROSCOs), a cost they must factor into their 
bid. There are currently 16 franchisees operating in the UK.293 
3. Open Access 
Open access passenger TOCs operate outside of a franchise agreement, applying to ORR 
for the right to operate a specific train route.294 Open access operators are fully private 
companies who compete with the franchisees for passengers. As with both freight and 
franchise services, a licence to operate a passenger service must be obtained from ORR 
                                          
290 SI 2005, No. 3050. 
291 ORR, Criteria and Procedures for granting licences and licence exemptions (2011), available at 
http://www.rail-reg.gov.uk/upload/pdf/406.pdf [accessed 05/07/11] 
292 Gladding, above n.280, at 153. 
293 A list of current franchisees can be found on the Department for Transport website at 
http://www.dft.gov.uk/topics/rail-passenger-franchises/public-register/ [accessed 05/07/11] 
294 'RZQLH*$QG6MRVWHGW&µ2552SHQ$FFHVVLV%DFNRQ7UDFNGNER v Office of Rail Regulation¶
[2005/2006] 15(2) Utilities Law Review 59, at 59. 
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and an access arrangement made with Network Rail. There are currently eight open 
access operators in the UK: Eurostar, London Underground, Heathrow Express, Hull 
Trains, North Yorkshire Moors Railway, Nexus, Grand Central, and West Coast 
Railway.295 
IV.4.2. Trams, Underground Rail and Light Railways 
A tramway is a rail system built at street level, and often sharing the road with traffic. A 
light railway is an urban rail transportation system which operates with lighter 
equipment and at lower speeds than the mainline rail system. These systems are also 
regulated by ORR, mainly to ensure health and safety. There are 9 companies in the UK 
providing tram and underground or light rail services296: 
x Croydon Tramlink 
x Docklands Light Railway  
x London Underground  
x Manchester Metrolink 
x Midland Metro 
x Nottingham Express Transit 
x Sheffield Supertram 
x Strathclyde Partnership for Transport (operating the Glasgow subway system) 
x Tyne and Wear Metro 
Docklands Light Railway, the London Underground and Croydon Tramlink are all owned 
and operated by the public sector body Transport for London. The Strathclyde 
Partnership for Transport is also a public sector body, established by the Transport 
(Scotland) Act 2005.297 The Tyne and Wear Metro is owned and operated by Nexus, the 
Tyne and Wear Passenger Transport Executive. The remaining tramways and light 
                                          
295 Source: http://www.networkrail.co.uk/aspx/2369.aspx [accessed 05/07/11]. 
296 Source: http://www.rail-reg.gov.uk/server/show/nav.1353 [accessed 05/07/11]. 
297 Section 1 Transport (Scotland) Act 2005. 
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railways have been awarded by the relevant local transport authority to the private 
companies through a competitive tendering process. 
V. Postal Services 
The postal services sector is the most recent sector to be included in the utilities 
procurement regime, being added in the 2004 reforms. As Glynn and Stubbs note, the 
regulatory history of this sector has shown slower progress towards deregulation and 
more opposition to opening to competition than in the other utility sectors.298 While the 
UK has made moves to open the sector to competition in recent years ± and now has 
one of the most open markets in Europe ± Royal Mail is still the major player in the 
sector, delivering 99% of all mail in the UK299, and so this company will be the main 
IRFXVRIWKLVVHFWLRQ7KHVHFWLRQZLOOEHJLQZLWKDEULHIRYHUYLHZRI5R\DO0DLO¶VVWUXFWXUH
before examining the various postal activities, the universal service obligation and 
finally, the state of competition in the UK. 
V.1. Royal Mail 
Royal Mail Group Ltd is the main postal service provider in the UK. This company is a 
wholly-owned subsidiary of Royal Mail Holdings plc, a public limited company in which 
the UK Government hold 100% of the shares. The company was first established under 
the name Consignia in 2001, replacing the previous service provider, the Post Office, 
which was a statutory public corporation. The company changed its name to Royal Mail 
in 2002. Royal Mail Group Ltd operates its mail services through the Royal Mail brand 
and operates an express/courier service in the UK through the Parcelforce Worldwide 
brand. Royal Mail Group Ltd also owns the subsidiary companies General Logistics 
Systems BV (GLS), which operates express/courier parcel delivery services in Europe, 
and Post Office Ltd, which offers a range of postal, financial and retail services. The 
                                          
298 Glynn, D. aQG6WXEEV'µ7KHHQGWRWKHSRVWDOH[FHSWLRQ"¶LQ5RELQVRQ&HGUtility Regulation in 
Competitive Markets, (2007, Cheltenham: Edward Elgar), at p.119. 
299 Hooper, R., Hutton, D. and Smith, I. Modernise or Decline: Policies to maintain the universal postal service 
in the United Kingdom, (2008), available at http://www.berr.gov.uk/files/file49389.pdf [accessed 05/07/11], 
at p.48. 
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PDMRULW\RI5R\DO0DLO*URXS¶VUHYHQXHFRPHVIURPWKHSRVWDOVHUYLFHVof the main Royal 
Mail brand.300 
V.2. Postal Services Activities 
The postal sector as it relates to the Utilities Directive covers the collection, sorting, 
transportation and delivery of mail (covering letters, packets and parcels). It also covers 
some financial activities such as postal giro orders when these activities are done by a 
body which also provides postal services.301 The postal market as a whole is worth an 
estimated £11 billion per year.302 The market may usefully be divided into addressed 
letters, unaddressed mail, express or courier delivery, standard parcel delivery, and the 
auxiliary services provided by Post Office Ltd. 
V.2.1. Letters 
The letter market covers addressed mail under 350g and/or which costs less than £1 to 
send (the area for which a licence is required). It also covers any parcels which are small 
enough to fit through a letter box.303 Mail delivery is completed in five stages: (1) 
collection from post boxes, post offices and businesses; (2) sorting by region; (3) 
transport to the correct regional mail centre; (4) sorting into the correct local delivery 
³ZDONV´GHOLYHU\WRILQDODGGUHVV:KLOHWKLVVHFWRULVQRZIXOO\RSHQWRFRPSHWLWLRQ
in practice most operators still rely on Royal Mail to complete the final stage, the delivery 
to the consumer.  
V.2.2. Unaddressed Mail 
This covers any mail put through a letterbox which does not have an address, such as 
free newspapers and advertisements. It does not require any kind of licence to deliver.  
 
                                          
300 72.8% in 2007-8, see Hooper, Hutton and Smith, ibid, at p.24. 
301 Art. 6(2) Utilities Directive. 
302 Postcomm, UK Postal Market: Competitive Market Review, (2008), available at 
http://www.psc.gov.uk/documents/571.pdf [accessed 05/07/11] at p.4. 
303Ibid, at p.5. 
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V.2.3. Express or courier delivery 
This area covers any mail over 350g which is guaranteed to arrive by a certain time or 
day, and any service which requires a signature on receipt or which includes a tracking 
service. Express and courier services are not regulated in the UK.304 
V.2.4. Standard Parcel Delivery 
Standard parcel delivery covers any package over 350g which is not guaranteed to arrive 
before a certain time.305 
V.2.5. Auxiliary Services: Post Office Ltd 
There are approximately 11,500 Post Office outlets in the UK.306 The Post Office offers a 
range of postal services supporting Royal Mail such as collection of postal items and the 
sale of stamps. In addition to this it also provides a number of financial and retail 
services. These include insurance, banking and investment services, which are regulated 
activities under the Utilities Directive when completed by a body which also offers postal 
services. However, they also include unregulated activities such as licensing services. 
V.3. The Universal Service Obligation 
The rHTXLUHPHQWIRUD³XQLYHUVDOSRVWDOVHUYLFH´LQHDFK(80HPEHU6WDWHLVODLGGRZQLQ
Article 3 of Directive 97/67/EC.307 In the UK, this is implemented in Section 4 of the 
Postal Services Act 2000. This sets out the requirements of a universal postal service as: 
x At least one delivery of postal items every working day to the home of every 
individual in the UK. 
x At least one collection of postal items every working day from each access point. 
                                          
304Hooper, Hutton and Smith, above n.299, at p.26. 
305Postcomm, above n.302, at p.5. 
306 Source: http://www.postoffice.co.uk/portal/po/jump1?mediaId=20000192&catId=63400714 [accessed 
05/07/11] 
307 Directive 97/67/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 15 December 1997 on common rules 
for the development of the internal market of Community postal services and the improvement of quality of 
service, OJ L15. 
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x A service of conveying postal items from one place to another, in addition to the 
incidental services of receiving, collecting, sorting and delivering those items, 
provided at an affordable price which is uniform throughout the UK. 
x A registered post service provided at an affordable price. 
The requirement that the price be uniform throughout the country is a UK addition. The 
EU Directive requires only that the prices be affordable and does not expand on this 
obligation.308 Royal Mail is the current universal service provider (USP) for the UK and is 
required under the terms of its postal licence to ensure the requirements of Section 4 of 
the Postal Services Act 2000 are fulfilled. This Act also created the Postal Services 
Commission (Postcomm), a regulatory body whose duty it is to protect the universal 
service.309 
V.4. Competition 
The impetus for opening the postal market to competition has mainly come from the EU, 
which aims to create an internal market for postal services, with the most recent 
directive setting a date of December 2010 for competition to be introduced throughout 
the EU.310 The UK has opened the market faster than the EU required. Postcomm 
introduced competition in the UK in a number of stages since 2001, moving from the 
introduction of niche licences to opening up the bulk mail market until finally fully 
opening the postal market from 1 January 2006.   
With the exception of letter delivery, the majority of postal services are unregulated and 
open to any company. A licence is required from Postcomm in order to deliver any mail 
weighing under 350g. As of 2011, there were 57 licensed operators, including Royal 
Mail.311 Licences are available without restriction on number to any company which can 
                                          
308 Art. 12 Directive 97/67/EC. 
309 Sections 1 and 3 Postal Services Act 2000. 
310 Art. 2 Directive 2008/6/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 20 February 2008 amending 
Directive 97/67/EC with regard to the full accomplishment of the internal market of Community postal services, 
OJ L52/3. 
311 An up-to-date list of all licensHGSRVWDORSHUDWRUVFDQEHIRXQGRQ3RVWFRPP¶VZHEVLWH
athttp://www.psc.gov.uk/postallicencesandoperators/licensedoperators [accessed 05/07/11]]. 
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fulfil the requirements set down by Postcomm regarding mail integrity and common 
operational procedures.312 
While some licensed compaQLHVKDYHGHYHORSHGDORFDOGHOLYHU\QHWZRUNDQGRIIHU³HQG-
to-HQG´FROOHFWLRQDQGGHOLYHU\VHUYLFHVPRVWFRPSHWLWLRQRSHUDWHVWKURXJKFRPPHUFLDO
³DFFHVVDUUDQJHPHQWV´ GXH WR WKHGLIILFXOW\ LQ VHWWLQJXSDQDWLRQZLGHQHWZRUN8QGHU
these arrangements the postal companies negotiate with Royal Mail for access to their 
main sorting offices and for permission to use Royal Mail staff and services for the final 
delivery to the consumer, in return for a fee paid by the company to Royal Mail. Under 
the terms of Ro\DO 0DLO¶V SRVWDO OLFHQFH 5R\DO 0DLO LV UHTXLUHG WR QHJRWLDWH VXFK DQ
agreement with any rival licensed postal operator who wishes access to the postal 
network. If Royal Mail and the company are unable to come to a suitable arrangement 
they may ask Postcomm to intervene and set the terms. Postcomm may also intervene 
where access is denied.313 
VI. Conclusion 
This chapter has set out an overview of the operation of the UK utility sector in those 
areas governed by the Utilities Directive from which the sample for the empirical 
research was drawn. It can be seen that the size of the different sector and the amount 
of competition in each varies greatly, factors which may impact on both the use of CSR 
policies by the companies and their views and approach to compliance with the EU 
procurement regime. The following chapter will set out an overview of the EU utilities 
procurement regulation, setting out in more detail the precise level of procurement 
regulation applicable to each sector covered in this chapter. 
  
  
                                          
312 Postcomm, Postal Licence Applications ± Guidance for Applicants (2010), available at 
http://www.psc.gov.uk/documents/1962.pdf [accessed 05/07/11] 
313 Information on access complaints may be found at 
http://www.psc.gov.uk/regulating/postcomm_investigations [accessed 05/07/11] 
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Chapter 5 - The European Union Legal Regime on Procurement 
I. Introduction 
This chapter will set out the EU legal regime applying to procurement, focusing on 
utilities procurement. The chapter aims to describe the framework of legal rules which 
govern the procurement of the utilities sector, giving a background to a more specific 
discussion of the particular procurement rules relating to labour policies which this thesis 
will consider later. The procurement policy and legal framework discussed here will 
influence the procurement practices of utilities, whether CSR policies are included in 
those practices and, if so, how they are structured. The chapter will first examine the 
policy behind the EU procurement regulation. This will be followed by an overview of the 
relevant rules under both the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU) 
and Directive 2004/17/EC314 (the Utilities Directive). 
II. Reasons for Procurement Regulation 
One of the most important aims of the European Union (EU) is the creation of a common 
market, an area of economic integration which will eliminate any barriers in the free 
movement of goods, persons, services and capital.315  The EU is based on the economic 
theory that removing these trade barriers will improve the economic growth of the EU in 
general, and of the individual member states.316 Public procurement refers to the 
purchase by the public sector of the goods, services and works it requires, and it may 
act as a barrier to trade where government favours national suppliers over international 
suppliers, specifically European suppliers in the EU context. Governments may favour 
national suppliers for a variety of reasons, including policy reasons such as supporting 
national industry or combating local unemployment, and more simple reasons such as a 
                                          
314 Directive 2004/17/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council coordinating the procurement 
procedures of entities operating in the water, energy, transport and postal services sectors, OJ 2004 No. 
L134/1. 
315 Art. 3 Treaty on European Union. 
316 For a detailed discussion of the theory behind, and development of, the EU single market, see Craig, P. and 
de Búrca, G. EU Law: Text, Cases and Materials, (4th Ed), (2008, Oxford: OUP), at Ch. 17.   
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lack of awareness of foreign suppliers.317 These barriers to trade caused by nationalistic 
purchasing practices are significant due to the size of the government market, estimated 
in 2002 to be worth 16.3% of the overall GDP of the EU.318 
Procurement regulation often focuses on the special nature of public markets. In private 
procurement the effect of competition should prevent nationalistic purchasing where this 
would be unprofitable, but public markets do not operate in the same manner. They do 
not have the same focus on increasing profit and also differ in structure both in demand 
and supply and in other areas such as risk.319 Procurement regulation aims to ensure 
that public markets operate like private markets despite these differences, opening up 
public procurement to competition and preventing discrimination on grounds of 
nationality. 
The utilities sector regulation covers both public bodies and public undertakings, to 
ZKLFKWKHDERYHDUJXPHQWVZLOODOVRDSSO\DQGSULYDWHERGLHVZLWK³VSHFLal or exclusive 
ULJKWV´320 (discussed further below, in the section on the Utilities Directive). There are 
two connected reasons for including these private bodies in any procurement regulation. 
The first is that the special or exclusive rights which the firm is in possession of may 
make them vulnerable to pressure from government to favour national suppliers in its 
procurement.321 Being dependent on the rights awarded by the government to stay in 
business will make a utility less able to resist such pressure than other private firms. The 
second reason is the fact that the rights on which the firms operate are limited to a 
certain number of firms and so those firms are not subject to the same competitive 
pressures when purchasing as firms in a completely open market would be.322 Linked to 
the first reason, this lack of competition also makes it harder for the firms to resist 
                                          
317 Arrowsmith, S. The Law of Public and Utilities Procurement, (2nd Ed), (2005, London: Sweet and Maxwell), 
at pp.121-122. 
318 Ibid, at p.123. 
319 Bovis, C. EU Public Procurement Law, (2007, Cheltenham: Edward Elgar Publishing), at p.12. 
320 Art. 2(2)(b) Utilities Directive. 
321 .RWVRQLV7µ7KH'HILQLWLRQRI6SHFLDORU([FOXVLYH5LJKWVLQWKH8WLOLWLHV'LUHFWLYHLeased Lines or Crossed 
:LUHV"¶>@33/5DW 
322 Ibid, at 88. 
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government pressure. As with public bodies, it is felt that regulation is needed to combat 
the effects of this lack of competition. 
The EU regulation of procurement thus aims to prevent discrimination, especially on 
grounds of nationality, and to combat the lack of competition in public and utilities 
procurement. In order to fulfil these aims the EU regulation both prevents public and 
utility sector bodies from adopting procurement practices which discriminate against 
other European states, and imposes certain transparent regulatory procedures which 
must be followed when procuring, to allow the non-discrimination obligations to be 
monitored easily.323 Member States, however, may be less concerned with avoiding 
discrimination in their procurement and more concerned with ensuring the process is as 
efficient as possible and that they receive value for money in their procurement. Entities 
in the utility sector may also face commercial pressures (such as those mentioned in the 
previous chapter as factors which drive the development of CSR policies) which mean 
that they need to include CSR issues in their procurement to stay profitable. These 
needs may conflict with the strict requirements of the EU rules. In addition, utilities must 
balance the non-GLVFULPLQDWLRQGHPDQGVRI WKH(8¶VSURFXUHPHQWSROLF\ZLWK WKH IRFXV
on improving CSR policies which the EU also promotes, as discussed in the previous 
chapter.  
The EU regime is in theory only a framework of rules designed to apply only to those 
contracts where there is a possibility of intra-Community competition, and Member 
States are free to regulate how they wish within this framework.324 However, as Trepte 
notes WKH UHFHQW WUHQG LQ WKH (8 UHJXODWLRQ KDV EHHQ ³WRZDUGV DSSO\LQJ HYHU PRUH
UHJXODWLRQ WR FRQWUDFWV RI GLPLQLVKLQJ YDOXH´325 7KLV WUHQG UHGXFHV VWDWHV¶ IUHHGRP WR
regulate their procurement as they wish, including their freedom to include policies such 
as CSR policies. The sections which follow will examine the EU rules in more detail. 
 
                                          
323 Arrowsmith, above n.317, at p.125. 
324 Case C31/87 Gebroeders Beentjes BV v Netherlands [1988] ECR 4635, at para. 20. 
325 Trepte, P-A, 3XEOLF3URFXUHPHQWLQWKH(8$3UDFWLWLRQHU¶V*XLGH, (2nd Ed), (2007, Oxford: OUP), at p.3. 
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III. The TFEU Rules 
III.1 Introduction 
While the TFEU has no principles in it which relate expressly to procurement, several of 
the internal market provisions and the fundamental principles of the Treaty affect 
procurement in practice. These Treaty principles operate in addition to the rules under 
the directives and so affect all procurement contracts, but they are of special importance 
for contracts which fall outside the scope of the procurement directives, such as 
contracts below the financial thresholds. The Treaty rules are also relevant for utilities 
which have gained an exemption from the Utilities Directive rules under Article 30 of that 
directive (see below). The most important rules for procurement are the free movement 
provisions; the free movement of goods (Article 34 TFEU), freedom of establishment 
(Article 49 TFEU) and the freedom to provide services (Article 56 TFEU). Article 18 TFEU, 
which prohibits discrimination on grounds of nationality, and Article 107 TFEU, dealing 
with state aid, are also relevant. Finally, in the utilities context, Article 106 TFEU is 
important when considering the position of private entities with special or exclusive 
rights under the Treaty. 
III.2 The Free Movement Provisions 
III.2.1. Free Movement of Goods 
$UWLFOH  7)(8 IRUELGV ³TXDQWLWDWLYH UHVWULFWLRQV RQ LPSRUWV DQG DOO PHDVXUHV KDYLQJ
HTXLYDOHQWHIIHFW´7KH&RXUWRI-XVWLFHRIWKH(XURSHDQ8QLRQ&-(8 has held that this 
prohibits DQ\ UXOH ZKLFK LV ³FDSDEOH RI KLQGHULQJ GLUHFWO\ RU LQGLUHFWO\ DFWXDOO\ RU
potentially, intra-&RPPXQLW\ WUDGH´326 Article 49 prohibits a state from discriminating 
against foreign individuals and companies wishing to establish themselves in that state. 
Article 56 is similar, but prohibits discrimination against individuals wishing to provide a 
temporary service in a Member State rather than establish themselves there. 
                                          
326 Case 8/74, Procureur du Roi v Dassonville [1974] ECR 837 
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While Article 34 and the other free movement provisions are generally used to prevent 
restrictions affecting the whole market, they apply equally where only access to the 
public market is restricted, as with discriminatory procurement measures.327 Article 34 
and the other free movement provisions apply to the state, which includes public bodies 
and local authorities, covering contracting authorities under the Public Sector Directive 
and Utilities Directive.328 Bodies classed as public undertakings under the Utilities 
Directive are probably also covered, though it is arguable that this is not automatic but 
depends on the level of control by public authorities in the specific procurement.329 It is 
less clear whether it covers bodies with special or exclusive rights under the Utilities 
Directive (see section on Article 106 below). 
The free movement provisions prevent both rules which discriminate against imports 
(direct discrimination)330 and rules which appear to apply to both national and foreign 
goods equally but which are in fact harder for foreign goods to comply with (indirect 
discrimination).331 They also prevent rules which do not discriminate against foreign 
goods either directly or indirectly but which nevertheless form hindrances to trade (non-
discriminatory rules).332 
The application of Article 34 to these non-discriminatory rules was later limited by the 
CJEU in the case of Keck, which introduced a distinction between rules relating to the 
characteristics of the goods themselves, which are caught by Article 34, and rules 
concerning selling arrangements, which are not.333 This distinction is hard to apply in a 
procurement situation, however, where conditions may concern matters such as the pay 
of the workforce producing the goods, which is neither a rule concerning the 
characteristics of the supplies nor a selling arrangement. Unlike Article 34, the impact of 
                                          
327 Arrowsmith, above n.317, at p.183. 
328 Trepte, above n.325, at p.8. 
329 Arrowsmith, above n.317, at p.208. 
330 See, for example, Case C-21/88, Du Pont de Nemours Italiana SpA v Unita Sanitaria Locale No. 2 Di Carrara 
[1990] I-ECR 889.  
331 See, for example, Case 45/87, Commission v Ireland [1988] ECR 4929. 
332 See Case 120/78, Rewe-Zentrale AG v Bundesmonopolverwaltung für Branntwein>@(&5³Cassis 
de Dijon´ for goods, and Case C-384/93, Alpine Investments BV v Minister van Financien[1995] ECR I-1141 
for services. 
333 Cases C-267 and 268/91, Criminal Proceedings against Keck and Mithouard [1993] ECR I-³Keck´DW
paras. 15-17. 
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Articles 49 and 56 on non-discriminatory measures has not been limited in any way and 
so it appears that any condition imposed by an authority in a procurement for services is 
prima facie a restriction on trade which must be justified.334 
If a measure is found to violate Article 34 it may be saved if it is justifiable under a 
Treaty exception or an objective justification recognised by the CJEU. The Treaty 
exceptions to Article 34 are found in Article 36 TFEU. The Treaty exceptions for Articles 
49 and 56 are found in Articles 51 and 52.335 To successfully derogate from Article 34, 
WKH PHDVXUH PXVW DOVR QRW GLVFULPLQDWH ³DUELWUDULO\´ DQG PXVW QRW EH D ³GLVJXLVHG
UHVWULFWLRQ RQ WUDGH´336 Also, under the principle of proportionality, the measure must 
not go beyond what is necessary to achieve its aim.337 A measure may also be justified 
E\DJURXQGUHFRJQLVHGE\WKH&-(8D³PDQGDWRU\UHTXLUHPHQW´ IRUJRRGV³REMHFWLYH
MXVWLILFDWLRQV´ IRU VHUYLFHV DQG HVWDEOLVKPHQW338 A non-exhaustive list of such 
mandatory requirements was given by the Court in Cassis de Dijon and the court may 
add to that list at any time. It was previously argued that directly discriminatory 
measures could only be justified by Treaty exceptions but this no longer seems to be the 
case since Preussen-Elektra339, where environmental concerns, a court-based 
justification, were used to justify a directly discriminatory measure. 
7KHIUHHPRYHPHQWUXOHVVLJQLILFDQWO\UHVWULFWDSURFXULQJHQWLW\¶VDELOLW\WR LPSRVHDQ\
CSR conditions focusing on improving local conditions, for example to combat local 
unemployment. If it is the case that any condition is prima facie a restriction on trade, 
utilities may be unable to include most labour policies, as they would seem to be 
unjustifiable under the Treaty or CJEU justifications, as discussed in  Chapter 6.  
 
 
                                          
334 Case C-234/03, Contse SA, Vivisol Srl & Oxigen Salud SA v Instituto Nacional de Gestión Sanitaria (Ingesa) 
[2005] ECR I-³Contse´ 
335 Made applicable to services by Article 62 TFEU. 
336 Article 36 TFEU. 
337 Case 104/75, Officier van Justitie v De Peijper[1976] ECR 613. 
338 Cassis de Dijon, above n.20. 
339 Case C-379/98, Preussen-Elektra AG v Schleswag AG [2001] ECR I-³Preussen-Elektra´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III.3 The Principle of Transparency 
While most of the requirements of the TFEU are simply negative obligations such as non-
discrimination, the CJEU has also stated that the Treaty sets out a positive obligation of 
transparency. This obligation generally requires that procuring entities advertise the 
contracts they propose to award, even where they fall outside the scope of the 
procurement directives. The scope of the requirement and the degree of advertising 
required are debated widely. 
A principle of transparency under the TFEU had been mentioned by the CJEU in the cases 
of RI.SAN340 and Unitron,341 but the principle was not examined in any detail or its 
obligations stated until the case of Telaustria.342 This case concerned a service 
concession contract, a type of contract excluded from the procurement directives. The 
&-(8 VWDWHG WKDW WKH WUDQVSDUHQF\ REOLJDWLRQ XQGHU WKH 7)(8 UHTXLUHG ³D GHJUHH RI
advertising sufficient to enable the services market to be opened up to competition and 
WKH LPSDUWLDOLW\ RI SURFXUHPHQW SURFHGXUHV WR EH UHYLHZHG´343 The Court did not, 
KRZHYHUH[SDQGRQZKDWD³VXIILFLHQW´GHJUHHRIDGYHUWLVLQJZRXOGEH 
The CJEU confirmed that Treaty principles (which would include the principle of 
WUDQVSDUHQF\ DSSO\ WR FRQWUDFWV EHORZ WKH GLUHFWLYHV¶ WKUHVKROGV LQ WKH FDVH RI
Vestergaard.344 The application of the principle to non-SULRULW\ VHUYLFHV RU ³3DUW %
services, see further below in Utilities Directive section), which are subject to a more 
flexible regime under the directives, was confirmed by the CJEU in Commission v 
Ireland.345 Beyond this the scope of the obligation is uncertain, though Advocate-General 
Jacobs has stated in his Opinion in the case of Commission v Italy346 that any contract 
                                          
340 Case C-108/98, RI.SAN. Srl v Comune di Ischia, Italia Lavoro SpA and Ischia Ambiente SpA[1999] ECR I-
05219 
341 Case C-275/98, Unitron Scandinavia A/S and 3-S A/S, Danske Svineproducenters Serviceselskab v 
Ministeriet for Fødevarer, Landbrugog Fiskeri [1999] ECR I-08291. 
342 Case C-324/98,Telaustria and Telefonadress v Telekom Austria [2000] ECR I-10745. 
343 Ibid, at para. 62. 
344 Case C-59/00, Bent Mousten Vestergaard v Spøttrup Boligselskab[2001] ECR I-09505. 
345 Case C-507/03, Commission v Ireland [2007] ECR I-09777. 
346 Opinion of Advocate General, Case C-525/03, Commission v Italy, [2005] ECR I-09405, at paras. 40-49.   
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which would have a derogation from the directives were it subject to those directives 
(e.g. for extreme urgency) should also have a derogation from the Treaty requirements. 
In this case the CJEU also confirmed the requirement, previously suggested in 
Coname,347 that for the Treaty principles to apply, the contract must be of cross-border 
interest. In the case of a dispute, the burden of proof for showing such cross-border 
interest lies with the Commission.348 This was confirmed recently in the case of 
SECAP.349 Generally it is for the procuring entity to decide whether a particular contract 
is of cross-border interest, though a Member State may set out guidelines for 
determining this in national law.350 
The degree of advertising required to fulfil the transparency obligation has not been 
considered by the CJEU. The Commission has released a Communication in which it sets 
out its interpretation of the requirement.351 Following this, it is for the contracting 
authority to determine the degree of advertising appropriate for the particular contract, 
though there must be some positive advertising; it is not enough to simply contact a 
range of firms.352 Possible means of advertising suggested by the Commission are 
through websites, national newspapers and through publication in the Official Journal of 
the European Union. The advertisement should set out the essential details of the 
contract and the award procedure the contracting entity is using.353 
III.4 Non-discrimination 
Article 18 TFEU prohibits any discrimination on the grounds of nationality. It requires 
that any EU member is treated no less favourably than nationals of the particular 
Member State in question, and so would prevent any procurement measures which 
favoured national suppliers over other EU suppliers. The Article only applies to EU 
                                          
347 Case C-231/03, Consorzio Aziende Metano (Coname) v Comune di Cingia de' Botti [2005] I-07287. 
348 Commission v Ireland, above n.331, at para. 32. 
349 Joined Cases C-147/06 and C-148/06, SECAP SpA v Commune di Torino, Judgment of the Court of 15 May 
2008. 
350 Ibid, at para. 30. 
351 European Commission, Commission Interpretive Communication on the Community law applicable to 
contract awards not or not fully subject to the provisions of the Public Procurement Directives (2006) OJ C 
179/2. 
352 Ibid, at para. 2.1. 
353 Ibid, at para. 2.1.3. 
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nationals, allowing discrimination against non-EU persons.354 All the free movement 
provisions implement the principle of non-discrimination in their particular areas and so 
the provision is rarely invoked independently.355 
III.5 State Aid356 
To prevent any distortion to competition, the TFEU, in Article 107, forbids any aid given 
E\DVWDWHWRLQGXVWU\LQWKDWVWDWH7KHFRQFHSWRIDLGFRYHUVDQ\³HFRQRPLFDGYDQWDJH
which [the undertakinJ@ ZRXOG QRW KDYH UHFHLYHG XQGHU QRUPDO PDUNHW FRQGLWLRQV´
examples being a contract awarded on unusually favourable terms or a contracting entity 
procuring something for which it has no genuine need.357   Since an advantage must be 
conferred, there is no state aid if the aid given to a firm is simply compensation for 
services provided by that firm, as will be the case in properly performed procurement 
procedures.358 Article 107(2) sets out types of aid which are automatically compatible 
with the Treaty, for example aid to deal with the consequences of natural disasters. 
Article 107(3) sets out types of aid which may be considered compatible with the Treaty 
at the discretion of the European Commission, which includes regional development and 
may be relevant for social policies in procurement.359 If the Commission decides that the 
aid is not compatible, the aid must be repaid with interest.360 
There are two conditions for aid to fall within Article 107; the advantage given to the 
undertaking must come from state resources, and the measure must be imputable to the 
state.361 As regards the first condition, aid comes from state resources when it is given 
by any entity subject to the dominant influence of the state, which for bodies covered by 
the Utilities Directive will cover contracting authorities and public undertakings.362 For 
                                          
354 Trepte, above n. 325, at p.6. 
355 Arrowsmith, above n.317, at p.218. 
356 Ibid, at pp.219-232. 
357 Case C-39/94, Syndicat )UDQoDLVGHO¶([SUHVVLQWHUQDWLRQDO6)(,Y/D3RVWH[1996] ECR I-3547. 
358 Case C-280/00, Altmark Trans GmbH and Regierungspräsidium Magdeburg v Nahverkehrsgesellschaft 
Altmark GmbH, [2003] ECR I-7747. 
359 For an overview of the procedural rules for notifying state aid to the Commission, see Craig and de Burca, 
above n.316, at pp. 1098-1102.   
360 Case 310/85, Deufil v Commission [1987] ECR 901. 
361 Cases 67, 68 and 70/85, Kwerkerij Gebroeders Van der Kooy BV v Commission [1988] ECR 219. 
362 Case C-482/99, France v Commission [2002] ECR I-³Stardust Marine´ 
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private entities with special or exclusive rights no state resources are generally used so 
those entities will only be covered by Article 107 if the state provides the entity with 
specific resources for that contract.363 As regards the second requirement, while actions 
by a contracting authority will probably always be imputable to the state, for a public 
undertaking it must be considered whether a public authority was involved in giving the 
aid. In the case of Stardust Marine the CJEU set out a number of indicators of the 
relevant amount of control needed for a measure to be imputable to the state, such as 
the level of managerial supervision.364 If these are not satisfied, the measure will not fall 
within Article 107. 
III.6 Article 106: Entities with special or exclusive rights 
Article 106(1) TFEU states: 
In the case of public undertakings and undertakings to which Member States 
grant special or exclusive rights, Member States shall neither enact nor maintain 
in force any measure contrary to the rules contained in this Treaty. 
This article is important for determining the application of other Treaty articles to public 
undertakings and entities with special or exclusive rights under the Utilities Directive. 
The article is addressed to the Member States, not the undertakings themselves, and so 
it would seem that only the government will be liable for any breach of a Treaty 
provision by an undertaking. However, where an undertaking is covered directly by a 
Treaty provision, as may be the case with public undertakings under the free movement 
provisions (see above), there will be joint liability.365 
As under the Utilities Directive, public undertaking covers any undertaking which a public 
authority has a dominant influence over due to ownership, financial participation, or the 
rules governing that undertaking.366 For entities with special or exclusive rights, an 
                                          
363 Arrowsmith, above n.317, at p.230. 
364 Stardust Marine, above n.362, at paras.55-56. 
365 Arrowsmith, above n.317, at p.236. 
366 Joined Cases 188-190/80, France, Italy and the UK v Commission [1982] ECR 2545. See also Art. 2(1)(b) 
Utilities Directive. 
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exclusive right appears to refer to any right given to a single entity, and special rights to 
rights given under certain conditions to a limited number of entities, such as a licence to 
operate an energy network.367 It is arguable that where the right is open to anyone 
under objective criteria it is not a special or exclusive right given that there is little 
opportunity for the state to influence the undertaking in those circumstances.368 While it 
is not clear whether the concept of special and exclusive rights under Article 2 of the 
Utilities Directive is the same as under Article 106, it seems likely that most utilities have 
special or exclusive rights within the Article 106 definition and so will also be regulated 
by the Treaty.  
A Member State will violate Article 106 when it takes a measure in relation to a public 
undertaking or an entity with special or exclusive rights which is itself a violation of 
another Treaty article.369 Sierra argues that the article may also be violated when the 
entity itself takes a measure which would violate another Treaty provision if it were a 
Member State.370 Arrowsmith, however, argues that the position is analogous to the 
rules for state aid set out in Stardust Marine (see above), and so the article is only 
violated where the Member State is involved in the relevant measure, determined by 
examining the factors set out in that case.371 If this is correct, it would remove private 
utilities from the scope of the Treaty for most contracts, allowing them greater freedom 
in their procurement and increasing the scope for CSR policies to be included. 
IV. The Procurement Directives 
IV.1 History 
In addition to the rules on procurement deriving from the TFEU, the EU also regulates 
procurement through a system of directives. These directives set out certain positive 
obligations, such as transparent award procedures, which support the negative Treaty 
obligations. Essentially, the directives require that procuring entities advertise their 
                                          
367 Arrowsmith, above n.317, at p.238. 
368 Ibid, at p.238. 
369 Ibid, at p.235. 
370 Sierra, B. Exclusive Rights and EC Monopolies under EC Law, (1999, Oxford: OUP), at p.192. 
371 Arrowsmith, above n.317, at p.235. 
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contracts and then hold a competition between any interested firms on the basis of 
certain specified criteria, within certain set time frames. In 2004, the procurement 
directives underwent a major reform. This section will examine the rules under the 
directives and the effects of this reform in more detail, focusing on the Utilities Directive. 
For the public sector, the first procurement directives (the co-ordination directives) were 
adopted in the 1970s, regulating public works contracts and public supplies contracts.372 
These directives were amended in the 1980s and again in the 1990s, eventually forming 
Directive 93/36/EEC373 on supply contracts and Directive 93/37/EEC374 on works 
contracts. It was also at this time that a directive was issued for services contracts 
(Directive 92/50/EEC375). A system of remedies to deal with breach of these directives 
was set out in Directive 89/665/EEC.376 While these directives continued to be amended 
slightly over the years, the relevant procurement rules remained substantially the same 
until 2004, when the three separate directives for award procedures were replaced with 
RQHFRQVROLGDWHGGLUHFWLYH'LUHFWLYH(&³WKH3XEOLF6HFWRU'LUHFWLYH´377 The 
rules in this directive apply to most contracts awarded in the public sector. Detailed 
examination of its procedures is beyond the scope of this thesis, which is focusing on the 
utilities sector.378 
When the early procurement directives were adopted, they excluded most contracts 
made in the utilities sectors of transport, energy, water and telecommunications. This 
exclusion was due to the fact that these sectors were subject to different regimes in the 
various Member States, with some utilities being publically owned and others private.379 
It was felt that it was inappropriate to regulate only public utilities, as this would give an 
unfair advantage to private utilities who would still be able to discriminate, and equally it 
                                          
372 Directive 71/305/EEC, OJ 1971 L185/1 and Directive 77/62/EEC, OJ 1977 L13/1. 
373 OJ 1993 L199/1. 
374 OJ 1993 L199/54. 
375 OJ 1992 L209/1. 
376 OJ 1989 L395/33. 
377 Directive 2004/18/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council on the co-ordination of procedures for 
the award of public works contracts, public supply contracts and public service contracts, OJ 2004 L132/114. 
378 For detailed examination of the public sector directive, see Arrowsmith, above n.317, Trepte, n.325 above, 
and Bovis, n.319 above. 
379 Bovis, n.319 above, at p.26. 
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was seen as unacceptable at the time to regulate private entities.380 Nevertheless, these 
sectors created a possible barrier to trade due to the absence of competition they usually 
faced and the possibility of government control where they were publically owned or 
relied on the state for their rights, both of which it was felt might lead to discriminatory 
procurement practices.381 
Utilities were finally brought within the procurement regime by Directive 90/531/EEC382, 
which applied to works and supplies contracts in the energy, transport, water and 
telecommunications sectors. Services were added by Directive 93/38/EEC383, which also 
consolidated the works, supplies and services rules for the utilities sectors. To solve the 
problem of the different legal status of the various utilities in the different Member 
States, the directives applied to any entity, public or private, which operated in the 
relevant sectors and which fulfilled certain conditions which it was felt led to the 
possibility of discriminatory procurement. This covered public authorities, public 
undertakings and private bodies operating on the basis of special or exclusive rights.384 A 
system of remedies for breach was set out in Directive 92/13/EEC385 ³WKH 5HPHGLHV
'LUHFWLYH´ JLYLQJ FRXUWV WKH SRZHU WR VXVSHQG RU VHW DVLGH a contract and to order 
payment of damages (see further below in section on remedies). This directive remains 
in force, though it was amended recently by Directive 2007/66/EC to add certain 
requirements, such as a standstill period of 10 days between contract award and 
contract completion to allow firms to challenge the decision if they wish.   
In 1996, the Commission published a Green Paper to open a debate on reform of the 
procurement regulation.386 This was followed by a Commission Communication in 1998, 
where the Commission proposed new procurement legislation on the basis of the 
                                          
380 $UURZVPLWK6µ'HUHJXODWLRQRIXWLOLWLHVSURFXUHPHQWLQWKHFKDQJLQJHFRQRP\WRZDUGVDSULQFLSOHG
DSSURDFK"¶European Competition Law Review 420, at 420. 
381 European Commission, Communication from the Commission on a Community Regime for Procurement in 
the Excluded Sectors: Water, Energy, Transport and Telecommunications, COM(88) 347. 
382 OJ 1990 297/1 
383 OJ 1993 L199/84 
384 Art. 2 Directive 93/38/EEC 
385 Council Directive 92/13/EEC of 25 February 1992 coordinating the laws, regulations and administrative 
provisions relating to the application of Community rules on the procurement procedures of entities operating 
in the water, energy, transport and telecommunications sectors, OJ 1992 L76. 
386 European Commission, Public Procurement in the European Union: Exploring the Way Forward, COM(96) 
583. 
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responses to the Green Paper.387 It was not expected that the reforms would lead to any 
great change in the law, rather the aim was to simplify the current law and to increase 
flexibility, notably by including provisions to clarify the position as regards electronic 
procurement.388 The Commission set out its proposals for new directives on both public 
sector and utilities procurement in May 2000 and the new directives, the Public Sector 
Directive and the Utilities Directive, were adopted in 2004. These directives came into 
force on publication on 1st May 2004, and had to be implemented by 31st January 2006 
(except for the rules in the Utilities Directive on postal services, which had a later 
adoption date of 1st January 2009). The Utilities Directive has been implemented in the 
UK through the Utilities Contracts Regulations 2006.389 In general, the Regulations use 
the same wording as the Directive with no changes made. This section will refer 
primarily to the Article references in the Utilities Directive, though where the Regulations 
vary this will be examined. UK case law interpreting the Directive and Regulations will 
also be considered.  
While the reform process was not originally supposed to involve any major changes in 
the law, in fact in the end there have been some important reforms in the utilities 
regulation. For utilities these include the removal of the telecommunications sector and 
the addition of both the postal service sector and the general exemption for entities in a 
competitive market. These changes will be discussed further below in the sections 
examining the provisions of the Utilities Directive. The section will first set out the 
FLUFXPVWDQFHV XQGHU ZKLFK WKH GLUHFWLYH¶s rules apply, and then examine the rules 
governing the award of contracts. The section will then look briefly at the procedural 
requirements a procuring entity must fulfil after the award of the contract. Finally, the 
section will examine the remedies system available to deal with any breach of the rules. 
 
 
                                          
387 European Commission, Public Procurement in the European Union, COM(98) 143. 
388 Ibid, atp.3. 
389 SI 2006 No.6. 
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IV.2 Scope of the Utilities Directive 
7KH8WLOLWLHV'LUHFWLYHFRYHUVFRQWUDFWV³IRUSHFXQLDU\LQWHUHVWFRQFOXGHGLQZULWLQJ´390 It 
covers any works, services or supply contract (as defined in Article 1(2)(b)-(d)) which is 
above the monetary threshold.391 Splitting contracts with the intention of avoiding the 
application of the Directive is forbidden.392 Certain types of contract are excluded from 
the scope of the directive. This includes works and services concession contracts, which 
give the entity awarded the contract the right to exploit the work or service for 
payment.393 Articles 19-23 of the Utilities Directive list other excluded contracts, such as 
those awarded to a joint venture.394 Services which fall wiWKLQ $QQH[ ;9,, % ³3DUW %
6HUYLFHV´VXFKDVOHJDOVHUYLFHVDUHPRUHOLJKWO\UHJXODWHGWKDQRWKHUVHUYLFHV395 
The Utilities Directive covers any entity listed in Article 2 of the directive when that entity 
acts for the purpose of one of the utility activities listed in Article 3. The UK Regulations 
implement this in Schedule 1, with any entity listed in the first column of each Part to 
that section being covered by the Regulations when they are contracting for the purpose 
of an activity listed in the second column. To determine whether an entity is covered it is 
thus necessary to first examine whether that entity is a utility for the purpose of the 
directive and then, secondly, to examine whether the contract is made for one of the 
listed activities. Examples of covered utilities for each Member State are given in 
Annexes I-X of the directive. These lists are non-exhaustive, so entities which fall within 
WKH GHILQLWLRQ EXW ZKLFK DUH QRW OLVWHG PXVW DOVR DSSO\ WKH GLUHFWLYH¶V UXOHV396 The 
entities and activities covered are examined in more detail below. 
IV.2.1. Entities Covered by the Utilities Directive 
                                          
390 Art. 1(2)(a) Utilities Directive. 
391 Art. 16 Utilities Directive. See further Arrowsmith, above n.317, at pp.899-915.  
392 Art. 17(2) Utilities Directive. 
393 Art. 18 Utilities Directive. 
394 See further Arrowsmith, above n.317, at pp.916-929. 
395 Art. 32 Utilities Directive. See further Arrowsmith, above n.317, at pp.904-907. 
396 Art.8, Utilities Directive. 
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The entities covered by the Utilities Directive are stated in Article 2, and cover 
contracting authorities, public undertakings and private bodies with special or exclusive 
rights.  
x Contracting authorities 
This category covers traditional public bodies. It includes the state, local authorities, 
bodies covered by public law and any associations formed by any of these entities.397 A 
ERG\ FRYHUHG E\ SXEOLF ODZ LV GHILQHG DV DQ HQWLW\ ³HVWDEOLVKHG IRU WKH SXUSRVH RI
PHHWLQJQHHGVLQWKHJHQHUDOLQWHUHVWQRWKDYLQJDQLQGXVWULDORUFRPPHUFLDOFKDUDFWHU´
which has legal personality, and which is funded by another contracting authority or 
which has an administrative board with at least half of its members appointed by 
another contracting authority.398 This definition is the same as the definition for 
contracting authorities in the Public Sector Directive, and when making a contract which 
is not for a utility activity these entities will be covered by that directive. 
The CJEU has significantly expanded the definition of contracting authority through its 
case law. One of the most important developments for utilities came in the case of 
Mannesmann.399 In this case the Court ruled that any contracting entity which has any 
non-commercial activities, no matter how small a proportion of their overall activities, is 
classed as a contracting authority for the purposes of the procurement directives.400 
While in general the rules for contracting authorities and public undertakings are the 
same, the distinction may be important in the case of the new mandatory exclusions for 
criminal activity (see below in exclusion section), which only apply to contracting 
authorities. 
x Public Undertakings 
This category covers any entity over which any contracting authority may exercise, 
GLUHFWO\ RU LQGLUHFWO\ D ³GRPLQDQW LQIOXHQFH´ WKURXJK WKHLU RZQHUVKLS ILQDQFLDO
                                          
397 Art. 2(1)(a) Utilities Directive. 
398 Art. 2(1)(a) Utilities Directive. 
399 Case C-44/96, Mannesmann  Anlagenbau  Austria AG v Strohal Rotationsdruck GmbH [1998] ECR I-73. 
400 Ibid, at paras. 31-33. 
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participation in the entity or through the rules applying to the entity.401 The condition of 
a dominant influence is considered to be met when the contracting authority holds a 
PDMRULW\RIWKHXQGHUWDNLQJ¶VVKDUHFDSLWDORUFRQWUROVDPDMRULW\RIYRWHVDWWDFKHGWRLWV
shares, or where it has the power to appoint PRUH WKDQ KDOI RI WKH XQGHUWDNLQJ¶V
administrative body.402 
x Entities with special or exclusive rights 
One of the reforms introduced by the Utilities Directive in 2004 was a new definition of 
special or exclusive rights. Under the previous directive an entity had special or exclusive 
rights where it had a right which reserved the exploitation of a regulated utility activity 
for one or more entities.403 In addition, an entity was automatically considered to have 
such rights when; (1) they could take advantage of a procedure for the expropriation or 
use of property; (2) they could place network equipment on, under or over a public 
highway; or (3) if they supplied water, gas, electricity or heat to any network which 
enjoyed special or exclusive rights.404 
The new definition in the Utilities Directive is narrower in scope and excluded some 
entities which were covered by the previous definition. Article 2(3) of the Utilities 
Directive defines special or exclusive rights as: 
rights granted by a competent authority of a Member State by way of any 
legislative, regulatory or administrative provision the effect of which is to limit the 
exercise of [the regulated utility activities] to one or more entities, and which 
substantially affects the ability of other entities to carry out such activity. 
Under this definition, whether a right is considered a special or exclusive right depends 
on whether having the right gives that entity a competitive advantage over other entities 
in that sector. The new provision has two main effects. First, it means that entities which 
would have automatically been considered to have special or exclusive rights under the 
                                          
401 Art. 2(1)(b) Utilities Directive. 
402 Ibid. 
403 Art. 2(3) Directive 93/38/EEC. 
404 Ibid. 
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previous definition are no longer covered simply because they have those rights.405 
Whether these rights amount to special or exclusive rights falls to be determined under 
the same rules as apply to any other rights. Second, it seems that licences which are 
available to any entity which fulfils objective, non-discriminatory and transparent criteria 
do not constitute special or exclusive rights as they do not affect the ability of other 
entities to carry out the same activity.406 
The position of entities which hold a right which was awarded under a competition 
applying objective, non-discriminatory and transparent criteria, but which is awarded to 
RQHRUDOLPLWHGQXPEHURIHQWLWLHVLVXQFOHDU*LYHQWKHGHILQLWLRQ¶VUHIHUHQFHWRDULJKW
ZKLFKOLPLWVH[HUFLVHRIWKHULJKWWR³RQHRUPRUHHQWLWLHV´DQGZKLFKDIIHFWVWKHDELOLW\RI
any other entities to carry out the ability, it would seem that any right which is limited in 
number should be covered. However, this is contradicted in Recital 25 of the directive, 
which states:  
Nor may rights granted by a Member State in any form ... to a limited number of 
undertakings on the basis of objective, proportionate and non-discriminatory 
criteria that allow any interested party fulfilling those criteria to enjoy those rights 
be considered special or exclusive rights. 
$V .RWVRQLV DUJXHV WKH UHIHUHQFH WR D ³OLPLWHG QXPEHU´ RI HQWLWLHV LQ WKLV UHFLWDO
suggests that any right awarded on the basis of objective criteria cannot be a special or 
exclusive right.407 +RZHYHU WKH ODWHU UHTXLUHPHQW WKDW WKH ULJKW LV RSHQ WR ³DQ\
LQWHUHVWHGSDUW\´FRQWUDGLFWVWKLVLPSO\LQJWKDWDULJKWOLPLWHGLQQXPEHU is a special or 
exclusive right.408 It is arguable that any entity which receives its right under objective 
criteria is not susceptible to government influence as the government has no discretion 
over whether to award the licence, and so regulation is not necessary.409 However, 
government pressure is only one of the policy reasons behind regulating utilities. The 
                                          
405 Supported by Recital 25 of the Utilities Directive. 
406 Recital 25 Utilities Directive. 
407 Kotsonis, above n.321, at 71. 
408 Ibid. 
409 Arrowsmith, above n.317, at p.854. 
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other is the lack of competition and this is a factor where an entity holds an exclusive or 
limited right regardless of the conditions under which they received it, and so it seems 
arguable that such rights are covered by the directive.410 
IV.2.2. Activities covered by the Utilities Directive 
Entities falling within one of the categories discussed above are only covered by the 
Utilities Directive when they carry out one of the activities listed in the Directive, and 
only in relation to a contract awarded for the purpose of that activity. The relevant 
activities are listed in Articles 3-7 of the directive, and cover contracts in the fields of 
energy (gas, electricity and heat), water, transport (including providing terminal 
facilities), postal services and exploration for or extraction of oil, gas, coal or other solid 
fuels. These activities are specifically excluded from the Public Sector Directive, so any 
contracting authority which is usually covered by that directive is instead covered by the 
Utilities Directive for any contracts made for the purpose of providing those services.411 
Following Article 9, any contract which covers several activities is subject to the rules 
applicable to the activity for which it is principally intended. 
Under the previous directive, 93/38/EEC, telecommunications services were also 
covered. This sector was removed entirely from the current directive due to the 
extensive liberalisation of the market throughout the EU which meant that such bodies 
were subject to full competition and no longer at the risk of government influence.412 To 
ensure that public sector bodies providing telecommunications services are not subject 
to the Public Sector Directive following the removal of the sector from the Utilities 
Directive, Article 13 of the Public Sector Directive excludes contracts for the purpose of 
providing telecommunications services from the scope of the Directive. 
x Energy (Article 3) 
                                          
410 Ibid, at 89. 
411 Art. 12 Public Sector Directive. 
412 See Recital 5 Utilities Directive. 
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The directive applies to any procuring entity which provides or operates a fixed network 
which provides a service to the public in connection with the production, transport or 
distribution of electricity, gas or heat.413 For any procuring entity which is a contracting 
authority within the meaning of Article 2, the supply of electricity, gas or heat to such a 
network is also covered.  
For public undertakings and private bodies with special or exclusive rights, the supply of 
energy to a network may be covered if that supply is one of their main activities. In the 
case of the supply of electricity, the activity will not be covered where the production of 
electricity is necessary to carry out another activity (which is not itself an activity 
covered by the Utilities DirectiveZKHUHWKDWVXSSO\GHSHQGVRQO\RQWKHHQWLW\¶VRZQ
FRQVXPSWLRQRI WKHHOHFWULFLW\DQGKDVQRWH[FHHGHGRI WKHHQWLW\¶V WRWDODYHUDJH
production of electricity over the last three years.414 For gas and heat, supply will not be 
covered where production is an unavoidable consequence of carrying on another activity, 
supply is aimed only at the economic exploitation of that production and the supply does 
QRW DPRXQW WR PRUH WKDQ  RI WKH HQWLW\¶V DYHUDJH DQQXDO WXUQRYHU RYHU WKH ODVW
three years.415 
Under Article 26(b), bodies in the field of electricity, gas or heat are exempt from the 
Utilities Directive when they are purchasing fuels for the production of energy. The 
exemption was originally given because there was little possibility for cross-border 
competition in this area when utilities were first regulated, and the exemption was 
retained after the reform despite liberalisation in this area.416 
x Water (Article 4) 
The Utilities Directive applies to entities which produce or operate a fixed network which 
provides a service to the public in connection with the production, transport or 
                                          
413 Art. 3(1) and (3) Utilities Directive. 
414 Art. 3(4) Utilities Directive. 
415 Art. 3(2) Utilities Directive. 
416 Trepte, above n.325, at p.153. 
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distribution of drinking water.417 As with energy, where the entity is a contracting 
authority, the supply of water to such a network is also covered. Where the entity is not 
a contracting authority the supply of water is not covered, mutatis mutandis, under the 
same terms as electricity supply, discussed above.418 In addition to this, the directive 
covers contracts relating to hydraulic engineering, irrigation or land drainage where the 
volume of water intended for the supply of drinking water exceeds 20% of the total 
volume of water made available by those projects, and also to any contracts relating to 
the disposal or treatment of sewage.419 Contracts for the purchase of water are exempt 
under Article 26(a) of the directive. 
x Transport (Articles 5 and 7) 
The Utilities Directive covers the provision or operation of networks providing a service 
to the public in the field of transport by railway, automated systems, tramway, trolley 
bus, bus or cable.420 Under the previous directive, entities were exempt from the 
directive if they provided a bus service in an area where others were free to provide the 
same service.421 This exemption has not been retained in the current directive due to a 
general exemption for services in competitive markets under Article 30 (see below), but 
any providers which already had an exemption retain that exemption.422 The directive 
also covers any entities which exploit an area for the purpose of providing airport, 
maritime or inland port or other terminal facilities.423 It is unclear what type of activities 
PLJKW IDOO ZLWKLQ WKH GHILQLWLRQ RI SURYLGLQJ ³WHUPLQDO IDFLOLWLHV´ WKRXJK JXLGDQFH RQ
various relevant activities for airport terminals has been given by an Advisory 
Committee.424 
x Postal Services (Article 6) 
                                          
417 Art. 4(1) Utilities Directive. 
418 Art. 4(3) Utilities Directive. 
419 Art. 4(2) Utilities Directive. 
420 Art. 5(1) Utilities Directive. 
421 Art. 2(4) Directive 93/38/EEC. 
422 Art. 5(2) Utilities Directive. 
423 Art. 7(b) Utilities Directive. 
424 Advisory Committee on the Opening Up of Public Procurement and the Advisory Committee on Public 
Procurement, Policy Guidelines on Non-5HOHYDQW$LUSRUW$FWLYLWLHVXQGHUWKH³8WLOLWLHV'LUHFWLYH´, CC/92/23 (Rev 
1) final of 11 November 1992. For further discussion see Trepte, above n.325, pp161-164. 
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The current directive added the provision of postal services to the list of regulated 
DFWLYLWLHV 3RVWDO VHUYLFHV DUH GHILQHG LQ $UWLFOH E DV ³VHUYLFHV FRQVLVWLQJ RI WKH
clearance, sorting, routing, and delivery oI SRVWDO LWHPV´ 7KH GLUHFWLYH DOVR FRYHUV D
number of other services such as mail service management which are set out in Article 
6(2)(c). Previously, postal services which were provided by an entity which classed as a 
contracting authority for the purposes of the public sector directives was covered by 
those directives, and so the change allows these entities to take advantage of the more 
flexible regime under the Utilities Directive. Public undertakings and private bodies with 
special or exclusive rights will be regulated for the first time. 
x Exploration and extraction of oil, gas, coal or other solid fuels (Article 7) 
The Utilities Directive covers any entity which exploits an area for the purpose of 
exploring for, or extracting, oil, gas, coal or any other solid fuel.425 As with entities 
providing an energy network, there is an exemption for the purchase of fuel.426 Under 
the previous utilities directive, there was a major exemption for utilities in this area 
which could show that other entities were free to seek the same licence under the same 
conditions.427 The exemption had to be granted by the Commission and was not 
complete: entities still had to prove certain non-discriminatory and competitive 
standards.428 This exemption is not included in the current directive but any exemptions 
already granted continue to be valid.429 The UK had gained this partial exemption in 
1997430 which was implemented in Reg. 8(1) of the Utilities Contracts Regulations. In 
March 2010, however, the UK was granted a full exemption for the exploitation of oil and 
gas under Article 30 of the Utilities Directive (see below, section IV.2.3.) which removes 
                                          
425 Art. 7(a) Utilities Directive. 
426 Art. 26(b) Utilities Directive. 
427 Art. 3 Directive 93/38/EEC. 
428 See further Arrowsmith, above n.317, pp.862-DQG0DXQG&µ7KHGHURJDWLRQIRUWKHRLODQGJDV sector 
XQGHU$UWLFOHRIWKH8WLOLWLHV'LUHFWLYH¶33/5 
429 Art. 27 Utilities Directive. 
430 Commission Decision 97/367/EC: Commission Decision of 30 May 1997 establishing that the exploitation of 
geographical areas for the purpose of exploring for or extracting oil or gas does not constitute in the United 
Kingdom an activity defined in Article 2 (2) (b) (i) of Council Directive 93/38/EEC and that entities carrying on 
such an activity are not to be considered in the United Kingdom as operating under special or exclusive rights 
within the meaning of Article 2 (3) (b) of the Directive, OJ 1997 L 156. 
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the sector fully from the procurement regime, making the previous partial exemption 
redundant. 
 
IV.2.3. Article 30 Exemption 
The previous utilities directive contained a series of sector-specific exclusions for entities 
in a competitive market. Due to substantial liberalisation in the utilities sector as a 
whole, the current directive replaces these specific exclusions with one general 
exclusion, found in Article 30. The article states that contracts will not be subject to the 
GLUHFWLYH ZKHUH ³WKH DFWLYLW\ LV GLUHFWO\ H[SRVHG WR FRPSHWLWLRQ RQ PDUNHWV WR ZKLFK
DFFHVVLVQRWUHVWULFWHG´431 The exemption is not automatic, but must be applied by the 
Commission through a formal Decision.432 A Decision may be requested by either a 
Member State or the entity itself, or the procedure may be begun by the Commission on 
its own initiative.433 The Commission must make its decision within three months, 
though LWFDQH[WHQGWKLVWLPHLQ³GXO\MXVWLILHGFDVHV´434 If a decision is not made in this 
time, the exemption is automatically given.435 For entities in the UK, three Decisions 
have currently been adopted under Article 30, exempting entities in the fields of 
electricity generation, the supply of gas and electricity and the exploration for and 
exploitation of oil and gas.436 
The requirement that the activity is directly exposed to competition is expanded on in 
Article 30(2), which states that the existence of a competitive market must be decided 
                                          
431 Art. 30(1) Utilities Directive. 
432 Art. 30(4)-(6) Utilities Directive. 
433 Art. 30(4) and (5) Utilities Directive. 
434 Art. 30(6) Utilities Directive. The extension is limited to one month where liberalising legislation is in place 
and market access is deemed. 
435 Art. 30(5) Utilities Directive. 
436 Commission Decision 2007/141/EC of 26 February 2007 establishing that Article 30(1) of Directive 
2004/17/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council coordinating the procurement procedures of entities 
operating in the water, energy, transport and postal services sectors applies to the supply of electricity and gas 
in England, Scotland and Wales, OJ 2007 L62/23; Commission Decision 2006/211/EC of 8 March 2006 
establishing that Art. 30(1) of Directive 2004/17/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council coordinating 
the procurement procedures of entities operating in the water, energy, transport and postal services sectors 
applies to electricity generation in England, Scotland and Wales, OJ 2006 L76/6; Commission Decision 
2010/192 exempting exploration for and exploitation of oil and gas in England, Scotland and Wales from the 
application of Directive 2004/17 coordinating the procurement procedures of entities operating in the water, 
energy, transport and postal services sectors [2010] OJ L84/52. 
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by reference to criteria which conform with the Treaty provisions on competition, such as 
the existence of alternative goods or services. The tests which must be applied in this 
case are thus the tests used by the CJEU under Articles 101 and 102 TFEU to determine 
the relevant product and market for the purpose of competition law.437 As shown by the 
Decisions which have currently been adopted considering Article 30, the existence of 
competition is determined by many different factors, none of which is decisive.438 
When determining whether market access is unrestricted, the situation depends on 
whether the EU has adopted any liberalising legislation in the area. If liberalising 
measures have been adopted (relevant measures are listed in Annex XI of the Utilities 
Directive), and these measures have been implemented in the Member State, market 
acFHVVLV³GHHPHG´WREHXQUHVWULFWHG439 Where there are no relevant measures, it must 
EHVKRZQ³WKDWDFFHVVWRWKHPDUNHWLQTXHVWLRQLVIUHHde facto and de jure´440 All the 
Decisions so far have concerned markets where liberalising legislation existed and had 
been implemented, so it is uncertain what precisely freedom de facto and de jure 
involves. It seems likely that freedom de jure requires that there be no legal restrictions 
on access to the market, and de facto freedom requires that there be no problems 
accessing the market due to a natural monopoly on the part of an entity.441 
The exemption under Article 30 overlaps to a certain extent with the definition of special 
and exclusive rights. An entity which has a right which is open to anyone able to satisfy 
objective criteria would presumably satisfy the condition in Article 30 that access to the 
market is unrestricted, but would still have to show that the activity is open to 
competition.442 However, arguably such an entity does not have special or exclusive 
rights and so is not covered by the directive at all (see above on special or exclusive 
                                          
437 Arrowsmith, above n.317, at p.885. 
438 See, for example, Decision 2007/141/EC, n.436 above, at para. 8. 
439 Art. 30(3) Utilities Directive. 
440 Ibid. 
441 Arrowsmith, above n.317, at p.884. 
442 Kotsonis, above n.321, at 90. 
Page 103 of 300 
 
rights). Such entities may wish to apply for an Article 30 exemption despite this, to 
provide legal certainty.443 
Entities which obtain an exemption under Article 30 will still have to comply with the 
Treaty requirements, including the new transparency requirements. Equally, the 
exemption does not remove the entity from the Government Procurement Agreement 
(GPA) of the World Trade Organisation (WTO), which applies similar requirements to the 
Utilities Directive on utilities in the EU, which may limit the practical effect of the 
exemption.444 
IV.3 Award Procedures under the Utilities Directive 
This section will examine the rules a regulated utility must follow when awarding a 
contract covered by the directive. In addition to these specific rules, it must also comply 
with three general principles set out in the directive in Article 10; equal treatment, non-
discrimination and transparency. Equal treatment requires that entities treat comparable 
situations in a similar way, unless objectively justified.445 Non-discrimination is simply 
one aspect of equal treatment, forbidding unequal treatment on the grounds of 
nationality.446 The aim of transparency is to ensure that the other principles of equal 
treatment and non-discrimination have been complied with. 
IV.3.1. The Award Procedures 
The Utilities Directive provides three procedures which utilities may use to award 
contracts; the open procedure and the restricted procedure, which are formal tendering 
procedures, and the negotiated procedure, which offers more flexibility.447 The 
negotiated procedure may be split into two procedures, a procedure with a prior call for 
competition, and a procedure without such a call. Utilities have a free choice between 
the open procedure, the restricted procedure and the negotiated procedure with a call 
                                          
443 Arrowsmith, above n.317, at p.854. 
444 $UURZVPLWK6µ$Q$VVHVVPHQWRIWKH1HZ/HJLVODWLYH3DFNDJHRQ3XEOLF3URFXUHPHQW¶Common 
Market Law Review 1277, at 1311. 
445 Case C-243/89, Commission v Denmark, [1993] ECR I-3353. 
446 Arrowsmith, above n.317, at p.429. 
447 Art. 40 Utilities Directive. 
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for competition.448 In practice, most utilities in the UK will choose the negotiated 
procedure, as it offers them the most freedom and flexibility.449 
When awarding a contract using one of these methods, a procuring entity may choose to 
set up the contract as a framework agreement, a system under which certain suppliers 
are chosen, and terms of future contracts are established, and contracts may be 
awarded to those suppliers at future dates, with or without further competition.450 
The procuring entity may also set up a qualification list which is a system listing firms 
which are qualified for, and interested in tendering for, any future contracts awarded by 
that utility.451 Under this system, the utility issues an initial advertisement of a system 
setting out the types of contracts that may be awarded under it. After this, the utility 
may list all who applied, or limit the number using the same objective criteria as are 
used to limit the numbers in restricted and negotiated procedures, discussed below.452 
Many utilities in the UK delegate the operation of their qualification lists to third 
parties.453 
x Open Procedure 
Under this procedure, a contract notice giving precise details of the contract specification 
and award criteria of the contract will be published, and any interested party may put in 
a tender for that contract.454 While this procedure offers the greatest competition, it may 
be inappropriate for reasons of cost and time where there are likely to be many 
tenderers, as each individual tender will have to be examined.455 It may also be 
inappropriate where the contract is complex and it would be impossible to formulate a 
complete specification.456 Once the call for competition has been made, there are set 
                                          
448 Art. 40(2) Utilities Directive. 
449 Arrowsmith, above n.317, at p.964. 
450 Art. 14 Utilities Directive. 
451 Art. 53 Utilities Directive. 
452 Art. 53(2) Utilities Directive. 
453 6HH0DXQG&µ7KH'HYHORSPHQWRI9HQGRU5HJLVWUDWLRQ6\VWHPVIRU(XURSHDQ8WLOLWLHV¶33/5
CS51. 
454 Art. 1(9)(a) Utilities Directive. 
455 Trepte, above n.325, at p.376. 
456 Ibid. 
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time limits for the supply of specifications and other supporting documents and for the 
receipt of tenders.457 
 
x Restricted Procedure 
The restricted procedure is similar to the open procedure, but the procuring entity may 
select a limited number of firms to tender from the firms which expressed an interest in 
tendering following the initial call for competition.458 As with the open procedure, the 
time limits for the tendering process are found in Article 45 of the Utilities Directive. The 
number invited to tender should be enough as to ensure adequate competition.459 When 
deciding which firms to invite, the procuring entity may only consider the criteria which 
may be considered when deciding if a firm is qualified for the contract, given in the 
directive in Article 54 (discussed further below in qualification section).460 This article 
DOORZV WKH SURFXULQJ HQWLW\ WR XVH ³REMHFWLYH UXOHV DQG FULWHULD´ WR GHWHUPLQH ZKR WR
invite.  
x Negotiated Procedure 
Under this procedure the entity invites certain firms to participate in the procedure 
(under the same terms as invitations for the restricted procedure discussed above), and 
WKHQ ³QHJRWLDWHV WKH FRQWUDFW ZLWK RQH RU PRUH RI WKHVH´461 Unlike the open and 
restricted procedures, this procedure does not require a precise specification of the 
goods, services or works to be set out at any time (see section on specifications below), 
and at no point does a formal tendering process have to be held.462 The directive 
                                          
457 Arts.45 and 46 Utilities Directive. 
458 Art. 1(9)(b) Utilities Directive. 
459 Art. 54(3) Utilities Directive. 
460 Case C-362/90, Commission v Italy [1992] ECR I-2353. 
461 Art. 1(9)(c) Utilities Directive. 
462 Arrowsmith, above n.317, at p.1024. 
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contains no explicit rules on how the award process should be structured, allowing the 
procuring entity great freedom.463 
As previously mentioned, entities are free to use this procedure when they call for 
competition beforehand. The procedure is permitted without a call for competition in 
certain limited circumstances laid out in Article 40(3) of the Utilities Directive, which 
include where there is only one possible supplier and for reasons of extreme urgency. 
IV.3.2. Call for Competition 
Utilities may issue a call for competition in three ways.464 Firstly, the procuring entity 
may publish a contract notice in the Official Journal. Where entities use the open 
procedure, this is the only method that may be used.465 Contract notices detail the 
precise requirements of a specific contract. They should be sent to the Commission and 
should contain all the information set out in Annexes XIII A, B and C of the directive.466 
Secondly, the entity may publish a periodic indicative notice (PIN). A PIN gives advance 
QRWLFH WR WKH PDUNHW RI D XWLOLW\¶V JHQHUDO UHTXLUHPHQWV FRYHULQJ LVVXHV VXFK DV WKH
essential characteristics of any works contracts the utility intends to award over the next 
year.467 The notice should include all the information listed in Annex XV A. Finally, the 
utility may advertise the existence of a qualification system. The notice must contain the 
information listed in Annex XIV.  
IV.3.3. Technical Specifications 
In order to prevent a utility defining a product in such a way as to allow national 
favouritism when conducting a tendering procedure, the Utilities Directive sets out rules 
on the way the specific works, supplies or services that the utility requires may be 
defined.468 The requirements for these technical specifications are slightly different 
depending on whether the contract is for works or for supplies or services, and are found 
                                          
463 See further Arrowsmith, ibid, at pp.1027-1032. 
464 Art. 42(1) Utilities Directive. 
465 Art. 42(3) and Art.53(9) Utilities Directive. 
466 Art. 44 Utilities Directive. 
467 Art. 41 Utilities Directive. 
468 Art. 34 Utilities Directive. 
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in Annex XXI of the directive. For services or supplies, a technical specification is a 
VSHFLILFDWLRQ³GHILQLQJWKHUHTXLUHGFKDUDFWHULVWLFVRIDSURGXFWRU VHUYLFH´469 For works, 
the specification covers the technical requirements which set out the characteristics of 
WKH UHOHYDQW VXSSO\RUPDWHULDO VR WKDW LWPD\ ³EHGHVFULEHG LQDPDQQHU VXFK WKDW LW
IXOILOV WKH XVH IRU ZKLFK LW LV LQWHQGHG´470 As Trepte notes, the works definition 
incorporates a functional definition, unlike the definition for supplies or services.471 
Utilities may express their technical specifications either by using specifications as 
defined in Annex XXI and referring to certain European, national or international 
standards, by referring to performance or functional requirements, or by a combination 
of both methods.472 Where the specification refers to standards, Article 34(3)(a) sets out 
an order of preference of types of standards, ranging from national standards which 
transpose European standards to national standards and national technical approvals. 
(DFKVWDQGDUGPXVWEHIROORZHGZLWKWKHZRUGV³RUHTXLYDOHQW´WRDOORZSURGXFWVZKLFK
match the functional requirements of the standard.  
IV.3.4. Qualification 
³4XDOLILFDWLRQ´ LV WKH WHUP XVHG WR UHIHU WR WKH SURFHVV RI GHWHUPLQLQJ ZKLFK ILUPV D
utility feels are eligible to compete in the award procedure. Unlike the rules under the 
Public Sector Directive which limit the factors a procuring entity can consider at this 
stage to matters such as technical and financial ability, the Utilities Directive is fairly 
IOH[LEOH DOORZLQJ HQWLWLHV WR HVWDEOLVK DQ\ TXDOLILFDWLRQ FULWHULD ³LQ DFFRUGDQFH ZLWK
REMHFWLYH UXOHV DQG FULWHULD´473 In general, the directive does not require utilities to 
exclude firms for any reason, though there is an exception to this for utilities which are 
FODVVHG DV ³FRQWUDFWLQJ DXWKRULWLHV´ 7KHVH HQWLWLHV must exclude firms for the reasons 
                                          
469 Annex XXI(1)(a) Utilities Directive. 
470 Annex XXI(1)(b) Utilities Directive. 
471 Trepte, above n.325, at p.273. 
472 Art. 34(3) Utilities Directive. 
473 Art. 54(1)and (2) Utilities Directive. 
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listed in Article 45(1) of the Public Sector Directive, which covers issues such as fraud 
and certain criminal convictions.474 
7KH GLUHFWLYH GRHV QRW GHILQH ZKDW LV PHDQW E\ ³REMHFWLYH UXOHV DQG FULWHULD´ 7KLV
presumably covers all the matters listed in the Public Sector Directive, but should also 
allow other matters given the additional flexibility generally allowed by the Utilities 
Directive.475 7KH SRVVLEOH VFRSH RI WKH WHUP ³REMHFWLYH UXOHV DQG FULWHULD´ ZLOO EH
examined further in Chapter 6. 
The Utilities Directive does not explicitly state the types of evidence which may be relied 
upon to prove the qualification criteria it sets, though it does require that utilities do not 
demand any test or evidence which duplicates other objective evidence which is already 
available.476 Where the utility requires quality assurance certificates, they must accept 
equivalent evidence.477 Notably for CSR issues, the current Utilities Directive also 
introduced a provision on environmental management standards.478 This states that in 
appropriate cases, for works and services contracts, a procuring entity may require 
evidence of certain environmental measures that firm could apply in the contract. This 
suggests that such evidence may not be asked for in all cases, and never in supply 
contracts.  
IV.3.5. Contact performance conditions 
In addition to setting the precise technical specifications of the subject-matter of the 
contract, a procuring entity may also set down conditions relating to the performance of 
the contract. The provision allowing this is Article 38 of the Utilities Directive, which also 
VWDWHV WKDW VXFK FRQGLWLRQV ³PD\ LQ SDUWLFXODU FRQFHUQ VRFLDO DQG HQYLURQPHQWDO
FRQGLWLRQV´ 7KH FRQGLWLRQV PXVW EH OLPLWHG WR WKH ³SHUIRUPDQFH´ RI WKH FRQWUDFW
preventing a procuring entity from requiring general changes going beyond that 
                                          
474 Art. 54(4) Utilities Directive. 
475 Trepte, above n.325, at p.364. 
476 Art. 52(1) Utilities Directive. 
477 Art. 52(2) Utilities Directive. 
478 Art. 52(3) Utilities Directive. 
Page 109 of 300 
 
SHUIRUPDQFHHJ UHTXLULQJ FHUWDLQ VWDQGDUGVRISD\ IRU DOO D ILUP¶V HPSOR\HHV UDWKHU
than just the employees working on the contract.  
It has been stated in the context of the public sector rules that, while such contract 
conditions are legally binding if accepted by the tenderer, a procuring entity cannot 
disqualify a firm which it believes cannot comply in practice as the condition is not 
relevant to the various qualification criteria set out in the Public Sector Directive.479 
However, as discussed above, the utilities rules are more flexible, allowing 
GLVTXDOLILFDWLRQRQ WKHJURXQGVRI³REMHFWLYHUXOHVDQGFULWHULD´DQGVR WKHSRVLWLRQ IRU
contract performance conditions may be different. This possibility will be discussed 
further in Chapter 6.  
IV.3.6. Award Criteria 
The procuring entity may base the award of the contract on one of two criteria: the 
lowest price, or the most economically advantageous tender.480 The choice of criterion 
must be stated in the contract documents. Where no choice is made, the award must be 
made on the basis of lowest price.481 
Where lowest price is chosen, the contract must simply be awarded to the tenderer 
which offers the lowest tendered price, so long as they are qualified and fulfil the 
contract specifications. This criterion is very inflexible and is only really suitable for very 
simple products.  
Where the most economically advantageous tender is chosen, the entity may consider 
price along with other criteria such as quality and delivery date. The Utilities Directive 
gives a list of possible criteria in Article 55(1)(a), though this list is non-exhaustive and 
entities may also use other criteria.482 The criteria used must be linked to the subject-
matter of the contract, preventing the use of award criteria to judge matters such as the 
                                          
479 Case 31/87, Gebroeders Beentjes BV v State of the Netherlands [1988] ECR 4635, at para. 28. 
480 Art. 55(1) Utilities Directive. 
481 Case C-324/93, R v Secretary of State for the Home Department, ex parte Evans Medical Ltd [1995] ECR I-
563. 
482 Case C-513/99, Concordia Bus Finland Oy Ab, formerly Stagecoach Finland Oy Ab v Helsingenkaupunki and 
HKL-Bussiliikenne [2002] ECR I-7213. ³Concordia Bus´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general labour conditions of the firms tendering (see further Chapter 6).483 The CJEU has 
DOVRVWDWHGWKDWDZDUGFULWHULDPD\QRWDOORZDSURFXULQJHQWLW\³XQUHVWULFWHGIUHHGRPRI
FKRLFH´ZKHQDZDUGLQJWKHFRQWUDFWWKRXJKZKDWPLJKW qualify as unrestricted freedom 
was not expanded upon.484 
The procuring entity must specify the criteria it will be using and the relative weighting it 
will give to each of those criteria when awarding the contract. Where this is not possible, 
it must list the criteria in descending order of importance.485 Where the procuring entity 
plans to use sub-criteria within those award criteria these must also be disclosed.486 The 
CJEU in the case of ATI suggested that the weightings for sub-criteria may be 
determined by the procuring entity at a later date.487 In the UK, however, the case of 
Lettings International Ltd v London Borough of Newham appears to hold that where sub-
criteria and their weightings have been determined by a procuring entity before the 
tender process has begun, they must be disclosed to the tenderers.488 This was 
confirmed in the recent High Court case of McLaughlin and Harvey, where it was stated 
that a procuring entity was required to disclose all criteria and weightings they had 
devised which could haYHDQLPSDFWRQDILUP¶VSUHSDUDWLRQRIDWHQGHU489 
The CJEU has drawn a distinction between award criteria and selection criteria. Criteria 
used at the selection stage (technical and financial criteria, see above) may not be used 
as award criteria as they H[DPLQHWKHILUP¶VDELOLW\WRSHUIRUPWKHFRQWUDFWDQGGRQRW
determine which tender is the most economically advantageous.490 It is unclear whether 
the relative ability or likelihood of the various firms may be used as award criteria. The 
CJEU in EVN appeared to assume that the relative ability of the firms to supply the 
                                          
483 Art. 55(1)(a) Utilities Directive. 
484 Concordia Bus, above n.159, at para. 61. 
485 Art. 55(2) Utilities Directive. 
486 Case C-532/06, Emm.G. Lianakis AE v Dimos Alexandroupolis [2008] ECR I-00251³Lianakis´DWSDUD
45. 
487 Case C-331/04, ATI EAC Srl e Viaggi di Maio Snc, EAC Srl and Viaggi di Maio Snc v ACTV Venezia SpA, 
Provincia di Venezia and Comune di Venezia.[2005] ECR I-10109, ³ATI´ at para. 32. 
488 [2007] EWCA Civ. 1522, at para. 25. 
489 McLauglin and Harvey v Department of Finance and Personnel (No.2) [2008] NIQB 91, at para. 20. 
490 Lianakis, above n.486, at para. 30. 
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electricity required under the contract would be an allowable award criterion, but this 
case was not considered by the Court in Lianakis.491 
 
IV.3.7. Procedural requirements post-award under the Utilities Directive 
Under Art. 49(1), the procuring entity must inform all the participants in the award 
process of their award decision promptly. Unlike under the previous directive, this 
obligation applies to all the utility sectors equally and is also expressly stated to apply 
equally to the decision to award a framework agreement or a dynamic purchasing 
agreement. Following the new amendments to the Remedies Directive, under Art. 2b of 
that directive, the award notice sent to participants must also give the reasons for the 
IDLOXUH RI WKHLU WHQGHU VWDWLQJ WKH ³FKDUDFWHULVWLFV DQG UHODWLYH DGYDQWDJHV´ RI WKH
winning tender.492 It is unclear precisely how detailed these reasons should be. The 
General Court in Strabag Benelux stated that the main requirement was that the 
information given was clear and unequivocal, and suggested that it is sufficient simply to 
state the main criteria that the winning tender had an advantage in, e.g. price or 
quality.493 Following this, it was held in the UK case of Rapiscan that it was not 
VXIILFLHQWO\FOHDUDQGXQHTXLYRFDOWRVLPSO\VWDWHWKDWWKHWHQGHUHUORVWIRU³FRPPHUFLDO
UHDVRQV´ZKHUHLWLVQRWFOHDUZKDWFULWHULDIHOOXQGHUWKHKHDGLQJRIFRPPHUFLDO494 
Within two months of a contract, dynamic purchasing system or framework agreement 
award, the procuring entity must send a contract award notice to the Commission.495 The 
notice must provide all the information set out in Annex XVI of the Utilities Directive. 
Where the notice is for a framework agreement, this notice is sufficient notification of all 
contracts awarded under that agreement and no further notices need to be sent when 
the individual contracts are awarded. For a dynamic purchasing system, the contracting 
authority has the choice of sending notices within two months of each individual contract 
                                          
491 Case C-448/01, EVN AG v Austria [2004] 1 CMLR 22, at para. 70. 
492 Art. 49(2) Utilities Directive. 
493 Case T-183/00, Strabag Benelux NV v Council of the European Union [2003] ECR II-135, at para. 57. 
494 Rapiscan Systems v Commissioners of HM Revenue and Customs [2006] EWHC 2067, at para. 26. 
495 Art. 43(1) Utilities Directive. 
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award or grouping the notices on a quarterly basis and sending a notice within two 
months of the end of each quarter.496 Where the contract is for Part B services, the 
utility must indicate in the contract notice whether they agree to the publication of a 
contract award notice, suggesting that publication is voluntary for these contracts.497 
IV.4. Remedies 
Where the procurement rules have been breached, there are two options to deal with the 
breach. Firstly, the Commission or the Member State can bring an action to the CJEU 
under Articles 258 and 259 of the TFEU. As well as bringing actions on its own initiative, 
the Commission may also respond to breaches reported to it by Member States or 
individual firms. The final decision on whether to bring a case is, however, solely down to 
the Commission.498 The action is brought against the Member State and not against the 
particular procuring entity which has breached the rules. A Member State is held 
DFFRXQWDEOH IRU WKH DFWLRQVRI DOO ³SXEOLF´ERGLHV LQ WKDW6WDWHZKLFKZRXOGDSSHDU WR
cover contracting authorities and public undertakings.499 It is unclear, however, whether 
the State is responsible for the actions of private firms with special and exclusive rights. 
Where the CJEU finds a breach of the rules, it declares the Member State in breach and 
WKDW 6WDWHPXVW WDNH DOO ³QHFHVVDU\PHDVXUHV´ WR IL[ WKDWEUHDFK XS WR DQG LQFOXGLQJ
setting aside a concluded contract.500 
The second method of obtaining a remedy is for the aggrieved supplier to bring an action 
against the particular procuring entity in the national court. Certain minimum standards 
for the national procurement remedies system are set out by the Remedies Directive 
which was recently amended significantly.501 In the UK, the obligations of the Remedies 
Directive have been implemented in Regs. 45A-45P of the Utilities Contracts Regulations 
2006. 
                                          
496 Ibid. 
497 Art. 43(3) Utilities Directive. 
498 Case T-126/95, Dumez v Commission of the European Communities [1995] ECR II-2863, para. 33. 
499 Case C-24/91, Commission v Spain [1992] ECR I-1989. 
500 Case C-503/04, Commission v Germany [2007] ECR I-06153. 
501 See Directive 2007/66/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 11 December 2007 amending 
Council Directives 89/665/EEC and 92/13/EEC with regard to improving the effectiveness of review procedures 
concerning the award of public contracts, OJ 2007 L335/31. 
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7KH 5HPHGLHV 'LUHFWLYH DSSOLHVZKHUHYHU WKHUH LV D EUHDFK RI ³&RPPXQLW\ ODZ LQ WKH
ILHOGRISURFXUHPHQW´ FRYHULQJERWKEUHDFKHVRI UXOHVXQGHU the Utilities Directive and 
under the TFEU.502 Review procedures are available to any person who has or had an 
interest in obtaining the contract and who has been or risks being harmed by the 
relevant decision of the procuring entity.503 A claim thus cannot be brought by a firm 
where the breach does not prejudice them in any way.504 There are conflicting decisions 
on whether the likelihood of the firm winning the contract but for the breach is a relevant 
issue. In the High Court decision of Jobsin it was held that a claim should not be rejected 
simply because the breach would not have affected the outcome of the tender.505 
However, in the recent case of Lion Apparel it was held that a claim was not permitted 
where the procuring entity could prove that the breach did not affect the award 
decision.506 
The particular remedies the national courts must make available are set out in Art. 2 of 
the Remedies Directive. First, the court must have the power to order interim relief in 
the form of suspension of the award procedure. Second, the court must have the power 
to set aside unlawful decisions. Finally, there must be a power to award damages. Art. 
2(6) of the Remedies Directive offers Member States the option to provide that where 
the contract has been concluded the only possible remedy is damages, an option the UK 
has included in the Regulations in Reg. 45J. This option has been affected by the recent 
amendments which create a new mandatory standstill period between the conclusion of 
the award procedure and the conclusion of the contract and also by possibility of 
declaring a contract ineffective set out in the recent Remedies Directive reforms (see 
below). 
IV.4.1. Suspension 
                                          
502 Art. 1(1) Remedies Directive. 
503 Art. 1(3) Remedies Directive. 
504 De la Rue International v Scottish Power [2000] Scots CS 259. 
505 Jobsin Internet Services v Department of Health, High Court judgment of 18 May 2001. 
506 Lion Apparel Systems v Firebuy [2007] EWHC 2179 ³Lion Apparel´. 
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A suspension halts the award procedure until a decision on whether to award a set-aside 
or damages can be made. In the UK, the courts have usually followed the general 
principles relating to awarding interim relief when considering whether to award a 
suspension. In UK law, interim relief will be denied where damages would be an 
adequate remedy. This principle has been applied in some procurement remedies cases 
in the UK, such as Lion Apparel. However, the CJEU case of Alcatel stated that EU law 
required a set-aside to be available in every case despite the availability of damages, 
and it is arguable that this also applies to interim relief.507 This approach has also been 
applied in the UK in the cases of Harmon508 and BFS v Secretary of State for Defence.509 
The UK cases similarly conflict over whether the usual UK requirement of an undertaking 
in damages applies to interim relief under the Remedies Directive with Lion Apparel 
suggesting an undertaking would be required and the judge in Harmon considering that 
the requirements of EU law, especially the principle of effectiveness, would prevent it. 
The court must also consider the balance of convenience in the case, weighing up the 
possible benefits of suspension against the possible detrimental effects on the procuring 
entity and the successful tenderer. In practice, suspensions are very rarely awarded. 
The recent amendments add a requirement that where independent review of a 
procurement decision is requested, the contract is automatically suspended until the 
court makes a decision on whether the review is admissible and whether interim 
measures should be awarded.510 Except in this case, a review does not have an 
automatic suspensive effect.511 
IV.4.2. Set-aside 
Review bodies have the power to set aside any unlawful decisions or to amend any 
relevant documents. As previously noted, the CJEU decision of Alcatel held that the 
                                          
507 Case C-81/98, Alcatel Austria AG and Others, Siemens AG Österreich and Sag-Schrack Anlagentechnik AG v 
Bundesministerium für Wissenschaft und Verkehr [1999] ECR I-07671, at para. 43. 
508 Harmon CFEM Facades (UK) Ltd v The Corporate Officer of the House of Commons (2000) 2 LGLR 372. 
509 [2006] EWHC 1513. 
510 Art. 2(3) Remedies Directive. 
511 Art. 2(3a) Remedies Directive. 
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remedy of set-aside must be available in every case regardless of the availability of 
damages. 
IV.4.3. Damages 
Neither the Utilities Directive nor the Utilities Contracts Regulations specify how damages 
for breach of the procurement rules should be calculated. The UK courts have followed 
the usual tort standard of requiring the damages to put the claimant in the same position 
as if the breach had not occurred. Following Harmon damages for lost profits may be 
DZDUGHGHLWKHURQD³ORVVRIFKDQFH´EDVLVRUZKHUHDILUPFDQVKRZWKDWLWZDVYLUWXDOO\
certain that they would have won the contract damages may be awarded for the full 
YDOXHRIWKHORVWSURILWV:KHUHWKHFRXUW LVVDWLVILHGWKDWDILUPKDGD³UHDOFKDQFH´RI
winning the contract it may recover its tender costs from the procuring entity.512 
IV.4.4. Mandatory Standstill 
In Alcatel the CJEU introduced a requirement that, for an effective remedies system to 
exist, a firm must have adequate time between the end of the award procedure and the 
conclusion of the contract to bring a review action in which it is possible for the contract 
to be set aside.513 In those countries where the option to prevent a review action 
concerning a concluded contract resulting in any remedy other than damages has been 
XWLOLVHG WKLV UHTXLUHVD ³VWDQGVWLOO´SHULRGEHWZHHQWKHFRQWUDFWDZDUGDQGWKHFRQWUDFW
conclusion during which a review may be requested. This requirement is implemented in 
the UK Regulations in Reg. 33A which requires a standstill period of 10 days between 
notification of the award decision to the parties and the conclusion of the contract. The 
requirement for a 10 day standstill has also now been included in the Remedies Directive 
in Art. 2a. The standstill does not have to be complied with where the contract is of a 
                                          
512 Reg. 45(8) Utilities Contracts Regulations 2006. 
513 Alcatel, above n.507, at para. 43. 
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type which does not require a call for competition, where there is only one tenderer and 
in the case of specific contracts awarded under a dynamic purchasing system.514 
IV.4.5. Ineffectiveness 
The recent amendments to the Remedies Directive also add a new provision making 
contract awards ineffective in three situations: (1) where a procuring entity has made a 
direct award to a firm in a breach of the provisions of the Utilities Directive; (2) where 
the standstill requirement has not been complied with and there has also been a breach 
of the provisions of the Utilities Directive; (3) where the Member State has chosen to 
apply the derogation from the standstill for contracts under a dynamic purchasing 
system, the contract will be ineffective if the individual contract has not been advertised 
or all members of the system have not been invited to tender, and the individual 
contract is over the threshold value.515 In the case of direct awards, ineffectiveness may 
be avoided if the procuring entity publishes a notice in the Official Journal and does not 
conclude the contract until 10 days after the publication of that notice.516 The Member 
States may choose whether to make contracts ineffective retroactively or limit 
ineffectiveness to future performance but where the latter option is chosen the Member 
State must also provide for alternative remedies in the form of a fine or the shortening 
of the contract.517 These ineffectiveness rules have been implemented in the UK in Regs. 
45K-45O. 
V. Conclusion 
This chapter has set out an overview of the EU utilities procurement regime under both 
the TFEU and the Utilities Directive. The chapter has set out the aims of EU procurement 
regulation, which focus mainly on economic issues, with the opening up of the European 
procurement market being key. This economic focus may have an impact on the 
interpretation of the procurement regime regarding labour policies and this issue will be 
                                          
514 Art. 2b Remedies Directive. 
515 Art. 2d(1) Remedies Directive. 
516 Art. 2d(4) Remedies Directive. 
517 Art. 2d(2) and Art. 2e(2) Remedies Directive. 
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considered in more detail in the following chapter. The chapter has also set out the 
scope of the Utilities Directive, the possible procurement procedures available under that 
directive and the remedies available to supplier for a breach of the directive rules. This 
overview aimed to provide background to the more detailed discussion of the issue of 
labour policies in procurement in the following chapter. 
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Chapter 6 - Utilities Procurement and Labour Policies 
I. Introduction 
This chapter will examine the various methods available to utilities for implementing 
labour policies in their procurement, with special reference to the labour codes discussed 
in the previous chapter. The law in this area is very unclear, with a number of different 
interpretations being possible in some cases. This uncertainty means that implementing 
labour policies requires utilities to balance the possible risk of legal challenge against any 
social or commercial benefits to them of implementing the policy. The chapter aims to 
examine the possibilities for including labour policies in procurement, setting out 
methods which are clearly permitted under the EU regulation along with the constraints 
under that law, in order to examine how utilities respond to these opportunities and 
constraints. In addition to this, the chapter aims to highlight the grey areas in the law 
where the correct interpretation of the regulation is unclear, and examine the degree of 
risk associated with the various policies and implementation approaches. The issues 
discussed in this chapter will then be raised in the interviews with procurement 
practitioners to discover the impact, if any, they have in practice.  
The chapter first offers an examination of the general uncertainties faced by utilities 
when procuring, such as uncertainty over which legal regime, if any, is applicable to their 
procurement. The following section will briefly examine specific issues which may arise 
under the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU) rules for those 
utilities subject to the Treaty.518 The final section offers a detailed examination of the 
issues which may arise under Directive 2004/17/EC519 ³WKH 8WLOLWLHV 'LUHFWLYH´ 7KH
sections on the Treaty and the Utilities Directive discuss various methods by which the 
aims of the labour policies discussed in the previous chapter could be implemented, 
                                          
518 Coverage of the TFEU is discussed in Chapter 5, Section II. 
519 Directive 2004/17/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council coordinating the procurement 
procedures of entities operating in the water, energy, transport and postal services sectors, OJ 2004 No. 
L134/1. 
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drawing on a taxonomy by Arrowsmith setting out possible ways social policies may be 
included in procurement.520 
II. General Issues 
One of the first problems a utility may encounter is the issue of deciding which legal 
rules apply to that utility for a particular procurement. One uncertainty in this area is the 
applicability of the TFEU provisions to utilities which are regulated due to being public 
undertakings or having special or exclusive rights. As previously discussed in Chapter 5, 
Article 106 TFEU prohibits Member States from enacting any measure which breaches a 
Treaty provision in connection with a public undertaking or a private entity with special 
or exclusive rights. As discussed in that chapter, Article 106 clearly prohibits a breach of 
a Treaty provision by an undertaking or body with special or exclusive rights where that 
breach results directly from a State measure.521 It is unclear, however, if the Article is 
limited to such situations. Under one interpretation, Article 106 only applies where the 
Member State is directly involved in the breach by influencing the actions of the relevant 
entity.522 It has also been argued, however, that the Article goes further and prohibits 
undertakings and entities with special or exclusive rights from taking any action which 
EUHDFKHVWKH7)(8SUHYHQWLQJ0HPEHU6WDWHVIURP³HYDGLQJWKHLUREOLJDWLRQVE\KLGLQJ
behind the apparently independent behaviour of their public or privileged 
XQGHUWDNLQJV´523 
If the Treaty does cover public undertakings and private entities with special or exclusive 
rights, then utilities must consider those Treaty rules for all procurements, including 
those below the Directive¶VWKUHVKROGDQGSURFXUHPHQWH[FOXGHGIURPWKH'LUHFWLYHVXFK
as services concessions. Equally, utilities who have gained an exemption from the 
                                          
520 $UURZVPLWK6µ$WD[RQRP\RIKRUL]RQWDOSROLFLHVLQSXEOLFSURFXUHPHQW¶&KLQ$UURZVPLWK6DQG
Kunzlik, P. (eds), Social and Environmental Policies in EC Procurement Law: New Directives and New 
Directions, (2009, Cambridge: CUP). 
521 See, for example, Case C-475/99, Firma Ambulanz Glockner v Landkreis Sudwestpfalz [2001] ECR I-08089, 
para. 40. 
522 Arrowsmith, S.The Law of Public and Utilities Procurement, (2nd Ed), (2005, London: Sweet and Maxwell), at 
p.236. 
523 See Buendia Sierra, J. Exclusive Rights and EC Monopolies under EC Law, (1999, Oxford: OUP), at p.192-
194 and the literature cited there. 
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Directive under Article 30 of that Directive must still comply with the Treaty rules, which 
may limit the freedom they have in practice, especially in light of the transparency 
requirements introduced in Telaustria (see further below and section II.3, Chapter 5). If, 
however, the Treaty is not applicable, procurement which does not fall within the 
Directive will be completely exempt from any regulation. 
It has also been suggested that problems may be caused by the number of regulatory 
regimes which may apply to utilities. Arrowsmith and Maund argue that liberalisation of 
the utility sector in recent years has led to utilities consolidating into fewer, much larger 
companies, which often operate in several countries both within the EU and beyond.524 
This liberalisation has also led to utilities diversifying out of their traditional areas of 
activity, meaning that different sections of the same utility may be subject to different 
procurement regulation, for example where one activity has an exemption from the 
Utilities Directive.525 Arrowsmith and Maund argue that the EU rules may prevent utilities 
from implementing CSR policies which cover more than one country or activity, or from 
co-operating with other entities which operate in other countries/activities to design or 
implement a joint CSR initiative.526 They also note that the variation in regulatory 
regimes may confuse both utilities and suppliers.527 If this argument is correct, it may 
limit the ability of utilities to create their own industry-wide labour codes of conduct. 
III. Procurement under the TFEU 
As previously discussed in Chapter 5, several provisions in the TFEU regulate public 
procurement, with the most important being the free movement provisions. The Treaty 
rules have become more important in recent years due to the principle of transparency 
set out by the CJEU in Telaustria.528 This states that all contracts ± even those not 
subject to the rules under the Directive ± need to be advertised and must be conducted 
                                          
524 $UURZVPLWK6DQG0DXQG&µ&65LQWKHXWLOLWLHVVHFWRUDQGWKHLPSOLFDWLRQVRI(&SURFXUHPHQWSROLF\D
IUDPHZRUNIRUGHEDWH¶&KLQ$UURZVPLWKDQG.unzlik, above n. 520, section 6. 
525 Ibid, at p.473. 
526 Ibid, at p.474. 
527 Ibid. 
528 Case C-324/98, Telaustria Verlags GmbH and Telefonadress GmbH v Telekom Austria AG [2000] ECR I-
10745. 
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in a sufficiently transparent manner as to ensure compliance with the free movement 
provisions.529 
The Treaty provisions apply to all procurement contracts, both those covered by the 
Utilities Directive and those which are outside the Directive, for whatever reason.530 As 
discussed in the previous section, the application of the Treaty provisions to private 
utilities is debated but this section will proceed on the assumption that the provisions do 
indeed apply. In either case, the Treaty provisions are applicable to utilities which are 
classed as public authorities. 
III.1.Technical Requirements and Contractual Conditions 
One of the first opportunities a utility has to consider labour issues in procurement is 
when setting out the technical requirements of the contract ± what precisely the utility 
wishes to buy ± and when setting out any contract conditions which must be complied 
with by the firm completing the contract. This method will be crucial for most utilities 
complying with one of the international labour codes discussed in the previous chapter. 
As seen in that chapter, most of those codes set out certain minimum standards to be 
met by firms and contract conditions which must be accepted in their entirety are the 
easiest way for a utility to ensure this minimum is met. 
III.1.1. Compliance with legal requirements 
One of the most common requirements in the codes examined in the previous chapter 
was compliance with the relevant national law.531 7KHµQDWLRQDOODZ¶WKDWWKHFRGHVUHIHU
to appears to refer to the law which is applicable in the country where the contract is 
performed. Depending on what the contract is for, this may be either the law of the 
                                          
529 For further discussion of the free movement provisions and the transparency principle, see Chapter 5, 
section III.2. 
530 With the exception of contracts which fulfil the requirements of a Treaty exception, such as contracts for 
hard defence material, which are exempt under Article 296 EC. 
531 The requirement to comply with national law was found in all international codes examined in the previous 
chapter and is also the second most common requirement in individual and industry codes, found in 65.5% of 
codes dealing with labour issues: OECD, Codes of Corporate Conduct: Expanded Review of their Contents, 
(2001), available at http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/57/24/1922656.pdf [accessed 14/04/09], at p. 10. 
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awarding state or the law of the home state of the contractor. The arguments relating to 
each scenario are essentially identical and will be examined together.532 
As discussed in Chapter 5, for the free movement provisions of the TFEU to apply, the 
condition in question must create a hindrance to trade. The requirement to comply with 
national law appears to be non-discriminatory, affecting national and foreign suppliers 
equally. It was argued in Chapter 5 that even non-discriminatory conditions appear to be 
classed as hindrances to trade which require justification for services and works 
contracts, though the situation is less clear for supply contracts since the case of 
Keck.533 Arrowsmith and Kunzlik take the contrary view that non-discriminatory 
provisions are to be treated LQWKHVDPHZD\DV³VHOOLQJDUUDQJHPHQWV´XQGHUKeck and 
are not automatically hindrances to trade.534 Under this view, requiring compliance with 
the law is not caught by the free movement rules at all and utilities are free to include 
such a condition in their contracts. 
However, even presuming that justification is required in all cases, it is arguable that 
requiring compliance with the law would be justifiable for public policy reasons. 
Arrowsmith argues that public bodies may justify such contract conditions by the need to 
disassociate themselves from criminal behaviour, the desire to set a good example and 
also to ensure that companies which do not comply with the law do not gain an unfair 
advantage over compliant companies.535 These arguments appear equally applicable to 
utilities. In addition to this, utilities may wish to ensure compliance with the law and 
avoid association with unethical suppliers for commercial reasons, allowing the company 
to present themselves as socially responsible to their various stakeholders. 
                                          
532 This discussion will only consider the issues raised under EU procurement law, but it may be noted that 
there may be an issue with only requiring legal compliance under English contract law due to an absence of 
consideration, see McCrudden, C. Buying Social Justice: Equality, Government Procurement and Legal Change, 
(2007, Oxford: OUP), at p. 525. 
533 Cases C-267 and 268/91, Criminal Proceedings against Keck and Mithouard [1993] ECR I-³Keck´DW
paras. 15-17. See further Chapter 5, sec. III. 
534 $UURZVPLWK6DQG.XQ]OLN3µ(&UHJXODWLRQRISXEOLFSURFXUHPHQW¶&KRI$UURZVPLWKDQG.XQ]OLN
above n.520, at pp.67-72. 
535 Arrowsmith, above n.520, pp.112-113. 
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In this respect, it is notable that the Utilities Directive seems to assume that requiring 
compliance with national law is allowable since Article 39 allows Member States to 
require a utility to state where information on national obligations relating to, inter alia, 
working conditions may be obtained by a tenderer. Equally, Directive 2004/18/EC536 
³WKH 3XEOLF 6HFWRU 'LUHFWLYH´ DOORZV SURFXULQJ HQWLWLHV WR H[FOXGH ILUPV ZKLFK KDYH
committed certain criminal offences from tendering.537 This may suggest that the EU 
considers that ensuring compliance with the law is a legitimate concern for authorities.538 
Requiring compliance with national law is a low-risk option for utilities. 
III.1.2. Contract conditions going beyond the law 
The international labour codes discussed in Chapter 3 generally saw compliance with the 
relevant national law as a bare minimum. The codes generally set out specific 
requirements going beyond this such as minimum wages for the workforce or prohibition 
of child or forced labour. This section will examine the possibility of including contract 
conditions going beyond legal compliance in procurement contracts, focusing on 
requirements commonly mentioned in the labour policies examined in the previous 
chapter. 
III.1.2.1. Conditions relating to contract performance 
The utility may wish to set out certain conditions which the contractor must comply with 
when the contract is being performed. This section will first set out the general issues 
which must be considered when setting out such conditions, before considering the issue 
in several specific situations arising from the policies in the previous chapter. 
General issues 
As discussed in the previous section, for a policy to be subject to the free movement 
provisions it must be classed as a hindrance to trade. The CJEU jurisprudence on 
                                          
536 Directive 2004/18/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council on the co-ordination of procedures for 
the award of public works contracts, public supply contracts and public service contracts, OJ 2004 L132/114. 
537 Art. 45 Public Sector Directive.  
538 $UURZVPLWK6µ$SSOLFDWLRQRIWKH(&7UHDW\DQGGLUHFWLYHVWRKRUL]RQWDOSROLFLHVDFULWLFDOUHYLHZ¶&KLQ
Arrowsmith and Kunzlik, above n.520, at p.162. 
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services suggests that any policy which restricts trade in any way needs to be 
justified.539 This is supported in the context of labour policies by the case of Beentjes in 
which the CJEU held a condition requiring that 70% of the contract workforce should be 
recruited from the long-term unemployed would be XQODZIXO LI ³WHQGHUHUV IURP RWKHU
0HPEHU6WDWHVZRXOGKDYHGLIILFXOW\ FRPSO\LQJZLWK LW´.540 This was also the approach 
taken in the recent case of Rüffert where a requirement to pay contract workers a 
certain wage was held to cause an additional burden to firms from Member States with 
lower prevailing wage rates and to require justification.541 
Since in all these cases the policy created an extra burden for foreign suppliers the policy 
appears to have been classed as indirectly discriminatory. The issue of a labour policy 
which is non-discriminatory in its effects has not been considered by the CJEU. Some of 
the issues in the labour codes examined may affect both national and foreign firms 
equally, for example being training the contract workforce in a particular skill (presuming 
a national qualification is not specified). As noted in the previous section, Arrowsmith 
and Kunzlik suggest that non-discriminatory measures should not generally be classed 
as hindrances to trade and should fall outside the scope of the free movement 
provisions.542 If a labour policy can be formulated to be non-discriminatory, this is 
probably the lowest risk option for a utility since, even if classed as a hindrance to trade, 
it is more likely to be justifiable. 
Should a policy be classed as a hindrance to trade, it may still be allowable if the 
hindrance can be justified under a Treaty exception or under an objective justification 
recognised by the CJEU.543 As a general rule, for a measure to be justifiable it must be 
intended to fulfil a genuine social aim of the utility, be suitable for obtaining its objective 
and must not go beyond what is necessary to achieve that objective.544 Several specific 
                                          
539 See, for example, Case C-384/93, Alpine Investments BV v Minister van Financien[1995] ECR I-1141. 
540 Case C-31/87 Gebroeders Beentjes BV v Netherlands >@(&5³Beentjes´SDUD6HHDOVR
Case C-225/98, Commission v France [2000] ECR I-³Nord Pas De Calais´ 
541 Case C-346/06, Rüffert v Land Niedersachsen [2008] ECR I-01989, para. 37. 
542 Arrowsmith and Kunzlik, above n.534. 
543 For further discussion of justification, see Chapter 5, sec. II.  
544 Case C-234/03, Contse SA, Vivisol Srl & Oxigen Salud SA v Instituto Nacional de Gestión Sanitaria (Ingesa) 
[2005] ECR I-³Contse´DWSDUD 
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justifications relevant to labour policies have been recognised by the CJEU, for example 
protection of workers.545 Worker protection is the main aim of the majority of the 
requirements in the labour codes examined in the previous section, especially those 
concerned with health and safety and employment conditions such as holiday 
entitlement, so this possible justification is important. The CJEU also recognised 
addressing long-term unemployment as a legitimate concern in Beentjes.546 Equal 
opportunities is also a key aspect of EU law, as shown by Article 18 of the TFEU, so 
policies prohibiting discrimination are likely to be justifiable. 
It has been argued by Arrowsmith and Maund that labour policies adopted to comply 
with one of the international labour codes discussed in the previous chapter may be 
more likely to be justifiable than policies designed by the utility independently.547 Policies 
which rely on external norms may be considered less open to abuse by the CJEU since 
the requirements cannot be changed by the procuring entity. Equally, policies designed 
by international organisations may be more likely to be known by firms throughout the 
EU, helping to prevent any discrimination for national firms which might occur if national 
standards are used. 
Arrowsmith and Maund note that the requirement to show that a policy is suitable to 
achieve its objective before it can be justified may be problem for some policies.548 As 
discussed in Chapter 2 on Corporate Social Responsibility, a utility may adopt a social 
policy for two main reasons. Firstly, the utility may wish to obtain the direct benefit of 
the labour policy, for example the abolition of child labour in the companies they are 
associated with. Secondly, they may implement the policy for commercial reasons, due 
to the demands of their stakeholders and/or in the belief that such a labour policy will 
improve their profitability.   
                                          
545 Case C-113/89, 5XVK3RUWXJXHVDY2IILFHQDWLRQDOG¶LPPLJUDWLRQ >@(&5³Rush Portuguesa´
para. 18. 
546 Above n.540, at para. 37. 
547 Arrowsmith and Maund, above n.524, at pp.448-449. 
548 Arrowsmith and Maund, above n.524, at p.447. 
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Where a utility relies on the social benefit of the policy for justification, the issue of 
proving that benefit becomes relevant. It is unclear whether, where a utility is relying on 
an externally designed labour code or has designed its own code to support external 
standards, that code will be accepted by the CJEU as suitable simply because it supports 
those standards, or whether it will have to be proved that the code actually has a real 
impact on labour standards.549 If the utility must prove actual benefit from the code, the 
degree of monitoring provided for in the code may be relevant. Some standards, such as 
the UN Global Compact, provide for virtually no monitoring, making the actual impact of 
the code hard to measure and suggesting that the code is often no more than a PR 
exercise. Others, such as the OECD Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises and the 
Ethical Trading Institute Base Code, make provision for some external enforcement of 
the code provisions and so may be more easily justified.550 
There are two possible problems where a policy is adopted for commercial reasons. 
Firstly, the CJEU has held in several cases that economic objectives cannot justify a 
hindrance to trade.551 Arrowsmith, however, argues that this general principle is too 
broad and needs to be nuanced, noting that when the principle was first adopted, it was 
only used to prevent policies which were clearly incompatible with the Treaty.552 She 
argues that economic policies which are not incompatible with the principles of the single 
markets should not be automatically unlawful, but the issue of justification should be 
judged for each specific policy on the facts.553 Where a policy is adopted by a private 
entity for genuine commercial reasons, it would appear that there is no incompatibility 
with the Treaty principles, and it may be that the CJEU would consider such a policy 
justifiable.  
Secondly, even if an economic objective may be a justification, the link between CSR and 
profit has not been proved, making it hard to claim that a labour policy is suitable for 
                                          
549 Arrowsmith and Maund, above n.524, at p.447. 
550 See OECD Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises 2000, p.32 and Ethical Trading Institute Principles of 
Implementation, Principle 2.1. 
551 See, for example, Case C-353/89, Commission v Netherlands [1991] ECR I-4069 and Case C-398/95, 
Syndemos ton en Elladi Touristikonkai Taxidiotikon Grafeion v Ypourgos Ergasias [1997] ECR I-3091. 
552 Arrowsmith, above n.538, at p.156. 
553 Ibid, at p.157. 
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achieving a commercial aim.554 It is also unclear whether it will be sufficient for a utility 
to show it has been subject to pressure to include such policies from its stakeholders, or 
whether they must demonstrate somehow that there is actual commercial benefit from 
its compliance with stakeholder demands. 
Requiring a certain mark or certification 
A utility may wish to require a product with a certain mark, for example the Fair Trade 
mark, so they can be easily sure of the labour standards of the workforce who produced 
that product. Equally, they may wish to require that any suppliers they contract with are 
certified to a certain standard such as SA 8000, discussed in the previous chapter. 
Requiring a product mark or certification by an external body reduces the procedural 
burden on the utility, which would otherwise have to examine all the evidence 
themselves for each supplier. 
It appears, however, that under EU law a utility cannot require a certain product mark or 
certification to a particular scheme, but must accept a tender from any supplier who can 
show they can meet the substantive requirements of the utility in any other way. This 
was first suggested in the case of UNIX, where the CJEU stated that a requirement that 
an information technology system use a UNIX operating system was held to form a 
hindrance to trade since it excluded other operating systems which were equally able to 
PHHW WKH DXWKRULW\¶V IXQFWLRQDO UHTXLUHPHQWV555 This has the possible benefit of 
increasing competition by including non-certified suppliers and products, but also 
increases the procedural burden on utilities. The EU rules have the effect of preventing a 
utility from balancing the possible benefits against the burden themselves, and requiring 
certain certification must be seen as a very high-risk option.  
 
 
                                          
554 See Chapter 2 on Corporate Social Responsibility, sec. III.1. 
555 Case C-359/89, Commission v Netherlands [1995] ECR I-³UNIX´6HHDOVR&DVHCommission v 
Ireland >@(&5³Dundalk´ 
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Regulating activities outside the awarding state  
The labour policies examined in the previous chapter are designed with firms operating 
in high-risk countries abroad in mind and so one possible issue is the extent to which EU 
law lets utilities regulate activities which take place outside their home state. The EU law 
on this area varies slightly depending on whether the state in which the contract is 
performed is also an EU Member State or whether it is a third (non-EU) country. This 
issue is more likely to arise in supply contracts, where the goods may be manufactured 
outside the awarding state and shipped to the utility. 
Where the country in which the contract is performed is also an EU Member State the 
opportunities for implementing worker protection policies seem limited since it must be 
shown that the protective measures of that country are inadequate, a requirement which 
is very hard to meet in practice.556 It may also be noted that the European Commission 
appear to take a narrow view of what is allowable in relation to regulating matters in 
another state. In an Interpretive Communication in this area, it states that contractual 
clauses relating to the manner in which supply contracts are executed may create a 
hindrance to trade, given the changes to the organisation of an undertaking established 
in another Member State which may be required.557 This may suggest that the 
Commission is concerned with the inability to identify precisely which work is the work 
done under the contract (since the contract supplies will often be manufactured 
alongside other products) and so it will be difficult for a company to comply with the 
contractual conditions for only the goods under the contract. The supplier may thus be 
required to change all of their business to comply with the contract, creating a greater 
restriction on trade. 
More often, however, the relevant firms will be based in a non-EU state. Unlike with EU 
Member States there is probably no presumption that the worker protection regulation of 
                                          
556 See, for example, Case C-76/90, Manfred Säger v Dennemeyer& Co. Ltd, [1991] ECR I-4221. 
557 European Commission, Interpretive Communication of the Commission on the Community Law applicable to 
public procurement and the possibilities for integrating social considerations into public procurement, 
&20³&RPPLVVLRQ&RPPXQLFDWLRQRQ6RFLDO,VVXHV´VHF 
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these countries is adequate, and so the policy will fall to be justified under the general 
rules for justification discussed above. Arrowsmith suggests that in these cases the 
policy may be justifiable not only by the protection which it offers the contract workers, 
EXWDOVRSRVVLEO\E\DILUP¶VGHVLUHWRGLVDVVRFLDWHLWVHOI IURPH[SORLWDWLYHEHKDYLRXU558  
As discussed previously in section III of Chapter 2 on Corporate Social Responsibility, 
utilities are often under pressure from a variety of sources, such as consumers, 
employees and investors, to be socially responsible, and given this, a utility may need to 
disassociate itself from poor labour practices in order to satisfy these commercial 
pressures. If such a commercial justification is allowable (see the discussion on economic 
justification above), this would enable utilities to implement labour policies where the 
precise impact of the policy is hard to determine. The Commission Communication on 
Social Issues does not consider the possibility of regulating activity outside the EU, but 
if, as argued above, the concern is with the restriction on trade which may be caused by 
regulating activity going beyond contract performance, the argument may equally apply 
to non-EU firms. 
Production Methods 
The majority of the labour codes examined in the previous chapter required that 
companies ensure that their workforce have certain minimum labour standards.559 This 
section will examine the possibility of a utility setting standards relating to the workforce 
producing the product they are purchasing. This situation will also include utilities who 
wish to purchase products which are made under fair trade conditions. 
7KH&RPPLVVLRQ¶VYLHZRQWKHOHJDOLW\RIFRQGLWLRQVUHODWLQJWRSURGXFWLRQPHWKRGVZDV
noted in the previous section, where it was seen that the Commission argue that the 
SRVVLEOH HIIHFWV RQ WKH VXSSOLHU¶V ZKROH EXVLQHVV VWUXFWXUH PHDQ WKDW VXFK FRQGLWions 
may be considered a restriction on trade.560 In addition to this, in its Communication 
                                          
558 Arrowsmith, above n.538, at p.174. 
559 See, for example, Principles 5 and 6 of the Ethical Trading Institute Base Code and Sections 7 and 8 of SA 
8000, setting out minimum wage rates and maximum working hours. 
560 Commission Communication on Social Issues, above n.557, sec. 1.6. 
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relating to Environmental Considerations, the Commission suggests that production 
matters may only be considered where they impact on the actual characteristics of the 
product.561 This would appear to rule out the possibility of including production 
conditions relating to the workforce since these would generally have no impact on the 
product itself. 
The view of the Commission has been criticised, however. The Commission states that a 
requirement that electricity is sourced from environmentally friendly sources would be 
acceptable.562 .XQ]OLN DUJXHV WKDW WKLV FODLP FRQWUDGLFWV WKH &RPPLVVLRQ¶V RZQ
requirement that production conditions have an impact on the characteristics of the 
SURGXFW VLQFH ³JUHHQ´ HQHUJ\ LV LQGLVWLQJXLVKDEOH DW WKH SRLQW RI FRQVXPSWLRQ IURP
energy generated from fossil fuels.563 It has been suggested that the example of green 
energy was included by the Commission because it would not have been politically 
acceptable to suggest that EU law prevented authorities from considering green issues 
given the importance of environmental matters to the EU.564 It could be argued, similarly 
to this, that it would be politically unacceptable to prevent utilities from excluding firms 
ZLWK XQHWKLFDO ODERXU SUDFWLFHV ,I WKLV LV WKH FDVH DQG FRQWUDU\ WR WKH &RPPLVVLRQ¶V
argument there is no requirement that production methods affect the characteristics of 
the product, it will be possible for utilities to include such conditions.  
Local Labour 
One common aspect of labour codes is the requirement to improve the welfare of the 
local community in which the company is operating. In order to do so, labour codes may 
include a requirement to favour national firms for contracts, or to hire national labour for 
                                          
561 European Commission, Interpretive communication of the Commission on the Community law applicable to 
public procurement and the possibilities for integrating environmental considerations into public procurement, 
COM(2001) 274, at Part II, section 1.2.  
562 Ibid. 
563 .XQ]OLN3µ7KHSURFXUHPHQWRIµJUHHQ¶HQHUJ\¶&KLQ$UURZVPLWKDQG.XQ]OLNDERYHQ520, at p.395. 
6HHDOVR.XQ]OLN3µ0DNLQJWKHPDUNHWZRUNIRUWKHHQYLURQPHQWDFFHSWDQFHRIVRPH³JUHHQ´FRQWUDFW
award criteria in public procuUHPHQW¶Journal of Environmental Law 175.  
564 Arrowsmith, above n.522, at p.1275. 
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their workforce on the contract.565 The requirement is to favour labour which is local to 
the area of the contract performance, leading to three possible situations depending on 
where that contract is performed: (1) favouring labour based in the home state of the 
awarding utility; (2) favouring labour based in another EU member state; or (3) 
favouring labour based in a non-EU state. This section will discuss both the possibility of 
including a contract condition requiring that the workforce of the contract be recruited 
from the local area and the possibility of favouring local firms for contracts.  
x Labour based in home state 
Of the three possible scenarios identified, a policy favouring labour recruited in the home 
state of the utility is the highest risk. The TFEU free movement provisions prohibit any 
condition which requires a company to recruit their workforce from the awarding state, 
or from any specific area therein. Such conditions are harder to meet in practice by 
foreign firms, forming an indirectly discriminatory hindrance to trade.566 Connected to 
this, any condition which prevents a firm from bringing its own workforce to the host 
state to perform the contract is also prohibited, preventing a utility from including such a 
condition in the hope that this will force the supplier to recruit a workforce in the home 
state.567 
As regards set-asides for local firms, the CJEU in Du Pont de Nemours has stated that 
policies which reserve contracts for firms in certain areas are directly discriminatory, 
creating a hindrance to trade contrary to the free movement principles.568 Policies are 
also caught by the free movement rules when they are indirectly discriminatory, as in 
the case of Commission v Italy, in which a preference was given to companies which had 
                                          
565 See, for example, OECD Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises, General Principles 3 and 4, which require a 
firm to encourage local employment and local capacity building, and the ILO Tripartite Declaration of Principles 
Concerning Multinational Enterprises and Social Policy (2006), p.6, which states that a company should 
promote employment opportunities, giving priority to nationals of the state in which they are operating. 
566 Case C-243/89, Commission v Denmark [1993] ECR I-3353. 
567 Case C-113/89, 5XVK3RUWXJXHVDY2IILFHQDWLRQDOG¶LPPLJUDWLRQ [1990] ECR I-1417. 
568 Case C-21/88, Du Pont de Nemours Italiana SpA v Unita Sanitaria Locale No. 2 di Carrara [1990] ECR I-
889, at para. 14. 
Page 132 of 300 
 
their main operations in the area of the contract performance, a criterion more likely to 
be satisfied in practice by Italian firms.569 
x Labour based in another EU state 
EU law is less clear on the situation where the contract is performed in another EU 
member state and the workforce of that state is preferred. Such a policy is not 
discriminatory in the sense that it is usually used, since it does not favour parties based 
the awarding state in any way. As discussed in sec. III of Chapter 5, however, non-
discriminatory hindrances to trade are also generally prohibited by the free movement 
provisions, so the question becomes whether recruiting local labour or setting aside 
contracts for local firms does indeed form a hindrance to trade. Set-asides certainly 
restrict trade, limiting contracts only to certain firms. A requirement to recruit local 
labour also appears to be a hindrance to trade, preventing firms from other countries 
who wish to use their existing workforce from completing the contract. 
x Labour based in a third country 
As with labour based in an EU state, the law is unclear over whether favouring labour 
based in a non-EU state is allowable. Again, such a policy is not discriminatory, but 
would form a hindrance to trade, as with labour recruited in another EU state, discussed 
above. It may also be noted that EU law generally prefers EU states to non-member 
states in its law, as shown, for example, in Article 58 of the Utilities Directive which 
allows a utility to prefer EU goods over non-EU goods where the tenders are equivalent. 
Given this, it appears that the CJEU would likely regard a policy favouring labour in a 
non-EU state to be a hindrance to trade under the free movement provisions. 
x Justification 
As discussed previously, utilities may use two possible justifications for labour policies: 
the social benefit of the policy to the workforce and/or local community, and the 
                                          
569 Case C-360/89, Commission v Italy [1992] ECR I-3401, at para. 12. 
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commercial benefit to the utility. The social benefit of the policy in this case would be the 
benefit to the local industry of the country in which the utility is operating. This 
justification, however, is contrary to the basic principle underpinning the EU free trade 
regulation that free cross-border trade is more beneficial to all states involved than 
states operating individually.570 Given this, it seems unlikely that such a justification 
would be accepted by the CJEU. 
If it is not possible to justify the policy on its intrinsic social benefit, then the utility must 
rely on the commercial benefits to its business for a justification, for example, improved 
relations with the local community, or the benefit obtained from complying with the 
pressure from its various stakeholders to include such labour policies in its business. The 
problems with relying on commercial justification were discussed above in the section on 
³*HQHUDO ,VVXHV´ ,I HFRQRPLF MXVWLILFDWLRQV DUH DOORZDEOH LQ SULQFLSOH WKH TXHVWLRQ
becomes whether the CJEU will accept that the commercial interests of a utility are 
sufficient justification for a policy which, as noted above, goes contrary to the general 
principle behind free trade. Given the lack of clarity in this area, including local labour 
policies should be seen as a high risk approach. 
As regards set-asides, it may be noted that set-asides are one of the most restrictive 
methods of promoting labour policies, preventing any competition outside of the firms 
which meet the criteria and so it may be arguable that other methods, such as a 
preference for local firms in award criteria, would be a more proportionate method to 
use.571 Setting aside contracts for local firms thus appears to be one of the most high-
risk options available.  
Employment conditions: Rüffert and the Posted Workers Directive 
                                          
570 For discussion of the principles behind EU free trade, see Barnard, C. The Substantive Law of the EU: The 
Four Freedoms, (2nd Ed), (2007, Oxford: OUP), Ch.1. 
571 Arrowsmith, above n.538, at p. 183. 
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Utilities may also have to consider the impact of Directive 96/71/EC572 ³WKH 3RVWHG
:RUNHUV'LUHFWLYH´ZKHQWKH\DUHVHWWLQJFRQGLWLRQVZKLFKZLOODSSO\WRDZRUNIRUFHRI
an undertaking established an EU Member State who are posted to the host Member 
State in order to perform a contract.573 The directive applies to maximum work levels 
and minimum rest periods; minimum holidays; minimum levels of pay; the conditions of 
hiring-out of workers; health and safety; protection of pregnant workers, children and 
young people; and non-discrimination rules.574 For these activities, Member States are 
required to ensure that the local terms and conditions of employment are applied to the 
posted workers.575 
In the recent case of Rüffert, the CJEU held that, where the Posted Workers Directive 
applies, a procuring entity cannot require a higher standard of employment terms than 
the minimum provided for in the directive.576 The Court held that requiring compliance 
with national law creates an extra burden on firms from Member States where the 
employment conditions are generally lower and so is a hindrance to trade contrary to 
Art. 56 TFEU.577 It was held that the restriction could not be justified by reference to 
worker protection given that the condition in question went beyond the requirements of 
the Posted Workers Directive and this Directive set out the EU level of protection deemed 
necessary for workers.578 The argument that an entity cannot request a higher level of 
protection where an EU standard exists is supported by the case of Medipac, in which the 
CJEU suggested that a public authority had to accept sutures of a standard compatible 
with Directive 93/42/EEC.579 In the specific circumstances covered by the Posted 
                                          
572 Directive 96/71/EC of the European Parliament and the Council concerning the posting of workers in the 
framework of the provision of services, [1997] OJ L18/1. 
573 Art. 1(1) Posted Workers Directive. 
574 Article 3(1) Posted Workers Directive. 
575 Ibid. 
576 Rüffert, above n.541. 
577 Ibid, at para. 37. 
578 Ibid, at para. 33. The Court also stated that the condition went beyond what was necessary since it only 
applied to workers on public contracts and there was no evidence that this protection was necessary only for 
public workers and not also for workers in the private sector (para. 40). This will not be an issue for most 
utilities since they operate in the private sector, but may affect utilities which are public authorities. For further 
GLVFXVVLRQRQWKHLPSOLFDWLRQVIRUWKHSXEOLFVHFWRUVHH$UURZVPLWKDQG.XQ]OLNµ(GLWRUV¶1RWH± the decision in 
Rüffert v Land Niedersachsen¶LQ$UURZVPLWKDQG.XQ]OLNDERYHQ520, at pp.1-8. 
579 Case C-6/05, Medipac-Kazantzidis v Venizelio-Pananio [2007] ECR I-³Medipac´ 
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Workers Directive therefore, a utility may need to limit themselves to conditions 
requiring compliance with the national law. 
III.1.2.2 Conditions going beyond contract performance 
A utility may wish to ensure that its contractor does not only comply with certain labour 
standards on its contract work for that utility but also more generally in its business, 
preventing the utility from being associated with an unethical supplier. Several of the 
obligations contained in the labour codes examined previously may require policies which 
are not linked to the contract performance in order to be effective. For example, the 
majority of the labour codes examined contained an obligation to work towards the 
DEROLWLRQRIFKLOGODERXU3URKLELWLQJFKLOGODERXURQDXWLOLW\¶VFRQWUDFWZRUNPD\QRWEH
effective in practice, simply pushing children into other, possibly more dangerous work. 
Auxiliary policies aimed at, for example, educating children may also be needed. This 
need is acknowledged in Principle 4.2 of the Ethical Trading Institute Base Code, which 
UHTXLUHV FRPSDQLHV WR ³GHYHORS RU SDUWLFLSDWH LQ DQG FRQWULEXWH WR SROLFLHV DQG
programmes which provide for the transition of any child found to be performing child 
labour to enable her or him to attend and remain in quality education until no longer a 
child´ 
The position of conditions which go beyond contract performance under the TFEU rules is 
unclear. As previously discussed in the section on production effects, the Commission 
Communication on Social Issues suggests that conditions going beyond performance 
form a hindrance to trade which it would be difficult to justify given the greater burden 
on the supplier.580 This view is possibly supported by the case of EVN.581 In this case, 
one award criterion was the amount of electricity over the amount required for the 
contract which could be supplied from renewable sources (the ability to supply the 
contractual amount from renewable sources being a qualification condition). The criterion 
was unlawful under the Public Sector Directive since it was not linked to the subject 
                                          
580 Commission Communication on Social Issues, above n.557. 
581 Case C-448/01, EVN AG v Austria [2003] ECR I-³EVN´ 
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matter of the contract as required by that Directive582, but the CJEU also stated that the 
criterion favoured larger suppliers over small suppliers who would also be able to supply 
the contractual amount and so was discriminatory.583 This may suggest that conditions 
going beyond contract performance will not be accepted by the CJEU. Arrowsmith 
disagrees with this view, however, arguing that the decision simply shows that the 
criterion in question was not proportional to its aim.584 Equally, the decision is concerned 
with the equal treatment principle under the directives and, while that principle was 
breached in this case given that the directives prohibit criteria not linked to the subject 
matter of the contract, the same prohibition may not apply under the Treaty.585 
It may therefore be possible for a utility to include non-performance related conditions in 
their procurement. Such policies will probably be considered hindrances to trade, but 
may be justifiable for policy reasons, including the need to avoid association with 
unethical suppliers and also the possible need for such auxiliary policies for a policy to be 
effective. Where the policy can be formulated so that it is non-discriminatory, there is 
probably a lower risk of challenge. 
III.2. Exclusion 
Where a utility has set out contract conditions relating to its labour policies, it may wish 
to exclude any firm which it does not believe will comply with the condition, or who has 
failed to comply in the past, from the tendering process. The relevant considerations 
here appear to be the same as for deciding whether a particular contract condition is 
lawful, looking at whether the exclusion conditions create a hindrance to trade and, if so, 
whether it can be justified. As with contract conditions, exclusion relating simply to 
compliance with the law appears to be the lowest risk and exclusion for matters going 
beyond the contract, such as exclusion for using child labour in factories which are not 
FRPSOHWLQJWKHXWLOLW\¶VSDUWLFXODURUGHUEHLQJWKHKLJKHVWULVN,WPD\EHQRWHGWKDWWKH
                                          
582 And also by the Utilities Directive, see below in sec. IV.2. 
583 EVN, above n.581, at para. 69. 
584 Arrowsmith, above n.538, at p. 181. 
585 Ibid. 
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Utilities Directive appears to allow a broad discretion in this area (see further below), 
DOORZLQJH[FOXVLRQIRUDQ\³REMHFWLYHUHDVRQV´DQGLWVHHPVXQOLNHO\WKDWWKH7)(8UXOHV
would narrow this discretion. 
III.3. Award Criteria 
It is possible to implement labour policies through a preference in the award criteria, for 
e[DPSOH WKURXJKDFULWHULRQHYDOXDWLQJD ILUP¶VQRQ-discrimination policy, under which 
firms with better policies receive a higher score. This method allows a utility to balance 
the importance of the policy against other factors, including the possible cost of 
implementing that policy.  Arrowsmith and Maund have suggested that award criteria are 
not generally used for implementing labour policies by utilities, given that they such 
policies are often intended to ensure a certain minimum standard of labour conditions, 
and it is not considered appropriate to balance this minimum against commercial 
concerns.586 Because of this, if award criteria are to be used, they may be best combined 
with contract conditions, where the conditions set out the minimum conditions which 
must be accepted by any supplier and the award criteria may be used to determine the 
most ethical supplier, or to implement other policies going beyond the minimum. Award 
FULWHULD PD\ EH XVHIXO IRU HYDOXDWLQJ GLIIHUHQW ILUPV¶ PHWKRGV IRU LPSOHPHQWLQJ a 
particular policy, for example, for setting out their plan for training workers. 
The principles relating to award criteria under the TFEU are the same as discussed 
previously for contract conditions and exclusion. An award criterion will be caught by the 
free movement rules where it forms a hindrance to trade and, where caught, it must be 
justified by policy reasons. In regards to justification, it may be relevant that award 
criteria are one of the least restrictive methods to use when implementing labour policy, 
given that the cost of the policy is weighed against other matters, making such criteria a 
lower risk option.587 
IV. Procurement under the Utilities Directive 
                                          
586 Arrowsmith and Maund, above n.524, at p.463. 
587 Arrowsmith, above n.538, at p.190. 
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This section will examine the impact of the Utilities Directive on the possibility of 
including labour policies in procurement.588 If the Treaty rules do apply to private 
utilities, they must also consider the principles discussed in the previous section for each 
procurement.  
It may first be noted that Recital 13 of the Directive states that nothing in the Directive: 
³VKRXOGSUHYHQWWKHLPSRVLWLRQRUHQIRUFHPHQWRIPHDVXUHVQHFHVVDU\WRSURWHFW
public morality, public policy, public security, health, human and animal life or the 
preservation of plant life, in particular with a view to sustainable development, 
SURYLGHGWKDWWKHVHPHDVXUHVDUHLQFRQIRUPLW\ZLWKWKH7UHDW\´ 
McCrudden, examining the comparable provision in Recital 6 of the Public Sector 
Directive, argues that this forms a Treaty-based exception to the provisions of the 
Directive.589 If this argument is correct, it would allow a utility to derogate from the 
requirements of the Utilities Directive where the particular policy is necessary for 
protection of one of the interests listed in Recital 13. Labour policies of the kind 
discussed here and in the previous chapter may fall within the definition of public 
policy.590 Arrowsmith, however, does not believe the Recital has the effect of creating 
such a Treaty-EDVHG H[FHSWLRQ DUJXLQJ WKH GLUHFWLYHV¶ SURYLVLRQV DUH GHVLJQHG WR
balance the various policy interests and exhaustively regulate this area, removing 
XWLOLWLHV¶GLVFUHWLRQWRGHFLGHWKHLPSRUWDQFHRIWKRVHLQWHUHVWV591 The issue has not been 
examined in the case law and so the correct interpretation is unclear. 
IV.1.Technical Specifications 
The technical specifications of a contract set out precisely what it is that the utility 
ZLVKHVWREX\7KHGLVWLQFWLRQEHWZHHQWKHVHVSHFLILFDWLRQVDQG³VSHFLDOFRQGLWLRQV´VHW
out as contract conditions is key under the public sector rules where an entity can 
                                          
588 For discussion of the rules under the Utilities Directive more generally, see Chapter 5, Section IV. 
589 McCrudden, above n.532, at pp.531. 
590 See, for example, the Rush Portuguesa case, discussed above, in which protection of workers was accepted 
as legitimate policy aim. For further discussion, see McCrudden, above n.532, at pp.532-535. 
591 Arrowsmith, above n.538, at p.194. 
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probably only exclude suppliers for non-compliance with technical specifications, not for 
other  special conditions. The distinction may be less crucial for utilities, which may be 
able to exclude for non-compliance with contractual conditions also (see discussion 
below, section IV.3). Even if utilities can exclude for non-compliance with contractual 
conditions, one interpretation of allowable award criteria also refers back to the notion of 
technical specifications, with only matters linked to these specifications being lawful 
criteria (see below, section IV.4). This section will examine whether labour issues may 
be included in the technical specifications of a contract. 
The definition of technical specifications is set out in Annex XXI of the Utilities Directive. 
)RUVXSSO\RU VHUYLFHFRQWUDFWVD WHFKQLFDOVSHFLILFDWLRQ LVDVSHFLILFDWLRQ³GHILQLQJ WKH
UHTXLUHGFKDUDFWHULVWLFVRIDSURGXFWRUVHUYLFH´592 For works contracts, the specification 
LV³WKHWRWDOLW\RIWKHWHFKQLFDOSUHVFULSWLRQVGefining the characteristics required of a 
material, product or supply, which permits a material, a product or supply to be 
described in a manner such that it fulfils the use for which it is intended by the 
FRQWUDFWLQJHQWLW\´593 
It is unclear whether issues relating to the workforce performing the contract may be 
included in the technical specifications, for example whether a utility can specify that 
products were produced under fair trade conditions.594 Arnould, examining the identical 
definitions in the Public Sector Directive, argues that the reference in the works 
GHILQLWLRQWRWKHVSHFLILFDWLRQGHVFULELQJWKHSURGXFWLQDPDQQHU³VXFKWKDWLWIXOILOVWKH
XVH IRUZKLFK LW LV LQWHQGHG´ LPSOLHV WKDW SURGXFWLRQPHWKRGV DUH RQO\ UHOHYDQWZKHUH
they have an impact on the use of that product or service.595 This also appears to be the 
view of the European Commission who state that a particular production process may be 
XVHGRQO\LILWDIIHFWVWKH³SHUIRUPDQFHFKDUDFWHULVWLFVYLVLEOHRULQYLVLEOHRIWKHSURGXFW
                                          
592 Annex XXI, sec. 1(a) Utilities Directive. 
593 Annex XXI, sec. 1(b) Utilities Directive. 
594 See section III 1.2.1 above for discussion of whether workforce criteria relating to the production of 
products are lawful under the EC Treaty. 
595 $UQRXOG-µ6HFRQGDU\3ROLFLHVLQ3XEOLF3URFXUHPHQW7KH,QQRYDWLRQVRIWKHQHZ'LUHFWLYHV¶
PPLR 187, at 191. 
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or sHUYLFH´596 If this argument is correct, it would appear to rule out the possibility of 
including workforce issues in the technical specifications as the performance of a product 
will not be affected by the make-up or conditions of the workforce producing that 
product. 
McCrudden makes the case for a wider view of specifications, arguing that so long as the 
specifications are transparent, do not reduce competition and are non-discriminatory, 
then any social matters which affect the subject-matter of the contract may be included 
in the technical specifications if these define what the authority wishes to buy.597 Under 
this interpretation, criteria such as requesting fair trade products would be allowable 
though criteria which operate post-award and are not linked to the subject-matter of the 
contract would not, for example hiring a proportion of the workforce from the 
unemployed as in the Beentjes case.598  If correct, this interpretation offers much 
greater flexibility to utilities.   
IV.2. Contract Conditions 
The Utilities Directive does not generally set any limits on what contractual conditions 
may be set by a utility where those conditions are limited to compliance with legal 
requirements and/or to the performance of the contract. In connection to compliance 
with legal requirements, it may be noted that the Utilities Directive appears to assume 
this is allowable, given Article 39 which allows Member States to require a utility to state 
where information on the obligations under local law may be obtained. The possibility of 
including other social contract conditions going beyond legal compliance is set out in 
Article 38, which states: 
Contracting entities may lay down special conditions relating to the performance 
of the contract, provided that these are compatible with Community law ... The 
                                          
596 European Commission, Interpretive communication of the Commission on the Community law applicable to 
public procurement and the possibilities for integrating environmental considerations into public procurement, 
&20³&RPPLVVLRQ&RPPXQLFDWLRQRQHQYLURQPHQWDOFRQVLGHUDWLRQV´DWSDUDVHF,, 
597 McCrudden, above n.532, at p.542. 
598 0F&UXGGHQ&µ(&SXEOLFSURFXUHPHQWODZDQGHTXDOLW\OLQNDJHVIRXQGDWLRQVIRULQWHUSUHWDWLRQ¶&KLQ
Arrowsmith and Kunzlik, above n.520, at p.297. 
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conditions governing the performance of a contract may, in particular, concern 
social and environmental considerations. 
Under this Article, conditions will be lawful so long as they do not breach general EU law, 
and so the principles discussed above for the TFEU will be relevant. As discussed above 
in Section I, there is a question mark over how far, if at all, the Treaty obligations apply 
to private utilities. If the obligations do not apply at all, private utilities would appear 
able to set any contract conditions they felt necessary for their business, as is the case 
with other private entities. Arrowsmith and Maund argue, however, that the Utilities 
Directive appears to be designed to ensure that utilities are subject to the same 
regulation as public bodies under the Treaty, and suggest that the CJEU might interpret 
the Directive as following the same principles as under the Treaty.599 
While including contract conditions requiring compliance with the law and which are 
limited to contract performance is probably allowable, including a condition which goes 
EH\RQGSHUIRUPDQFHLVDKLJKHUULVNRSWLRQ$UWLFOHVWDWHVWKDWFRQGLWLRQV³UHODWLQJWR
WKHSHUIRUPDQFHRIWKHFRQWUDFW´DUHDOORZDEOH7KHSURYLVLRQSDUDOOHOV$UWLFOHRIWKH 
Public Sector Directive, and this provision is generally taken to imply that conditions 
which do not relate to the performance of the contract are thus not lawful.600 Given that 
the provisions are identical, the same argument may apply to the utilities provision also. 
Arrowsmith and Maund suggest, however, that the different context of the Utilities 
Directive might imply a more flexible interpretation.601 They note that if utilities cannot 
include conditions going beyond performance they will also be unable to exclude firms 
for reasons unrelated to contract performance, an interpretation which would limit the 
effect of the seemingly flexible exclusion provision of the Utilities Directive. The authors 
argue that Article 38 may simply clarify that provisions relating to performance are 
allowable, without limiting the use of other provisions. If this argument is correct, 
utilities would have much more flexibility, but the option appears very high-risk. 
                                          
599 Arrowsmith and Maund, above n.524, at p.448. 
600 See, for example, Arrowsmith, above n.522, at p.1280. 
601 Arrowsmith and Maund, above n.524, at p.458. 
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IV.3. Exclusion 
As discussed in the previous section looking at the Treaty, a utility may wish to exclude 
certain firms from the possibility of tendering. The Utilities Directive states that firms 
PD\ H[FOXGH ILUPV ³LQ DFFRUGDQFH ZLWK REMHFWLYH UXOHV DQG FULWHULD´602 Article 54(4) 
states that these objective criteria may include the criteria allowable under the Public 
Sector Directive. Under the public sector rules, a procuring entity may exclude a firm for 
lack of financial standing, lack of technical or professional ability, or for certain other 
specified reasons relating to the professional conduct of the firm, including holding any 
FULPLQDOFRQYLFWLRQVRUEHLQJJXLOW\RI³JUDYHSURIHVVLRQDOPLVFRQGXFW´603 It may also be 
noted that where the utility is classed as a public authority, they are required to exclude 
firms for the reasons set out in Article 45(1) of the Public Sector Directive, which covers 
convictions for certain criminal offences such as corruption or money laundering. It is 
unclear, however, whether the discretion for excluding firms extends beyond the matters 
covered by the Public Sector Directive and, if so, how far it extends. Trepte argues that, 
given the purpose behind the Utilities Directive was to provide more flexibility for entities 
operating in this area than is available in the public sector, the discretion available to 
utilities is indeed wider.604 7KLV LV VXSSRUWHG LQ WKH &RPPLVVLRQ¶V &RPPXQLFDWLRQ RQ
Social Issues, which notes that utilities have a wider discretion that the public sector 
when excluding firms, though they do not discuss precisely how wide that discretion 
is.605 The issue has not been examined by the CJEU and so remains unclear. 
7KH8WLOLWLHV'LUHFWLYH GRHVQRW GHILQHZKDW LVPHDQW E\ ³REMHFWLYH UXOHV DQG FULWHULD´
$UURZVPLWK DQG 0DXQG VXJJHVW WKDW DQ REMHFWLYH FULWHULRQ LV ³D FULWHUion suitable to 
DFKLHYH D OHJLWLPDWH SROLF\ RI WKH XWLOLW\´606 They also suggest that, as with the rules 
concerning award criteria (discussed below), objective criteria should be capable of 
                                          
602 Art. 54. 
603 Art. 45 Public Sector Directive. For further discussion of the rules relating to exclusion under the public 
sector rules, see Arrowsmith, above n.522, Ch.12. 
604 Trepte, P. 3XEOLF3URFXUHPHQWLQWKH(8$3UDFWLWLRQHUV¶*XLGH, 2nd Ed, (2007, Oxford: OUP), p.364. 
605 Commission Communication on Social Issues, above n.557, sec. 1.3. 
606 Arrowsmith and Maund, above n.524, p.451. 
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verification and should not confer an excessive amount of discretion on the utility.607 The 
DXWKRUV VHW RXW HLJKW SRVVLEOH LQWHUSUHWDWLRQV RI ZKDW LV FRYHUHG E\ ³REMHFWLYH
FULWHULD´608: 
1. A firm may be excluded under any criterion related to the particular contract, 
where the exclusion is done for reasons of commercial procurement. 
2. A firm may be excluded under any criterion related to the particular contract, 
where the exclusion is done for any legitimate procurement policy reason. 
3. A firm may be excluded under any criterion related to the particular contract, 
where done for commercial reasons. 
4. A firm may be excluded under any criterion related to the particular contract, 
where done for any legitimate policy reason. 
5. A firm may be excluded for any commercial procurement reason. 
6. A firm may be excluded for any legitimate procurement policy reason. 
7. A firm may be excluded for any commercial reason. 
8. A firm may be excluded for any reason linked to a legitimate policy of the utility. 
Several of these interpretations would allow a utility to exclude a firm for a labour policy 
reason. Interpretations 2, 4, 6 and 8 are the most flexible possible approaches, allowing 
a utility to exclude firms for any reason connected to a legitimate labour policy, 
regardless of whether or not the policy is intended to bring any commercial benefits to 
the utility. Interpretations 3 and 7 would allow a utility to exclude a firm for a labour-
related reason where that reason is linked to their overall business aims, which may rely 
on the ability to show a link between CSR and profitability which, as noted above and in 
Chapter 2, is very hard to do in practice. Interpretations 1 and 5 are the least flexible, 
requiring any exclusion criteria to relate to commercial procurement policy, a 
requirement which seems hard to meet for labour policies given that they generally 
reduce competition, increase the costs of the procurement and do not provide any 
commercial benefit to the utility specifically linked to the procurement. The case of 
                                          
607 Ibid. 
608 Ibid, at pp.451-453. 
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Concordia Bus may be seen to support a more flexible approach.609 In this case the CJEU 
rejected an argument by the Commission that any award criteria used had to provide a 
commercial benefit to the procuring entity, stating that non-economic factors may also 
influence the value of a tender and may be considered.610 It is arguable that the same 
argument should apply also to contract conditions and exclusion criteria and a utility 
should not have to prove a direct commercial benefit for any policy they adopt. 
As noted in the section on the Treaty rules, a utility may wish to exclude a firm from 
tendering where that firm has breached a labour condition in a previous contract. Doing 
so prevents further breach and the threat of such future exclusion may also create an 
incentive to firms to comply with the relevant conditions.611 Excluding a supplier on the 
grounds of previous non-compliance appears to be possible under the Public Sector 
Directive where that non-FRPSOLDQFH FDQ EH FODVVHG DV ³JUDYHPLVFRQGXFW´ DQG VLQFH
the Utilities Directive allows all the grounds allowable under the Public Sector Directive, 
such exclusion would also appear possible for utilities.612 The Public Sector Directive does 
QRW GHILQH ZKDW EHKDYLRXU ZRXOG FODVV DV ³JUDYH PLVFRQGXFW´ EXW $GYRFDWH *HQHUDO
Gulman stated in his Opinion for Commission v Spain that a deliberate violation of a 
contract condition would be covered.613 Arrowsmith and Maund argue that limiting 
exclusion to deliberate violations may catch direct violations of social obligations in the 
main contract but could fail to catch violations further down the supply chain.614 The 
authors argue that in order to avoid having to accept a new tender by the firm whose 
breach terminated the previous contract, all violations should be grounds for exclusion, 
whether deliberate or not.615 Even if such violations are not classed as grave misconduct 
for the purposes of the Public Sector Directive, exclusion may still be allowable for 
utilities if their discretion to exclude is indeed wider.  
                                          
609 Case C-513/99, Concordia Bus Finland Oy Ab (formerly Stagecoach Finland Oy Ab) v Helsingen Kaupunki 
[2002] ECR I-³Concordia Bus´ 
610 Ibid, at para. 55. 
611 Arrowsmith and Maund, above n.524, at p.454. 
612 Art. 45 Public Sector Directive, applied to utilities by Art. 54(4) Utilities Directive. 
613 Case C-71/92, Commission v Spain [1993] ECR I-$GYRFDWH*HQHUDO¶V2SLQLRQat para. 95. 
614 Arrowsmith and Maund, above n.524, at p.456. 
615 Ibid. 
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Many of the considerations a utility will wish to exclude potential suppliers for if they are 
following one of the labour codes discussed previously will be unrelated to the 
performance of the contract, for example the use of child labour WKURXJKRXWDVXSSOLHU¶V
business. As discussed in the previous section, it appears that the use of contract 
conditions which go beyond the performance of the contract is prohibited by the Utilities 
Directive. If so, the possibility of excluding suppliers based on such conditions is also 
presumably prohibited since, as Arrowsmith and Maund note, it is unlikely the Directive 
allows utilities to exclude for a condition they are not legally allowed to include.616 If this 
is the case, it appears that a utility will be unable to exclude firms for violations of their 
labour code when that violation will not directly affect the particular contract work. 
One possible way of dealing with this restriction would be to class a violation of a labour 
FRGH DV ³JUDYH SURIHVVLRQDO PLVFRQGXFW´ ZKLFK DV GLVFXVVHG DERYH JHQHUDOO\ DOORZV
exclusion. Arrowsmith and Maund note two difficulties with this approach, however. 
Firstly, if violations which class as grave misconduct is limited to violations of codes 
accepted by the supplier in question, this could lead in practice to more suppliers 
refusing to accept such codes.617 On the other hand, if grave misconduct is not limited to 
codes accepted by the supplier, it may be difficult to establish which considerations may 
EHFODVVHGDV³REMHFWLYH´LQRUGHUWRDOORZH[FOXVLRQ618 Overall, it appears that excluding 
firms for considerations unrelated to the performance of the contract is a high-risk 
option.  
IV.4. Award Criteria 
As previously discussed in the section on the Treaty rules, labour-related award criteria 
may not be appropriate for most obligations under labour codes, since the method is not 
appropriate for ensuring minimum standards. The method may, however, be used where 
the utility wishes to implement any policies which go beyond setting minimum 
standards.  
                                          
616 Ibid, at p.459. 
617 Ibid, at p.460. 
618 Ibid. 
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The rules relating to award criteria are set out in Article 55 of the Utilities Directive. 
Article 55(1)(a) sets out a list of allowable criteria. This list does not mention labour 
issues, but this list was expressly stated to be non-exhaustive in Concordia Bus and so a 
utility is prima facie free to use other criteria, including labour-related criteria, in its 
contracts.619 The main area of uncertainty relating to the use of labour policies in award 
criteria comes from the requiremHQWLQ$UWLFOHDWKDWDQ\FULWHULDPXVWEH³OLQNHG
to the subject-PDWWHURIWKHFRQWUDFW´7KLVUDLVHVWKHLVVXHRIZKDWSUHFLVHO\LVPHDQWE\
³WKHVXEMHFW-PDWWHURIWKHFRQWUDFW´ 
0F&UXGGHQ DUJXHV WKDW WKH SKUDVH LV QDUURZHU WKDQ WKH UHIHUHQFH WR ³relating to the 
SHUIRUPDQFH RI WKH FRQWUDFW´ ZKLFK OLPLWV WKH XVH RI FRQWUDFW FRQGLWLRQV UHTXLULQJ D
³FORVHUQH[XV´EHWZHHQWKHDZDUGFULWHULDDQGWKHVXEMHFW-matter of the contract than is 
required between contract conditions and performance of the contract.620 Arnould 
agrees, taking a narrow view of subject-matter which seems to link it to the technical 
specifications of the contract.621 If this argument is correct, most labour policies will not 
be able to be included as award criteria since, as discussed above, it is unlikely that they 
can be considered part of the technical specifications of the contract. Arrowsmith 
disagrees, however, arguing that award criteria may be used whenever contract 
conditions on that policy might be included.622 
The broader interpretation put forward by Arrowsmith seems to be supported by the 
case of Nord Pas de Calais.623 ,QWKLVFDVH)UHQFKDXWKRULWLHVKDGLQFOXGHGDILUP¶VDELOLW\
to combat local unemployment as an award criterion and the CJEU held that a criterion 
such as this was lawful so long as it was non-discriminatory (a requirement this criterion 
appeared to fail, given its reference to local employment).624 This ruling specifically 
shows that workforce criteria can be included in award criteria. The case may also 
support a wider reading of the subject-matter of the contract since, as Arnould notes, 
                                          
619 Concordia Bus, above n.609, at para. 54. 
620 McCrudden, above n.532, at p.564. 
621 Arnould, above n. 595, at 192. 
622 Arrowsmith, above n.538, at p.238. 
623 Case C-225/98 Commission of the European Communities v France [2000] ECR I-³Nord Pas De 
Calais´ 
624 Ibid, at para. 54. 
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the criterion here was not relating to subject-matter in the narrow view of technical 
specifications.625 The ruling has been criticised as the CJEU relied on Beentjes to support 
their finding, a case which was concerned with contract conditions rather than award 
criteria. Equally, however, it has been argued that this could be taken as support of the 
principle that award criteria may be used whenever contract conditions may be 
included.626 The Commission has interpreted the case as allowing workforce criteria only 
when other aspects of the tender are equal, but, while this was the case on the facts, 
WKHUHLVQRPHQWLRQRIWKLVIDFWLQWKH&-(8¶VMXGJHPHQWDQGVRWKHUHGRHVQRWDSSHDUWR
be any reason to limit the use of such criteria in this way.627 
Any labour issue which is included as an award criterion must also be capable of 
verification by the authority.628 This may cause problems in supply contracts where the 
policy affects the whole supply chain, as it may be hard to check the standards of each 
contractor in that supply chain, especially for complex goods which have a long supply 
chain, for example, electrical goods. 
IV.5. Proving compliance with labour considerations 
Setting conditions relating to labour considerations in the contract and having the ability 
to exclude those who cannot comply will not aid the utility in practice if they cannot 
request the relevant information from the supplier in order to determine whether they 
can in fact comply. Unlike the rules under the Public Sector Directive, the Utilities 
Directive does not set out an explicit list of the types of evidence which may be 
requested. This suggests that a utility may request any evidence which may reasonably 
be used to determine compliance with a legally included labour policy. Arrowsmith and 
Maund argue that a utility may not request any information beyond that which is 
necessary for determining compliance as this would impose an unnecessary burden on 
                                          
625 Arnould, above n.621, at 195 
626 Arrowsmith, above n.538, at p241. 
627 Commission Communication on Social Considerations, above n.557, at para. 1.4.1. 
628 EVN, above n.581, at para. 51 
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suppliers.629 They also note that requesting such information creates a presumption that 
this irrelevant information has been taken into account when determining the result of 
the tendering process.630 
7KH 'LUHFWLYH GRHV KRZHYHU VWDWH WKDW XWLOLWLHV PD\ QRW LPSRVH DQ\ ³DGPLQLstrative, 
WHFKQLFDORUILQDQFLDOFRQGLWLRQV´RQFHUWDLQFRPSDQLHVEXWQRWRWKHUV631 Arrowsmith and 
Maund note that this may cause issues for utilities who operate in high-risk countries.632 
Utilities may wish to request additional evidence from firms operating from high-risk 
areas, which would appear to be prevented by this requirement. Equally, however, if 
utilities respond by requesting large amounts of evidence from all suppliers, they may be 
seen as imposing an unnecessary burden on companies which operate in low-risk 
areas.633 
Utilities are also forbidden from requesting any specific evidence which duplicates 
evidence already available.634 Connected to this, it is stated for technical specifications 
that, where a utility has set their specifications by reference to a particular standard, 
WKH\ PXVW DFFHSW DQ\ SURGXFW ZKLFK FDQ EH VKRZQ WR EH ³HTXLYDOHQW´635 This 
requirement supports the principle discussed above under the Treaty section that a 
utility may not generally require specific standards or registration under a certain 
scheme, but must accept any alternative which can be proved to fulfil its functional 
requirements, the problems relating to which were discussed above. 
IV.6. Qualification Systems 
Unlike bodies in the public sector, utilities have the option of choosing possible tenderers 
on the basis of a qualification list. Under this system, possible suppliers are chosen on 
the basis of certain advertised criteria and future contracts may be limited to suppliers 
on the qualification system. In the same way that utilities may use labour criteria to 
                                          
629 Arrowsmith and Maund, above n.524, at p.466. 
630 Ibid. 
631 Art. 52(1)(a) Utilities Directive. 
632 Arrowsmith and Maund, above n.524, at p.466. 
633 Ibid. 
634 Art. 52(1)(b) Utilities Directive. 
635 Art. 34(3) Utilities Directive. 
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exclude firms for individual procurements, utilities may also use these criteria to exclude 
firms from the qualification system. Utilities may also choose to collect information from 
suppliers at the registration stage and exclude suppliers only for particular 
procurements. In addition to the general issues which may arise for exclusion (see 
above, section 3), there are also several possible issues specific to qualification systems, 
and this section will examine these. 
Arrowsmith and Maund suggest that problems may arise from the fact that many 
qualification systems cover all contracts for those utilities, not only those which are 
UHJXODWHG XQGHU WKH8WLOLWLHV'LUHFWLYH¶V UXOHV636 Even if utilities may exclude firms for 
labour-related considerations (see above, section 3), it is unclear whether they may do 
so for registration to a scheme where it is possible that those criteria will only be 
relevant for a proportion of the contracts awarded under the system. Arrowsmith and 
Maund argue that, while it is unlikely that utilities may exclude firms only for reasons 
relevant to a particular type of contract, it is equally unrealistic to expect firms to ensure 
that every exclusion criterion is relevant to every procurement.637 Equally, where utilities 
do not exclude suppliers at registration but merely collect information for later exclusion, 
it is unclear whether utilities may request information which will only be relevant for a 
proportion of the contracts.638 
V. Conclusion 
This chapter has attempted to set out the possibilities for including labour concerns in 
utilities procurement under the EU regime. It can be seen that there is fundamental 
uncertainty running through the EU procurement regime. There is a lack of clarity over 
the application of the TFEU to the private utilities at all, creating uncertainty right from 
the beginning of the procurement process. The chapter has also shown that while some 
potential labour policies, notably the possibility of favouring local labour, are clearly 
prohibited under the EU regime, for the majority of policies the precise scope available 
                                          
636 Arrowsmith and Maund, above n.524, at p.469-471. 
637 Ibid, at p.470. 
638 Ibid. 
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under the EU legal regime is unclear. The chapter has highlighted the possible points in 
the procurement process at which labour policies could be included in procurement and 
noted the issues which might arise at each point, attempting to evaluate the level of risk 
associated with each method. The actual use of labour policies in utilities procurement 
and the impact, if any, of the EU legal regime and its lack of clarity will be evaluated in 
Part II of the thesis. Prior to that, however, the next chapter will offer a discussion of 
potential regulatory issues relating to the EU legal regime and the use of CSR policies, 
including the potential impact of the lack of clarity in the law. 
  
Page 151 of 300 
 
Chapter 7 - Regulatory Theory 
I. Introduction 
This chapter examines various theories relating to regulation, focusing on compliance 
with and enforcement of regulation. The chapter aims to determine why companies 
comply with regulation and, specifically, whether the fact that the precise requirements 
of that regulation are unclear, as is the case with the EU utilities procurement 
UHJXODWLRQ¶V UHTXLUHPHQWV UHODWLQJ WR FRUSRUDWH VRFLDO UHVSRQVLELOLW\ KDV DQ LPSDFW RQ
compliance with that regulation. These theories will then be examined in the empirical 
UHVHDUFKH[DPLQLQJSURFXUHPHQWSUDFWLWLRQHUV¶H[SHULHQFHVDSSO\LQJWKHODZ 
The chapter begins with an examination of the various types of regulation available to 
regulatory bodies, focusing on the advantages and disadvantages of command and 
consensus techniques, the categories most appropriate to the procurement regulation 
and the labour codes examined in this thesis. The chapter then examines indeterminacy 
in the law, looking at whaW SUHFLVHO\ LV PHDQW E\ ³LQGHWHUPLQDF\´ DQG WKH SUREOHPV
caused by lack of clarity in the law. The next section examines compliance theory, first 
examining the general reasons a party complies with regulation and the factors which 
can influence that decision before examining the impact of indeterminacy on the decision 
to comply with regulation in more detail. Finally, the chapter examines theories on 
enforcement of regulation, providing a basis on which to examine the effectiveness of 
the EU regime. 
II. Types of Regulation 
II.1. Definition of Regulation 
The concept of regulation is generally considered to be hard to define. Baldwin and Cave 
LGHQWLI\WKUHHFRPPRQXVHVRIWKHZRUG³UHJXODWLRQ´639 Firstly, regulation may be seen 
as a specific set of commands, applied by a particular body devoted to this purpose. This 
                                          
639 Baldwin, R. and Cave, M. Understanding Regulation: Theory, Strategy and Practice, (1999, Oxford: OUP), at 
p.2.  
Page 152 of 300 
 
definition covers, for example, rules set out for the electricity transmission sector under 
the Electricity Act 1989 and regulated by Ofgem. This definition also covers most classic 
³FRPPDQGDQG FRQWURO´ UHJXODWLRQ (the term commonly used for regulation formed of 
rules prohibiting certain actions backed up with sanctions should those rules be 
breached, see further below), and is the most common understanding of regulation.640 
Secondly, regulation may be seen as any deliberate state influence on social or industrial 
behaviour. This definition includes forms of influence other than command and control 
measures, such as economic incentives. Finally, regulation may be seen as any form of 
social control or influence, whether that influence is intentional or not. This includes not 
only measures emanating from the state but also those from other sources, such as the 
market. Black notes yet another common definition of regulation, limiting the term to the 
use of legal instruments created by government.641 
The views of regulation above focus on the source and scope of a regulatory measure. In 
contrast, other definitions take a more functional approach. Hood, Rothstein and Baldwin 
VHWRXWD³F\EHUQHWLFVSHUVSHFWLYH´DUJXLQJ WKDWDQ\FRQWUROV\VWHPQHHGVWKUHHPDLQ
components: 
There must be some capacity for standard-setting to allow a distinction to be 
made between more and less preferred states of the system. There must also be 
some capacity for information-gathering or monitoring to produce knowledge 
about current or changing states of the system. On top of that must be some 
capacity for behaviour-modification to change the state of the system.642 
Black, however, criticises this definition on the grounds that it does not distinguish 
between systems of control involving intentionality and those which do not.643 
Intentionality is crucial, she argues, to distinguish regulation from all other forms of 
                                          
640 See further Black, J. Critical Reflections on Regulation, (2002, London: Centre for Analysis of Risk and 
Regulation), p.8 and Ogus, A. Regulation: Legal Form and Economic Theory (2004, Oxford: Hart), at Ch.1. 
641 Ibid, at p. 9. 
642 Hood, C., Rothstein H. and Baldwin, R. The Government of Risk: Understanding Risk Regulation Regimes, 
(2001, Oxford: OUP), at p.23. [Emphasis in original] 
643 Black, above n.640, at p.18. 
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social control.644 6KH DOVR QRWHV WKDW WKH F\EHUQHWLFV GHILQLWLRQ ³DVVXPHV D OHYHO RI
HIIHFWLYHQHVVZKLFKPD\LQSUDFWLFHEHDEVHQW´645 Under the functional definition, Black 
argues, identifying a measure as regulation requires an empirical investigation into its 
effectiveness under the three grounds set out, rather than simple analytical 
investigation. Taking these criticisms of the cybernetics approach into account, Black 
suggests the following definition of regulation: 
[R]egulation is the sustained and focused attempt to alter the behaviour of others 
according to defined standards or purposes with the intention of producing a 
broadly identified outcome or outcomes, which may include mechanisms of 
standard-setting, information-gathering and behaviour-modification.646 
The EU procurement rules satisfy any of the above definitions of regulation. In addition, 
the labour codes examined in Chapter 3 also satisfy the broader definitions set out by 
Black and Hood et al. Under these definitions, then, utilities are subject to two different 
forms of regulation when considering the possibility of including labour considerations in 
their procurement. The next section will consider these different forms of regulation in 
more detail. 
II.2. Types of Regulation 
Morgan and Yeung identify five classes of regulation: (1) Command; (2) Competition; 
(3) Consensus; (4) Communication, and (5) Code.647  Command techniques are the most 
common understanding of regulation, covering legal regulation, and will be discussed in 
more detail further below. Competition based techniques include economic instruments 
such as taxes and subsidies.648 Consensus techniques rely on the consent of the parties 
involved, and most self-regulation techniques involve aspects of this category of 
regulation along with some command influences. Self-regulation, such as the labour 
                                          
644 Ibid, at p.19. 
645 Ibid, at p.8. 
646 Ibid, at p.20. 
647 Morgan, B. and Yeung, K. An Introduction to Law and Regulation: Text and Materials, (2007, Cambridge: 
CUP), at p.80. 
648 Ibid, at pp.85-92. 
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codes considered in this thesis, will be discussed further below. Communication 
techniques focus on providing information to the public about the relevant issue, 
covering techniques such as public education campaigns.649 Code based techniques aim 
WR HOLPLQDWH FHUWDLQEHKDYLRXUE\ ³GHVLJQLQJRXW WKHSRVVLELOLW\ IRU LWVRFFXUUHQFH´ IRU
example software code designed to prevent certain cyber crimes.650 
II.2.1. Command and Control Regulation 
Command and control UHJXODWLRQFRYHUV³WKHVWDWHSURPXOJDWLRQRIOHJDOUXOHVSURKLELWLQJ
specified conduct, underpinned by coercive sanctions (either civil or criminal in nature) if 
WKHSURKLELWLRQ LVYLRODWHG´651 It is this form of regulation which the EU has chosen to 
regulate procurement, with the procurement rules based under the TFEU, the Utilities 
Directive and the relevant case law falling under this category as binding legal rules 
created by the legislative bodies of the EU and enforced by civil sanctions through the 
courts of the Member States. Baldwin and Cave note that the strengths of command and 
control regulation lie in the ability to impose fixed standards on society, which operate 
immediately.652 The authors also note that command and control regulation is useful as a 
political tool, as the state is seen to be taking action against undesirable behaviour 
forcefully.653 
Command and control regulation has increasingly been criticised, however. Baldwin and 
Cave note four possible problems which may arise with this type of regulation. Firstly, it 
is argued that where there is a close relationship between the regulator and the 
UHJXODWHGWKHUHLVDULVNRI³FDSWXUH´XQGHUZKLFKWKHUHJXODWRUIRFXVHVRQWKHLQWHUHVWV
of the regulated area over the interests of society.654 A second possible problem is 
excessive legalism.655 It has been argued that the legalistic approach required by 
                                          
649 Ibid, at p.96-102. 
650 Ibid, at p.102-105. 
651 Ibid, at p.80. 
652 Baldwin and Cave, above n.639, at p.35. 
653 Ibid. 
654 Ibid, at p.36. There is now an extensive literature on regulatory capture, see, for example, Dal Bó, E. 
µ5HJXODWRU\&DSWXUH$5HYLHZ¶Oxford Review of Economic Policy 203 and the literature cited 
there. 
655 Ibid, at p.37. 
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command and control regulation and the recent proliferation of legal rules increases the 
financial costs imposed on all parties and can stifle innovation.656 Thirdly, Baldwin and 
Cave note that it can be hard in practice to determine the appropriate level at which to 
set the legal standard.657 Finally, enforcement of command and control regulation is 
expensive and often uncertain (see below in the sections on compliance and 
enforcement).658 
II.2.2. Self-regulation 
Corporate social responsibility codes generally belong to the category of self-regulation. 
Codes such as the labour codes examined in Chapter 3 have elements of both consensus 
regulation and traditional command regulation. The requirements of the codes are 
established by the parties regulated, possibly with negotiation with other parties such as 
non-governmental organisations such as the UN or the OECD, and so are based 
fundamentally on the consent of the parties, unlike the command based regulation 
discussed above under which rules are created for the relevant bodies and enforced by 
third parties. However, once the parties have consented, those codes which contain 
monitoring provisions and sanctions for breach operate in a similar manner to command 
regulation. Self-regulation such as these codes thus appears to be a hybrid of command 
and consensus regulation.659 
Ogus notes several possible benefits of self-regulation as opposed to traditional 
command and control regulation.660 Firstly, since self-regulatory agencies will usually 
have a greater knowledge of the area than the state, the information costs involved in 
setting and interpreting the regulatory standards will be lower. Secondly, monitoring and 
enforcement is also likely to be cheaper and more effective since the relationship 
between the regulator and the regulated is based on trust. Thirdly, since the processes 
involved in creating self-regulation are usually much more informal than those involved 
                                          
656 6HHIRUH[DPSOH6WHZDUW5µ7KH'LVFRQWHQWVRI/HJDOLVP,QWHUHVW*URXS5HODWLRQVLQ$GPLQLVWUDWLYH
5HJXODWLRQ¶>@Wisconsin Law Review 655, at 680.  
657 Baldwin and Cave, above n.639, at p.38. 
658 Ibid, p.38. 
659 For further discussion of the hybrid nature of self-regulation , see Morgan and Yeung, above n.647, p.106. 
660 2JXV$µ5HWKLQNLQJ6HOI-UHJXODWLRQ¶Oxford Journal of Legal Studies 97, at 97-98. 
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in command-based regulation the financial costs and delay involved in amending the 
standards are lessened. Finally, the administrative costs of the regulation are generally 
borne by the parties involved rather than the taxpayer, though corporations may pass 
that cost down to the consumer. 
There are also several criticisms of the self-regulation method, however. Baldwin and 
Cave note that the rules created by the parties involved in the self-regulation may be 
self-serving and fail to deal with the actual issues which society needs to be regulated.661 
They also note that the procedures used to create the relevant standards may lack 
transparency and accountability.662 There may also be a possible issue of the general 
public lacking trust in the parties to apply the standards properly and wishing to see the 
state take responsibility for certain issues.663 
III. Indeterminacy in the Law 
The command and control regulatory technique used by the procurement regulation 
relies on the use of rules, that is, general statements prohibiting certain conduct. Black 
notes three main problems associated with the use of rules: a tendency to over- or 
under-inclusiveness, issues of interpretation and problems with indeterminacy.664 Black 
DUJXHV WKDW WKHVH SUREOHPV VWHP ERWK IURP WKH QDWXUH RI UXOHV DV ³DQWLFLSDWRU\
generalised abstractions [which] when endowed with legal status are distinctive, 
DXWKRULWDWLYHIRUPVRIFRPPXQLFDWLRQ´DQGIURPWKHQDWXUHRIODQJXDJHZKLFKZLOODIIHFW 
how parties interpret and understand those rules.665 Problems of inclusiveness arise from 
the fact that rules are generalisations built up from certain specific instances of conduct 
which the state wishes to prevent. Over- or under-inclusiveness will occur where the 
generalisation does not intersect precisely with the properties of the event or individual 
which the regulation aims to cover.666 Problems of interpretation occur where the parties 
applying, or subject to, the regulation have different understandings of the terms in the 
                                          
661 Baldwin and Cave, above n.639, at p.40. 
662 Ibid. 
663 Ibid, at p.41. 
664 Black, J. Rules and Regulators, (1997, Oxford: Clarendon Press), at p.6. 
665 Ibid. 
666 Ibid, at pp.7-8. 
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regulation.667 This section will examine the third problem, indeterminacy in the law, in 
more detail, looking at how a lack of clarity such as that present in the utilities 
procurement law relating to CSR might impact on parties in practice. 
MacNeil sets out two possible sources of legal indeterminacy. Firstly, the law may be 
uncertain where some doubt over the correct interpretation of the law remains over a 
significant period of time, such as where an unclear legal provision is never raised in 
litigation.668 Secondly, law may be uncertain where a previously settled view of the law is 
overturned by the courts.669 This thesis is mostly concerned with the first type of 
uncertainty, indeterminacy arising from lack of clarity in the legal provisions themselves 
UDWKHUWKDQWKHFRXUWV¶LQWHUSUHWDWLRQRIWKRVHSURYLVLRQVEXWZLOODOVRFRQVLGHUWKHHIIHFW
of any case law which has changed the view of the applicable law, such as the Telaustria 
case establishing the principle of transparency and the need for advertisement in 
contracts covered only by the TFEU.670 
III.1. Identifying Legal Indeterminacy 
Identifying a problematic level of indeterminacy in legal provisions may cause an issue 
since there is a certain level of indeterminacy present in all law. Hart described legal 
UXOHVDVKDYLQJD³FRUH´RIFHUWDLQW\DQGD³SHQXPEUDRIXQFHUWDLQW\´LHHYHU\ODZZLOO
KDYH D ³FRUH´ VHW RI IDFWXDO FLUFXPVWDQFHV WR ZKLFK LW FHUWDLQO\ DSSOLHV EXW DV WKH
circumstances vary from that core, the application of the law becomes more and more 
uncertain.671 Indeterminacy arises simply because it is impossible for the legislator to 
anticipate all possible future events to which the law might need to be applied.672 As 
MacNeil notes, this means that a certain amount of litigation in order to reduce the 
penumbra of uncertainty of a law is inevitable.673 However, while a certain amount of 
indeterminacy is normal for a law, in some cases the indeterminacy may be much 
                                          
667 Ibid, at pp.12-13. 
668 0DF1HLO,µ8QFHUWDLQW\LQFRPPHUFLDOODZ¶>@Edinburgh Law Review 68, at 70. 
669 Ibid. 
670 Case C-324/98, Telaustria Verlags GmbH and Telefonadress GmbH v Telekom Austria AG [2000] ECR I-
10745. See further Chapter 5, Section III.2. 
671 Hart, H.L.A. The Concept of Law, (2nd Ed), (1994, Oxford: Clarendon Press), at p.124-128. 
672 Ibid, at p.128-129. 
673 MacNeil, above n.668 at 78. 
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VWURQJHU LQGLFDWLQJ ³WKDW WKH FRUH LWVHOI PD\ EH LQGHWHUPLQDWH´674 The question thus 
becomes how to determine this level of indeterminacy in a law. 
.UHVV GHILQHV LQGHWHUPLQDF\ DV WKH VLWXDWLRQ LQ ZKLFK ³WKH FRUUHFW WKHRU\ RI OHJDO
UHDVRQLQJIDLOVWR\LHOGDULJKWDQVZHURUSHUPLWVPXOWLSOHDQVZHUVWROHJDOTXHVWLRQV´675 
Under this approach, a law will be indeterminate if it is impossible to reach a single 
correct answer when operating within the core of that law.676 In order to test for this 
level of indeterminacy, Kress examines the number of dissenting judgements given in 
appellate courts, under the premise that the more uncertain a law is the more 
disagreement there will be over its interpretation in the courts.677 Another method for 
testing for indeterminacy is used by Maggs, who identifies a legal provision as uncertain 
where it would be litigated by a lawyer in court.678 Both tests suffer from the flaw that 
reasons other than uncertainty may often inform such actions. 
MacNeil criticises both these approaches on the grounds that they only deal with cases 
which go to court and thus do not include other cases where the uncertainty is resolved 
through other methods.679 In order to deal with this, MacNeil defines indeterminacy as 
H[LVWLQJ ³LQ FLUFXPVWDQFHV LQ ZKLFK RQH RU PRUH RI D UDQJH RI DFWLRQV ZKLFK DUH LQ
essence responses to WKH SUHVHQFH RI XQFHUWDLQW\ LV URXWLQHO\ HPSOR\HG´680 This 
method allows consideration of how parties deal with uncertainty when they are planning 
what action they should take. Given the scarcity of litigation over procurement decisions 
in the UK this method of determining indeterminacy is the most suitable for use in this 
research. 
 
 
                                          
674 Ibid, at 78. 
675 .UHVV.µ/HJDO,QGHWHUPLQDF\¶>@California Law Review 283, at 320. 
676 MacNeil, above n.668, at 78. 
677 Kress, above n.675, at 324-325. 
678 0DJJV*µ5HGXFLQJWKH&RVWVRI6WDWXtory Ambiguity: Alternative Approaches and the Federal Courts Study 
&RPPLWWHH¶Harvard Journal on Legislation 123, at 125. 
679 MacNeil, above n.668, at 79. 
680 Ibid, at 79. 
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III.2. The Importance of Certainty in the Law 
The main reason certainty in the law is seen to be important is the need for the law to be 
predictable. As Black argues: 
[I]ndeterminacy matters because rules, particularly legal rules, are entrenched, 
authoritative statements which are meant to guide behaviour, be applied on an 
indefinite number of occasions, and which have sanctions attached for their 
breach. It is thus important to know whether this particular occasion in one of 
those in which the rule should be applied.681 
If a particular law is unclear, parties cannot use that law to guide their behaviour and 
thus have no way of determining whether their planned conduct is legal or illegal. 
Because of this, MacNeil argues that certainty in the law is crucial for markets to operate 
efficiently.682 Under this argument, in order for markets to operate properly, the 
participants in the market must be able to make fully informed decisions. Where the law 
concerning a particular issue is unclear to the extent that the result of a certain action 
cannot be predicted, the market participant cannot make a fully informed decision about 
that issue.683 
Another problem caused by uncertainty in the law is increased cost.684 Maggs sets out 
nine costs imposed on society due to legal indeterminacy:685 
1. Increased legal research costs: indeterminacy in the law increases the number of 
legal cases and other sources that a lawyer must consider in order to understand 
the law. 
2. Litigation costs: Parties will take disputes to court more often where the correct 
interpretation of the law is unclear. Cases where there is ambiguity over the law 
will also reach the appellate courts more often, adding to the legal costs. 
                                          
681 Black, above n.664, at p.10. 
682 MacNeil, above n.668, at 71. 
683 Ibid, at 72. 
684 Ibid, at 72. 
685 Maggs, above n.678, at 126-130. 
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3. Judicial system costs: Increased litigation due to lack of clarity in the law not only 
adds to the costs of the parties directly concerned, as discussed in the previous 
point, but also those of the taxpayer, who funds the judicial system. 
4. Increased unlawful activity: As discussed above, lack of clarity in the law makes it 
harder for an individual to predict whether a particular action will be lawful or not. 
Maggs argues that this imposes costs on society from a person failing to abide by 
the law, and also on the individual, who will suffer unexpected consequences from 
that breach of the law. 
5. Decreased lawful activity: Parties may prefer to err on the side of caution and 
refuse to take any action when faced with unclear legislation, preventing 
productive action. 
6. Discrimination: Lack of clarity in the law may allow those enforcing the law to 
apply it in a biased manner. 
7. Separation of powers problems: Lack of clarity in legislation may result in the 
court effectively creating the law when interpreting it, causing legitimacy issues 
(see further below). 
8. Replacement costs: Amending unclear legislation or a mistaken interpretation of 
that legislation by the courts will impose costs on the state. 
9. Diminished utility and justice: Where legislation is unclear, a court may interpret 
the rule in a less useful or just way than that intended by the legislature. 
MacNeil notes that the costs imposed by lack of clarity in the law will fall over time as 
the courts interpret the law to reduce the uncertainty, but that the process of 
interpretation itself creates substantial costs.686 
Finally, another reason certainty in the law is seen as important is due to the link 
between certainty and legitimacy in the law. It has been argued that indeterminacy may 
affect the legitimacy of law VLQFHOHJLWLPDF\³GHSHQGVRQMXGJHVDSSO\LQJWKHODZDQGQRW
creating their own ... judicial decisions are legitimate only if judges are constrained 
                                          
686 MacNeil, above n.668, at 72. 
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HLWKHUFRPSOHWHO\RUZLWKLQQDUURZERXQGV´687 The greater the indeterminacy of a piece 
of regulation, the greater the discretion judges have when interpreting that legislation. 
This discretion allows judges to effectively make law themselves, usurping the role of the 
state and its legitimately elected representatives.688 Under this view, then, certainty is 
cruciaOIRUOLPLWLQJ³DUELWUDU\MXGLFLDOGHFLVLRQ-PDNLQJ´689 
III.3. Responses to Indeterminacy in the Law 
MacNeil notes four possible ways in which a party may respond to indeterminacy in a 
legal provision.690 The first two methods deal with the indeterminacy using contract law. 
Firstly, parties may include terms in their contract specifically dealing with the 
uncertainty, though this still leaves those parties open to the risk that the courts will 
interpret the law in a different manner to the interpretation they chose. Secondly, 
parties may transfer the risk arising from legal indeterminacy through contract terms.  
The third way in which parties may respond to indeterminacy is through taking 
advantage of that indeterminacy through creative compliance.691 Creative compliance 
involves a formalistic approach to the law where strict compliance with the precise 
UHTXLUHPHQWVRIWKHODZLVXVHG³LQDPDQLSXODWLYHZD\WRFLUFXPYHQWRUXQGHUPLQHWKH
SXUSRVHRIUHJXODWLRQ´.692 Where the law lacks clarity, parties are more likely to discover 
loopholes which they can use to their advantage. MacNeil notes that creative compliance 
in this situation is likely to improve the clarity of the law over time as loopholes 
discovered are examined in the courts.693 
Finally, indeterminacy in the law leads to greater reliance on methods of clarification 
VXFKDV³FOHDUDQFHGHFLVLRQV´RIILFLDOJXLGDQFHDQGOHJDORSLQLRQV694 Clearance decisions 
are a decision by a regulator confirming that a proposed action does not breach any 
                                          
687 Kress, above n.675, at 285. 
688 Ibid, at 287. 
689 Ibid, at 71. 
690 MacNeil, above n.668, at 81-85. 
691 Ibid, at 82. 
692 0F%DUQHW'DQG:KHODQ&µ7KH(OXVLYH6SLULWRIWKH/DZ)RUPDOLVPDQGWKH6WUXJJOHIRU/HJDO&RQWURO¶
(1991) 54(6) Modern Law Review 848, at 849. 
693 MacNeil, above n.668, at 83. 
694 Ibid, at 83-84. 
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UHJXODWLRQ *XLGDQFH GRFXPHQWV IURP D SDUWLFXODU ERG\ LQGLFDWH WKDW ERG\¶V
interpretation of the law, with examples in the procurement field being guidance from 
the Office of Government Commerce DQG WKH (XURSHDQ &RPPLVVLRQ¶V Interpretative 
Communications. It has been noted that when dealing with uncertainty in procurement 
in the area of public-private partnerships, official guidance was seen as very influential 
by practitioners, often treated as authoritative.695 
IV. Compliance with the Law 
One of the aims of this thesis is to determine the level of compliance with the utilities 
procurement legislation, given the lack of clarity in that law and the possible commercial 
pressures on utilities to include CSR policies in procurement. This section examines 
theories of compliance, beginning with an examination of what precisely is meant by 
compliance. Following this, general theories examining why parties comply with 
regulation will be examined before the section concludes with an examination of the 
effect of indeterminacy on compliance. 
IV.1. Definition of Compliance 
It is often stated that the aim of regulatory enforcement is to ensure compliance with the 
regulation, but as Yeung notes, it is rarely stated precisely what parties are supposed to 
comply with.696 <HXQJGLVWLQJXLVKHVEHWZHHQ ³UXOH FRPSOLDQFH´ZKLFK FRYHUV WHFKQLFDO
FRPSOLDQFH ZLWK WKH SUHFLVH UHTXLUHPHQWV RI WKH UHJXODWLRQ DQG ³VXEVWDQWLYH
FRPSOLDQFH´ZKLFKFRYHUVFRPSOLDQFHQRWRQO\ZLWKWKHUXOHVEXWDOVRZLWKWKHFROOHFWive 
goals behind those rules.697 While the two types of compliance are often coextensive so 
that compliance with the rules will bring about compliance with the overall goals of the 
regulation this is not always the case. In some cases it may be possible, for example, for 
parties to technical comply with the requirements of a law in such as way as to defeat 
                                          
695 %UDXQ3µ6WULFW&RPSOLDQFHYHUVXV&RPPHUFLDO5HDOLW\7KH3UDFWLFDO$SSOLFDWLRQRI(&3XEOLF3URFXUHPHQW
/DZWRWKH8.¶V3ULYDWH)LQDQFH,QLWLDWLYH¶European Law Journal 575, at 582. 
696 Yeung, K. Securing Compliance: A Principled Approach, (2004, Oxford: Hart Publishing), at p.11. 
697 Ibid. 
Page 163 of 300 
 
WKHREMHFWRIWKDWODZ³FUHDWLYHFRPSOLDQFH´698 It is also possible for a law to be poorly 
designed so that compliance with the requirements of the law does not in fact help to 
achieve the overall goal of that regulation.699 
In order to comply substantively with the overall goals of a piece of regulation, a party 
must understand clearly what those goals are. For the EU procurement legislation, the 
overall goal is the opening up of the procurement market to competition (see section II, 
Chapter 5). The provisions in the procurement directives allowing social and 
environmental criteria to be included in procurement, however, do not appear to be 
based explicitly on this overall goal, but on a political need to include such 
considerations. When determining what action to take in relation to a particular 
procurement then, a utility should consider these differing goals and make a judgment 
on how best to meet the needs of those goals. 
The following sections will consider the factors that parties consider when deciding 
ZKHWKHU WR FRPSO\ ZLWK UHJXODWLRQ LQ WKH WUDGLWLRQDO VHQVH RI ³UXOH FRPSOLDQFH´
Compliance in the case of utilities procurement will be taken to be compliance with the 
rules relating to labour policies in procurement under both TFEU and the Utilities 
Directive as discussed in Chapter 6. The first section will consider the situation in which 
the requirements of those rules are clear, and the second section will consider the 
situation where the requirements are indeterminate.  
IV.2. General Compliance Theory 
The classic approach to modelling compliance is based on the work of the philosopher 
Jeremy Bentham.700 8QGHU %HQWKDP¶V DUJXPHQW LQGLYLGXDOV QDWXUDOO\ VHHN WR SXUVXH
pleasurable activities, but this tendency is constrained by rational decisions evaluating 
WKHSRVVLEOHQHJDWLYHFRQVHTXHQFHVRIDQ\DFWLRQ%HQWKDP¶VDUJXPHQWZDVH[SDQGHG
                                          
698 For further discussion of creative compliance, see McBarnet and Whelan, above n.692. 
699 Yeung, above n.696, p.11. 
700 Bentham, J. The Principles of Morals and Legislation, (1988, Buffalo, NY: Prometheus Books). 
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into an economic model by Becker, setting out compliance decisions as a cost-benefit 
evaluation: 
7KH DSSURDFK WDNHQ KHUH IROORZV WKH HFRQRPLVWV¶ XVXDO DQDO\VLV RI FKRLFH DQG
assumes that a person commits an offence if the expected utility to him exceeds 
the utility he could get by using his time and other resources at other activities. 
Some peUVRQVEHFRPH³FULPLQDOV´WKHUHIRUHQRWEHFDXVHWKHLUEDVLFPRWLYDWLRQ
differs from that of other persons, but because their benefits and costs differ.701 
0DQ\ IDFWRUVDUH WKRXJKW WR LQIOXHQFHDSDUW\¶VHYDOXDWLRQRI WKHFRVWVDQGEHQHILWVRI
committing an offence. Classically, it was argued that the probability of punishment, the 
severity of that punishment and the time between the offence and the punishment being 
applied were the most important factors.702 However, in recent years several authors 
have noted WKDW FRQWUDU\ WR%HFNHU¶VPRGHOPDQ\ FRPSDQLHV FRPSO\ZLWK UHJXODWLRQ
which has very low penalties and a low conviction rate and consideration of other factors 
has been included in the economic models to account for these findings.703 Sutinen and 
Kuperan, for example, examine psychological and sociological theories with the aim of 
constructing a model which better fits the available empirical evidence.704 The authors 
FRQFOXGHWKDWPRUDOIDFWRUVDQGWKHGHVLUHWRLPSURYHRQH¶VVRFLDOUHSXWDWLRQQHHGWREH
integrated into the economic model.705 Notably, a party is more likely to be non-
compliant if other members of that community are non-compliant.706 When examining an 
LQGLYLGXDO XWLOLW\¶V FRPSOLDQFH ZLWK WKH SURFXUHPHQW UHJXODWLRQ WKHQ LW LV LPSRUWDQW WR
consider also the compliance standard of the industry as a whole. 
Rather than simply amending the classic economic model, however, other authors have 
argued that the economic model is critically flawed and completely new models are 
                                          
701 %HFNHU*µ&ULPHDQG3XQLVKPHQW$Q(FRQRPLF$SSURDFK¶Journal of Political Economy 169, 
at 176. 
702 Simpson, S. Corporate Crime, Law, and Social Control, (2002, Cambridge: CUP), at p.23. 
703 See, for example, HarriQJWRQ:µ(QIRUFHPHQW/HYHUDJH:KHQ3HQDOWLHVDUH5HVWULFWHG¶Journal 
of Public Economics DQG5D\PRQG0µ5HJXODWRU\&RPSOLDQFHZLWK&RVWO\DQG8QFHUWDLQ/LWLJDWLRQ¶
Journal of Regulatory Economics 165. 
704 6XWLQHQ-DQG.XSHUDQ.µ$VRFLR-HFRQRPLFWKHRU\RIUHJXODWRU\FRPSOLDQFH¶International 
Journal of Social Economics 174. 
705 Ibid, at 178-182. 
706 Ibid, at 181. 
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needed to explain compliance. Simpson, for example, examined empirical studies of 
SHUFHSWXDOGHWHUUHQFHWKHUHODWLRQVKLSEHWZHHQSDUWLHV¶VXEMHFWLYHYLHZVRISXQLVKPHQW
risk and criminal activity) and observed that the impact of legal sanctions on the decision 
to offend varies depending on whether the party is criminally uncommitted, committed 
or marginally committed, with sanctions only being significant for the latter group.707 
7KRVHXQFRPPLWWHGWRFULPHDUHXQDIIHFWHGE\WKHWKUHDWRIOHJDOVDQFWLRQV³EHFDXVHWKH
idea to commit a criminaODFWVLPSO\QHYHURFFXUVWRWKHP´708 Conversely, the criminally 
committed are not deterred by the threat of legal sanctions since they view them simply 
as a professional risk and, while they may plan their criminal activity in such a way as to 
minimise this risk, they are not deterred from committing crime totally. It would appear, 
therefore, that the empirical research should also consider the view towards legal 
compliance held by the individual procurement practitioners interviewed. 
It is also possible thDWDQLQGLYLGXDOV¶RYHUDOOYLHZRIWKHOHJLWLPDF\RIWKHOHJDOV\VWHPLV
key when determining whether or not that individual will comply with a given law. Tyler 
conducted empirical research in this area on a sample of Chicago citizens, examining the 
impact of legitimacy in comparison to three other main factors on compliance with the 
law; deterrence (covering the issues discussed in the classic economic model above 
relating to punishment and risk), peer opinion, and personal morality.709 The broad 
concept of OHJLWLPDF\ZDVEURNHQGRZQLQWRWZRIDFWRUVLQGLYLGXDOV¶SHUFHLYHGREOLJDWLRQ
to obey the law and their overall support for legal authorities.710 The research found 
legitimacy to be a key factor influencing compliance, operating both strongly and 
independently of the other factors considered.711 Within the overall concept of 
OHJLWLPDF\LWZDVDOVRIRXQGWKDWSHRSOHV¶SHUVRQDORSLQLRQVRIWKHLUREOLJDWLRQWRFRPSO\
with the law was the major factor, though support for legal authorities still produced a 
statistically significant result.712 Legitimacy, while important, was not found to be the 
                                          
707 Above, n.702, at pp.28-32. 
708 Ibid, at p.29. 
709 Tyler, T. Why People Obey the Law, (Rev. Ed.) (2006, Princeton: Princeton University Press) at pp.42-50. 
710 Ibid, at p.45. 
711 Ibid, at p.63. 
712 Ibid, at p.62. 
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only relevant factor, however. The research also found that personal morality was key, 
ZLWKLQGLYLGXDOV¶SHUVRQDOYLHZVRQZKHWKHURUQRWWKHODZDFFRUGHGZLWKWKHLURZQYLHZV 
of right and wrong being an important factor when determining their compliance with 
that law.713 
Given that utilities are corporations, the balance of factors to be considered when 
considering whether to breach the law may vary from those considered by an individual. 
Cullen, Maakested and Cavender suggest that corporate criminal acts are much more 
likely to be deliberate actions than crimes of passion.714 Under their argument, breaching 
the law in a corporate setting is likely to be seen as a simple business decision to be 
taken where the benefits outweigh the possible costs, and so is even more likely to 
follow the rational economic models set out by Becker and others. Compliance with the 
law is often seen by corporations as a simple matter of risk management, with 
compliance reducing the risk of legal challenge and the corresponding costs of that 
challenge, but not being strictly necessary.715 Given this, it is possible that the factors in 
the classic economic model of deterrence will be more relevant when determining 
compliance with the law by corporations than issues such as personal morality and 
legitimacy.  
For any of the factors examined above to be relevant, the parties involved must be fully 
aware of the requirements of the law and this may not always be the case in practice, 
even where the requirements are clear and precise. Baldwin, conducting empirical 
research into punitive risk management, noted a relatively low level of knowledge on 
punitive risks in the companies surveyed with, for example, only 38% of respondents 
feeling their board of directors were knowledgeable on company law risks and only one 
in eight respondents being sure where the responsibility for managing such risks lay in 
                                          
713 Ibid, at p.64. 
714 Cullen, F., Maakested, W. and Cavender, G. Corporate Crime Under Attack: The Ford Pinto Case and 
Beyond, (1987, Cincinnati, Ohio: Anderson), at p.342.  
715 /DXIHU:µ&RUSRUDWH/LDELOLW\5LVN6KLIWLQJDQGWKH3DUDGR[RI&RPSOLDQFH¶ 52 Vanderbilt Law 
Review 1343, at 1397-1402. 
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their company.716 Lack of compliance can clearly be based on ignorance and confusion 
over the law, and the level of knowledge of the law held by the procurement 
practitioners interviewed will be considered in this research. 
IV.4. Compliance with Indeterminate Law 
The deterrence theory examined above relies on the assumption that the party subject 
to the regulation knows precisely what is required of them. Calfee and Craswell note that 
where the requirements of a law are unclear, a party does not face the usual binary 
choice between legal and illegal actions.717 Rather, there is a distribution of probabilities 
ranging from certain liability to no risk of liability at all, with the actual legal standard 
sitting somewhere in that range (but without it being clear precisely where). For utilities, 
the distribution would appear to run from including no social aspects in procurement at 
all (no possibility of challenge), to considering only social matters when procuring 
(almost certain chance of challenge). If the correct legal standard is seen as centred 
between these two extremes, a move towards including no social criteria may be seen as 
³RYHU-FRPSOLDQFH´ DQG D PRYH WRZDUGV HPSKDVLVLQJ WKH LPSRUWDQFH RI VRFLDO FULWHULD
PD\EHVHHQDV³XQGHU-FRPSOLDQFH´ 
Calfee and Craswell argue that where the correct legal standard is unclear, parties will 
generally tend to over-comply.718 They note that whatever standard the party chooses to 
comply with, there is always a chance that the party will not be challenged, or if 
challenged, will not be found liable.719 The authors argue that while this factor alone 
would lead to under-compliance, this analysis disregards the fact that should a party get 
challenged, the expected penalty is lower the more a party has over-complied. Equally, 
the probability of challenge decreases as a party approaches the over-compliance end of 
                                          
716 %DOGZLQ5µ7KH1HZ3XQLWLYH5HJXODWLRQ¶Modern Law Review 351, at 363-364. 
717 &DOIHH-DQG&UDVZHOO5µ6RPH(IIHFWVRI8QFHUWDLQW\RQ&RPSOLDQFHZLWK/HJDO6WDQGDUGV¶Virginia 
Law Review 965, at 969. 
718 Ibid, at 979-981. 
719 Ibid, at 979. 
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the probability spectrum. Over-compliance thus not only reduces the possible costs of 
breach, but reduces the chance of having to pay any costs at all.720 
Calfee and Craswell also note, however, that this conclusion only stands where the level 
of uncertainty is moderate.721 Where a legal provision is extremely uncertain, a change 
in the standard that the party chooses to comply with has less effect on the chance of 
challenge and, given this was the main factor leading to over-compliance as set out 
above, the result is that the party tends towards under-compliance.722 The authors note 
that a tendency to under-comply is strongest where the amount that a party can save in 
private costs through lack of compliance is relatively high and the likelihood of not being 
found liable is also high.723 
V. Enforcement Strategies 
Baldwin and Cave note that officials who enforce regulation often use a variety of 
techniques, ranging from formal punitive techniques such as legal prosecution to more 
informal techniques such as persuasion and negotiation.724 A distinction may be drawn 
EHWZHHQ³GHWHUUHQFH´DSSURDFKHVZKLFKXVHSHQDOWHFKQLTXHVWRHQIRUFHUHJXODWLRQDQG
³FRPSOLDQFH´ DSSURDFKHV ZKLFK XVH WKH PRUH LQIRUPDO PHWKRGV725 Baldwin and Cave 
note that compliance approaches hold conformity with the law to be the central aim of 
enforcement while deterrence approaches often have a stronger emphasis on 
retribution.726 The procurement regulation is enforced by punitive civil sanctions, with 
remedies for breach including damages.727 This section will examine the benefits and 
disadvantages of such deterrence approaches and examine various alternative 
enforcement methods. 
                                          
720 Ibid, at 981. 
721 &UDVZHOO5DQG&DOIHH-µ'HWHUUHQFHDQG8QFHUWDLQ/HJDO6WDQGDUGV¶Journal of Law, 
Economics and Organisation 279, at 286. 
722 Ibid. 
723 Calfee and Craswell 1984, above n.717, at 981. 
724 Baldwin and Cave, above n.639, at pp.96-97. 
725 Ibid, at p.97. 
726 Ibid. 
727 For further discussion of remedies, see Chapter 5, Section IV.4. 
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Baldwin argues that recently there has been a growing focus on the use of punitive 
sanctions in the UK, with the emphasis much more on deterrence approaches than 
compliance.728 The main benefit of such deterrent approaches rests on the fact that 
punitive sanctions show clearly that such behaviour is seen as unacceptable, reinforcing 
³VRFLDO VHQWLPHQWV RI GLVDSSURYDO DQG >HQKDQFLQJ@ VRFLDO SUHVVXUHV WR FRPSO\´729 
Punitive sanctions should not only deter the relevant party from re-offending, but also 
deter other parties from offending. They also have a political purpose, allowing the state 
to be seen by the public taking action against the undesirable behaviour.  
Baldwin notes, however, that deterrence approaches suffer from several drawbacks 
when applied to corporations.730 Individuals within companies are often confused over 
the balance between corporate and individual liabilities and are unaware of the various 
risks to themselves and their company.731 Baldwin also notes that companies are often 
poorly organised to anticipate and deal with punitive risks and directors are also often 
poorly prepared to supervise risk-management amongst their staff.732 
It has also been argued that deterrent approaches are inefficient since formal legal 
proceedings will usually cost much more and create much more delay than informal 
compliance approaches.733 Deterrent approaches are also usually much more inflexible 
than compliance approaches, preventing the individual circumstances of the case to be 
considered.734 Baldwin also argues that there is no guarantee that punitive sanctions will 
result in compliance by companies.735 While compliance is one method of avoiding a 
sanction, companies may also deal with the problem by putting pressure on the 
regulator, shifting the blame to other individuals or companies in the corporate group or 
concealing breaches of regulation from regulators.736 This may partly be explained by the 
fact that punitive approaches focus on punishment and promote negative expectations of 
                                          
728 %DOGZLQ5µ7KH1HZ3XQLWLYH5HJXODWLRQ¶Modern Law Review 351, at 352-360. 
729 Baldwin and Cave, above n.639, at p.98. 
730 Baldwin, above n.728, at 370. 
731 Ibid, at 367-370. 
732 Ibid, at 370. 
733 Baldwin and Cave, above n.639, at p.98. 
734 Ibid. 
735 Baldwin, above n.728, at 371. 
736 Ibid. 
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the regulated company, and this may result in the company resenting the regulator and 
rebelling against their influence.737 
Because of these possible problems with deterrence approaches, several authors have 
set out alternative enforcement strategies, usually with a greater focus on compliance 
DSSURDFKHV $\UHV DQG %UDLWKZDLWH VHW RXW D PRGHO RI ³UHVSRQVLYH UHJXODWLRQ´ XQGHU
which parties are subject to increasingly formal and punitive methods the more they 
continue to breach the regulation.738 The regulating agency should spend most of its 
time working with parties with the least interventionist methods of enforcement but 
should also have significant punitive sanctions available to it. Ayres and Braithwaite 
argue that the threat of these significant sanctions should help an agency convince a 
party in breach that operating with the agency through the less interventionist methods 
is to its advantage.739 Yeung criticises the responsive regulation method, however, on 
the grounds that it punishes parties for failure to co-operate with regulators, arguing 
WKDW³>L@QWKHDEVHQFHRIVSHFLILFOHJLVODWLYHSURVFULSWLRQ LWLVQRWXQODZIXOWRGHFOLQHWR
co-operate with state aXWKRULWLHV´740 She also notes that the method results in 
companies which commit serious breaches of the regulation but which have previously 
co-operated with the regulator being treated better than companies which commit minor 
offences but which have not previously co-operated.741 
In addition to the responsive regulation method, Ayres and Brathwaite also present the 
RSWLRQ RI ³HQIRUFHG VHOI-UHJXODWLRQ´ XQGHU ZKLFK FRPSDQLHV GHVLJQ VSHFLILF UHJXODWLRQ
and monitoring methods themselves, but the operation of this system is overseen by 
state agencies.742 This method is also examined by Ogus, who notes that the advantages 
would include the fact that the standards are likely to be better tailored to the 
circumstances of that industry and the regulated parties will be able to participate in the 
                                          
737 Ayres, I. and Braithwaite, J. Responsive Regulation (1992, Oxford: OUP), at p.25. 
738 Ayres and Braithwaite, above n.737, at Ch.2. 
739 Ibid, at p.40. 
740 Yeung, above n.696, at p.168. 
741 Ibid. 
742 Ayres and Braithwaite, above n.737, at Ch.4. 
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regulation process.743 Ogus notes, however, that this form of regulation may not be 
suitable where the risks give rise to particularly drastic consequences or information 
regarding the risks is hard to find.744 He also notes that the model relies on the 
companies involved in designing the regulation being well-informed and well-intentioned 
and this is not always the case in practice.745 
Similar to the enforced self-regulation techniques outlined above, Parker suggests a 
PHWKRGRI³PHWD-UHJXODWLRQ´XQGHUZKLFKOHJDODXWKRULW\LVXVHGWRLQFUHDVHDFRPSDQ\¶V
commitment to its self-regulation.746 7KLVPD\EHGRQHE\DGMXVWLQJDFRPSDQ\¶VSUHFLVH
liabilities depending on the status of their self-regulation, for example linking liability to 
the existence of an effective self-regulatory code, or by legally requiring a company to 
implement a self-regulatory code where a regulatory breach has occurred.747 Baldwin 
criticises this approach, however, noting that the approach relies on corporate parties 
viewing their responsibilities in the same way as regulators and this is not the case in 
practice, a criticism which also applies to the enforced self-regulation approaches 
above.748 Baldwin also notes that the variation in the matters which must be regulated 
and lack of clarity over which body should take the lead in any regulatory negotiations 
means that such regulation is likely to result in confusion and conflict between the 
various parties.749 
VI. Conclusion 
This chapter has examined the notion of regulation, examining the form of regulation 
taken by both the EU procurement regime and voluntary CSR policies, noting that 
utilities are thus subject to two, potentially competing, types of regulation. The chapter 
has then discussed the potential problems caused by regulation which, like the EU legal 
regime, lacks clarity, and the impact of such lack of clarity on compliance with the law. 
                                          
743 Ogus, above n.660, at 101-102. 
744 Ibid, at 102. 
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746 Parker, C. The Open Corporation, (2002, Cambridge: CUP), at p.246. 
747 Ibid, at p.256. 
748 Baldwin, above n.728, at 377. 
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The chapter has finally discussed the formal punitive method used by the EU 
procurement regime for enforcement of the regulation and noted the problems with such 
µFRPSOLDQFH¶ DSSURDFKHV DORQJ ZLWK SRVVLEOH DOWHUQDWLYHV WR VXFK SXQLWLYH PHDVXUHV
Part II of the thesis will evaluate the reactions of UK utilities to the EU legal regime, 
using the theory set out in this chapter as a base for the empirical research to determine 
the response of interviewees to uncertainty in the law and compliance with the 
procurement regime. 
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Chapter 8 - Methodology 
I. Introduction 
Building on the overview of methodology in Section IV, Chapter 1, this chapter sets out 
the detail of the methodology applied in the empirical aspect of this thesis. The chapter 
aims to set out both the reasons why the particular methodology was chosen and the 
practical methods used throughout the project. Section II begins by setting out the 
theory behind qualitative research and the reasons such methodology was seen to be 
appropriate for this project. The chapter then examines sampling methods and sets out 
the process by which the sample for the project was chosen in Section III. Section IV 
sets out how the interview guide used in the research was designed. Section V concludes 
by setting out the data analysis methods used throughout the project. 
II. Qualitative Methodology 
II.1. Choice of qualitative methodology 
There are two broad categories of methodology in the social sciences; qualitative and 
quantitative. Quantitative methodology is associated with positivist theory, which for a 
long time was the dominant philosophy within the natural sciences. Qualitative 
methodology, by contrast, is generally associated with interpretivist theory. This section 
will first briefly examine positivism and quantitative research before looking at 
interpretivism and qualitative research and setting out why qualitative methodology was 
felt to be the more suitable methodology for this thesis.  
7KHWHUP³SRVLWLYLVP´ZDVILUVWXVHGE\WKHVRFLDOVFLHQWLVW&RPWHZKRDSSOLHGVWDWLVWLFDO
techniques to the study of social phenomena, arguing that sociology should follow the 
methodology and principles of the natural sciences.750 Black states that traditional 
positivist theory is based on three principles: (1) science can only know physical 
phenomena; (2) every scientific idea must be based on empirical evidence; (3) value 
                                          
750 Comte, A. (trans. Martineu, H), The Positive Philosophy of Auguste Comte, vol. 1-3, (2000, Kitchener: 
Batoche Books). 
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judgments cannot be measured empirically and thus cannot be investigated 
scientifically.751 A key belief of positivism is that research must be fully objective. The 
values of the researcher should not influence the research in any way.752 
Quantitative research follows the beliefs of positivism, emphasising the use of a 
deductive approach through which theory is tested through empirical scientific research, 
most often through the collection of statistical information. The topic of research must be 
³FRQFHSWXDOLVHG´DSURFHVVWKURXJKZKLFKWKHsocial concepts being studied are reduced 
to categories which may be statistically investigated.753 Quantitative research is 
concerned with measuring the social phenomenon accurately and generally aims to find 
causal relationships between phenomena.754 Probability sampling is generally used with 
an aim to ensuring that the results of the study can be generalised to the whole 
population (see further below in section III on sampling). Quantitative research is best 
suited to broad investigation of a social phenomenon, examining statistical trends over a 
wide population. 
The main criticism aimed at positivism and quantitative research by interpretivist 
researchers is the argument that human action cannot be measured and explained in the 
same way as natural phenomena and research methods should take account of this 
fact.755 In contrast to positivism, interpretivist approaches emphasise the subjective 
nature of social research. Interpretivist researchers argue that, unlike the natural world, 
social reality has no objectiYH WUXWK EXW LV FUHDWHG SXUHO\ E\ SHRSOH¶V VXEMHFWLYH
understandings of phenomena. If social phenomena are to be understood, these 
subjective views of the phenomena must be examined.756 The aim with interpretivist 
research is generally not to explain social phenomena, but to understand them.757 
                                          
751 %ODFN'µ7KH%RXQGDULHVRI/HJDO6RFLRORJ\¶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-1972) 81 Yale Law Journal 1086, at 1092. 
752 Bryman, A., Social Research Methods, (2nd Ed), (2004, Oxford: OUP), at p.11. 
753 Ibid, at p.65. 
754 Ibid, at p.76-77. 
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Bryman notes that interpretivism is a general term often used to cover various 
philosophies critical of positivism.758 The broad field of interpretivism has been heavily 
influenced by hermeneutic-phenomenological philosophy.759  Hermeneutics is based on 
the work of Max Weber, who set out the concept of verstehen in research.760 Benton and 
Craib define the concept of verstehen DV³DQXQGHUVWDQGLQJRIWKHORJLFDODQGV\PEROLF
systems ± the culture ± ZLWKLQZKLFKWKHDFWRU OLYHV´761 The aim of hermeneutic social 
research is to gain this empathetic understanding of social culture. Hermeneutic 
phenomenology is based on the concept of verstehen DQGIRFXVHVRQUHVHDUFKLQJ³OLYHG
H[SHULHQFH´ H[DPLQLQJSHRSOHV¶ H[SHULHQFHVRID FHUWDLQShenomenon in their life and 
the meaning they attach to that phenomenon.762 
Creswell notes that qualitative methodology is fragmented, with the term covering 
various methods.763 This fragmentation can make it hard to give a good definition of 
qualitative research, but Mason notes some common themes throughout most qualitative 
research.764 Firstly, qualitative research methodology follows interpretivist philosophy in 
emphasising understanding over explanation and focusing on subjective interpretation. 
Secondly, quaOLWDWLYHUHVHDUFKXVHVPHWKRGV³ZKLFKDUHERWKIOH[LEOHDQGVHQVLWLYHWRWKH
VRFLDOFRQWH[W LQZKLFKGDWDDUHSURGXFHG´DVRSSRVHGWRWKHVWULFWVWDWLVWLFDOPHWKRGV
used in quantitative research.765 Thirdly, qualitative research aims to examine a 
particular phenomenon in great detail, focusing much more on depth of data rather than 
examining broad trends as quantitative research does. In addition to these themes, 
Bryman notes that qualitative methodology generally takes an inductive approach to 
                                          
758 Bryman, above n.752, at p.13. 
759 Ibid, at pp.13-16. 
760 For more on Weber and hermeneutics, see Benton, T. and Craib, I. Philosophy of Social Science: The 
Philosophical Foundations of Social Thought, (2001, Houndmills: Palgrave), Ch.5. 
761 Ibid, at p.79. 
762 Creswell, J. Qualitative Inquiry and Research Design: Choosing Among Five Approaches, (2nd Ed), (2007, 
London: SAGE Publishing), at p.59. 
763 Ibid, at p.4. 
764 Mason, J., Qualitative Researching, (2nd Ed), (2002, London: SAGE Publications), at pp.3-4. 
765 Ibid, at p.3. 
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research, building a theory from the data collected rather than testing a pre-existing 
theory.766 
Choice of methodology should be guided by the research questions and aims of the 
research.767 7KLVWKHVLVDLPVWRH[DPLQHSURFXUHPHQWSUDFWLWLRQHUV¶SUDFWLFDOH[SHULHQFHV
with applying the EU legal regime on procurement to the area of labour policies. The 
thesis aims to further understanding on how the regime is applied in practice; it does not 
DLPWRPHDVXUHWKHUHJLPH¶VHIIHFWLYHQHVVLQDQ\REMHFWLYHZD\8OWLPDWHO\WKHSURMect 
aims to build up a theory of the ways in which procurement practitioners react to law 
which conflicts with commercial need, and also how they react to lack of clarity in the 
law. These areas have no real existing theory behind them which could be used to guide 
deductive research and this lack of theory would make a quantitative study hard to 
design effectively since the relevant concepts to measure are not clear. Given this and 
the aim of the study to understand rather than measure, qualitative research seems the 
most appropriate methodology for this thesis. 
II.2. Semi-structured interviewing 
Various qualitative research methods exist, with some of the most prominent being 
ethnography, conversation and discourse analysis and in-depth interview techniques. In 
the same way that the choice of overall methodology should be governed by the aims of 
the research project, these aims should also govern the choice of the specific methods to 
be used.768 
As noted above, the aim of this research is to understand practitLRQHUV¶H[SHULHQFHV LQ
applying the law. In order to achieve this aim, it is necessary to have detailed focused 
discussion with the practitioners operating in the utilities sector and in-depth 
interviewing appears the most applicable method to achieve this. The other main 
possible method is a quantitative self-completion questionnaire, in which questions on 
                                          
766 Bryman, above n.752, at p.266. 
767 Charmaz, K. Constructing Grounded Theory, (2006, London: SAGE Publications), at p.15. 
768 Mason, above n.764, at p.59. 
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specific issues are set out with along with set responses and the research participants 
choose the response most applicable to their situation.769 Such a method has the 
advantage that data can be collected from a larger sample than is generally possible with 
the more time-intensive qualitative interviews. However, in addition to the reasons noted 
in the previous section on why quantitative methodology was not appropriate for this 
project, a questionnaire alone is not as well suited to understanding experiences as a 
method which allows detailed discussion with the research participants directly. Mason 
notes that qualitative interviewing is ideal for understanGLQJSHRSOH¶VH[SHULHQFHVLQIXOO
offering a much deeper understanding of the issues than the superficial overview which 
might be gathered through a quantitative survey on the same issue.770 In-depth 
qualitative interviewing also allows for more investigation of the overall context of the 
phenomenon which is being investigated than is possible with survey techniques.771 The 
relatively short length of an interview as compared to other qualitative techniques such 
as ethnography also means that a wider sample of practitioners can be studied, allowing 
more detailed investigation throughout the utilities sector. 
Bryman identifies three types of interview: structured, semi-structured and 
unstructured.772 Structured interviewing is generally identified as a quantitative 
technique. Under this method, an interview schedule setting out the questions to be 
asked is created before the interview process begins. The schedule should set out the 
precise wording of the questions as well as the order in which they are to be asked and 
this should not be varied from at all during the interview process. The aim is for each 
interviewee to be given the exact same interview so that the responses can be 
accurately quantified.773 
In semi-structured interviewing the interviewer has an interview guide setting out 
questions or topics to be covered in each interview, but the wording and order of the 
                                          
769 For more on quantitative surveys, see Bryman, above n.752, at Ch.6. 
770 Mason, above n.764, at p.65. 
771 Ibid. 
772 Bryman, above n.752, at p.318-319. 
773 Ibid, at p.110. 
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questions may be varied during the interview. Certain questions may also be skipped 
and issues which are not on the guide may be covered in response to issues raised by 
the interviewee. Semi-structured interviews have the advantage of flexibility, allowing 
interviewees to focus on the issues which they personally feel are the most important 
rather than being confined to the issues raised by the interviewer, which may not in fact 
be all that important in practice.774 
Unstructured interviews have no kind of interview guide or schedule to guide the 
progress of the interview. The interview operates much like a conversation, with the 
interviewer simply starting the general topic and then responding to what the 
interviewee says. In these cases the focus is generally much more on what the 
interviewee wishes to say than what the interviewer wishes to get from the interview 
and this method is best suited to highly sensitive or subjective issues.775 
For this thesis, semi-structured interviews have been chosen as the most appropriate 
method of data collection. Semi-structured interviews are generally the approach 
favoured where the research has a clear focus, since the structure of the interview guide 
allows that focus to be discussed without the possibility of the interview wandering off 
track, as is possible with unstructured interviews.776 In this case, specific issues have 
been highlighted for discussion through the literature review and using an interview 
guide can ensure that all these issues are covered in the interviews while unstructured 
interviews, being driven more by the interviewee than the interviewer, may not allow 
discussion of all issues. Equally, having a common framework of questions in each 
interview allows the data to be compared and analysed much more easily than is 
possible with fully unstructured interviews.  
The flexibility of semi-structured interviews also appears to make them more suitable for 
this project than fully structured interviews. It is possible that the issues which have 
been highlighted in the literature review are not in fact commonly encountered or 
                                          
774 Ibid, at p.321. 
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considered important by those applying the law, and the flexibility of semi-structured 
interviews allows interviewees to raise the issues they feel are important. Structured 
interviews would not necessarily allow these issues to be raised and thus might fail to 
discover important aspects of the research. 
Having determined the method of data collection, the next section discusses how the 
interview subjects were chosen.  
III. Sampling 
III.1. Sampling Introduction 
0DVRQ GHILQHV VDPSOLQJ DQG VHOHFWLRQ DV ³SULQFLSOHV DQG SURFHGXUHV XVHG WR LGHQWLI\
choose, and gain access to relevant data sRXUFHV´777 The term is generally associated 
with probability sampling, which aims to take a representative sample from a large 
population, allowing the results gained from analysis of the sample to be generalised to 
that population.778 Probability sampling faces problems when applied to qualitative 
research, however. As Bryman argues, the mutability of qualitative research means that 
it can be hard to state the precise population that is being studied at any one time, 
making it impossible to determine what the random sample should be based on.779 Also, 
probability sampling often results in large samples, which makes in-depth qualitative 
interviewing very time-consuming and expensive.780 While large probability samples are 
able to indicate general trends in an area they are not suitable for discovering the 
complex detailed data that most qualitative research searches for.  
Given these problems and the choice of qualitative methodology for this research, 
probability sampling will not be used in this thesis. Instead, a form of purposive 
sampling will be used, based on the theoretical sampling used in grounded theory 
                                          
777 Mason, above n. 764, at p.120. 
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research.781 Under this method, rather than the sample being definitively decided at the 
beginning of the research, the sample evolves as the research is conducted. Potential 
interviewees will be originally chosen based on their relevance to the research questions 
and the developing theory.782 Theoretical sampling leads to an iterative process of data 
collection and data analysis in which the data analysed leads to refinement of the theory 
guiding future data collection. While the potential sample is very broad in the early 
stages of data collection when the theory is still fairly general, sampling will become 
more specific and focused as data collection continues.783 Sampling stops when the point 
RI ³WKHRUHWLFDO VDWXUDWLRQ´ LV UHDFKHGZKLFK LVZKHQ WKH SDUWLFXODU FDWHJRU\ RU WKHPH
being investigated has been well-defined and the interview data is only confirming the 
information already gained rather than offering new insights.784  
One of the practical problems theoretical sampling raises is that of defining the initial 
sample. Since the grounded theory method is an inductive method (a method in which 
the theory is created from the data, as opposed to a deductive method which uses data 
to test a pre-existing theory), at this early stage there is no defined theoretical 
framework which may be used to guide the data collection. Instead, the sample must be 
determined by the issues raised by the research questions and by practical 
considerations such as available resources and access issues.785 The next section will 
discuss the initial sample in this research and the reasons why that sample was chosen. 
III.2 Utilities Sample 
Directive 2004/17/EC786 ³WKH8WLOLWLHV'LUHFWLYH´ FRYHUV HQWLWLHVZKLFK FRQGXFW FHUWDLQ
activities in the energy, water, transport and postal services sectors.787 As set out in 
Chapter 4, the UK utilities sector as a whole covers well over a thousand companies. 
                                          
781 For more on grounded theory, see Strauss, A. and Corbin, J., Basics of Qualitative Research Techniques and 
Procedures for Developing Grounded Theory, (2nd Ed), (1998, Thousand Oaks, Calif: SAGE Publications). 
782 Mason, above n.764, at p.124. 
783 Strauss and Corbin, n.781 above, at p.203. 
784 Ibid, at p.212. 
785 Ibid, at p.204. 
786 Directive 2004/17/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council coordinating the procurement 
procedures of entities operating in the water, energy, transport and postal services sectors, OJ 2004 No. 
L134/1. 
787 For further discussion see Chapter 4 on the UK utilities sector and Chapter 5 on the EU procurement regime. 
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Given the limited time and resources of this research, it was not feasible to interview the 
whole population, making it necessary to choose a sample in order to conduct qualitative 
research. Equally, the utility population includes many companies not subject to, or not 
fully subject to, the EU procurement regime making them of less relevance to the 
research question of this thesis. The size of the regulated utilities sector, i.e. those 
covered fully by the Utilities Directive, was discussed previously in Chapter 4. Given the 
lack of clarity in the Directive over precisely which organisations are covered, the precise 
number of regulated utilities in the UK is somewhat uncertain but, as suggested in 
Chapter 4, is probably no larger than 100 companies. 
The sample has been chosen on the basis of two main criteria. Firstly, to include at least 
some companies which have an interest in including CSR policies in their procurement.  
Secondly, companies have been chosen based on the need for diversity in the companies 
covered by the sample. This covers several requirements: 
1. The need to cover entities which operate in more than one region, including 
companies which operate in more than one EU member state and also 
companies which operate in countries outside the EU. 
2. The need to cover both public and private companies. 
3. The need to include companies which have moved from the public sector regime 
to the utilities regime. 
4. The need to ensure that the sample reflects the population in terms of variance 
in the size of the companies included. 
5. The need to include both companies which use the joint qualification lists 
operated by Achilles Information Ltd, and companies which operate their 
procurement individually. 
The rest of this section will examine the reasons behind these criteria and how the 
sample deals with each of them in more detail. It was originally intended to cover also 
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utilities in various legal regimes, i.e. including utilities in the oil and gas sector which 
have a partial exemption under Art. 3 of the previous directive and companies which 
have a full exemption under Art. 30 of the current directive. This would have allowed 
investigation into the way in which the legal regime impacts on the use of labour policies 
through a comparison with similar companies which are not subject to the same regime. 
Unfortunately, due to both time constraints and a difficulty in identifying and contacting 
such interviewees, this was not possible in this project and this research studies only the 
core sample of fully regulated utilities.   
The initial sample chosen covers utilities in the electricity and gas transmission and 
distribution sectors, the water and sewerage sector, the postal services sector and the 
transport sector. The sample covers 22 companies, with 5 in the energy sector, 7 in the 
water sector (including one company which also operates in the UK energy sector), 9 in 
the transport sector and 1 company in the postal services sector. Unfortunately, due to a 
very low response rate from companies in Scotland and Northern Ireland (no companies 
from Northern Ireland replied to requests for interview and only one company from 
Scotland did so), the sample does favour English and Welsh companies.  
III.2.1. Variance in legal regimes 
The energy companies chosen for the sample cover the electricity transmission and 
distribution operators and the gas transport companies operating in the UK. These 
companies have been chosen since, unlike companies operating solely in the electricity 
generation or electricity/gas supply sectors and companies operating in the oil and gas 
extraction sector, they have no exemption from any part of the Utilities Directive. They 
are thus the companies in the energy sector most suited to research examining the 
effects of the rules under that directive on CSR policies. Within the transport sector, the 
sample includes those companies which do not have an exemption from the directive, 
covering mostly rail and airport utilities. The water companies and the postal services 
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company included in the sample are also fully covered by the Utilities Directive when 
performing a regulated activity. 
8WLOLWLHV¶ SURFXUHPHQW PD\ DOVR EH DIIHFWHG E\ WKH 7UHDW\ RQ WKH )XQFWLRQLQJ RI WKH
European Union (TFEU). The Treaty rules on free movement are relevant for 
procurement, including the obligations set out in the case law of the Court of Justice of 
the European Union (CJEU). This includes the recent transparency obligation set out in 
the case of Telaustria788 (see Chapter 5), which requires that all procurement contracts 
are advertised. The Treaty rules apply to every procurement which does not have a 
specific exemption from the Treaty, such as defence procurement covered by Art. 346 
TFEU. This means the rules DSSO\WRXWLOLWLHV¶SURFXUHPHQWZKHUHLWLVXQGHUWKHWKUHVKROG
for the Utilities Directive, where the contract is exempt from the Directive or subject to a 
limited regime, and where the relevant sector has an exemption from the Directive 
under Art. 30. As with the rules under the Directive, these Treaty requirements limit the 
ability of companies to include certain CSR policies. 
7KHVH 7UHDW\ UXOHV DOVR DGG DQ H[WUD OD\HU RI XQFHUWDLQW\ WR XWLOLWLHV¶ SURFXUHPHQW
Firstly, while the Treaty applies to utilities which are public authorities or public 
undertakings, it is unclear whether the requirements also apply to private utilities 
operating on the basis of special or exclusive rights (see Chapter 5). Even where the 
Treaty requirements do apply, the precise nature of those requirements is very uncertain 
since the CJEU has yet to set out the required level of advertisement.  
III.2.2. Variance in region and activity 
Many utilities have changed the way in which they operate in recent years. The growth 
in privatisation and deregulation throughout the utilities sector has given utilities the 
ability to merge with and takeover other utilities. This has led to companies becoming 
generally much larger and operating internationally, with activities both in the EU and 
globally. Equally, companies now often operate over more than one utility activity and 
                                          
788 Case C-324/98 Telaustria Verlags GmbH and Telefonadress GmbH v Telekom Austria AG [2000] ECR.I-
10745. 
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can also operate in both regulated and unregulated sectors. This means that their 
different activities are subject to different procurement rules depending on whether the 
activity is covered by the Utilities Directive and on the jurisdiction in which the activity 
takes place. This may prevent utilities from implementing policies covering more than 
one of the sectors or jurisdictions in which they operate since any policy would have to 
comply with the most restrictive relevant procurement regulation, limiting its overall 
use.789 The impact of these different regulatory regimes may also hinder the ability of 
utilities to co-operate with other companies in other jurisdictions, for example, to run a 
joint qualification list. These different activities and different regulatory regimes also 
mean that a utility may have difficulty determining which rules should be followed for 
each procurement, especially any procurement which may cut across sectors.790 
In order to examine the effect of these different regulatory regimes in practice, the 
sample has been designed to include companies operating in various sectors and in 
various different geographical regions. The sample includes one company which operates 
over two utility sectors; water and energy. In addition to this, the sample includes four 
companies in the energy sector which not only operate distribution networks but also 
have branches which operate in the non-regulated generation and supply areas. The 
postal services company included in the sample also completes a variety of activities 
including both regulated activities such as letter delivery and non-regulated activities 
such as certain licensing activities performed by one of its subsidiary companies.  
III.2.3. Public and private companies 
 The water, transport and postal services sectors all have a small number of public 
utilities operating within them, along with a greater number of private utilities. The need 
to make a profit may place private companies under more pressure to include CSR 
                                          
789$UURZVPLWK6DQG0DXQG&µ&65LQWKHXWLOLWLHVVHFWRUDQGWKHLPSOLFDWLRQVof EC procurement policy: a 
IUDPHZRUNIRUGHEDWH¶LQ$UURZVPLWK6DQG.XQ]OLN3HGVSocial and Environmental Policies under the EC 
Procurement Rules: New Directives and New Directions, (2009, Cambridge: CUP), at sec. 6. 
790 Ibid, at sec. 6. 
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policies in their procurement.791 Equally, however, public companies face public pressure, 
being subject to the need to have a good social reputation and to set an example to 
other companies. Including both public and private companies in the sample allows an 
examination of whether the public or private status of a company influences its choice to 
include CSR policies in practice.  
III.2.4. Move from one legal regime to another 
It was decided to add the postal services company to the sample because, uniquely 
among the UK utilities, this company was until recently regulated under the Public Sector 
Directive. The public sector rules are generally much less flexible than the utilities 
regulation and this may have influenced the previous use of CSR policies. Including this 
postal services company in the sample allows the consequences of the move from the 
public sector rules to the more flexible utilities rules to be examined.  
III.2.5. Variance in company size 
As with the implementation of any business policy, the size and funds of the company 
may have an effect on the decision to implement a CSR policy and on the precise way 
that policy is formulated since larger companies will simply have more money available 
for both the policy and any legal advice felt necessary to ensure the policy is compatible 
with EU law. In order to examine the effect the size of the company has on the use of 
CSR policies in more detail, it is important that the sample covers not only large 
multinational firms, but also small and medium sized businesses. This ensures that while 
enough large firms are included that the sample covers a significant proportion of the 
XWLOLW\PDUNHW LQ HFRQRPLF WHUPV WKHSRVVLEOH HIIHFWV RID FRPSDQ\¶V Vize can also be 
analysed and the sample is not biased towards large firms. For this research, the size of 
a company is defined by reference to its annual turnover. 
                                          
791 For more on the commercial pressures on companies leading to the inclusion of CSR policies and the link 
between CSR and profit, see Chapter 2 on Corporate Social Responsibility. 
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As previously mentioned, the sample of energy companies chosen for this research 
focuses on the utilities operating in the gas and electricity transmission and distribution 
sectors. In this sector, the companies which operate the regional monopoly networks 
(the Distribution Network Operators (DNOs) and Gas Distribution Networks (GDNs)) do 
show some variation in size, with some such as E.ON being large multinational firms and 
others, such as Electricity North West Ltd, being much smaller firms operating solely in 
the UK.792 However, the sector does significantly favour very large utilities. It was also 
decided that, for the water sector, the English and Welsh water only companies would be 
included as well as the monopoly water and sewerage companies, since these companies 
are generally much smaller than both the water and sewerage companies and the 
energy companies. The transport sector covers mostly relatively small companies 
operating individual transport networks, offering a different perspective to the mostly 
larger water and energy companies. This offers a variation in size throughout the 
sample.   
III.2.6. Companies on and off the Achilles Database 
Many utilities in the UK use a qualification list operated by the firm Achilles Information 
Ltd, the Utilities Vendor Database (UVDB). The UVDB qualifies suppliers using a number 
of criteria, ranging from general financial and technical criteria to looking at certain CSR 
practices of the supplier. Several utilities also use the Verify service run by Achilles which 
H[DPLQHVDVXSSOLHU¶VKHDOWKDQGVDIHW\UHFRUG*LYHQWKDWWKHLQIRUPDWLRQFROOHFWHGIRU
the UVDB and Verify may impact on how a utility designs its CSR policies, the sample 
aims to include both companies who use the list and those who operate their 
procurement independently. The sample does significantly favour companies using the 
database, with all the energy distribution and transmission and the water and sewerage 
companies listed as using the UVDB. The use of the database is, however, low amongst 
transport companies, and the postal services company also does not use UVDB. Even 
within the sample of those companies using the UVDB, however, there is variance in the 
                                          
792 For more information, see Chapter 4 on the UK utility sector. 
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precise usage of the list, with many companies also running independent procurements 
for certain contracts rather than relying on the qualification list for every procurement. 
This will allow the precise impact of the UVDB criteria on the usage of CSR policies to be 
examined in more detail. 
IV. Interview Guide 
IV.1. The topics covered 
The topics which were to be investigated in this project were determined by the 
literature review set out in the previous chapters. From this review, eight areas of 
interest were identified for further investigation. 
IV.1.1. Decision to address labour issues in procurement and the structure of labour 
policies 
The empirical research first aimed to examine the decision over whether or not to 
include any labour issues in their procurement at all and, if labour issues were included, 
what kind of issues. This general knowledge provided the base for evaluating the later 
more specific issues examined.  
As discussed in Chapter 2, section III, utilities may face various pressures to consider 
labour issues throughout their business, most notably from their shareholders, 
consumers and employees.793 The impact of these pressures along with arguments that 
companies which are more socially responsible are intrinsically more profitable may 
mean that utilities see adopting labour policies to be commercially necessary.794 On the 
other hand, the EU regime governing the use of labour criteria in procurement is 
complex, with some issues such as the recruitment of local labour being clearly 
prohibited and the legality of other issues such as the exclusion of firms with poor labour 
                                          
793 Vogel, D. The Market for Virtue: The Potential and Limits of Corporate Social Responsibility (2005, 
Washington DC: Brookings Institution Press), at p.46. For further discussion, see Chapter 2 on Corporate 
Social Responsibility. 
794 7KH³EXVLQHVVFDVH´IRU&65VHHIXUther Chapter 2 on Corporate Social Responsibility at Section III.1.  
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practices being unclear.795 The empirical research aimed to determine what factors 
LQIOXHQFHXWLOLWLHV¶GHFision whether or not to include labour issues in their procurement 
and, more specifically, the extent to which the EU legal regime is a factor in their 
decision. 
For those utilities which took the decision to include labour considerations in their 
procurement, the empirical research aimed to determine which labour issues are most 
commonly included. Reviewing the most commonly used labour codes raised several 
possible issues which could be included:796 
x Prohibition of child labour  
x Prohibition of discrimination  
x Prohibition of forced labour  
x Minimum wage rates  
x Maximum working hours  
x Health and safety in the workplace  
x Skills training for employees 
x Freedom of association  
x Recruitment of local labour 
Utilities were asked which, if any, of these policies they included. They were also able to 
discuss other policies not mentioned on the list. 
The research then attempted to determine the methods through which the issues were 
PRVWFRPPRQO\ LQWHJUDWHG LQWRDXWLOLW\¶VSURFXUHPHQWSROLF\7KH OLWHUDWXUHVXJJHVWHG
that social issues could be included at several stages in the procurement process:797 
1. Deciding what to procure 
2. Setting the technical specifications 
                                          
795 For detailed discussion of the possibility of including labour issues in procurement under the EU regime, see 
Chapter 6. 
796 See Chapter 3 on Corporate Social Responsibility: Labour Policies. 
797 See further Chapter 6. 
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3. Setting contractual conditions to be complied with during the performance of the 
contract 
4. Setting the minimum standards for tendering and selection of tenderers in 
restricted/negotiated procedures 
5. Award criteria relating to labour issues 
6HYHUDOFRQVLGHUDWLRQVFRXOGLQIOXHQFHDXWLOLW\¶VFKRLFHRIVWUXFWXUH)URPWKHOLWHUDWXUH
review it became apparent that most issues included in labour codes concerned 
minimum standards to be reached. These are best dealt with through setting contract 
conditions for performance and setting minimum standards to be met before a supplier is 
eligible to tender, suggesting that these would be the most common approaches. On the 
other hand, commercial reasons may lead to approaches involving award criteria being 
favoured, as these best allow a company to determine the costs of a particular social 
policy and weigh it against other relevant factors. The empirical research aimed to 
discover what factors were most important when a utility was planning the procurement 
structure and, as with the decision to include labour issues at all, whether the EU regime 
had an impact upon the choice. 
IV.1.2. Contract conditions 
Following the general discussion of the area of labour policies in procurement as a whole, 
the rest of the areas of interest covered in the interview guide all dealt with specific 
areas of concern. Firstly, for those utilities which used contract conditions in order to 
implement labour policies, certain specific problem areas from a legal perspective in the 
field of contract conditions were identified. As with the types of policies, the identified 
problems are a starting point for discussion but interviewees may also highlight other 
areas. 
x The use of contract conditions relating to matters beyond the performance of the 
contract. 
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Inclusion of contract conditions which do not relate to the performance of the contract 
are prohibited for contracts governed by the Utilities Directive under Article 38. However, 
it has been noted that many labour policies would be ineffective if limited solely to the 
performance of the contract without the inclusion of auxiliary supporting policies as well, 
for example, policies for the education of child labourers who have been prevented from 
working for the utility.798 The requirements of the labour codes studied generally 
UHTXLUHGFHUWDLQPLQLPXPVWDQGDUGVWREHUHTXLUHGLQWKHXWLOLW\¶VZRUNIRUFHDQGWKDWRI 
its suppliers and could generally be complied with through only performance related 
conditions. However, there were some exceptions, again generally related to child 
labour.799 The questions on this area aimed to determine whether Article 38 was 
generally complied with or if other considerations led to a utility including non-
performance related criteria despite the requirement.  
x Compliance with national law 
Compliance with the national law of the country in which the contract is performed is 
required by all labour codes examined and is usually seen as the base level of 
compliance with the code. It is also one of the lowest-risk approaches to implementing 
labour considerations into procurement, with the Utilities Directive appearing to assume 
that requiring compliance with national law is allowable in Article 39, which allows a 
utility to set out where information on the national obligations relating to the workforce 
may be obtained. The empirical research in this area aimed to determine whether 
compliance with national law was commonly required and if so, whether this was the 
only requirement or whether the utility also added extra requirements beyond this, along 
with the reasons for the choice. 
x Labour certification marks (Fair trade product marks and supplier certification) 
                                          
798 See section III.1.2.2. in Chapter 6 on Utilities Procurement and Labour Policies. 
799 The most notable of these exceptions was Principle 4.2 of the Ethical Trading Institute Base Code, which 
UHTXLUHVFRPSDQLHVWR³GHYHORSRUSDUWLFLSDWHLQDQGFRQWULEXWHWRSROLFLHVDQGSURJUDPPHVZKLFKSURYLGHIRU
the transition of any child found to be performing child labour to enable her or him to attend and remain in 
TXDOLW\HGXFDWLRQXQWLOQRORQJHUDFKLOG´ 
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Product marks and certification schemes provide an easy and cost-effective way for a 
utility to see that the product it is purchasing or the supplier it is working with has 
satisfactory labour standards. Given the recent rise to prominence of fair trade products, 
it is also possible that a utility may feel pressure from its employees to ensure that 
products used by the company bear the Fairtrade label wherever possible. However, 
under the EU regime it appears that a utility must accept any product or service which 
satisfies its functional requirements.800 
For fair trade products, there is also an issue over whether a utility can set contract 
conditions governing the labour standards of the workforce which is producing that 
product. There is no case law on the topic and, while the Commission suggests that 
production methods cannot be considered where they have no impact on the actual 
characteristics of the product, this view has been heavily criticised.801 The empirical 
research aimed to determine whether requirements were set regarding production along 
with whether specific marks were required and the reasons for the choice. 
x Local labour 
A common requirement in the labour codes examined was the requirement to improve 
the welfare of the local community in which the utility was operating, often by favouring 
local labour or firms.802 Depending on the location of contract performance, this could 
UHTXLUH D XWLOLW\ WR IDYRXU ORFDO ODERXU LQ HLWKHU WKH XWLOLW\¶V KRPH VWDWH DQRWKHU (8
Member State or a third FRXQWU\ )DYRXULQJ ORFDO ODERXU RU ILUPV LQ WKH XWLOLW\¶V KRPH
state has been declared by the CJEU to be contrary to the free movement provisions.803 
There is no case law discussing favouring local firms or labour in either other EU Member 
                                          
800 Case C-359/89, Commission v Netherlands [1995] ECR I-³UNIX´ 
801 See European Commission, Interpretive communication of the Commission on the Community law applicable 
to public procurement and the possibilities for integrating environmental considerations into public 
procurement, COM(2001) 274; .XQ]OLN3µ0DNLQJWKHPDUNHWZRUNIRUWKHHQYLURQPHQWDFFHSWDQFHRIVRPH
³JUHHQ´FRQWUDFWDZDUGFULWHULDLQSXEOLFSURFXUHPHQW¶Journal of Environmental Law 175; and the discussion 
at sec.1.2.1 of Chapter 6 on Utilities Procurement and Labour Policies. 
802 See, for example, OECD Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises, General Principles 3 and 4, which require a 
firm to encourage local employment and local capacity building, and the ILO Tripartite Declaration of Principles 
Concerning Multinational Enterprises and Social Policy (2006), p.6, which states that a company should 
promote employment opportunities, giving priority to nationals of the state in which they are operating. 
803 See Case C-243/89, Commission v Denmark [1993] ECR I-3353 on favouring local labour and Case C-21/88, 
Du Pont de Nemours Italiana SpA v Unita Sanitaria Locale No. 2 di Carrara [1990] ECR I-889 on setting aside 
contracts for local firms. 
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States or third countries, though it seems likely that it would be considered a hindrance 
to trade which must be justified under the free movement provisions.804 The empirical 
research here aimed to determine whether local labour clauses were included in 
contracts in any of the three scenarios given above and, if so, whether the decision to 
include them was weighed against the risk of challenge under the EU rules. 
x Posted workers 
Finally, the empirical research aimed to determine what impact, if any, the case of 
Ruffert had had on the utilities sector when posted workers were involved in a 
contract.805 This case suggests that where workers are posted from one member state to 
another, the host member state cannot require higher working conditions than are 
provided for in the Posted Workers Directive.806 The empirical research aimed to 
determine whether utilities were content to stick with the labour standards of their 
supplier in these cases or preferred to demand higher standards despite the Ruffert 
requirements. 
IV.1.3. Award Criteria 
It was noted above that one possible method of including labour considerations in 
procurement was through the use of award criteria. The European Commission suggests 
that award criteria considering labour issues may only be included where the criteria are 
only considered if all other aspects of the tender are equal.807 The empirical research 
here aimed to determine whether utilities accepted this view or whether they included 
award criteria examining labour issues in other ways. 
IV.1.4. Qualification and selection of tenderers 
                                          
804 See further discussion at sec.1.2.1 of Chapter 6 on Utilities Procurement and Labour Policies. 
805 Case C-346/06, Rüffert v Land Niedersachsen [2008] ECR I-01989 
806 Directive 96/71/EC of the European Parliament and the Council concerning the posting of workers in the 
framework of the provision of services, [1997] OJ L18/1. 
807 European Commission, Interpretive Communication of the Commission on the Community Law applicable to 
public procurement and the possibilities for integrating social considerations into public procurement, 
COM(2001) 566, at sec.1.4.1. 
Page 193 of 300 
 
Under the Utilities Directive, utilities may exclude and select tenderers for a shortlist 
EDVHGRQ³REMHFWLYHUXOHVDQG FULWHULD´808 There is no guidance given on what precisely is 
meant by objective rules and criteria beyond the statement that it includes all the 
possible grounds for exclusion and selection which are allowable under the Public Sector 
Directive.809 The empirical research in this area aimed to determine what kind of criteria 
are commonly used for qualifying and selecting tenderers, with emphasis on whether 
labour criteria are used and if so, how those criteria are structured. 
IV.1.5. Qualification Systems 
Utilities may choose to limit their contracts to suppliers on a qualification list. In the 
same way that minimum standards may be set before a firm is eligible to tender for a 
particular contract, standards may also be set for firms wishing to join the qualification 
system. The empirical research aimed to determine what kind of criteria utilities used to 
qualify firms for the system and whether those criteria were chosen to be applicable for 
all possible contracts under the system or just a proportion. 
IV.1.6. Evidence and monitoring 
The Utilities Directive does not set out any explicit list of the evidence which may be 
required from firms in order to prove they can comply with the minimum qualification 
standards and the contract conditions, suggesting utilities may request any evidence 
related to those standards and conditions. The Directive does, however, require that 
utilities must request the same evidence from all suppliers, regardless of how high or low 
risk the utility judges them to be.810 The empirical research here aimed to determine 
what kind of evidence to prove compliance with labour issues was commonly requested 
by utilities, if indeed they requested anything at all. 
IV.1.7. Procurement outside the Utilities Directive 
                                          
808 Art. 54 Utilities Directive. 
809 Art. 54(4) Utilities Directive. 
810 For further discussion, see Chapter 6, Section IV.5. 
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As noted above in the sampling section, the applicability of the TFEU rules to private 
sector utilities with special or exclusive rights is unclear. The empirical research in this 
area aimed to determine whether the private utilities considered themselves bound by 
the Treaty rules. It also aimed to determine whether and how labour policies were 
included by utilities in their procurement outside the Directive, whether they felt the 
Treaty rules were applicable or not. 
IV.1.8. Cross-regime procurement 
As noted above in the sampling section, in recent years utilities have expanded out of 
their traditional sectors and countries, and this has made them subject to differing legal 
regimes for different parts of their business. The empirical research here aimed to 
determine what impact being subject to so many regimes had on their overall 
procurement policy, if any. 
IV.2. Formulating the interview guide questions 
The questions in the original interview guide were based on the topics above. This 
original interview guide was amended over the research process to take account of any 
other issues raised by the interviewees which are not covered in the guide and which it is 
felt appropriate to research further. This section sets out how the interview questions in 
the guide were worded and structured and sets out the reasons behind those choices. 
Interview questions may be split into two categories: open questions and closed 
questions.811 With open questions, interviewees may answer the question in any way 
they wish, using whatever wording they choose. With closed questions, interviewees 
choose their response from options given by the interviewer. Closed questions have 
several advantages. Firstly, the answers are easier to process since the relevant 
categories are pre-determined by the researcher, whereas for open questions the 
answers must be evaluated in detail after the interview and the common themes 
LGHQWLILHGDWWKDWODWHUVWDJH(TXDOO\FORVHGTXHVWLRQV³HQKDQFHWKHFRPSDUDELOLW\RIWKH
                                          
811 Bryman, above n.752, at p.145. 
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GDWD´ XQOLNH RSHQ TXHVWLRQV ZKHUH WKH YDULDWLRQ LQ DQVZHUV FDQ FUHDWH a difficulty in 
GHWHUPLQLQJZKHQLQWHUYLHZHHV¶DQVZHUVDUHUHIHUULQJWRWKHVDPHWKLQJ812 Bryman also 
notes that closed questions are often easier to understand by interviewees since the 
availability of answers helps to clarify any ambiguity in the wording of the question.813 
There are also several disadvantages to closed questions, however. Closed questions do 
not allow interviewees to raise issues not mentioned in the interview guide, something 
which was noted above as an aim in this research and one of the reasons semi-
structured interviewing was chosen as the main research method. Connected to this, 
Bryman notes that it can be difficult to make closed questions exhaustive, offering every 
possible answer as an option.814 The difficulty in covering every possibility added to the 
inability of the interviewee to raise issues which might have been missed means that 
certain important factors may be missed entirely from the research. 
Open questions are generally preferred in qualitative research. Open questions place 
more emphasis on the views of the interviewee rather than the interviewer, allowing 
their subjective views to shape the research, a core belief of qualitative research (see 
above, Section II). Given that, as discussed previously, the aim of this research is to 
determine the practical experiences of the interviewees and the need to allow avenues of 
research not highlighted in the research to be explored, open questions will generally be 
preferred in this research. However, the benefits of closed questions discussed above 
PHDQWKDWVRPHFORVHGVW\OHTXHVWLRQVZLOOEHLQFOXGHGWKRXJKDQ³RWKHU´FDWHJRU\ZLOO
also be given to enable interviewees to raise options not included in the possible 
answers.815 In particular, the questions which aim to gather general data on the types of 
labour policy included and the methods by which these policies are structured will offer 
suggestions on possible policies and methods of structuring those policies, both to 
                                          
812 Ibid, at p.148. 
813 Ibid. 
814 Ibid, at p.150. 
815 7KHRSWLRQRIXVLQJDQ³RWKHU´FDWHJRU\LQFORVHGTXHVWLRQVWRHQDEOHTXHVWLRQQDLUHVWREHPRUHH[KDXVWLYH
is suggested by Bryman, above n.752, at p.150. 
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enable the data to be more easily compared and also to aid understanding of the 
question. 
While generally the law concerning the use of labour policies in procurement is unclear 
and thus equally the legality of the approaches taken by the interviewees is uncertain, 
for some of the topics covered, the use of labour policies is clearly unlawful, for example 
the use of local labour clauses in the home state of the utility. In this case, the interview 
questions had to be formulated carefully to deal with this sensitivity. The questions 
which were perceived to be the most sensitive were mixed in with other questions of less 
sensitivity.816 A statement of context was also given, which gave reasons why companies 
might take the particular action and gave the expectation that the interviewee had also 
taken this action. For example, the local labour question read: 
Many institutional labour codes such as the OECD Guidelines and the ILO 
Tripartite Declaration have clauses promoting the use of local labour: have you 
ever favoured local labour or firms, either here in the UK or elsewhere? Why/why 
not? 
The aim here was that the context provided would allow the interviewee to feel confident 
enough in their actions despite the sensitivity of the issue and to provide an honest 
response. Without this context, it was feared that many interviewees would refuse to 
discuss the issue given the unlawfulness of the action. 
Generally questions such as the one above which contain such expectations are criticised 
for leading the interviewee to their answer, adversely affecting the overall quality of the 
interview data by ensuring that the researcher only receives the answer they are looking 
for.817 In this case, however, the possible benefits of the contextual information for 
allowing the sensitive issue to be approached would appear to outweigh the possible 
disadvantages of using a leading question.  
                                          
816 Bradburn, N., Sudman, S. and Wansink, N. Asking Questions: The Definitive Guide to Questionnaire Design, 
(Rev Ed), (2004, San Francisco: Jossey-Bass), at p.81. 
817 Kvale, S. and Brinkmann, S. InterViews: Learning the Craft of Qualitative Research Interviewing, (2nd Ed), 
(2009, London: SAGE Publishing), at p.171. 
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V. Conduct of Interviews 
The 22 interviews were conducted between January and April 2010, taking between 30 
and 80 minutes each. The majority of the interviews WRRN SODFH DW WKH LQWHUYLHZHHV¶
offices, allowing face to face discussion. Four of the interviews, however, were conducted 
by telephone due to time constraints on the part of the interviewees. There are differing 
opinions on the utility of telephone interviews as compared to face-to-face interviews. 
One of the commonly mentioned drawbacks of using a telephone interview is that the 
interviewer cannot see the body language of the interviewee, which can make it harder 
for the interviewer to know when an interviewee is confused by a question.818 Another 
possible problem is that the length of a telephone interview can usually only be at most 
20-25 minutes, whereas a face-to-face interview can be sustained for much longer, 
allowing more in-depth investigation of the issues.819 Sturges and Hanrahan dispute this, 
however, noting that in their research comparing telephone and face-to-face interviews 
they obtained approximately the same amount of data from both forms of interview.820 
They also found that the nature and depth of responses to their questions also did not 
vary depending on the medium of interview.821 Telephone interviews were thus deemed 
an adequate alternative to face to face interviews where it was not feasible to meet in 
person. 
The majority of the interviews were audio-recorded using a digital voice recorder. Boeije 
argues that recording interviews is greatly advantageous for qualitative research, 
improving the quality of the data by ensuring the interviewer does not have to choose 
what to take notes on, allows discussion of the data with colleagues, and provides 
verbatim quotes which may be used in the final report, helping readers judge the 
DFFXUDF\RI WKH UHVHDUFKHU¶V LQWHUSUHWDWLRQ822 Recording the interview also means that 
extensive notes do not need to be taken at the time, which can interrupt the flow of the 
                                          
818 Creswell, above n.762, at p.132. 
819 Bryman, above n752, at p.115. 
820 6WXUJHV-DQG+DQUDKDQ.µComparing Telephone and Face-to-Face Qualitative Interviewing: A Research 
1RWH¶Qualitative Research 107, at 112. 
821 Ibid, at 112. 
822 Boeije, H. Analysis in Qualitative Research, (2010), (London: SAGE Publications), at p.72. 
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interview.823 Seven of the interviewees were unwilling to be recorded and in these cases 
notes were taken during the interview and then written up as soon as possible after the 
interview finished. 
Those interviews which were recorded were later transcribed. The precise level of 
transcription needed is always affected by the purpose of the research.824 Given that the 
focus of this research is on the content of the interviews rather than the speech and 
intonation of the interviewees, it was felt that a detailed verbatim transcription was not 
needed and the transcription edited the interview responses into a formal written style, 
removing hesitations and repetitions when possible. Where information was included 
which was irrelevant to the research, it was omitted from the transcription, but for the 
majority of the interviews there was a full transcription with no omissions.   
VI. Data Analysis 
Following transcription, the process of data analysis began. Qualitative data analysis 
generally involves discovering the main themes of the interview data through a process 
known as coding.825 Coding is the process wheUHE\ WKH UHVHDUFKHU ³DWWDFK>HV@ RQH RU
more keywords to a text segment in order to permit later identification of a 
VWDWHPHQW´826 Kvale and Brinkmann note that coding may be either concept-driven or 
data-driven.827 Concept-driven coding uses codes designed by the researcher prior to the 
data analysis, usually by examining existing literature in the area, while in data-driven 
analysis the codes are developed solely through examining the data collected.828  Data-
driven coding is more commonly used in qualitative research and is generally associated 
with the use of grounded theory approaches, where the aim of the data analysis is to 
build up a theory based on the data collected.829 Under this approach, coding should be 
done iteratively with the data collection, with initial data analysis guiding subsequent 
                                          
823 Kvale and Brinkmann, above n.817, at p.179. 
824 0F/HOODQ(0DF4XHHQ.DQG1HLGLJ-µ%H\RQGWKH4XDOLWDWLYH,QWHUYLHZ'DWD3UHSDUDWLRQDQG
7UDQVFULSWLRQ¶Field Methods 63, at 67. 
825 Creswell, above n.762, at p.148. 
826 Kvale and Brinkmann, above n.817, at p.202. 
827 Ibid, at p.202. 
828 Ibid. 
829 See Strauss and Corbin, above n.781. 
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data collection.830 Given the lack of developed theory in this area, as discussed 
previously in section II, it was felt that concept-driven coding was inappropriate. A data-
driven coding approach was thus taken when analysing the data. All coding for the 
project was completed using the qualitative data analysis software NVivo 8. 
Under a data-driven approach, codes should begin as simple descriptive statements in 
order to define the experience of the interviewee. Following this, the codes should be 
compared in order to form steadily more theoretical codes, which may lead to expanding 
the sample in order to better investigate certain codes.831 The process should generally 
stop when the point of theoretical saturation is reached (see above, in section III.1), 
WKDW LV ZKHQ WKH VDPSOLQJ DQG DQDO\VLV SURFHVV ³QR ORQJHU VSDUNV QHZ WKHRUHWLFDO
LQVLJKWVQRUUHYHDOVQHZSURSHUWLHVRI\RXUFRUHWKHRUHWLFDOFDWHJRULHV´832 
Richards distinguishes between three types of codes which may arise from interview 
data; descriptive, topic and analytic codes.833 Descriptive codes look at the attributes of 
FDVHVIRUH[DPSOHWKHVL]HRIWKHLQWHUYLHZHH¶VRUJDQLVDWLRQDQGDUHWKHW\SHRIFRGHV
more commonly used in quantitative research.834 Information was collected in the 
interviews on issues such as the jurisdictions the company operated in and procurement 
procedures of subsidiaries/parent companies, but in general descriptive codes were 
rarely used in this research.  
Topic coding was the first stage of the analysis. Topic coding refers to the simple process 
of identifying the issue the interviewee is talking about at each stage.835 It is a necessary 
preliminary step to more detailed analysis, collecting all the data on the specific research 
issues in one place so that they can be more easily compared and contrasted. For this 
project, the use of the interview guide as a common framework meant that each 
interview covered essentially the same topics, with only minor variations where 
                                          
830 Ibid. 
831 Kvale and Brinkmann, above n.817, at p.202. 
832 Charmaz, above n.767, at p.113. 
833 Richards, L. Handling Qualitative Data: A Practical Guide, (2nd Ed), (2009, London: SAGE Publications), at 
p.96. 
834 Ibid, at p.99. 
835 Ibid, at p.100. 
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interviewees raised their own issues, and so these question topics were taken as the 
base themes for analysis. Any topic raised by interviewees which did not fit into one of 
the interview guide topics was given its own topic code. 
Analytical coding is the stage in which overarching themes are identified in the data and 
FRGHVDUHGHWHUPLQHGEDVHGRQ³LQWHUSUHWDWLRQDQGUHIOHFWLRQRQPHDQLQJ´836 This was 
WKHPDLQVWDJHRIWKHDQDO\VLV,QWHUYLHZHHV¶RSLQLRQVDQGWKRXJKWVZHUHH[DPLQHGDQG
common statements were analysed to identify broad themes. Many of the themes 
identified were then combined into larger overarching themes. The themes identified 
range from practical discussion on how labour policies had been included in certain ways 
to more general themes such as common conceptions of the EU legal regime. They will 
be discussed in detail in the substantive data analysis chapter, Chapter 9. 
VII. Validity, Reliability and Generalisability of the Results 
It is important for empirical research to be designed and conducted in such a way as to 
ensure that the findings can be trusted. The traditional requirements for testing the 
quality of empirical research are the measures of validity and reliability, with 
generalisability sometimes included as a third criterion, but also sometimes included as 
part of validity.837 Reliability is concerned with the consistency of a measure of a 
concept, including whether the measure is stable over time and whether the measure is 
objective or affected by subjective judgement.838 Validity looks at whether the measure 
used in the research does in fact measure the concept examined.839 Generalisability is 
concerned with whether the results of the research can be generalised out to the 
population.840 
These measures, however, were primarily designed for quantitative research and their 
applicability to qualitative research has been questioned. Both reliability and validity in 
                                          
836 Ibid, p.102. 
837 See Seale, C. The Quality of Qualitative Research, (1999), (London: SAGE Publications), at Ch. 4. 
838 Bryman, above n.752, at p.71. 
839 Ibid, at p.73. 
840 Ibid, at p.76. 
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the traditional sense set out above are concerned with the accuracy of measures, which 
is a key issue in quantitative research but of less use for qualitative research where the 
research ideas are not measured or conceptualised in the same manner. This has led to 
many commentators proposing their own methods of testing the credibility of qualitative 
research. 
The majority of the proposals suggest entirely new criteria for judging validity. Cho and 
Trent analysed the main proposals for determining validity in qualitative research and 
LGHQWLILHGWZRJHQHUDODSSURDFKHVZKLFKWKH\WHUPWKH³WUDQVDFWLRQDODSSURDFK´DQGWKH
³WUDQVIRUPDWLRQDO DSSURDFK´841 Methods taking the transactional approach are 
³JURXQGHG LQDFWLYH LQWHUDFWLRQEHWZHHQWKH LQTXLU\DQGWKH UHVHDUFKSDUWLFLSDQWV´DQG
use techniques such as triangulation. The transformational approach is more radical, 
FKDOOHQJLQJ WKH QRWLRQ RI YDOLGLW\ DQG ³MXGJHV work to be valid only if it signals that 
YDOLGLW\ DFKLHYHV DQ HYHQWXDO LGHDO´842 Within both approaches, however, there are a 
large number of possible criteria and methods for testing validity which have been 
suggested, and there is no consensus on which approach is the most appropriate.843 
A different tactic, however, is to simply use the classic tests of validity, reliability and 
generalisability but to edit the methods by which these concepts are tested to make 
them more applicable to qualitative research. This is the approach taken by Mason, who 
argues that the broad notions of validity, reliability and generalisability are not 
problematic in themselves so long as the specific technical procedures which have 
become associated with them in quantitative research are not transferred over to 
qualitative research.844 Seale also argues that the classic tests are a necessary starting 
point when looking at assessing quality, though some of the newer criteria build usefully 
on the core concepts.845 Bryman notes that using these traditional criteria has had a 
resurgence in popularity in recent years due to a feeling by some bodies that the newer 
                                          
841 &KR-DQG7UHQW$µ9DOLGLW\LQ4XDOLWDWLYH5HVHDUFK5HYLVLWHG¶Qualitative Research 319, at 320. 
842 Ibid. 
843 See Seale, above n.837, at p.43. 
844 Mason, above n.764, at p.38. 
845 Seale, above n.837, at p.49. 
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approaches, especially those which reject the notion of validity, show a lack of concern 
for rigor and quality in research.846 The approach of using the classic criteria also has the 
benefit of giving clear aims against which to test the quality of research and, because of 
this, is the approach taken in this research. 
VII.1 Validity 
As noted above, the traditional definition of validity examines whether the measures 
used in the research correctly measure the concept the researcher intended to examine. 
This presupposes the use of measurements, but Kvale and Brinkmann argue that for 
qualitative research the definition can be reframed to ³WKH GHJUHH WKDW D PHWKRG
LQYHVWLJDWHV ZKDW LW LV LQWHQGHG WR LQYHVWLJDWH´ WDNLQJ WKH HPSKDVLV RII VWDWLVWLFDO
measurements.847 The authors note that the issue of validity is an ongoing one and 
should be considered throughout the entire research process, beginning with justifying 
the choice of theoretical background and research methods and ending with the way in 
which the data results are presented.848 The reasons behind the choice of qualitative 
methodology and, in particular, the use of semi-structured interviews were discussed 
above in section II. The methods used to ensure validity through the other stages of the 
research process will be discussed below. 
'XULQJ WKH LQWHUYLHZ VWDJH WKH LVVXH RI YDOLGLW\ UHODWHV WR ³WKH WUXVWZRUWKLQHVV RI WKH
subjects repoUWVDQGWKHTXDOLW\RI WKH LQWHUYLHZLQJ´849 For this project, the validity of 
the interviews was enhanced by sending the interview guide to all interviewees a week 
prior to the interview, allowing the interviewees the chance to query any topic or 
question tKH\ZHUHXQVXUHDERXW ,QWHUYLHZHHV¶ UHVSRQVHVZHUHDOVRFURVV-checked by 
asking similar questions with different phrasing and, where responses were unclear, 
setting out my interpretation of their response to questions to the interviewee and 
asking them whether that interpretation was correct.  
                                          
846 Bryman, above n.752, at p.383. 
847 Kvale and Brinkmann, above n.817, at p.246. 
848 Ibid, at pp.248-249. 
849 Ibid, at p.249. 
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As regards data analysis, Creswell and Miller set out some of the most common methods 
for establishing validity in qualitative research.850 One of these is the search for 
disconfirming or negative evidence.851 Using this method, once the main themes are 
identified in the data, the researcher goes through the data thoroughly to identify and 
DQDO\VHLQGHWDLODQ\FDVHVZKLFKFRQWUDGLFWWKHWKHPHLQRUGHUWRWHVWWKHUHVHDUFKHU¶V
assumptions. This method was used throughout this research with all negative cases 
examined carefully and discussed in the data analysis chapter. 
VII.2. Reliability 
Kvale and Brinkmann state that reliability in qualitative research relates to the 
³FRQVLVWHQF\ DQG WUXVWZRUWKLQHVV RI UHVHDUFK ILQGLQJV´.852 A distinction is often drawn 
between internal and external reliability.853 Internal reliability relates to whether, in 
studies in which there are multiple researchers, those researchers agree on the 
measures used.854 This was not an issue in this project which only had one researcher.  
External reliability is concerned with the replicability of the research. Given the in-depth 
data and focus on subjective opinions in qualitative research, true replicability is hard to 
achieve since repeating the research would be incredibly time-consuming and costly and 
there is no guarantee that the personal experiences of the interviewees would not have 
changed since the first study, resulting in new data. Nonetheless, LeCompte and Goetz 
argue that external reliability in qualitative research can be improved by providing a full 
and detailed account of the research process. This should include, where relevant, 
information about the researcher and the interviewees, the theories informing the 
research and the methods used for data collection and analysis.855 This chapter has 
aimed to provide a full account of the information needed to replicate the project, with 
                                          
850 CUHVZHOO-DQG0LOOHU'µ'HWHUPLQLQJ9DOLGLW\LQ4XDOLWDWLYH,QTXLU\¶Theory into Practice 124. 
851 Ibid, at 127. 
852 Kvale and Brinkmann, above n.817, at p.245. 
853 See Seale, above n.837DWSDQG/H&RPSWH0DQG*RHW]-µ3Uoblems of Reliability and Validity in 
(WKQRJUDSKLF5HVHDUFK¶Review of Educational Research 31. 
854 Ibid, at 41. 
855 Ibid, at 36-40. 
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the sections above setting out the details of and reasons behind the choice of 
methodology. 
VII.3. Generalisability 
Generalising the results of qualitative research out from the specific case studied to 
other situations can be problematic given the small samples used in such research. 
Generalisation is not necessarily important for qualitative research since cases may be of 
interest in their own right, regardless of whether the findings can be related to any other 
situation.856 Nonetheless, as Seale notes, research is obviously of greater benefit if it can 
be related to other areas and thus generalisability should be enhanced wherever 
possible.857 Generalisability here was improved by ensuring the research sample was as 
representative of the general utilities sector as possible, see the discussion above in 
section III. The findings of the research may thus safely be generalised beyond the 
sample to the general UK utilities sector.  
Caution should be used when generalising out further to utilities based in other EU 
member states, however, given the difference in application of the EU rules throughout 
the EU. In particular, while the UK has simply adopted the Utilities Directive without 
significant amendment, many EU member states expand on the directive rules, providing 
additional regulatory requirements for utilities to meet when procuring. These additional 
requirements also sometimes include specific requirements relating to the inclusion of 
CSR issues in procurement, which will have a direct impact on the operation of utilities in 
this area and may mean the factors identified in relation to the UK utilities are of less 
significance.  
Caution should also be used when generalizing other EU member states given the high 
number of utilities operating in the private sector in the UK. Utilities operating the public 
sector are more clearly regulated by the Treaty requirements and also often have parts 
of their operation covered by the public sector directive, which may impact on their 
                                          
856 Seale, above n.837, at p.107. 
857 Ibid, at p.107. 
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overall procurement practice. They are also often less subject to competitive pressures, 
which may impact on the use of CSR in procurement (see discussion in Chapter 2 on 
Corporate Social Responsibility) The research results may thus not reflect the practice of 
utilities in jurisdictions with a higher proportion of utilities in the public sector.  
Equally, Chapter 5 on the EU Legal Regime highlighted the key differences between the 
utilities and public sector rules, showing that generally the utilities rules are more 
flexible, though there is less certainty over the correct interpretation of the rules. Many 
of the options for including CSR issues in procurement which are potentially allowable 
under the utilities rules are clearly prohibited under the public sector rules. Given this, 
the results of this research should not be generalised out to companies operating in the 
public sector.   
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Chapter 9 - Data Analysis 
I. Introduction 
This chapter will set out the results of the qualitative interviews and analyse the data in 
light of the literature review and the issues raised in previous chapters. The findings 
examine CSR and labour issues first before going on to examine the legal issues relating 
to the use of such labour policies in procurement. As discussed in Chapter 8, all 
interviewees have been anonymised and are represented by a code showing the utility 
sector they operate in; WA for water, EN for energy, TR for transport and PO for postal 
services. Where a company operates in more than one sector they have been given the 
code for the sector in which the majority of their business takes place.  The chapter 
attempts to summarise the findings of the data, setting out the numbers of interviewees 
who agreed on certain topics in order to illustrate the prevalence of a certain view. 
However, as discussed previously in the methodology chapter the analysis is qualitative 
and the numbers shown do not represent the result of any statistical analysis. Where 
appropriate the analysis also includes verbatim quotes from those interviewees who 
agreed to be quoted. 
7KHFKDSWHUEHJLQVZLWKDQRYHUYLHZRILQWHUYLHZHHV¶YLHZVRQ&65JHQHUDOO\ providing 
a background for the following sections (Section II). Section III examines the factors 
ZKLFKLPSDFWXSRQLQWHUYLHZHHV¶GHFLVLRQRYHUZKHWKHURUQRWWRLQFOXGHODERXUSROLFLHV
in procurement, paying particular attention to the impact of the legal regime. Section IV 
briefly considers the types of labour policy most commonly included. Section V sets out 
LQWHUYLHZHHV¶RSLQLRQVRIWKH(8OHJDOUHJLPHJHQHUDOO\DQGWKHLUWKRXJKWVRQLWVLPSDFW
in this area. The bulk of the chapter is taken up by Section VI, which examines in detail 
the methods interviewees used to structure labour policies within procurement, reflecting 
back on the issues identified in Chapter 6. Section VII examines the use of labour 
policies by interviewees in procurement which is not covered by the Utilities Directive. 
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The chapter finishes with a discussion of the importance of evidence and monitoring 
techniques to interviewees and the impact of the EU regime in this area (Section VIII).  
II. Impressions of CSR 
This section will examiQH LQWHUYLHZHHV¶ YLHZV RI &65 JHQHUDOO\ DQG ODERXU SROLFLHV
SDUWLFXODUO\ ,WZLOO ILUVWGLVFXVV LQWHUYLHZHHV¶RSLQLRQRI WKH LPSRUWDQFHRI&65WR WKHLU
company and how that impacts on their procurement policy before going on to consider 
LQWHUYLHZHHV¶YLHZV of the impact and utility of CSR and labour policies. 
II.1. Importance of CSR to the company 
Interviewees were asked to indicate the importance of CSR to their company on a scale. 
Table 1 below sets out the results: 
Importance of CSR Number 
Essential 1 
Very important 16858 
Quite important 1 
Somewhat important 2 
Not important at all 3 
 
It can thus be seen that the most common response was to state that CSR was very 
important to the company. Interviewees often noted that CSR had become much more 
important in recent years, consistent with the findings in Chapter 2. The importance 
given to CSR by interviewees would suggest that the use of CSR policies in procurement 
was common, but in fact the use of labour policies in procurement was relatively low and 
often confined to simple requirements such as compliance with UK labour law. This may 
                                          
858Includes two interviewees who placed their company between essential and very important. 
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be connected to the emphasis given to environmental issues over labour issues, noted 
by five interviewees. It may also be that the importance given to CSR generally by the 
company has not been carried down to the procurement level, with CSR and 
procurement being seen as separate issues.  
So, how important are labour related policies to us in [WA#5]? I would say on the 
whole, very important, but whether that is replicated in our actual practices, I 
GRQ¶WNQRZ,QWKHEXVLQHVVVRUWRIVXVWDLQDELOLW\HQYLURQPHQWDOSUDFWLFHVDUHDOO
very high on the agenda, often talked about, you know, something that is clearly 
part of the culture. Important to the directors and the board. But having said 
WKDW\HDKLW¶OOSUREDEO\FRPHRXWZKHQ\RXORRNDWZKDWZHDFWXDOO\GRWRVKRZ
WKDWDQG,¶PQRWVXUHSHUKDSVRXUDFWLRQVZRXOGDJUHHZLWKRXUWKLQking on the 
subject.859 
There is also the possibility that, for all the condemnation given by interviewees towards 
suppliers who treated CSR as a public relations exercise (see below), this was also in 
play for the utilities: 
,¶PDELWRIF\QLFZKHQLWFRPHV to these things. Because you hear people say, we 
value these things, and then you look at their award criteria for contracts and it 
GRHVQ¶WDSSHDUDQ\ZKHUH6R\RXVD\RQHWKLQJ\RXGRDQRWKHU860 
II.2. Views about CSR 
Interviewees often had ideas about CSR and labour policies which affected their use of 
those policies in procurement. Two such views came up often; (a) that CSR was only 
really useful when purchasing products rather than works or services; and (b), that CSR 
was only relevant when purchasing from a developing country.  
The argument that CSR and labour policies particularly were more relevant to the 
purchase of products was the less common of the two ideas, being stated by nine 
                                          
859 WA#5. 
860 WA#6. 
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interviewees out of twenty-two. Interviewees appeared to associate the notion of labour-
related CSR with high profile issues such as child and slave labour and the production of 
products in sweatshops using such labour. Any requirements which were included in 
service contracts were generally limited to those services where the pay was likely to be 
low and dealt mostly with wage related issues. CSR policies going beyond compliance 
with national law appeared to be mostly restricted to product purchases. 
,WKLQNLI\RX¶UHLQDPRUHNLQGRIPDQXIDFWXULQJRUUHWDLOW\SHEDFNJURund, then I 
WKLQNREYLRXVO\\RX¶YHJRWDPRUHGLUHFWOLQN*LYHQZKDWZHEX\DQGZKHUHZH
kind of procure it from, there are areas such as cleaning, for example, cleaning 
contracts, where we have put some kind of labour policy considerations into the 
initiDO WHQGHUSURFHVVEXWZHGRQ¶W IRUH[DPSOHKDYHDGHWDLOHGSROLF\ OLQNHGWR
our CSR.861 
This belief was also possibly connected to the second preconception in that interviewees 
noted that most service providers were based in the UK, so requirements for service 
contracts tended to be limited to compliance with UK law. This notion that CSR issues 
were only relevant for contracts with countries outside the UK and EU was prevalent 
amongst interviewees, expressed in some form by eighteen out of the twenty-two 
interviewees. Prior to the research it was thought that utilities had begun procuring from 
developing countries regularly but in fact this was rare and all interviewees noted that 
their suppliers generally came from the UK and the EU. Procurement outside the UK was 
especially rare in the transport sector, with interviewees in that sector often stating that 
90-99% of their procurement went to UK-based suppliers. This meant that CSR was less 
of a concern than if they operated elsewhere: 
The view we have at the moment is our supply chains are mainly restricted to the 
GRPHVWLFPDUNHWDQGDOVR:HVWHUQ(XURSHVRWKHUH¶VDEHOLHILQWKHRUJDQLVDWLRQ
WKDW WKH\¶UHQRWDVUHOHYDQWDV LIRur supply chains were spreading out to enter 
                                          
861 TR#7. 
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areas such as the Far East and other parts of the world. So we think at the 
moment [CSR is] not something that our business sees as a priority.862 
The eighteen interviewees who felt that CSR was mainly useful for contracts outside the 
EU believed that UK and EU law set out high standards of labour conditions and were 
also happy that these were complied with in all EU countries. Ensuring compliance with 
certain minimum standards was the main concern of interviewees (see further below, 
Section V), so if the law set out such standards, interviewees felt that examining them 
again during the procurement process would be unnecessary. Labour policies unrelated 
to the law which could be used in the UK, for example training and apprenticeship 
schemes, were rarely considered by interviewees. 
III. Factors Impacting on the Decision to Include Labour Policies in 
Procurement 
7KLVVHFWLRQH[DPLQHVWKH IDFWRUVZKLFKKDGDQ LPSDFWRQ LQWHUYLHZHHV¶GHFLVLRQVRYHU
whether or not to include labour policies in procurement, in particular the impact of the 
EU legal regimHLIDQ\7KHVHFWLRQILUVWFRQVLGHUVWKHIDFWRUVZKLFKOHGLQWHUYLHZHHV¶WR
include labour policies. The impact of commercial reasons such as avoiding adverse 
publicity or gaining new business is first examined. The impact of stakeholder and 
external pressure on the company to examine labour issues will then be considered 
before concluding with the impact of moral concerns. The section then examines factors 
which led interviewees to either not include labour issues at all or to limit their use. This 
section considers the impact of the legal regime, cost issues, belief that CSR and labour 
issues were not relevant and lack of knowledge about the use of CSR and labour issues 
in procurement. 
 
 
                                          
862 TR#2. 
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III.1. Factors leading to the adoption of labour policies in procurement 
III.1.1. Commercial Reasons 
When asked whether their decision to include labour policies in procurement had been 
influenced by the desire for commercial gain of any kind863, almost all interviewees 
denied this. Only two interviewees out of the total twenty-two answered the question in 
the affirmative, expressly stating that commercial concerns had been a factor in their 
decision to include labour policies in procurement.864 For both companies the main desire 
ZDVWRSRUWUD\WKHFRPSDQ\DV³UHVSRQVLEOH´FUHDWLQJDEUDQGLPDJHRIVXVWDLQDELOLW\IRU
WKHFRPSDQ\VHHIXUWKHUEHORZLQµ$GYHUVH3XEOLFLW\¶:$DUJXHGWKDWDFRPPHUFLDO
element to labour and environmental policies was ultimately a benefit for those policies, 
VLQFHLWLPSURYHGDFRPSDQ\¶VFommitment to them:  
,W ZDV D FRPPHUFLDO WKHUH ZDV D FRPPHUFLDO DQJOH WR LW \HDK , WKLQN WKDW¶V
SUREDEO\ QRW D EDG WKLQJ , WKLQN LI WKHUH¶V D FRPPHUFLDO DQJOH WKHQ ZH¶UH
probably more likely to keep up RQVRPHRIWKHDXWKRULWLHVDVZHOORWKHUZLVHLW¶V
almost a bit more difficult to sustain. 
Generally, however, admitting to commercial reasons for labour policies was rare, with 
most interviewees emphasising moral reasons for the adoption of CSR policies in their 
company. Despite this disavowal of commercial concerns, many companies mentioned 
factors which could be seen as commercial when discussing the reasons for their use of 
labour policies when answering other questions in the interview. The most prominent 
factors mentioned by these interviewees were avoiding adverse publicity, improving the 
TXDOLW\ RI VXSSOLHUV¶ SHUIRUPDQFH DQG JDLQLQJ QHZ EXVLQHVV DOO RI ZKLFK ZLOO EH
discussed in more detail below. The other factors discussed as influences below in 
µ([WHUQDO 3UHVVXUHV¶ DQG µ,QWHUQDO 3UHVVXUHV¶ PD\ Dlso have commercial aspects, for 
example, aiming to get better performance from employees by acting on their CSR 
                                          
863 See discussion of the possible commercial benefits of CSR in Chapter 2, Section III.1. 
864 PO#1 and WA#6. 
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concerns, but no interviewees discussed this side, preferring to focus on moral 
obligations.  
x Adverse Publicity 
The fear of adverse publicity should the company not check its labour standards was the 
most common reason given for including labour policies in procurement, mentioned as a 
key factor by fifteen interviewees. The commercial impact of adverse publicity on private 
companies appears to have had an impact on the operation of the utility sector, with 
three companies expressly mentioning the high-profile campaigns against Primark and 
Nike as examples of situations they wished to avoid.865 
For those companies which had built up a reputation based on sustainability, the 
GLVFXVVLRQRIDGYHUVHSXEOLFLW\ZDVRIWHQFRXFKHGLQWKHWHUPVRI³EUDQGPDQDJHPHQW´
)RURWKHU ILUPVWKH LVVXHZDVVLPSO\DV:$SKUDVHG LW³DYRLGDQFHRIGLVDVWHU´ ,Q
both cases the concerns were fundamentally the same ± avoiding stories about the 
company in the newspapers: 
A: I think the threat of not doing it [CSR] LVIDLUO\VHYHUHQRZ<RXGRQ¶WZDQWWR
be on the front of the newspaper, ah... 
B: For anything, really. 
&,W¶VQHYHUJRLQJWREHDJRRGQHZVVWRU\,W¶VQRWJRRd PR.866 
The risk of adverse publicity was the main risk considered not only when a company was 
determining whether or not to include labour policies in procurement generally, but also 
when deciding whether certain types of labour policies should be included and which 
particular contracts should include labour policies.867 The higher the risk of poor labour 
standards being discovered in the supply chain and the more high-profile those risks 
were (child labour was the main fear, see Types of Labour Policy), the more likely labour 
                                          
865WA#4, WA#7 and TR#4. 
866TR#5. 
867See further below in Section VI, Structure of Labour Policies in Procurement. 
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would be covered in the procurement beyond the national law level. One company 
UHIHUUHGWRWKLVDV³WKH'DLO\0DLOWHVW´ 
[Our company] did things like the Daily Mail test which was, so, are we going to be 
on the front page of the Daily Mail with some horrendous five year Bangladesh boy 
PDNLQJRXU&(2¶VIOHHFHRUVRPHWKLQJOLNHWKDWKLVKDUGKDWRUVRPHWKLQJ6RZHDVN
ourselves those kinds of questions, what are we going to be at risk of?868 
x 4XDOLW\RIVXSSOLHUV¶SHUIRUPDQFH 
Five interviewees noted that including strong labour policies in procurement had the 
added benefit of ensuring the company was working with a reliable supplier. It was 
DUJXHG WKDW SRRU ODERXU VWDQGDUGV OHG WR D KLJK WXUQRYHU RI VWDII DQG ³D GLVJUXQWOHG
VWDII´ZKLFKLQWXUQOHGWRSRRUSHUIRUPDQFHRQWKHSDUWRIWKHVXSSOLHU869 There was a 
strong belief that if a company wanted to ensure that it got high quality goods or 
services from a supplier, checking to ensure that company had good labour standards 
was a key step in the process. Overall it was felt that the procuring company would 
simply have a better working relationship with a company which looked after its staff: 
We do believe that things that are produced in better working conditions will be 
EHWWHU LWHPV VXFK DV XQLIRUPV :H GR EHOLHYH ZH¶OO JHW EHWWHU SURGXFWV LI WKH
FRQGLWLRQV LQ ZKLFK WKH\¶UH EHLQJ SURGXFHG DUH EHWWHU DUH JRRG $QG ZH GR WKH
ERDUG LW¶V KDUG to quantify these things but there is a broad understanding that 
VXSSOLHUV WKDW ORRN DW WKHVH VRUWV RI WKLQJV DUH SUREDEO\ EHWWHU VXSSOLHUV WKH\¶UH
IRFXVLQJRQFXVWRPHUVHUYLFHVZH¶UHSUREDEO\JRLQJWRKDYHDEHWWHULQWHUDFWLRQZLWK
them all along the way.870 
Connected to these arguments was the issue of security of supply. Four interviewees 
noted that they would be uncertain about the reliability and long term prospects of a 
                                          
868 EN#4. 
869 TR#3. 
870 TR#8. 
Page 214 of 300 
 
supplier with poor labour standards.871 Firms with low labour standards were generally 
seen as less financially stable by procuring companies and there was a sense of fear that 
contracting with such a company would simply lead to the company collapsing part way 
through the contract. 
x CSR useful for gaining new business 
Finally, four interviewees noted that bidding for work in the private sector had had an 
impact on the inclusion of labour policies in their procurement.872 It was noted that many 
private sector bodies examined supply chain issues in their own procurement and in 
order to win business from those companies, companies in the utility sector had to 
ensure they could meet all the requirements. It was also noted that going beyond 
requirements set by the private sector body and/or having higher standards on CSR 
issues than competitors was seen as a benefit when attempting to win new business, 
DQGWKLVLQWXUQLPSDFWHGRQWKHLQFOXVLRQRIODERXUSROLFLHVLQWKHXWLOLW\¶VSURFXUHPHQW 
III.1.2. External Pressure 
Interviewees were asked about the impact of consumers, investors and employees on 
WKHLUGHFLVLRQWRORRNDW&65LVVXHVIROORZLQJ9RJHO¶VLGHQWLILFDWLRQRIWKHVHWKUHHJURXSV
as the main drivers of the CSR movement.873 The impact of consumers and investors is 
discussed in this section and the impact of employees in the following section on internal 
pressures Three interviewees also identified pressure from the government as an 
additional pressure leading to the adoption of CSR policies and this is also discussed 
below. Overall, as with commercial issues, interviewees were keen to declare external 
pressure as secondary to moral reasons for adopting CSR policies. 
 
 
                                          
871 WA#6, TR#3, TR#8, and PO#1. 
872 TR#3, TR#5, PO#1, EN#4. 
873 Vogel, D. The Market for Virtue: The Potential and Limits of Corporate Social Responsibility (2005, 
Washington DC: Brookings Institution Press), at p.46. See also Chapter 2, Section III. 
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x Consumer 
Only four interviewees felt that consumer demand had an impact on their decision to 
include labour policies in procurement.874 Of these four, two felt that pressure from 
individual consumers had influenced their company, noting that CSR was becoming 
much more of a public concern and feeling that their company had to react to that 
concern.875 The other two interviewees stated that the pressure came much more from 
corporate consumers: 
,W¶VPRUH WKH ODUJH FRPPHUFLDO FRQVXPHUV OLNH WKH EDQNV RU WKH ELJJHU FRPSDQLHV
who are working through their own CSR policies, and if we want to win business from 
them then we need to be better in that area than people like [competitor name]. So, 
WKH\¶OO VRPHWLPHV ZDQW WR VLW GRZQ ZLWK XV DQG WDON DERXW &65 LVVXHV %XW WKH
DYHUDJHLQGLYLGXDOFRQVXPHULVQ¶WUHDOO\WKDWFRQFHUQHG876 
The majority of interviewees, however, stated that they had felt no pressure from 
consumers at all, whether individual or corporate, stating that the push towards the use 
of labour policies came from within the company rather than outside. Three interviewees 
were openly dubious about the actual commitment of consumers to CSR.877 There was a 
belief amongst these interviewees that the main driving concern of consumers was 
simply the price of the product and any CSR policies completed by the company would 
always come second to that: 
,¶YHQHYHU VHHQPXFKGHPDQG IURPFRQVXPHUV WKH\VHHPWR MXVWZDQW ORZSULFHV
more than anything. I mean, you hear people talking about how they want decent 
ODERXUVWDQGDUGVEXW,GRQ¶W WKLQNWKH\DFWXDOO\DFWRQWKDWZKHQLWFRPHVGRZQWR
it.878 
Overall, consumer demand appears to have had a low impact on the use of labour 
                                          
874 PO#1, EN#4, WA#5, TR#9. 
875 EN#4 and WA#5. 
876 PO#1. 
877 EN#3, WA#3, TR#3. 
878 WA#3. 
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policies in procurement by utilities. 
x Investor 
Investors appear to have had even less of an impact than consumers on the use of 
labour policies. Only two companies stated that investors had had any impact at all on 
their decision to include labour policies in procurement.879 One company noted that after 
a takeover by a company with a much higher concern for CSR issues, they had felt 
pressure from the shareholders (and the new board, see below in Corporate (Board and 
Parent Company) Influence) to improve the CSR policy in their company in order to meet 
the standards of the rest of the corporate group. The other company noted that some 
potential investors did look at CSR issues, though the impact of that on the actual 
decision to invest was low: 
We did have, we did get a lot of enquiries from potential investors, which was more 
DERXW UHTXHVWLQJ LQIRUPDWLRQ UDWKHU WKDQZHEHOLHYH\RX¶UHXQVXVWDLQDEOH WKHUHIRUH
ZH¶UHQRWJRLQJWRLQYHVWLWZDVPRUHUHTXHVWVIRULQIRUPDWLRQ880 
Overall, then, pressure felt from investors was rare and had little impact generally on a 
comSDQ\¶VGHFLVLRQWRORRNDW&65 
x Government/Public Funding 
Three interviewees (two public sector bodies and one private sector body heavily 
subsidised by public funds) identified pressure from the government and a feeling of 
responsibility from receiving public funding as a factor in adopting labour policies within 
their company.881 Interviewees noted that their actions reflected on the government as a 
whole and because of this they felt a responsibility to ensure that their labour standards 
were acceptable. There was also a general feeling that the government would take action 
against a company should poor labour standards be discovered, though the interviewees 
were unspecific as to what action that would be in any detail. 
                                          
879 TR#5 and EN#4. 
880 EN#4. 
881 PO#1, TR#1, TR#8. 
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III.1.3. Internal Pressures 
This section discusses influences on the decision over whether or not to include CSR 
issues in procurement which came from within the company itself. In addition to the 
influence of employees, identified by Vogel as a key influence (see above), the section 
DOVR GLVFXVVHV WKH LPSDFW RI D FRPSDQ\¶V ERDUG RI GLUHFWRUV DQGRU SDUHQW FRPSDQ\
identified by 8 interviewees as a driving force for CSR issues. These factors generally did 
QRWLPSDFWXSRQWKHSURFXULQJRIILFHUGLUHFWO\EXWGHWHUPLQHGWKHFRPSDQ\¶VRYHUDOO&65
policy, which in turn impacted on the procurement decision. 
x Employees 
Six interviewees agreed that employees had had an impact on the labour policy within 
their company. Interviewees noted that general interest in CSR issues had increased 
throughout their staff over recent years and some committed individuals attempted to 
LPSURYHWKHFRPSDQ\¶Vpolicy on these issues: 
:HDOVRKDGDQHPSOR\HHEDVHZKRVDLGWKDWWKH\GLGQ¶WSDUWLFXODUO\WKLQNWKDWWKH
FRPSDQ\ WUHDWHG GLGQ¶W SDUWLFXODUO\ WKLQN WKDW ZH EHKDYHG UHVSRQVLEO\ PHDQLQJ
sustainably.882 
[W]e do get pressure from our staff on issues like recycling, on issues like waste, on 
LVVXHV OLNH IDLU WUDGH SURGXFWV WKH ZKROH JDPXW UHDOO\ WKH\¶UH LQWHUHVWHG DQG ZH
want to engage with them as well.883 
In addition to the impact of individual employees, three interviewees noted the impact of 
trade unions on including labour policies in procurement, stating that there had been 
SUHVVXUH IURP WKHLU HPSOR\HHV¶ XQLRQV WR FKHFN ODERXU VWDQGDUGV WKURXJK WKHLU VXSSO\
chain and ensure there had been no exploitation of workers at any point.884 One 
company also noted that CSR policies provided a useful area on which the company 
could work with the union, aiding relations between the two: 
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CSR is an issue that the management and the union can work together on. It helps 
to strengthen the stakeholder influence in the company, which is important to us.885 
Of the three main possible drivers identified during the previous literature review, then, 
employee pressure appears to be the factor which has had the most impact. 
x Corporate (Board and Parent Company) Influence 
Ten interviewees felt that the push to include CSR policies in procurement had come 
primarily from higher up in the company structure. Often interviewees admitted that 
they were unsure as to the precise reasoning behind the decision to push CSR, though 
four interviewees felt that it was driven by a personal commitment on the part of their 
CEO or other board members to CSR (see further below, in Moral Reasons).886 
Interviewees generally emphasised that the decision to include CSR policies throughout 
the company was a purely internal decision: 
Well, we have a very strong CEO, the CEO is very connected to sustainability, so 
it came from internal.887 
Three companies also noted the influence of their parent companies.888 In two of those 
cases the push towards CSR followed a corporate takeover by a company with a stronger 
commitment to CSR, which then imposed its values on its new subsidiary. In the third 
case, a decision was taken by the parent company to join the UN Global Compact and 
this decision was then imposed on all subsidiary companies.889 
III.1.4. Moral Reasons 
Moral and ethical reasons for undertaking labour policies were the most commonly given 
by the interviewees, with seventeen citing moral reasons as a factor in their decision. 
Interviewees emphasised that labour policies werH LQFOXGHG LQSURFXUHPHQWEHFDXVH³LW
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887 EN#4. 
888 WA#5, EN#2, TR#5. 
889 See Chapter 3 for discussion of the UN Global Compact. 
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ZDVWKHULJKWWKLQJWRGR´890 and seemed to be based simply on a feeling that something 
was ethical rather than any detailed consideration of the reasons behind CSR policies: 
I was the one who pushed for labour concerns ± I just felt it was something we 
had to do.891 
 -XVWZDQWLQJWRGRLWUHDOO\-XVWEHOLHYLQJLW¶VWKHULJKWWKLQJWRGR.892 
Interviewees often appeared to feel a sense of duty to be socially and environmentally 
aware. There seemed to be a general notion that looking at CSR issues was a key part of 
EHLQJD³UHVSRQVLEOHFRPSDQ\´ ,Q WKHSDUWLFXODUDUHDRI ODERXUSROLFLHV WKLV IHHOLQJRI
responsibility was particularly strong when it came to health and safety policies with 
interviewees wanting to ensure that workers were as safe as possible: 
[W]e feel we have a duty of care to our contractors to ensure that the staff are at 
least given the minimum protection that legislation requires.893 
 3HRSOH¶VOLYHVDUHDWVWDNHVRZHKDYHDGXW\WRGRDVPXFKDVZHFDQ894 
Two interviewees also mentioned a desire to give something back to the local community 
that they were based in.895 One noted that the local community had to pay the utility for 
their service since they had a monopoly in that area and argued that this imposed on 
them a duty to help that community as much as they could. The other noted the 
deprived area they were based in and argued that it was the responsibility of the 
company as one of the few employers and purchasers in the area to improve the 
conditions of the people there. In both cases, this led not only to the general desire to 
look at labour issues, but also the interviewees stated their desire to favour the use of 
ORFDOODERXUVHHIXUWKHUEHORZLQµ/RFDOODERXUSROLFLHV¶ 
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III.2. Factors leading to not including labour policies in procurement 
II.2.1. Impact of the EU Legal Regime 
One of the main aims of this thesis is to determine the extent to which the EU Directives 
influenced the use of labour policies. In line with this, one of the questions in the 
interview guide related to the impact of the legal regime, if any, on the decision to 
include labour policies in procurement. The responses showed that the legal regime had 
relatively little impact, with only five interviewees out of twenty-two stating the EU rules 
had had an impact on their decision.896 The remaining interviewees had either not 
considered the rules at all or decided that they would have no impact on the use of 
labour policies in procurement. 
Of the five interviewees who considered the EU law, all ultimately decided that labour 
policies could be completed legally under the regime, though the considerations 
influenced the precise manner in which those labour policies were included in 
procurement. All five examined the legal requirements in detail before choosing the 
method which they felt was the least open to legal challenge (though it is notable that 
the actual methods chosen varied widely, ranging from contract conditions demanding 
compliance simply with national law to prequalification standards on a range of labour 
issues, see further below in Structure of Labour Policies in Procurement). Crucially, 
however, the EU legal regime does not appear to have acted as a deterrent to including 
labour policies in procurement at all. The concern was simply how best to integrate 
labour concerns into procurement: 
We went over it quite carefully with our legal team ... I mean, the risk that it 
might not be relevant to the subject matter of the contract is our big issue. The 
risk obviously being that we do something that might not be legal, we get a 
FKDOOHQJH DQG WKH FKDOOHQJH LV XSKHOG 6R LW¶V ZKHWKHU WKH UHOHYDQW SURFHVVHV
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DFWXDOO\ FRYHU WKDW DQG LW¶V YHU\ GLIILFXOW LW¶V DFWXDOO\ SUREDEO\PRUH GLIILFXOW LQ
this area than any other areas of sustainability.897 
The remaining interviewees, who either did not consider the EU rules at all or felt that 
they would pose no problem to labour issues generally simply assumed that labour 
issues were legal within the EU procurement directives without considering the actual 
directives in any detail. This appears to be linked with the common view amongst 
interviewees that the EU law required nothing more than a competitive procedure with 
publication (see further below in Section V): 
$ ,GRQ¶W WKLQNZHFRQVXOWHG WKH(8 UXOes. We put in there something that we 
considered to be compliant, but do they reflect the EU rules, the answer, to be 
honest... 
%,WKLQNLW¶VMXVWFRPPRQVHQVHWKRXJKLVQ¶WLW"898 
Overall then, the EU legal regime appears to have had a minimal impact on iQWHUYLHZHHV¶
decisions over whether or not to include labour policies in procurement, with only a 
minority considering the EU rules at all and no interviewees ultimately being deterred 
from using labour policies completely due to those EU rules. 
III.2.2. Cost and Resource Issues 
One of the main reasons given by interviewees for either not including labour policies in 
procurement at all or for limiting the use of labour policies in some way was cost and 
resource issues, with ten interviewees citing such issues as a factor. Contrary to the 
DUJXPHQWVWKDW&65LPSURYHVDFRPSDQ\¶VSURILWDELOLW\DVVHWRXWSUHYLRXVO\LQ&KDSWHU
2, most interviewees believed that CSR issues would generally increase cost to a 
company and would not bring in economic benefit (see further above, section II): 
You tend not to benefit commercially if you do buy ethically. It tends to be you 
VSHQG PRUH LI \RX EX\ HWKLFDOO\ DQG WKDW¶V VRPHWKLQJ WKDW RXU EXVLQHVV LV
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reluctant to ever agree on, what price do you pay for more sustainable ethically 
procured goods, and there is no answer forthcoming, you know?899 
Interviewees noted that, generally speaking, economic issues would win out against CSR 
issues in their company, limiting the use of labour policies. Connected to this, four 
interviewees noted the impact of the recent recession, arguing that the general 
economic climate in the UK in recent years had increased the importance of cost as 
compared to CSR issues: 
, WKLQN LW¶V MXVW RXUSULRULWLHVDW WKHPRPHQW , WKLQN WKDWZLWK WKH UHFHVVLRQ ... 
they have targets that were set before the recession really hit and those targets 
KDYHQ¶W EHHQ PHW 5LJKW QRZ WKH ELJJHVW FKDOOHQJH LV WR DFKLHYH VRPH PRUH
LQYHVWPHQW\RXNQRZUHWXUQVEDVLFDOO\7KHSUREOHPIRUXVLVWKDW&65GRHVQ¶W
really pay, to be honest.900 
Cost and resource issues also had a major impact on the choice of method for including 
labour policies in procurement, as well as on the evidence and monitoring completed to 
FKHFN VXSSOLHUV¶ FRPSOLDQFH ZLWK those policies. This impact will be discussed in more 
detail in those sections below. 
III.2.3. Belief that CSR is irrelevant in a certain area 
The most common reason given by interviewees for not including labour policies, 
whether in certain cases or more generally, was that they did not believe that CSR was 
relevant. This was linked strongly to the two ideas about CSR discussed above in Section 
II, that CSR was only useful when purchasing products and/or when operating outside 
the EU. 
Ten interviewees indicated that they did not include labour policies in their procurement 
because they did not feel that labour policies were necessary or relevant in a certain 
type of contract, most often because the contract did not contain any product purchases. 
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Eighteen interviewees also indicated that they either did not include labour policies at all 
in procurement or limited their use due to a belief that such policies were only relevant 
where the contract was performed outside the EU and such contracts were very 
uncommon in the company. These beliefs were discussed in more detail in Section II. 
III.2.4. External Pressure 
While rare, some interviewees mentioned influences from sources external to their 
company being a factor towards not including labour policies in procurement. The two 
factors highlighted were the dislike of CSR policies by some suppliers and, unique to the 
water sector, the impact of the sector regulator. 
x Suppliers 
Three interviewees mentioned that they were cautious about including labour policies in 
procurement for fear of how their suppliers would react to such policies, believing that 
suppliers would react poorly to being evaluated on labour issues.901 Interviewees were 
also afraid that competition might drop badly if they either rejected suppliers based on 
labour issues or the suppliers themselves chose to leave due to dissatisfaction with the 
use of labour policies: 
7KHUH¶V DOVR D IHDU WKDW FRPSHWLWLRQZLOO GURS LIZH LQFOXGH HWKLFDO FRQGLWLRQV ± we 
GRQ¶W KDYH PDQ\ VXSSOLHUV DV LW LV DQG ZH GRQ¶W ZDQW WR ORVH DQ\ *LYHQ KRZ
suspicious they seem of ethical issues, if we include them they might just walk.902 
x Regulator 
7ZRLQWHUYLHZHHVLQWKHZDWHUVHFWRUIHOWWKDW2):$7¶VUHJXODWLRQRIWKHVHFWRUUHTXLUHG
them to take a purely economic approach to procurement and limited their possible use 
of labour policies.903 They argued that the five year funding periods led to a short term 
view which did not lend itself to examining labour and wider CSR issues. It was also 
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noted that OFWAT could directO\ ORZHUDFRPSDQ\¶VSULFHVDQG when this was done, it 
had a GLUHFWLPSDFWRQWKHFRPSDQ\¶VSURFXUHPHQW, driving emphasis towards price over 
sustainability issues. 
III.2.5. Lack of Awareness of CSR 
Five interviewees stated that the main reason that labour policies were not used, or were 
not used in a certain area, was simply because the idea of including labour issues had 
never occurred to them.904 General awareness of CSR was usually low and, even where 
the concept of CSR was familiar, there was little awareness of how CSR could be used in 
procurement: 
So [CSR is] sorW RI LW¶V RQ WKH UDGDU LQ WKH EDFNJURXQG EXW LW¶V QHYHU UHDOO\
WUDQVODWHG LQWRDPRUHFOHDUVWUXFWXUHGSROLF\6R LW¶VDSULQFLSOHDFFHSWHGEXW
KRZLWPDQLIHVWVLWVHOILW¶VGLIILFXOWWRVD\LW¶VQRWLW¶VQRWEHHQGHYHORSHGWRWKDW
extent.905 
III.3. Conclusions: Impact of the legal regime 
2YHUDOOWKHOHJDOUHJLPHDSSHDUVWRKDYHKDGQRUHDOLPSDFWRQDFRPSDQ\¶VGHFLVLRQRQ
whether or not to include labour policies in procurement, with only five interviewees 
feeling that the legal regime was relevant to their decision. Instead, the main reason for 
including such policies was a feeling of moral obligation and the main reason for not 
including labour policies being a belief that they were simply irrelevant. 
IV. Types of Labour Policies 
IV.1. Types of labour policy included in procurement 
Those interviewees who had stated that they included any labour policies in 
procurement, however regularly, were asked to indicate whether or not they considered 
the eight forms of labour policy set out below, along with being asked to indicate any 
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labour issues they considered which were not mentioned. In total, twenty interviewees 
answered this question. Interviewees were mixed between relying on national law to 
guide their decision, relying on external labour codes and taking the decision 
independently. The sections below examine the types of policy chosen and the reasons 
behind that choice, with emphasis on the impact of the EU legal regime. This is followed 
by an examination of the impact of national law and external labour codes on the 
decision over which types of labour policy to include. 
IV.1.1. Prohibition of Child Labour 
Twelve interviewees stated that they had included prohibition of child labour as a 
requirement in previous contracts, though five of those interviewees stated this was not 
a common policy to include and was covered only where there was felt to be a particular 
risk of the use of child labour. These interviewees emphasised that the majority of their 
procurement was completed within the UK where child labour was prohibited under law 
and there was thus no need to examine it in detail in procurement. 
No interviewees felt that there could be any issues under EU law preventing policies 
prohibiting child labour generally, though interviewees made clear that the policy was 
limited to preventing child labour ± there were no auxiliary measures included in the 
contract designed to aid the children since interviewees noted that this might be legally 
unsound (see below in Methods of structuring labour policies in procurement). Three 
interviewees expressed dissatisfaction with this, noting that often child labour was relied 
upon by families in developing countries and simple prohibition might not be the best 
approach to take.906 
IV.1.2. Prohibition of Forced Labour 
Eight interviewees mentioned that they included prohibition of forced labour in their 
procurement though, as with child labour above, this was generally limited to specific 
contracts where there was felt to be a specific risk of forced labour (generally those 
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contracts which were performed outside of the EU). No interviewees felt there could be 
any legal restrictions over including prohibition of forced labour in procurement. 
IV.1.3. Prohibition of Discrimination 
Nine interviewees stated that they included prohibition of discrimination in their 
procurement, though two of these stated that discrimination was not covered separately 
but was simply covered because their contracts required compliance with national law, 
thus leaving discrimination uncovered in cases where the contract was performed in a 
country with no or minimal discrimination law. Again, no interviewees mentioned any 
concerns over compliance with EU law when considering prohibition of discrimination. 
IV.1.4. Minimum Wage Rates 
Eleven interviewees included some consideration of minimum wage rates in their 
procurement. For nine interviewees, a requirement to comply with minimum wage rates 
was made explicit but for two interviewees, the requirement was generally implicit in a 
requirement to comply generally with national law and only made explicit in cases where 
it was felt that there was a specific risk of noncompliance. In all cases this was limited to 
the minimum wage rate applicable in the country in which the contract would be 
performed; no companies set their own wage rates to require anything higher. Often this 
ZDVOLQNHGWRDEHOLHIWKDWLWZDVWKHLUVXSSOLHUV¶ULJKWWRVHWWKHZDJHUDWHVIRUWKHLURZQ
employees.  
IV.1.5. Maximum Working Hours 
Nine interviewees stated that they considered the issue of maximum working hours in 
their procurement. As with minimum wage rates, discussed above, this was in all cases 
limited to compliance with the relevant national law. In two cases the condition was 
simply implicit in a general requirement to comply with all relevant national law. 
IV.1.6. Health and Safety Policies 
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Health and safety policies were the most commonly included labour policy, with 
seventeen interviewees including such policies in procurement. In all cases the 
interviewees stated that they went beyond health and safety issues required by national 
law, setting out detailed standards to be complied with. Interviewees noted that the 
utility sector required a lot of engineering work to be completed, often working on 
dangerous areas such as on railway tracks or electricity pylons and, given this, health 
and safety was a key priority. Health and safety policies included in procurement were 
often very extensive, including issues such as intensive staff training on health and 
safety issues and drugs and alcohol tests for workers. In no cases did any interviewees 
feel there could be any issue with including these policies under EU procurement law. 
IV.1.7. Skills Training for Employees 
Nine interviewees stated that they included requirements relating to skills training for 
employees in their procurement. These skills training programmes not only include the 
health and safety training mentioned in the previous section, but also  issues such as 
looking at whether suppliers provide apprenticeship schemes and basic literacy and 
numeracy training for unskilled service providers. For non-health and safety related skills 
training, interviewees noted the commercial benefit of skills training improving the 
attitude of staff and also resulting in a lower staff turnover.  
IV.1.8. Local Labour Policies 
Favouring local labour is recommended in most international labour codes, helping to 
improve both the skills of the local workforce and the local economy.907 As was noted 
previously in Section III.1.2.1, Chapter 6, this may result in three situations: (1) 
favouring local labour in the home member state (the UK in this case); (2) favouring 
local labour in another EU member state and; (3) favouring local labour in a non-EU 
state. Of these three scenarios, favouring local labour in the home state is the highest 
risk, being clearly unlawful following the Storebaelt case, but it seems likely that all 
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three scenarios breach the free movement rules of the TFEU.908 
Recruitment of local labour was the area in which the impact of the EU legal regime 
could be seen most. Only three interviewees admitted to favouring local labour in 
procurement, but the issue of favouring local labour and the EU restrictions relating to 
that were discussed in a further seventeen interviews.909 For those three interviewees 
who stated they had favoured local labour, the preferred method was to require a local 
office and management, which would generally lead to local recruitment, but one 
interviewee stated that on occasion they had also favoured local suppliers in the 
prequalification questionnaire (see further below in Structure of Labour Policies in 
Procurement). None of the three interviewees who included local labour policies felt that 
there could be any issue with including such policies under EU law and thought that their 
actions were perfectly lawful. 
The majority of interviewees, however, stated that such policies could be considered 
unlawful under the EU rules. Of those seventeen interviewees who discussed local labour 
policies but did not include such policies in their procurement, only three stated the EU 
law had not been a factor in their decision not to include local labour policies. For these 
interviewees, policies favouring local labour worked counter to the market forces which 
generally decide where labour comes from and were unnecessary. The remaining 
fourteen interviewees felt that the EU legal regime had been the main factor in the 
decision not to include such policies. Interviewees noted that, under EU law policies 
favouring the use of local labour were seen as discriminatory and thus unlawful, which 
led to a much higher chance of legal challenge than for any other labour policy: 
/RFDOODERXU¶VDQLQWHUHVWLQJRQHEHFDXVHZHGRFRQVLGHULWEXWRIWHQWKURXJKNLQG
of an EU procuremHQWURXWH,W¶V... how do you have that as a criteria when, you 
know, it could be seen as a discriminatory criteria under the procurement regs?910 
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Interviewees were generally in favour of the inclusion of local labour policies and 
discussion of such policies was the area in which the EU legal regime was criticised the 
most (see further below, Impressions of the EU legal regime). Interviewees noted that 
favouring local labour would be a useful method for regenerating the areas in which they 
were based, important given that interviewees often also felt a duty to repay their 
customers in some way (see above, Factors leading to the adoption of labour policies). 
Interviewees also noted commercial benefits of using local labour, including faster 
response times and a generally better relationship with a supplier based close by. There 
may also be an element of public pressure involved when considering local labour; one 
interviewee mentioned the Lindsey Refinery incident of 2009, noting the negative public 
reaction which resulted in that case to the use of foreign labour.911 Overall, interviewees 
indicated that, were the EU law not so restrictive in this area, they would prefer to 
favour local labour in their contracts to some extent: 
[W]HZRXOGQ¶WZDQW WREH WRRSDURFKLDO\RXNQRZZHZRXOGQ¶WZDQW WRVRUWRI
cut ourselves off and become an island state, we certainly can see the benefit of 
working with a large amount of suppliers over a national and international level, 
EXW WKHUH¶VQRGRXEW LI WKH ODZDOORZHGXV WRHYHQ put a quota or a proportion 
amount [for local labour], we would certainly do it.912 
The majority of interviewees stated that they did not include any policies related to local 
labour at all due to the EU restrictions. Two interviewees stated that they considered 
response times when looking at service contracts, noting that this might be considered 
indirect favouring of local labour and expressing uncertainty over the legality of such 
actions under EU law.913 One interviewee turned to non-legally binding methods of aiding 
local labour, talking to suppliers awarded contracts about the possibility of advertising 
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work in local newspapers and working with local colleges, without any policies actually 
being required to be completed by the supplier.914 
The focus amongst interviewees was on favouring local labour within the home state, 
with both the interviewees who had actually favoured labour and those who had 
considered doing so referring to favouring labour in the area of the UK in which they 
were based. Consistent with the identification of this approach as the highest risk, the 
majority of interviewees stated that they did not include conditions favouring local UK 
labour in their contracts due to the legal restrictions. 
No interviewees stated that they favoured local labour in any contracts which were 
performed outside the UK. This included interviewees who used external labour codes to 
inform their labour policies, who generally edited the code so as to ensure compliance 
with EU law (see above, External Labour Codes). This appears to be due to a mixture of 
factors. Firstly, most interviewees stated that they had very few contracts which were 
performed abroad, meaning that this issue had not had to be considered. Secondly, as 
with recruitment of UK labour, interviewees felt it was clearly contrary to EU law. 
Interviewees did not appear to feel the same pressure to recruit locally abroad as they 
did when the contract was performed in the UK, giving rise to less pressure to defy the 
EU rules. 
Overall, it appears that recruitment of local labour is an area which utilities generally 
regard as important and is a policy which the majority of utilities wish to implement. 
Equally, it is the area in which the EU legal regime has had the most impact, heavily 
restricting the use of such policies. 
IV.2. The impact of national law 
As can be seen in the discussion of the types of labour policy included in procurement 
above, many interviewees focused on the requirements of UK national law to guide their 
labour policies. This was especially true for eight interviewees who noted that ensuring 
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compliance with UK national law was their main aim when looking at labour issues in 
procurement. The main concerns were compliance with minimum wage requirements, 
the Working Time Regulations 1998915, the Transfer of Undertakings (Protection of 
Employment) Regulations 2006 (TUPE)916 and immigration law. Interviewees emphasised 
the cost risk associated with non-compliance with these laws and thus focus on 
compliance was part of a commercial decision. In every case, these eight interviewees 
noted that the vast majority of their contracts were concluded with UK based suppliers, 
making UK law the natural focus. There may also be a link here with the common belief 
that CSR policies are generally only relevant when dealing with suppliers outside the EU 
(see above, Section II).  
IV.3. Use of external labour codes 
Reliance on external labour codes was low, with only four interviewees using external 
labour codes to guide their decision over which labour policies they would include in 
procurement.917 Of these, one used the UN Global Compact, one the ETI Base Code, one 
the ILO Tripartite Declaration and finally, one relied on the CIPS CSR principles.918 A 
further three interviewees stated that they were members of the UN Global Compact and 
that this had influenced their general approach to CSR but had not directly impacted on 
their decision over which types of labour policy to include in procurement.  
The four interviewees who did use external labour codes relied heavily on those codes, 
generally looking only at the labour issues included in that code without expanding on 
those requirements in any way. Two of the interviewees (those using the ETI Base Code 
and the ILO Principles) noted that the codes had been edited slightly to ensure 
compliance with the EU legal regime, though they emphasised that the changes were 
minimal. Notably, both the ETI Base Code and the ILO Principles require favouring local 
                                          
915 SI 1998 No. 1833. 
916 SI 2006 No. 246. 
917 See further Chapter 3 for discussion of these external labour codes. 
918EN#2, TR#8, WA#4 and WA#1, respectively. 
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labour and this requirement was not included by either interviewee (see discussion of 
local labour above). 
IV.4. Conclusions: Impact of the legal regime 
Overall the EU legal regime appears to have had minimal impact on the types of labour 
policy chosen, with most interviewees choosing to focus on compliance with national UK 
law. The EU procurement directives were generally seen as not limiting the types of 
policy which could be included in any way. The major exception to this was the use of 
policies favouring local labour, which were generally viewed favourably by interviewees 
but used in only a minority of cases due to the restrictions under EU law. 
V. The EU Legal Regime 
7KLV VHFWLRQ H[DPLQHV LQWHUYLHZHHV¶ JHQHUDO YLHZV RI, and compliance with, the 
requirements under the Utilities Directive relating to labour policies, providing the 
background for a more detailed discussion of the use of various methods of including 
ODERXUSROLFLHVLQWKHIROORZLQJVHFWLRQ7KHVHFWLRQZLOOILUVWEULHIO\FRQVLGHULQWHUYLHZHHV¶
impressions of the EU regime and their knowledge of the requirements of the law in this 
DUHD,WZLOOWKHQJRRQWRORRNDWLQWHUYLHZHHV¶RYHUDOOYLHZRIWKHLPSDFWRIWKH(8OHJDO
regime on the use of labour policies in procurement and whether the right balance has 
been met in the law, looking iQGHWDLODWLQWHUYLHZHHV¶RSLQLRQVRQWKHFODULW\RIWKHODZ
and how it could be improved. The section will conclude with a look at compliance with 
the directive and whether interviewees have felt the need to evade the requirements of 
the directive in any way and, if so, why. 
V.1. General impressions of the EU regime and awareness of the law 
,QWHUYLHZHHV¶NQRZOHGJHRIWKHUHTXLUHPHQWVRIWKH8WLOLWLHV'LUHFWLYHZDVJHQHUDOO\IDLUO\
low. There was a sense that the directive required that a procurement be fair and open 
but relatively little knowledge of the specific requirements of the directive. Often this was 
simply because the possibility of completing a labour policy via a certain method in 
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procurement had never been thought of by an interviewee and thus they had had no 
reason to consider the legality of that method. There was also a strong belief on the part 
of a minority of interviewees that the EU Utilities Directive did not require anything more 
than an open competitive procedure and labour policies would be lawful so long as they 
were compatible with that: 
What the EU is concerned with, what the directives are trying to do is ensure you 
have effective competition and you have clearly identified criteria for award and 
award on those criteria. That is whaWLW¶VVD\LQJ ... obviously you can interpret it 
DV\RXOLNHEXW,¶PMXVWUHDGLQJZKDWWKH(8SURFXUHPHQWODZVD\VDQGDVIDUDV
,¶PFRQFHUQHGWKDW¶VMXVWIDLUFRPSHWLWLRQDQGHYDOXDWLRQFULWHULD919 
Awareness of the law was lowest when discussing the requirements applicable under the 
Treaty (see below, section VIII). However, it is reasonable that knowledge would be low 
in this area given the lack of clarity over whether or not the Treaty provisions apply to 
private sector bodies or not and so a lower level of knowledge was anticipated here. 
Interviewees appeared to feel most confident discussing the legality of local labour 
policy, an area where the law seems to be clearer and which also appears to be an area 
of high importance to interviewees. 
Overall, interviewees were positive about the EU legal regime both in the specific area of 
labour policies and more widely, with fifteen interviewees out of twenty-two stating that 
they supported the regime. Interviewees felt that the EU requirements ensured that 
procurement was as competitive as possible, including a wide range of suppliers from 
various countries.  
%,WKLQNWKH(8UHJXODWLRQVDUH\HDKQRSUREOHP7KHUH¶VDORWRISHRSOHWKLQN
WKDWWKDWDUHQ¶WLQSURFXUHPHQWWKLQNWKDWLW¶VWKHUHWRVORZWKHSURFHVVGRZQDQG
I think the complete reverse.  
A: It gives you a far bigger negotiating arm and it gives you a far bigger 
                                          
919 EN#2. 
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competition, which is always good.920 
Interviewees also liked the clear structure provided by the EU  regime, which aided them 
in planning procurement so that the appropriate issues were considered and applied in a 
clear and consistent manner. Interviewees generally felt also that the EU regime 
provided the appropriate amount of flexibility in procurement, allowing the utility the 
freedom to consider issues important to that company (including CSR), whilst still 
maintaining the clear structure interviewees wanted: 
,WKLQNLW¶VSUHWW\UHDVRQDEOHDWOHDVWLQWKHXWLOLWLHVVHFWRU7KLVVHFWRUKDVTXLWHD
ELW RI IOH[LELOLW\ HVSHFLDOO\ZLWKQHJRWLDWLRQZKLFK LV YHU\XVHIXO ,¶YH ORRNHGDW
the rules that the public sector have to follow and I don¶WWKLQNWKH\¶GOHW\RXJHW
WKH EHVW GHDO WR EH KRQHVW EXW ZH GRQ¶W KDYH WKDW SUREOHP LQ WKH XWLOLWLHV
sector.921 
Consistent with the finding above that the majority of interviewees were happy with the 
EU regime, the majority of interviewees felt that the legal regime had no real negative 
impact on the use of labour policies in procurement. Only seven interviewees out of the 
total twenty-two stated that, overall, they considered the EU legal regime to be too 
restrictive in relation to labour policies. These interviewees were generally those who 
had spent the most time considering the potential legal issues relating to labour policies 
in procurement and/or had attempted the most wide-reaching labour policies, suggesting 
that the legal regime limits the use of more ambitious labour policies. Notably this group 
also included all the interviewees from utilities operating in the public sector, who were 
also subject to the more restrictive Public Sector Directive for some of their 
procurement. 
The remaining interviewees felt that while there were negative aspects of the EU regime 
relating to the use of labour policies, they were minor and outweighed by the other 
benefits of the regime. Interviewees generally emphasised that they felt that CSR was 
                                          
920 TR#5. 
921 WA#3 
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WKHFRPSDQ\¶VUHVSRnsibility and an issue separate from the EU regime, which had little 
impact and, indeed, should have little impact upon the use of such policies: 
, WKLQN ZKDW ZH ZRXOG VD\ LV WKDW LW¶V RXU UHVSRQVLELOLW\ WR EDODQFH DOO WKHVH
matters and the EC regime gives XV WKH IOH[LELOLW\ WR GR WKDW EXW LW LVQ¶W WKH
driving factor and the reason why we do it.922 
:HOO ,¶YHQHYHU VHHQ LWDVDEDUULHU WREHDEOH WR ORRNDW&65 ,W\RXNQRZ ,
would say a lot about the EU process but actually sort of prohibiting you from 
loRNLQJDW&65LVQRWRQHRIWKHP,¶YHQHYHUUHDOO\FRQVLGHUHGWKDWLWVWRSV\RX
from doing that.923 
One of the main criticisms of the EU legal regime from all the interviewees was the 
inability to consider local labour issues in procurement (see discussion above, section 
IV). The other main criticism, noted by nine of the interviewees, was the lack of clarity 
over what precisely could be included in procurement: 
,WERWKPDNHV LWKDUG WR LQFOXGH&65DQGDOVR LW¶VQRW FOHDUKRZPXFKFDQDQG
FDQ¶WEHLQFOXGHG7here must be a better way to enforce the spirit of the EU and 
fair trade across the whole union with, as I see it, a massively increasing [desire] 
across countries to implement CSR more and more.924 
Interviewees noted that the possibility of including labour and other CSR issues in 
procurement did not seem to have been envisaged by the directive, making it hard to fit 
such issues in whilst complying with the rules. One interviewee in particular noted that 
CSR was considered an economic issue in their company and the directive made an 
³DUWLILFLDOGLVWLQFWLRQ´EHWZHHQHFRQRPLFDQGVRFLDOSROLFLHVZKLFKZDVQRWSUDFWLFDODQG
hard to understand.  
As a result of this lack of clarity, guidance and advice on the law from external sources 
was key, with interviewees noting that they generally relied on consultants outside the 
                                          
922 TR#9 
923 WA#5 
924 TR#8. 
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utility such as Achilles Information Ltd to answer queries on the law and to keep them up 
to date. A few interviewees (mostly the larger utilities and utilities in the public sector) 
had their own legal team which sent guidance on the directives to the procurement 
team. More general guidance such as that produced by the European Commission and 
the OGC was also relied upon. Interviewees were often dissatisfied with the level and 
quality of guidance available however, with eight interviewees stating a desire for better 
guidance in this area. 
[W]H¶UHQRWKHOSHGEHFDXVHDWKHUH¶VDODFNRIFODULW\LQWKHDFWXDOUHJXODWLRQVE
ZH¶YHJRWRXURZQ2*&ZKRLVVXHYHU\XVHOHVVDKXQKHOSIXOJXLGDQFHDQGGRQ¶W
really help us a great deal so we spend a lot of time trying to interpret the 
laws.925 
Interviewees noted that it could be hard to find information about the law, expressing a 
desire that guidance be publicised more and be more easily accessible. Another issue 
which was highlighted was cost; interviewees noted that training courses were available 
but were often expensive meaning that many people had to do without professional 
training. There was thus a strong need for better free resources and guidance in this 
area. 
I think there could be more readily available information on how the regime 
ZRUNV ,W¶VQRWYHU\ZHOOH[SODLQHGDWDOO,PHDQZHIROORZLWEHFDXVHZHKDYH
WREXWKHOSLVQ¶WUHDOO\IRUWhcoming. Why should I have to pay a consultant or go 
on a dozen courses just to find out how to do something which we are being 
forced to do?926 
Another complaint interviewees had about the current available guidance in this area 
was that it focused too much on what it was not possible to include in procurement and 
the unlawfulness of various methods. Interviewees noted that it would be more useful 
                                          
925 Ibid. 
926 WA#3. 
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for their planning if guidance was given showing what could be done and giving case 
studies of successful ways of including labour policies in procurement. 
V.2. Compliance with the Directive 
This section will examine the general level and approach to compliance with the directive 
by interviewees. It was noted previously in Chapter 7, Section IV, that there are a 
variety of theories behind compliance with the law, from economic theories based on 
risk-benefit analysis to PRUHVRFLDOWKHRULHVEDVHGRQSHRSOHV¶YLHZVRIWKHOHJLWLPDF\RI
the law. It was also noted that where the legal provisions lack clarity, there is a general 
tendency towards over-compliance. Given the relatively low level of challenges brought 
against procuring entities in the UK combined with the possible pressures on companies 
to be seen as socially responsible, it was thought that utilities may be relatively prone to 
non-compliance in this area, though the lack of clarity in the law might impact upon 
that.927  
In fact it was discovered that utilities generally did their best to be compliant to the level 
that they understood the law to require. The main reason appeared to be the overall 
approval of the EU rules (see above). Interviewees were happy to follow the rules as 
best they could because they genuinely felt that they were the best rules for the 
situation. 
³:e would, it would be highly unlikely for us to not follow the Utilities Directive 
procedure EHFDXVH WKH\¶UH IDLUO\ PRUDO standards *inaudible*, so I think law-
abiding would come first.´928 
This finding matches the theory discussed in Chapter 7 above set out by Tyler that 
compliance with the law depHQGVRQDSDUW\¶VYLHZRIWKHOHJLWLPDF\RIWKHODZZLWKD
                                          
927 See further Chapter 7, sec. IV. 
928 WA#6. 
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feeling of personal obligation to obey the law being a key factor, along with the extent to 
ZKLFKWKHODZDFFRUGVZLWKWKDWSDUW\¶VRZQYLHZRIZKHWKHURUQRWWKHODZLVMXVW929 
Another possible reason for this strong desire to comply with the directive was that, 
despite the low number of cases in the UK, the possibility of challenge was a big 
consideration for interviewees. Eight interviewees in particular highlighted the fear of 
challenge as being an important factor in their decisions over whether and how to 
include labour policies in procurement. There appeared to be a general feeling amongst 
interviewees that suppliers were becoming more litigious and the risk of challenge was 
thus increasing, leading to a more risk-averse approach to procurement amongst 
utilities. 
, PHDQ OXFNLO\ ZH KDYHQ¶W KDG DQ\ DFWXDO XSKHOG FKDOOHQJHV EXW ZH¶UH YHU\
mindful of it and very, we try to follow OJEU regulations quite rigidly. I think you 
sort of need to nowadays, more and more companies are getting so sort of 
litigious, and I think also because of the economic climate, a lot of companies 
DUH\RXNQRZIHDUIXOWKDWWKH\¶UHQRWJRLQJWREHDURXQGLQDIHZ\HDUVWLPHRU
VRPHWKLQJDQGWKH\WKLQNVRGµHPZKDWKDYH,JRWWRORVHDQGWKH\¶UHDOOVRUW
of launching challenges left right and centre, you need to be squeaky clean at the 
moment.930 
One interviewee also noted that, while challenges were rare, the damages which could 
be awarded if the challenge were successful ZHUH³PRPHQWRXV´931 suggesting that in this 
situation the high sanction might outweigh the low chance of a breach being discovered. 
There was also the consideration that any challenge, even if ultimately not successful, 
involved high legal advice costs and a demanding commitment of time and resources to 
deal with on the part of the procurement team which interviewees wanted to avoid.  
                                          
929
 See further Chapter 7, sec. IV.2. and Tyler, T. Why People Obey the Law, (Rev. Ed.), (2006, Princeton: 
Princeton University Press). 
930 WA#5. 
931 TR#3. 
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Consistent with this high level of compliance, only four interviewees stated that they felt 
the strict nature of the directive might lead to utilities evading the requirements to 
include labour issues, and of those four, only two stated that they personally attempted 
to evade the requirements of the directive. One interviewee noted that strict compliance 
with the law might cause issues with monitoring and evidence and lead to labour policies 
with little practical effect (see further below, section IX): 
<RX¶YH UHDOO\JRW WREDODQFH VWLFNLQJZLWKLQ WKH ODZDQGGRLQJ VRPHWKLQJZKLFK
actually has some teeth and actually has a requirement for a supplier, because 
LW¶VTXLWHHDV\WRHQGXSZLWKVRPHWKLQJWKDW¶VTXLWHZHDNDQGLW¶VMXVWRKZRXOG
you mind thinking about the ETI base code and maybe joining SEDEX if you get 
time, sort of thing.932 
Another interviewee noted that the EU rules simply meant that they changed their 
justification for their policies but the actual policies remained the same no matter what 
the directive required. In particular they noted that environmental justifications were 
now used for policies which would also have social benefits since such justifications were 
seen as easier to fit within the rules: 
[O]ur offer used to say that it was Wensleydale cheese and the eggs would be 
from a local supplier ... QRZLW¶VEHHQWXUQHGDURund, exactly the same suppliers 
EXWZH¶UHUHGXFLQJRXUDLUPLOHVDQGIRRGPLOHV6RLW¶VDGLIIHUHQWVODQWH[DFWO\
WKHVDPHEXWLW¶VQRZWDUJHWHGVD\LQJ LW¶VDORFDOVXSSOLHUEHFDXVHZH¶UHUHGXFLQJ
our miles.933 
Overall, then, it appears that interviewees generally aimed to comply with the legislation 
as best they could, both because of fear of legal challenge but also because they 
genuinely believed the rules were fair. The actual level of compliance is hard to measure 
given the lack of clarity in the law. This makes it difficult to determine what the correct 
approach would be but it seems that the majority of the non-compliance by interviewees 
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would be through a mistaken interpretation of the law rather than a deliberate attempt 
to evade the directive. 
Given this lack of deliberate breach, it may be that the current compliance approach 
taken by the EU regime towards enforcement of the regime may not be the most 
appropriate. It was noted in Chapter 7 that these approaches suffer from the problem 
when applied to companies that those companies are often poorly organised to 
anticipate and deal with such punitive measures and those within the company are often 
unaware of the potential risks. Where a breach is committed by accident, a high punitive 
measure is unlikely to prevent future breach from that company or others subject to the 
same regulation. It was also noted that such approaches are expensive and often cause 
a great deal more delay than informal approaches. It may thus be that the EU legal 
regime would be better enforced in the UK by a method VXFKDV$\UHVDQG%UDLWKZDLWH¶V
µUHVSRQVLYH UHJXODWLRQ¶ PRGHO 8QGHU WKLV PHWKRG UHJXODWRU\ ERGLHV ZRXOG EHJLQ E\
working with companies which breach regulation to ensure no further breaches take 
place, but there would also be increasingly formal and punitive methods available for 
repeated breaches.934 This method would offer support to those utilities which are aiming 
to comply but failing due to lack of knowledge but would also keep the punitive methods 
for repeated breach, preventing creative compliance by those utilities currently 
complying due to fear of challenge.   
VI. Structure of Labour Policies in Procurement 
This section examines the methods chosen by interviewees to include labour policies in 
procurement, given the influence of the EU procurement directives over the procurement 
process. It sets out the various methods used by interviewees, examining the issues 
KLJKOLJKWHGLQWKHSUHYLRXVOLWHUDWXUHUHYLHZLQ&KDSWHUDQGWKHLQWHUYLHZHHV¶RSLQLRQV
of the importance of these issues and their approach towards them in practice.  
VI.1. Methods of structuring labour policies within procurement 
                                          
934
 See further Chapter 7, sec. IV.2 and Ayres, I. and Braithwaite, J. Responsive Regulation, (1992, Oxford: OUP).  
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VI.1.1. Contract Conditions 
Examining labour issues through inclusion in contract conditions was popular amongst 
interviewees, with sixteen stating that they had included some labour aspects in their 
contract conditions at some point. Contract conditions were generally used in 
combination with other methods of including labour issues in procurement rather than as 
the sole method, often covering the same issues as were looked at elsewhere in the 
process. 
Contract conditions limited to legal compliance 
It was noted in Chapter 6 that contract conditions concerning labour issues may be 
divided into two types: conditions simply requiring compliance with national law and 
conditions going beyond the law. As discussed in Section III.1.1, Chapter 6, conditions 
requiring compliance with the law are probably one of the lowest risk options for a utility 
to take, with Article 39 of the Utilities Directive appearing to assume that compliance 
with local law may be required. 
The most common use of contract conditions was indeed to require compliance with UK 
national labour law requirements, with interviewees often having a general clause in 
their contracts requiring compliance with all relevant law and also including specific 
clauses for any areas of law where it was felt there was significant risk of breach.935 This 
was consistent with compliance with labour law issues generally being the most popular 
types of labour criteria to include (see above, Section IV) and reflects the importance 
interviewees attached to complying with UK law.  
Of the sixteen interviewees who included contract conditions requiring compliance with 
UK law, only six stated they also regularly included conditions which went beyond legal 
compliance (see below, section VII.1.2). The EU legal regime appears to have had little 
impact on the decision of the remaining ten interviewees to limit their conditions to UK 
                                          
935 Contract conditions requiring compliance with UK law, whether directly or indirectly by requiring compliance 
with a labour code which in turn required compliance with national law, were included by 16 interviewees. 
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law, with the main factor in the decision rather being their view that UK labour law set a 
high standard which they did not feel the need to improve upon.  
[T]KHUH¶VDSDUWZKLFKVD\VWKLVFRQWUDFWLVJRYHUQHGE\WKHODZVRIWKLVWKLVWKLV
DQGWKLV LQWKH8.VRZHGRQ¶W ORRNDQ\VRUWRIGHHSHULI\RXOLNHbecause we 
feel that is probably sufficient for what we do.936 
[W]H¶YHMXVWQRW IHOW WKHQHHG [to go beyond legal compliance] UHDOO\,W¶VQRWD
conscious decision not to and I guess the law is quite strict in terms of what you 
must comply with anyway.937 
For those contracts which included labour clauses and were performed outside the UK, 
compliance with the national law of the country of performance was also a common 
requirement, with eight of the interviewees who included such conditions stating that 
they regularly required compliance with national law. Of these eight, five usually limited 
the conditions imposed to compliance with national law and did not impose any 
conditions going beyond the law.938 
[W]e would normally limit it to national law because it would be unreasonable to ask 
companies who are performing within their own country to go outside of that.939 
Interviewees who limited conditions to legal compliance noted that generally national 
laws offered satisfactory labour standards; the problem was that the legal standards 
were not complied with.  
Well, the laws are one thing. The actual standards can be something different. So 
ZH¶GZDQWWRVDWLVI\RXUVHOYHVWKDWWKHSUDFWLFHVLQSODFHVXSSRUWWKHZHOIDUHVDIHW\
environmental considerations.940 
                                          
936 TR#3. 
937 TR#7. 
938 TR#5, EN#2, PO#1, WA#5, WA#7. 
939 EN#2. 
940 WA#7. 
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Only one interviewee stated that the EU procurement law had impacted on their decision 
over whether to limit the use of labour-related contract conditions to compliance with 
national law.941 Consistent with the legal analysis set out in Chapter 6, this interviewee 
noted that compliance with national law appeared to be the safest type of contract 
condition which could be completed under EU law. The interviewee also noted that 
requiring legal compliance was also the lowest risk approach when it came to the 
possibility of challenge by supplier since any supplier challenging would be claiming an 
unwillingness to comply with their national law, a fact most suppliers would be unwilling 
to admit. 
Contract conditions going beyond compliance with the law 
As noted previously, contract conditions which require more from suppliers than simply 
compliance with the relevant national labour laws are a higher risk option under EU 
procurement law compared to conditions which only require legal compliance. Conditions 
going beyond the law may be limited to issues relating to contract performance or may 
EHZLGHUWKDQWKLV,QWHUYLHZHHV¶XVHRIERWKW\SHVRIFRQGLWLRQLVGLVFXVVHGEHORZ 
x Contract conditions limited to contract performance 
Contract conditions which set out requirements going beyond compliance with national 
law were used relatively rarely, with only six of the sixteen interviewees who included 
labour-related contract conditions stating that they had required more than legal 
compliance in their contract conditions.942 The possibility for including social conditions in 
a procurement contract, including labour conditions, is set out explicitly in Article 38 of 
WKH 8WLOLWLHV 'LUHFWLYH ZKLFK DOORZV WKH LQFOXVLRQ RI ³VSHFLDO FRQGLWLRQV UHODWLQJ WR WKH
SHUIRUPDQFHRI WKHFRQWUDFW´$VGLVFussed previously in section IV.2, Chapter 6, such 
conditions are lawful so long as they are lawful under wider EU law, a requirement which 
requires that any conditions included in a procurement contract are compatible with the 
                                          
941 PO#1. 
942 WA#1, TR#1, TR#2, TR#8, TR#9, EN#4. 
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free movement provisions of the EU Treaty.943  Following this, it would appear that 
labour conditions are hindrances to trade which must be justified in order to be lawful.944 
This section discusses the findings of the data in relation to the particular issues 
highlighted in the previous literature review as discussed in Section III, Chapter 6. 
Use of external labour codes 
It was noted in the literature review that contract conditions which refer to external 
labour codes are more likely to be justifiable than conditions designed by the utility 
itself. This is due to the fact that independently designed conditions are more likely to be 
objective and are also less open to abuse by the utility. It was noted that external codes 
were not used often by interviewees, with only four of the sixteen interviewees using 
codes to inform their decisions relating to labour conditions. Of these four, only two 
actually included contract conditions in the procurement contract based on the external 
code they favoured, with the other two preferring to examine the requirements of their 
labour code through other methods. Despite this method being one of the lowest risk 
methods of including labour policies in procurement under the EU rules, it appears to be 
very rarely used in practice. 
Labour certification marks 
Including a condition requiring that a product complies with a certain labour certification 
mark was noted previously to be a high risk method, given the requirements in the 
Utilities Directive governing technical specifications, which may prevent utilities from 
setting requirements impacting on the production process of a good where that process 
does not impact on the ultimate performance characteristics of the product.945It was also 
noted that this was an area in which utilities might feel the most pressure to include 
labour criteria, given the rise in importance in recent years of labour certification marks 
                                          
943 See further Chapter 6, Section III.1.2.1. The impact of this requirement may also depend on the 
applicability of the EU Treaty to private utilities, see discussion at Section II, Chapter 6. 
944 See discussion at Chapter 6, Section III.1.2. 
945 See Chapter 6, Section III for further discussion. 
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such as Fairtrade, and this might lead to utilities being more willing to take a risk in this 
area. 
Labour certification marks were relatively rarely required by interviewees, with only 
three stating that they had awarded contracts where compliance with a mark was a 
requirement.946 For two of these, a requirement that products should be compliant with a 
labour certification mark was common, included in all contracts for certain products. For 
the remaining interviewee the requirement was only included where it was felt that a 
certain product posed a high risk of being made using labour working under poor 
conditions.  
Three main reasons were given by interviewees for their decision not to require 
compliance with labour certification marks; (1) simply never having considered the 
possibility of using labour marks; (2) a feeling that there were no relevant labour marks 
which could be referred to; and (3) the difficulty of doing so under EU law. 
The first and second of the reasons given are linked to a lack of awareness on the part of 
utilities as to the range of labour certification marks available. Interviewees tended to 
associate labour certification marks generally with the most famous mark, Fairtrade, and 
conclude that such marks were not relevant due to their low level of product purchasing 
(this is also linked to the common belief that labour criteria generally are only useful 
when purchasing products, see above Section II): 
:H GRQ¶W EHOLHYH >)DLUWUDGH LV@ applicable to the types of contract that we 
QHJRWLDWHDQGVRLW¶V not DSSOLFDEOHWRWKHVXSSO\FKDLQV:H¶GSUREDEO\GHDOZLWK
it on a case by case basis if we were buying products in from abroad, but most of 
the time we are buying goods that are manufactured within the UK.947 
For those interviewees who had evaluated the possible benefits of labour certification 
marks and decided that such marks would be worth including in the contract 
                                          
946 TR#5, EN#2, TR#6. 
947 TR#2. 
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requirements, the EU legal requirements then became a concern. Three interviewees 
included a requirement of compliance with a labour mark and these interviewees 
admitted they had not considered the law in this area or were unaware of the legal 
restraints under the Directive. Three further interviewees, however, noted that they did 
not include a requirement that a particular labour mark should be complied with because 
the EU legal regime prevented such a requirement. The interviewees noted that they 
often included statements that they would look favourably on the supply of products 
compliant with a certain mark, but did not require compliance: 
[W]e put that our caterers should be able to supply Fairtrade, or a proportion of 
)DLUWUDGHEXWZHFDQ¶W UHTXLUH WKDW WKH\¶UHVROHO\)DLUWUDGH. ... 6RWKH\¶UHDYDLODEOH
DQGWKH\¶UHSURPRWHGEXWZHFDQ¶WPDNHWKHPWKHRQO\RSWLRQ948 
x Contract conditions going beyond contract performance 
Given the wording of Article 38 of the Utilities Directive which allows the inclusion of 
social and environmental FRQWUDFW FRQGLWLRQV ³UHODWLQJ WR WKH SHUIRUPDQFH RI WKH
FRQWUDFW´ LW LV JHQHUDOO\ SUHVXPHG WKDW FRQWUDFW FRQGLWLRQV ZKLFK JR EH\RQG
performance are unlawful.949 Consistent with this, no interviewees stated that they had 
ever included contract conditions relating to anything beyond the performance of the 
contract. However, the main reason given for not including such conditions was not the 
legal restraints but simply because the possibility of doing so had not occurred to 
interviewees and they had seen no reason to include such conditions. One interviewee 
did note, however, that suppliers sometimes mentioned in their tenders that they looked 
at CSR issues beyond the contract such as training and education for workers unrelated 
to the contract,, suggesting that this area may become more relevant in future: 
                                          
948 TR#8. 
949 See further discussion at Chapter 6, Section IV.2. 
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:HKDYHQ¶WGRQH [included conditions going beyond performance] up until now. A 
lot of people I notice on a lot of the tender returns we get are making quite a big 
WKLQJDERXWWKDW¶VZKDWWKH\GR%XWZHGRQ¶WH[SOLFLWO\DVNIRULW950 
Reasons for using labour related contract conditions 
Contract conditions were primarily used by interviewees for issues which they felt would 
be on-going throughout the contract performance and which interviewees wished to be 
able to check that a supplier was complying with even after contract award. This was a 
common theme throughout the discussion of contract conditions. Two interviewees in 
particular noted that they preferred contract conditions to other methods of including 
labour issues in procurement due to the power they gave over suppliers during contract 
performance.951 These interviewees noted that contract conditions gave them leverage 
over the supplier should there be a dispute during performance, ensuring that labour 
issues could not simply be ignored once suppliers had won the contract. Interviewees 
also noted that contract conditions were the best method for encouraging suppliers to 
improve their labour standards over the course of the contract, as opposed to methods 
such as prequalification criteria which simply checked compliance with set standards. 
Setting out contract conditions which require the supplier to work with the utility over 
time to improve standards in certain areas has the benefit of not only improving those 
standards but also giving the utility a closer working relationship with its supplier, which 
was considered commercially beneficial.   
[O]k, so we get a supplier through the process and award them the contract, but 
ZH GRQ¶W UHVW RQ RXU ODXUHOV VR RN VR WKH\ PLJKW KDYH VRPH UHDVRQDEOH
compliance to some sustainability matters. We want them to be great in three, 
IRXUILYH\HDUVDQGIRUVRPDQ\RIRXUVXSSOLHUVOHW¶VVD\RXUWRSILIW\VXSSOLHUV
ZKLFK UHSUHVHQWVRPHWKLQJ OLNHRIDOORXUVSHQGZK\ZRXOGQ¶WZHZDQW WR
get really close to them and start improving their performance, not let them sit 
                                          
950 TR#1. 
951 PO#1, EN#4. 
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bDFNDQGJHWFRPSODFHQWIRUILYH\HDUVZKLOHWKH\¶YHJRWRXUFRQWUDFW952 
The previous sections examined the impact of the legal regime on the decision over 
whether to include contract conditions limited to compliance with the law or going 
beyond the law. Overall, the legal regime had little impact over the decision to use 
contract conditions generally, as opposed to other structures for including labour issues 
in procurement. Only one interviewee out of the sixteen including labour-related contract 
conditions stated the law had any impact on their decision, noting that they felt contract 
conditions were legally one of the safest methods to choose for evaluating labour issues, 
being less likely to be challenged by suppliers: 
[Y]RX¶UHOHVVOLNHO\WRJHWFKDOOHQJed on that kind of thing because tenderers can 
read that at the tender process and they just have to decide whether they comply 
ZLWKLWRUQRWZKHUHDVZKHQWKH\DUHHYDOXDWHGRQLWDQGWKH\GRQ¶WZLQWKHELG
they request the evaluations and they see they GURSSHG RQ WKDW WKH\¶OO WKLQN
challenge.953 
VI.1.2. Prequalification Criteria 
Use of labour related prequalification criteria 
Prequalification standards were the most popular method for examining labour issues, 
with seventeen interviewees stating that they included labour issues in their 
SUHTXDOLILFDWLRQ TXHVWLRQQDLUH 7KH ODERXU FULWHULD LQFOXGHG LQ LQWHUYLHZHHV¶
prequalification questionnaires covered the whole range of labour policies, from child 
labour down to health and safety. As in other areas health and safety and issues 
required under UK law were the most commonly included and usually the main focus of 
the questionnaire.  
The main query for prequalification criteria highlighted in the previous literature review 
was what precisely was meant by the UtiOLWLHV 'LUHFWLYH¶V VWDWHPHQW WKDW D XWLOLW\ FDQ
                                          
952 EN#4. 
953 TR#8. 
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H[FOXGH D ILUP ³LQ DFFRUGDQFH ZLWK REMHFWLYH UXOHV DQG FULWHULD´954 As discussed in 
Chapter 6, there appears to be a general acceptance that the discretion for utilities is 
wider than that allowed to the public sector, but there is no further information on 
precisely how wide. Confirming that general acceptance of wider discretion, none of the 
interviewees thought that they were limited to the technical and financial criteria which 
are set out in the Public Sector Directive. Indeed only two of the seventeen interviewees 
thought there were any legal restrictions on the types of criteria which could be 
examined at prequalification at all and notably both were utilities based in the public 
sector which were subject to the Public Sector Directive for some proportion of their 
procurement.955 
7KHGLVFXVVLRQLQ&KDSWHUDOVRH[DPLQHGWKHSRVVLEOHLQWHUSUHWDWLRQVRI³REMHFWLYHUXOHV
DQGFULWHULD´VHWRXWE\$UURZVPLWKDQG0DXQG956 Following these interpretations, it may 
be relevant if (a) the criteria are directly related to the particular contract or are wider in 
scope; (b) the criteria are linked to the commercial aims of the utility; and (c) the 
criteria are linked to the overall procurement policy of the utility. These considerations 
will be discussed below. 
As regards the criteria being relevant to the particular contract, the majority of 
interviewees stated that their prequalification criteria focused on the general status of 
the suppliers rather than looking at issues directly relating to the specific contract.957 
Interviewees usually had a standard questionnaire which they issued to every supplier 
for every procurement, with only a minority editing the questionnaire to take into 
account the specific circumstances of the particular contract. 
$K LW¶V D JHQHUDO WKH\ ORRN DW WKH FRPSDQ\ DQG LW¶V VRUW RIPRUH EURDG EUXVK
KRZ WKH\¶UH XVHG WR GRLQJ WKLQJV UDWKHU WKDQ KRZ LW DIIHFWV WKLV SDUWLFXODU
                                          
954 Art. 54 Utilities Directive. 
955 PO#1 and TR#8. 
956 $UURZVPLWK6DQG0DXQG&µ&65LQWKHXWLOLWLHVVHFWRUDQGWKHLPSOLFDWLRQVRI(&SURFXUHPHQWSROLF\D
IUDPHZRUNIRUGHEDWH¶&KLQ$UURZVPLWK6DQG.XQ]OLN3HGVSocial and Environmental Policies in EC 
Procurement Law: New Directives and New Directions, (2009, Cambridge: CUP), at p.451. See further Chapter 
6 at section IV.3. 
957 Fourteen interviewees stated that they usually examined the firm generally in their PQQ, with five of these 
stating that they also sometimes set out criteria relating to the particular contract.  
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contract.958 
Having a standard questionnaire has the benefits of being simple, efficient and time and 
resource-friendly. It is also a good way of checking that minimum standards of labour 
criteria are met by suppliers, given that those issues which interviewees were most 
commonly considering (health and safety and legal compliance) are unlikely to vary 
much by contract. Only one interviewee (PO#1) felt that there could be any legal 
problems with non-contract specific criteria, with the rest feeling such criteria were 
laZIXOXQGHUWKH(8UXOHV:KHWKHUWKH³REMHFWLYHUXOHVDQGFULWHULD´WKHSUHTXDOLILFDWLRQ
criteria are based on have to be connected to the particular contract under EU law is 
unclear (see Chapter 6, section IV.3). The Utilities Directive does not mention the issue 
but Arrowsmith and Maund argue that a connection with the contract is required in the 
case of contract conditions. It is possible that this implies a similar restriction for 
prequalification criteria, since it would be odd for a utility to be able to exclude a firm on 
the basis of a criterion which it could not lawfully include in the contract.959 If this 
interpretation is correct, it is inconsistent with the general practice of the interviewees in 
this research and would appear to be highly restrictive. 
As to the other concerns - whether the criteria are linked to the commercial or 
procurement policy of the utility - as was noted above (see section III), interviewees 
were reluctant to state that their decision to include labour concerns in procurement 
generally was related to commercial policy in any way. This was equally true for the 
specific area of prequalification standards, making it hard to argue that such criteria are 
linked to any commercial policy of the company. In addition, given that moral concerns 
were the main reason given by interviewees, it cannot be said that the inclusion of 
labour policies was an issue of procurement policy. This suggests that in order for the 
types of labour related prequalification standards used by the interviewees to be lawful, 
WKH(8ZRXOGKDYHWRWDNHRQHRIWKHPRUHIOH[LEOHLQWHUSUHWDWLRQVRI³REMHFWLYHUXOHVDQG
FULWHULD´GLVFXVVHGHDUOLHU 
                                          
958 TR#1. 
959Arrowsmith and Maund, above n.956, at p.459. 
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Reasons for choosing prequalification criteria 
Three main reasons were given by interviewees for using prequalification criteria as a 
method for including labour policies in procurement. One was simply that, given the 
preference for looking at legal compliance in relation to labour issues amongst 
interviewees, prequalification criteria were the easiest method for checking such 
minimum criteria given their focus on compliance with set standards.  
The second reason given was that it enabled a company to discard poor suppliers early 
in the process, allowing the bulk of the procurement process to be completed based on 
cost and technical issues without the fear of contracting with a supplier which had 
unsatisfactory labour standards. The main desire appeared to be to excludes poor 
suppliers completely to ensure there was no association between the utility and those 
suppliers. This is linked with the focus on compliance with legal minimum standards 
which was discussed previously and contrasts with the views of those interviewees who 
favoured contract conditions who wished to work with suppliers to improve standards. 
Finally, prequalification was judged to be the most cost and resource friendly method of 
examining labour issues. Interviewees, especially from the larger utilities, noted that 
their supplier pool was large, with some utilities having a base of over 1000 suppliers. 
Considering labour issues at the prequalification stage allowed the utility to create a 
simple set of questions which could then be applied to all suppliers in a questionnaire, 
requiring far less work than labour related award criteria or contract conditions, both of 
which require the utility to design the labour criteria specifically to relate to the particular 
contract and suppliers on a level not needed for prequalification. This was also linked to 
the previous issue of not wishing to work with poor suppliers, with interviewees noting 
that the investment of time and energy involved in procurement once the 
prequalification stage was over was much greater and they preferred to work only with 
sound companies at that stage: 
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[W]e can use sustainability as a filter, so the pre-qualification stage is usually 
ZKHUH\RX¶UHZRUNLQJ\RX¶UHKDYLQJWRGHDOZLWKORWVRISRWHQWLDOVXSSOLHUVDWWKDW
VWDJHVRLW¶VNLQGRIDQHDWVWDJHWRLQWURGXFHWKLVWRSLF,IZH¶YHDOUHDG\VHOHFWHG
WKH EDQN RI VXSSOLHUV DQG WKH\¶UH LQ WKH tendering stage and we find out 
VRPHWKLQJKRUULILF DERXW WKHPDW WKDW VWDJH\RXNQRZ WKH\¶YHJRWRQHRIRXU
VHQVLWLYHGRFXPHQWV\RXNQRZWKHUH¶VDORWRILQYHVWPHQWRIRXUWLPHIURPRXU
EX\LQJFRPPXQLW\LQWRWKDW6RZHSUREDEO\GRQ¶WZDQWWRGRWKDW960 
VI.1.3. Tender Evaluation (Award Criteria) 
Use of Labour Related Award Criteria 
Labour related award criteria were included in procurement relatively often by 
interviewees, with twelve interviewees evaluating labour issues at this stage. Of these 
twelve, four set out specific labour related criteria and eight examined labour issues as 
part of more general CSR and sustainability criteria. Health and safety issues were the 
area most commonly considered at the award criteria stage. 
It was noted in Chapter 6 that award criteria relating to issues such as sustainability 
generally are lawful, following the ruling by the CJEU in Concordia Buses allowing 
environmental award criteria. The main issue relating to the inclusion of labour related 
issues in award criteriDZDVWKHUHTXLUHPHQWWKDWDZDUGFULWHULDEH³OLQNHGWRWKHVXEMHFW
PDWWHURI WKHFRQWUDFW´DQG WKHH[WHQW WRZKLFK WKDWZDVSRVVLEOH IRU ODERXU LVVXHV961 
7KHXQFHUWDLQW\RYHUWKHPHDQLQJRI³VXEMHFWPDWWHU´ZKich was highlighted in Chapter 6 
was shared by some interviewees with the fact that many labour issues could not be 
classed as linked to the subject matter of the contract being one of the reasons cited for 
the decision not to include labour issues in award criteria, though the majority felt 
sustainability criteria were lawful and this included labour issues. The main reason given 
by interviewees for not including labour issues at this point was a belief that the award 
criteria stage was an inappropriate point at which to look at CSR issues.  
                                          
960 EN#4. 
961 Art. 55(1)(a) Utilities Directive. See further Chapter 6, Section IV.4. 
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With regards to the legal constraints, only two interviewees who had rejected the idea of 
considering labour issues through award criteria felt that such concerns could not be 
considered material to the contract and thus could not be included legally.962 There was 
a feeling amongst these two interviewees that the requirement that award criteria be 
linked to the contract had become more important recently: 
$ZDUGFULWHULDKDYHWREHEDVHGRQWKHWHQGHUWKHUH¶VEHHQDUHDOSXVKIRUWKDW
recently, so we only look at commercial concerns that are linked to the tender.963 
This feeling may be related to the recent cases evaluating the appropriate use of award 
criteria such as Lianakis.964 These cases have raised questions over the appropriate 
areas for examination by both prequalification and award criteria and may result in more 
procuring entities following the example of these two interviewees and rejecting labour 
related criteria for fear of breaching EU law in the future. 
The concern over the link to the subject matter of the contract felt by these two 
interviewees was related to the main reason given by interviewees for rejecting the use 
of labour criteria at this stage: a belief that labour issues should have been evaluated 
fully at previous stages.965 Interviewees argued that by the award stage of the 
procurement, the most important concerns for them were cost and technical issues: 
I think as an engineering company we would always take the technical and 
HQJLQHHULQJ DVSHFWV DV WKH PRVW FULWLFDO EHFDXVH WKDW¶V DFWXDOO\ ZKDW ZH¶UH
LQWHUHVWHGLQZH¶UHLQWHUHVWHGLQWKHLUWHFKQLFDODQGHQJLQHHULQJDELOLW\WRGRWKH
work. ... ,¶PQRWVXUHLW¶VVRPHWKLQJWKDWZHZRXOGORRNDWWRVD\DOOWKHVHSHRSOe 
are being employed in the right manner, more so than supplier B and therefore 
VXSSOLHU$LVJRLQJWRZLQ,¶PQRWVXUHZH¶GGRWKDWEHFDXVHLWZRXOGFRPHGRZQ
more in our industry to technical competence.966 
                                          
962 WA#1 and PO#1. 
963 WA#1. 
964 Case C-532/06, Emm G Lianakis AE v Dimos Alexandroupolis [2008] ECR I-00251. 
965 This was given as the reason for not evaluating labour issues as award criteria by seven interviewees.  
966 EN#1. 
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Those interviewees who did not include labour policies in award criteria often examined 
labour issues at the prequalification stage. These interviewees noted that doing so 
enabled them to be sure that any suppliers which did not have satisfactory labour 
standards had been cut out of the procurement process by the time they were 
determining award, allowing the utility to focus on the cost and technical issues which 
had been highlighted as most important at this stage. This approach is also linked to the 
finding that compliance with minimum labour law requirements was the main concern of 
most interviewees (see discussion above, section IV) and was consistent also with the 
argument that prequalification standards were the most appropriate method for checking 
compliance with minimum standards. Interviewees generally did not seem to have 
considered the possibility of using award criteria to determine relative standards of 
labour issues outside the area of health and safety and there was some uncertainty 
about the use of award criteria in this way: 
I mean, award criteria favouring firms with higher labour standards, well so what, 
LI WKH\¶UH VXSSO\LQJ ZLGJHWV ZKLFK HYHU\RQH¶V JHWWLQJ IURP WKH VDPH SODFH LW
GRHVQ¶WPHDQDQ\WKLQJ ... if it was a very big, a specific concern with labour, and 
LW¶V GLIILFXOW WR VHHZKat that could be, where we are going to put in an award 
FULWHULDZKHUHZH¶UHJRLQJWRVD\ZH¶OODZDUG[SHUFHQWLI\RX¶YHJRWVD\D
VFRUHYHUVXVDVFRUHWKHQEXWZHGRQ¶WGRWKDW\HW$QG,WKLQNLW¶VQHDUO\
LPSRVVLEOHWRGRLQP\YLHZLW¶VD\Hs/no situation.967 
The Commission Communication 
Another issue highlighted in Chapter 6 relating to the use of labour-related award criteria 
DULVHV IURP WKH VWDWHPHQW LQ WKH &RPPLVVLRQ¶V &RPPXQLFDWLRQ RQ 6RFLDO ,VVXHV WKDW
labour issues may only be considered as award criteria where all other aspects of the 
tender are equal.968 The interpretation of the law set out in the Commission 
                                          
967 EN#2. 
968 European Commission, Interpretive Communication of the Commission on the Community Law applicable to 
public procurement and the possibilities for integrating social considerations into public procurement, 
&20³&RPPLVVLRQ&RPPXQLFDWLRQRQ6RFLDO,VVXHV´DWSDUD 
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Communication is based on the facts of the case of Nord Pas de Calais and, as noted 
previously in Section IV.4, Chapter 6 has been criticised as implying a requirement which 
is not in fact mentioned in the CJEU judgement in that case.969 
,QWHUYLHZHHVZHUHDVNHGZKHWKHU WKH\DJUHHGZLWK WKH&RPPLVVLRQ¶V LQWHUSUHWDWLRQRI
the law in this area. The majority of interviewees noted that they had been unaware of 
the Commission Communication and this interpretation of the law concerning award 
FULWHULD SULRU WR WKH LQWHUYLHZ 7KH VWDWHPHQWV JLYHQ WKXV UHSUHVHQW WKH LQWHUYLHZHHV¶
personal opinion of the Communication and were made based on consideration between 
the time the interview guide was sent out and the interview taking place (usually a 
week) rather than any detailed consideration. Some interviewees declined to comment 
due to lack of knowledge in this area, but thirteen interviewees responded to the 
question. 
The majority of interviewees disagreed with the interpretation set out in the 
&RPPLVVLRQ¶V&RPPXQLFDWLRQRQ6RFLDO,VVXHV970 The main concern of interviewees was 
the autonomy of their company, with even those interviewees who stated they did not 
include labour related award criteria arguing that they should be free to do so if they 
wished, emphasising that it was not the role of the EU to decide that labour was an 
LQDSSURSULDWH DUHD 7KH DUJXPHQWV UHIOHFWHG LQWHUYLHZHHV¶ SHUFHSWLRQV RI (8 law as 
concerned primarily with ensuring fairness (see further discussion above, section V), 
with interviewees arguing that so long as labour related criteria were set out clearly and 
openly and used in a fair and non-discriminatory manner, they should be lawful: 
I think the whole point of award criteria is that you weight them depending on 
how important they are for you as a business and for your delivery. So long as 
\RXDVVHVV WKHGLIIHUHQW FRPSDQLHV EXW WKH\¶UHDOO EHLQJDVVHVVHG LQ WKH VDPH
                                          
969 Case C-225/98 Commission of the European Communities v France [2000] ECR I-³Nord Pas De 
Calais´ 
970 10 interviewees disagreed with the statement. 
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manner, thaW¶VWKHLPSRUWDQWWKLQJ971 
The three interviewees who agreed with the statement in the Commission 
Communication did so on the basis that the Commission was attempting to emphasise 
that labour issues were not generally appropriate for consideration at the award stage. 
The interviewees felt that the idea behind the statement was that by the award stage 
labour issues should have little impact, with award criteria being primarily based on cost 
and technical factors, and only allowing labour issues to be considered when other 
aspects of the tender were equal clearly showed procuring entities that the emphasis 
should be on commercial issues at this stage.  
Reasons for using labour related award criteria 
As noted previously, health and safety issues were the most commonly considered at 
this stage.  Other labour issues were considered less often and, if at all, commonly as 
sub-criteria within a general sustainability criterion. Use of labour related award criteria 
was generally limited to contracts where a specific labour risk had been identified, for 
example with products generally produced in developing countries. The main reason 
given by interviewees for considering such labour issues at the award criteria stage was 
that it enabled a certain issue to be considered and evaluated in depth during the 
procurement process where interviewees felt that issue needed to be evaluated beyond 
the level of detail allowed at the prequalification stage. Given the lower number of 
suppliers in the procurement process at this stage, utilities could evaluate more detailed 
evidence from each supplier allowing for more effective monitoring of labour issues (see 
further below, section IX).  
VI.2. Labour Criteria in Company Supplier Lists 
As discussed previously in Section IV.6, Chapter 6, utilities can choose to set up a 
supplier list under the EU procurement regime, from which they can then choose 
suppliers for specific contracts without having to go through any further tendering 
                                          
971 TR#4. 
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process. The main issue relating to the use of labour issues here is whether a utility can 
include labour criteria when choosing which suppliers are qualified for the supplier list 
(which will probably rely on the interpretation of the general qualification rules, see 
discussion above) and whether, if labour issues are included, such labour criteria have to 
be relevant for all contracts which could possibly be awarded using that supplier list. 
Six interviewees out of the twenty-two used a supplier list for procurement covered by 
the Utilities Directive with one further interviewee using a supplier list solely for 
procurement which was outside the directive. The lists varied from those which covered 
all procurement performed by the interviewee to those which only covered certain types 
such as engineering contracts. Of the six interviewees who operated a supplier list under 
the Utilities Directive, five examined some labour issues when determining which 
suppliers would be accepted onto the list. 
Interviewees generally felt that the labour criteria which they set for acceptance onto 
their supplier list would be relevant for all contracts which were awarded under that list. 
Each interviewee took a different approach to ensuring applicability. One possibility was 
limiting either the use of the supplier list or the type of labour criteria.  For example, one 
interviewee only used a supplier list for one specific type of contract and noted that the 
criteria had been specifically designed so that they would be relevant for that type of 
contract.972 Another interviewee limited labour criteria use to only health and safety 
issues which would be relevant for all contracts.973 These methods avoid the issue of 
ensuring applicability for all contracts, but do not aid utilities which wish to operate a 
general supplier list examining a wide range of labour issues. A possible solution was 
offered by one interviewee who operated a sliding scale approach to supplier list 
qualification, with different criteria and levels of evidence required for suppliers operating 
in different areas.974 
                                          
972 PO#1. 
973 TR#2. 
974 TR#5. 
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Only one interviewee had a system requiring compliance with set labour criteria for 
access to a general supplier list.975 The system, requiring compliance with the ten 
principles of the UN Global Compact, was still being designed and worked on by the 
procurement and legal team at the utility and was not currently in operation at the time 
of the interview. The interviewee felt that the criteria would be relevant for all contracts 
DZDUGHG XQGHU WKH V\VWHP DUJXLQJ WKDW WKH FULWHULD H[DPLQHG WKH VXSSOLHU¶V JHQHUDO
compliance with set standards of labour issues and thus were not contract specific. 
VI.3. Conclusions: Impact of the legal regime 
2YHUDOO WKH LPSDFW RI WKH (8 OHJDO UHJLPH RQ XWLOLWLHV¶ GHFLVLRQ RYHU KRZ WR VWUXFWXUH
labour issues within procurement was relatively low. While the legal regime was a factor 
LQLQWHUYLHZHHV¶GHFLVLRQVRYHUZKLFKPHWKRGZRXOGEHPRVWDSSURSULDWHIRUFRQVLGHULQJ
labour issues, other factors such as cost and also simple awareness of the possibility of 
including labour issues in certain ways were also key. Interviewees were reluctant to 
consider labour issues in ways which were clearly unlawful under the EU rules, for 
example with local labour clauses and contract conditions which go beyond the 
performance of the contract being very rarely used. Where the legal regime governing a 
certain approach was less clear, interviewees tended to assume that that approach was 
lawful and their main concern was with more practical issues. Interviewees tended not to 
consider the potential impact of the legal regime on the use of labour criteria in any 
depth and thus they felt little restriction on their actions.  
VII. Labour Criteria in Procurement outside the Directive 
Procurement which is outside the coverage of the Utilities Directive, for example, 
because it is below the threshold, is subject to far fewer restrictions under EU law. 
Procurement outside the directive may still be covered by the Treaty provisions, which 
have become more important in recent years since the CJEU set out the principle of 
transparency which applies under the Treaty. This principle requires that all contracts 
                                          
975 EN#2. 
Page 259 of 300 
 
which might be of cross-border interest are advertised and conducted in a transparent 
manner. Procurement will also have to be fully compliant with the free movement 
provisions, a requirement which may have considerable impact on the use of labour 
criteria in contract conditions The applicability of the Treaty provisions to private utilities 
is uncertain and should the correct interpretation be that private utilities are not covered 
then there are no legal restrictions at all on the use of labour criteria in procurement 
RXWVLGH WKH GLUHFWLYH 7KLV VHFWLRQ ZLOO H[DPLQH ERWK LQWHUYLHZHHV¶ knowledge of the 
Treaty provisions and their personal opinion over whether or not they are covered as 
well as their use of labour criteria in procurement outside the directive. 
VII.1. The Treaty Rules 
Interviewees working in private sector utilities who had stated that they included labour 
issues in procurement were asked about their familiarity with the requirements of the 
TFEU and whether they considered themselves bound by the rules set out in that Treaty. 
Interviewees operating in the public sector, i.e. those classed as contracting authorities 
under the Utilities Directive, were not asked this question, since the public sector is more 
clearly covered by the Treaty, but their use of labour criteria in procurement and the 
impact, if any, of the Treaty rules there was discussed (see section below). In total 
sixteen interviewees were asked about the applicability of the Treaty rules. 
Knowledge of the Treaty rules and the principle of transparency as set out in Telaustria 
and subsequent cases amongst private sector interviewees was moderate, with six of the 
sixteen interviewees stating that they had some familiarity with the requirements. 
Amongst these six, opinion was mixed over whether or not they were covered by the 
Treaty law. Only one interviewee stated that he did consider that the company was 
bound, and only one interviewee stated that they did not.976 The rest were unsure over 
the legal position but appeared to err on the side of caution, noting that they followed 
procedures close to those required under the Utilities Directive in all cases so the 
procurement should also be compatible with the Treaty: 
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,¶PDZDUHRIWKHGHEDWHLQWKLVDUHD%XWZHFRQVLGHUDOORXUSURFXUHPHQWWREH
FRYHUHGE\WKHGLUHFWLYHVWRDJUHDWHURUOHVVHUH[WHQW6RLILW¶VEHORZWKUeshold, 
ok, we may not advertise but we do expect there to be tenders in a competitive 
way, to the same rules and criteria that we do above threshold.977 
The remaining ten interviewees stated that they were unaware of any procurement rules 
stemming from the Treaty and consequently did not attempt to comply with those rules 
for their procurement: 
[W]H¶UHLQDELWRIDIXQQ\VLWXDWLRQbecause although we are a private body we 
arH,PHDQFOHDUO\ZH¶UHSXEOLFly funded and therefore subject to all of the usual 
utilities regulation and OFWAT regulations, so it could well apply to us. Gosh, if it 
GRHVZH¶UHQRWGRLQJLWZKDWHYHULWLV978 
The data collected in this research thus suggest that awareness of the implication of the 
Treaty rules for procurement is low amongst private sector utilities. Even amongst those 
who are aware of the rules, the applicability of those rules is uncertain. The majority of 
interviewees were operating on the basis that no Treaty rules applied to procurement 
which, if true, opens up the possibility of use of labour criteria significantly, not only in 
procurement outside the directive but also via contract conditions under the directive 
given that most restraints on such conditions are based on the free movement 
provisions. 
VII.2. Use of labour criteria in procurement outside the directive 
Due to the lower level of restrictions covering procurement outside the directive, even 
should the Treaty rules apply to private utilities, it seemed reasonable that utilities would 
take advantage of this flexibility to include labour criteria more extensively outside the 
regulated areas. In fact, the majority of interviewees indicated that there was no 
difference in the use of labour criteria in procurement within or outside the directive, 
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with the same issues being considered in either case. There were no cases in which a 
utility which did not consider labour issues in procurement covered by the directive 
considered such issues in procurement outside the directive. 
Fourteen of the twenty-two interviewees stated that they had at some point included 
labour issues in procurement which was outside the directive. Of these fourteen, eight 
noted that they routinely considered labour issues in all procurement which was outside 
of the directive. These eight all noted that they structured labour issues in the same way 
irrespective of whether the procurement was covered by the directive or not, following 
the same set of procedures for all procurement. These interviewees generally had 
positive opinions of the EU legal regime, feeling that it set out good standards for 
ensuring competitiveness and fairness in procurement and felt that they wanted to 
extend the principles to their non-regulated procurement because of this: 
All of the procurement we do, we try and follow EU procurement law anyway, 
irrespective of it is covered or it is not covered. My view is EU procurement law is 
merely a mechanism for ensuring that we do procurement in a fair, competitive 
way and my view is, why would I not want to do it like that?979 
Interviewees also noted that it was simpler for the procurement team to only have one 
set procedure to follow for procurement, regardless of the value or legal coverage of that 
procurement. The team thus only had to learn one set of rules and did not have to spend 
time determining whether or not the legal rules applied before beginning the 
procurement. 
The six interviewees who stated that they occasionally included labour criteria in their 
procurement noted that they only did so where they felt that there was a special labour 
concern which needed to be considered in a particular contract. Interviewees generally 
noted that contracts which were outside the coverage of the directive were most 
commonly outside since they were below the threshold. Such contracts of low value were 
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more likely to be awarded to a UK based supplier due to lack of cross-border interest 
and this resulted in interviewees feeling that few labour issues would be relevant beyond 
ensuring compliance with national law. This was also the main reason given by those 
interviewees who stated that they never included labour issues in procurement which 
was outside the directive. 
VIII. Evidence and Monitoring of Labour Policies 
This section will first look at the background to the need for evidence and monitoring of 
ODERXU SROLFLHV E\ GLVFXVVLQJ LQWHUYLHZHHV¶ WKRXJKWV RQ WKH LPSDFW RI &65 SROLFLHV LQ
practice. It will then discuss the types of evidence required by interviewees to prove 
compliance with the labour criteria set out in procurement, taking a specific look at the 
possible use of labour standard certification such as SA 8000.980 The section will 
conclude by considering the type of monitoring systems which interviewees use to check 
on the compliance with labour criteria post-award, when the contract is actually being 
performed, along with their responses to a breach of labour related conditions. 
VIII.1. Actual impact of CSR 
Interviewees often had concerns about the actual impact and utility of CSR policies in 
practice, with the most common concern (given by twelve of the twenty-two 
interviewees) being that CSR was often nothing more than window dressing in a 
company. Suppliers might set out policies which looked strong but very little was done to 
follow through on those policies and they had little practical impact. Interviewees 
worried that companies would simply give the answer which they felt was wanted during 
the tender process and then would ignore CSR issues when the contract was performed, 
and there would be few methods of checking up on this.  
                                          
980 SA 8000 and other forms of labour standard certification are discussed in more detail in Chapter 3. 
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[I]t would need to be something that was quite -- information which was in the 
public domain and universally measured, otherwise if it ends up being subjective 
WKHQLWZRXOGQ¶WKDYHDQ\WHHWKZRXOGLW",WZRXOGEHDWRNHQJHVWXUHUHDOO\981 
We could ask about labour issues like anything else, but obviously companies will 
MXVWJLYH\RXWKHDQVZHUWKH\WKLQN\RXZDQWVR\RXFDQ¶WMXVWWUXVWZKDWWKH\
say. You have to go check for yourself982 
Given this strong desire to ensure that any labour issues considered were treated 
seriously by suppliers, monitoring and evidence were a key issue to interviewees (see 
further below, Section IX). 
A minority of interviewees also had doubts about the utility and impact of CSR policies 
more widely. One issue (connected with the belief that CSR was only relevant for 
developing countries and the high use of UK suppliers) was that all suppliers would meet 
the minimum standards required by the utility so that CSR issues would rarely, if ever, 
have any real impact on procurement issues in practice. Two interviewees were also 
uncertain about the supposed commercial benefits of CSR (discussed previously in 
Chapter 2): 
[The directors of the company are] PRVWO\DFFRXQWDQWVDQGWKH\¶UHVXVSLFLRXVRI
DQ\WKLQJ WKDW¶VQRW UHODWHG WR WKHERWWRP OLQHDQGWKLV LVQ¶W UHDOO\ ± I know you 
VHHORDGVRIFODLPVWKDWWKHVHSROLFLHVZLOOPDNH\RXPRUHSURILWDEOHEXW,GRQ¶W
WKLQNLW¶VWUXH983 
VIII.2. Types of evidence required to prove ability to comply with labour policies 
,Q RUGHU WR FRPEDW LQWHUYLHZHHV¶ FRQFHUQV DERXW&65SROLFLHV EHLQJ µZLQGRZGUHVVLQJ¶
then,, it is essential for utilities to require evidence from suppliers to show that they can 
comply with the labour policies included in procurement. As discussed in Chapter 6, 
Section IV.5, the Utilities Directive, unlike the Public Sector Directive, does not set out 
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an explicit list of the types of evidence which may be requested from a supplier, 
suggesting that any suitable evidence may be allowable. Utilities may not impose any 
³³DGPLQLVWUDWLYHWHFKQLFDORU ILQDQFLDOFRQGLWLRQV´RQFHUWDLQFRPSDQLHVEXWQRWRWKHUV
which would appear to prevent companies from requesting extra evidence from 
companies which they judge to be high risk.984 
The majority of interviewees stated that they required some form of evidence to prove 
compliance with the labour policies that they included in their procurement.  Only three 
interviewees out of the twenty who included labour conditions in procurement noted that 
they did not routinely require any form of supporting evidence from their suppliers. The 
reason given by these three interviewees was primarily the time and cost involved in 
completing detailed checks on labour issues: 
[I]W¶V D UHVRXUFH WKLQJ ZH KDYHQ¶W JRW WKH UHVRXUFHV WR JR LQWR WKH GHWDLO RI
DXGLWLQJWKHVXSSO\FKDLQVRZHMXVWEDVLFDOO\UHO\RQWKHGHFODUDWLRQVWKDWZH¶UH
given.985 
For the majority of interviewees who did require evidence, the trend was towards not 
being prescriptive over the type of evidence required from suppliers but to accept 
anything which the supplier could provide to prove compliance.  
IW¶VGLIILFXOWWREHSUHVFULSWLYHEXWZHVHWRXWDUDQJHRISRVVLEOHHYLGHQFHZKLFK
can be provided ± certification, heDOWKDQGVDIHW\SROLFLHVRUDXGLWUHVXOWVEXWLW¶V
not required that people provide that ± they can prove they comply with the 
requirement in any way.986 
2QHFRPPRQDSSURDFKZDVWRDVNIRUDFRS\RIWKHVXSSOLHU¶V&65SROLF\DORQJZLWKDQ\
other relevant policies such as health and safety and then also ask for specific examples 
of how that policy was complied with in practice:  
We always want evidence for everything. We never just say... give us your policy, 
                                          
984 Art. 52(1)(a) Utilities Directive. 
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WKDW¶VQRWJRRGHQRXJKIRUXV:HZDQWWRNQRZKRZ\RX¶YHXVHGWKHSROLF\JLYH
XVDQH[DPSOHRIKRZLW¶VEHHQSXWLQWRSUDFWLFH.987 
5HO\LQJ RQ WKLV W\SH RI ³SDSHU HYLGHQFH´ VXFK DV SROLF\ VWDWHPHQWV FDVH VWXGLHV DQG
accreditation was the most popular approach to collecting evidence, used by seventeen 
interviewees. Seven interviewees also conducted audits of their suppliers in addition to 
UHTXLULQJ SDSHU HYLGHQFH JRLQJ WR WKH VXSSOLHUV¶ VLWHV DQG FKHFNLQJ ODERXU VWDQGDUGV
(amongst other issues) first-hand. Of these seven, three audited suppliers for every 
contract (though one only audited the winning supplier) and the rest only conducted 
audits for labour issues on contracts where there was judged to be a high risk of labour 
standard problems due to the high cost of such audits. 
IW¶V D ELW RI D SDLQ EXW DFtually ... LW¶V WKH RQO\ UHDOZD\ RI VXEVWDQWLDWLQJ \RXU
initial tender response where we asked about a hundred and twenty questions for 
the initial tender, all sorts of questions, and then we score that and use the visit 
almost as a sort of verification to see are they actually telling us the truth or are 
WKH\DFWXDOO\WHOOLQJXVZKDWZHZDQWWRKHDUEXWWKHUH¶VQRHYLGHQFHWREDFNLW
up.988 
VIII.2.1. Labour Standard Certification (SA 8000) 
Interviewees rarely required labour standard certification. Only one interviewee out of 
the twenty who included labour policies stated that certification was asked for (in this 
particular case it was the SA 8000 certification) and, as usual, suppliers were free to 
prove compliance through other means.989 One further interviewee stated that SA 8000 
was included on their list of possible evidence but was neither required nor preferred 
over any of the other possible evidence.990 
The most common reason given by interviewees for the lack of use of any labour 
standard certification was simple lack of awareness of any such certification. 
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Interviewees often noted that they asked for environmental certification such as the ISO 
certification and would be interested in a labour version, suggesting that the main 
problem was the lack of publicity for and awareness of labour certification schemes.   
VIII.3. Types of monitoring used to assess compliance with labour policies post-award 
The degree of monitoring given to labour issues may be relevant under EU law when 
considering whether a contract condition is justifiable under the Treaty rules. Monitoring 
post-award is also key for ensuring that CSR policies are actually effective, which was a 
key concern for interviewees. 
Post-award monitoring was used less often by interviewees than evidence during the 
procurement process. Eight interviewees out of the twenty who included labour issues in 
procurement stated that there was generally no specific monitoring for compliance with 
labour issues (excluding health and safety) during the performance of the contract.991 
These interviewees noted that there was an assumption that the evidence which they 
had checked during the procurement process would remain valid throughout the contract 
performance period: 
[A]s far as actually auditing that, or following it XSZHGRQ¶W:H MXVW DVVXPH
that it happens and nothing, as far as I know, has ever come to light, to me 
DQ\ZD\1RWWKDWLWZRXOG,VXSSRVHFRQWUDFWRUVZRXOGQ¶WQHFHVVDULO\YROXQWHHU
that information to us.992 
Two of the eight interviewees who stated that monitoring for labour issues did not take 
place did note that they monitored the contract for other technical issues. They felt that 
any labour issues which might arise would in all likelihood be caught during that more 
general monitoring process.993 
                                          
991 One of the eight (TR#6) noted that there was only no monitoring for contracts under three years; longer 
contracts had the prequalification criteria rechecked regularly. 
992 WA#2. 
993 EN#1 and EN#5. 
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The remaining interviewees monitored contracts through either site audits or contract 
management meetings, or a mixture of the two. Interviewees generally set out key 
performance indicators (KPIs) in the contract, including some on health and safety and 
more general labour issues, and these would then checked regularly, whether by 
qualified auditors or by discussion in regular contract meetings with the contract 
manager. 
[I]n every contract there are a set of KPIs and if we thought it was relevant then 
there would be one around the labour conditions if appropriate. ... Procurement 
DUHJHQHUDOO\ZKHUH LW¶VDKLJKYDOXHRUVODVKKLJKULVNFRQWUDFWSURFXUHPHQW
get involved in regular review meetings, measuring and monitoring KPIs. Low 
value contracts or low risk ZH¶GJHQHUDOO\OHDYHWRWKH business to deal with.994 
VIII.4. Breach of labour conditions 
Prior to the interviews, this research hoped to examine the approaches taken by utilities 
to breach of labour conditions on their contracts. In fact, only two interviewees reported 
experiencing a breach in a previous contract and one of these noted that it was only a 
suspected breach. In that case, the utility had had some concerns about the labour on 
the contract but had also had problems with poor quality and had terminated the 
contract on that basis without investigating the possible labour issues in any more 
detail.995 The one interviewee who had experience with breach of labour conditions noted 
that they tended to take a remedial approach, favouring setting out an action plan for 
removal before terminating the contract.996 
IX. Conclusions 
This chapter has assessed the impact of the EU legal regime on the use of labour policies 
in procurement. Based on the results of the empirical interviews, the impact of the law 
appears relatively low The main factors which impacted upon the decision over whether 
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or not to include labour policies were overwhelmingly commercial and moral. It is hard to 
rank the factors in any order, but the key reason interviewees adopted labour policies in 
procurement appeared to be in order to avoid any adverse publicity which would occur 
should poor labour standards be associated with the utility. The next most important 
factor appeared to be moral concern and a feeling that ensuring high labour standards 
ZDV ³WKH ULJKW WKLQJ WR GR´ &RQYHUVHO\ WKH PDLQ UHDVRQ LQWHUYLHZHHV GLG QRW LQFOXGH
labour policies in procurement was due to ignorance of the possibility of CSR and labour 
policies or a belief that such policies would not be relevant to the type of procurement 
their company focused on. The potential cost of such policies was also an issue. In 
comparison, legal issues were rarely considered when companies looked at whether 
labour policies were appropriate for their company.  Where legal issues were considered, 
they did not appear to prevent a company from adopting labour issues in principle in any 
case. 
Once a utility had taken the decision to include labour policies in procurement, legal 
issues began to have more importance. The EU legal regime impacted upon 
LQWHUYLHZHHV¶GHFLVLRQRYHUZKDWW\SHVRILVVXHWKH\ZRXOGLQFOXGHLQWKHLUODERXUSROLF\
and also how they would structure that policy within their procurement. The most 
obvious area of impact was relating to the use of policies favouring local labour or firms 
which interviewees identified as one of the areas which they would most like to pursue 
but which they were prevented from doing by the EU legal regime. The legal regime also 
DSSHDUHGWREHRQHRIWKHIDFWRUVLQLQWHUYLHZHHV¶SUHIHUHQFHIRULQFluding labour policies 
through the methods of contract conditions and prequalification standards rather than 
other methods such as award criteria, though other factors were also key such as a 
belief that the award stage was simply too late in the process to consider labour issues. 
Overall, interviewees were positive about the EU legal regime and felt that it had very 
little impact on the use of CSR and labour polices, nor should it, with such issues being a 
matter for the procuring entity alone. It was generally felt that the legal regime gave 
utilities enough flexibility to include such issues in procurement should they wish to do 
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so. It is notable however that a minority of interviewees which were those which were 
attempting the more ambitious labour policies felt that the EU regime was too restrictive. 
It also appears that utilities are unclear over the law in this area and one of the major 
desires of interviewees was that the legal regime be clarified and more guidance 
provided to aid those companies which wish to look at labour issues.    
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Chapter 10 - Conclusions 
I. Introduction 
As set out in the Introduction (Chapter 1), this thesis aims to examine the practical 
impact of the EU procurement regime on the use of labour policies and criteria in 
procurement conducted under the Utilities Directive, focusing in particular on how 
procurement practitioners dealt in practice with regulatory requirements which were 
commercially restrictive and/or unclear. In order to do so, the thesis examines the 
impact of the EU procurement regime on four main areas; (1) the use of labour policies 
in utilities procurement; (2) the types of labour policy commonly included in 
procurement; (3) the structure of labour policies included in utilities procurement and; 
(4) overall regulatory and compliance issues.   
Part I of the thesis set out the background to the research, determining the main areas 
RILQWHUHVWDQGVHWWLQJRXWDGRFWULQDODQDO\VLVRIWKH(8OHJDOUHJLPH¶VLPSDFWRQODERXU
policies in procurement. Part II then set out the methodology and results of a qualitative 
study using semi-structured interviews with a sample of procurement practitioners based 
in UK utilities, investigating the practical impact of the legal issues identified in Part I. 
This chapter sets out the overall conclusions of the research project in the four areas 
identified above. 
II. Use of Labour Policies 
The first main area the thesis investigated was the level of use of labour policies in 
procurement by companies operating in the regulated utilities sector and the factors 
ZKLFKLPSDFWHGRQFRPSDQLHV¶GHFLVLRQRYHUZKHWKHURUQRWWRLQFOXGHODERXUSROLFLHVLQ
their procurement, with emphasis on the importance of the EU legal regime to this 
decision.  
In order to aid this investigation, Chapter 2 examined the background to corporate social 
responsibility (CSR) generally and labour policies specifically, setting out the factors 
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which commonly led to the use of CSR policies in general business practice. In this 
chapter we saw that CSR, the process whereby companies integrate social and 
environmental concerns into their business practice, has become of increasing 
importance to all areas of business over recent years. It was shown that there were 
several main factors which led companies to include CSR policies in their business 
practice, with the main factor being the so-FDOOHG ³EXVLQHVV FDVH´ IRU&658QGHU WKLV
argument, socially responsible companies will in fact be more profitable than their less 
ethical competitors. Following this position, companies face pressure from their 
stakeholders to be more socially responsible, with the main sources of pressure being 
investors, the comSDQ\¶VHPSOR\HHVDQGFRQVXPHUV,t is argued that a company which 
satisfies the demands of these stakeholders will gain more custom than a company 
which does not.997 
The existence of the business case for CSR appears to be accepted by the EU and is 
referred to in the Green Paper on CSR998 but, as was also shown in Chapter 2, it has 
been difficult to prove this link between CSR and profit in practice, with the many studies 
in this area resulting in contradictory results. Nonetheless, regardless of the actual 
efficacy of the business case, it was argued that the pressure on utilities to include CSR 
issues in their business might lead to increased use of labour policies in procurement and 
the empirical research sought to investigate this issue. 
Acting against these business pressures was the possible influence of the EU 
procurement regime. Chapters 5 and 6 set out an overview of the EU procurement 
regime and its possible impact on the use of labour policies in procurement. These 
chapters showed that the utilities procurement regulation both restricts the use of 
certain types of labour policies in procurement and also has significant grey areas where 
the legality of the use of labour policies is uncertain. The possibility was raised here that 
                                          
997 See Chapter 2, Section I.2  of this thesis, based on Vogel, D. The Market for Virtue: The Potential and Limits 
of Corporate Social Responsibility (2005, Washington DC: Brookings Institution Press), Ch. 3.  
998 European Commission, Communication from the Commission concerning Corporate Social Responsibility: A 
business contribution to Sustainable Development &20³&RPPLVVLRQ&RPPXQLFDWLRQFRQFHUQLQJ
&RUSRUDWH6RFLDO5HVSRQVLELOLW\´DWS 
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these restrictions and ambiguities may outweigh the pressures on utilities to include 
labour policies in procurement such that utilities do not include such policies at all or 
limit their use to areas where they are clearly legal. The empirical research also sought 
to investigate this area.  
II.1 The Impact of the EU Regime 
The overall conclusion of the empirical research was that the impact of the EU legal 
regime was minimal when compared to other factors. A majority of interviewees 
assumed that the types of labour policies that they looked at would be compatible with 
the EU regime without making any detailed consideration of the law but even those who 
did look at the law ultimately decided that labour policies could be legally included in 
procurement under the Utilities Directive. The research showed that the EU regime does 
not appear to act as a deterrent to the overall inclusion of labour policies in 
procurement. Instead, the major influence of the EU law was on how those labour 
policies would be structured in the procurement. There was one major exception to this, 
however, in the area of policies favouring local labour or firms, where interviewees felt 
heavily restricted, see further below, Section III. 
II.2 The business case for CSR 
,WZDVVKRZQE\WKHHPSLULFDO UHVHDUFK WKDW WKHQRWLRQRI WKH³EXVLQHVVFDVH´ IRU&65
which was identified and discussed in Chapter 2 also had limited impact on the decisions 
of the procurement practitioners interviewed as to whether or not to include labour 
policies in procurement. A majority of those interviewees who included labour policies in 
procurement denied that commercial issues were key to their decision to include labour 
policies in procurement, with most arguing that the decision to include labour issues was 
a moral concern rather than a commercial one. The particular factors of investor, 
consumer and employee pressure which were identified by Vogel as a key part of the 
notion of the business case, as discussed in Chapter 2, were also felt to be relatively 
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unimportant by interviewees, with only a minority feeling those factors had been 
relevant to their labour policy decisions. 
7KHFRUUHFWQHVVRIWKH³EXVLQHVVFDVH´IRU&65ZDVDOVRFKDOOHQJHGGLUHFWO\E\VRPHRI
the interviewees. The main reason given by those interviewees who had chosen to either 
include no labour policies in procurement at all or to limit their use was that the inclusion 
of such policies created cost and resources issues. Contrary to the business case 
arguments, interviewees generally believed that CSR issues would cost a company and 
would not increase their profit or benefit them commercially in any meaningful way.  
Despite this general feeling that commercial factors were of limited relevance, some 
interviewees did identify factors which arguably could be considered commercial. The 
most important of these was the fear of adverse publicity, with companies including 
labour policies in procurement with the aim of avoiding association with suppliers with 
poor labour practices which might later be revealed to the public, tarnishing their 
reputation and impacting on their relationship with stakeholders. Other factors 
mentioned, such as the belief that improving labour standards led to superior 
performance from suppliers and better security of supply, suggest that commercial 
reasons may be the motive behind CSR policies more often than interviewees were 
willing to admit.  
Generally, it was shown that the main factor which determined whether or not a utility 
would include labour policies in procurement was the moral concerns of the procurement 
team or those higher up in the company. The attitude of the interviewees was 
reminiscent of the attitudes of the earliest social reformers discussed in Chapter 2, who 
did not believe that their work would benefit the company but felt they had a duty to 
improve the social community in which they operated. Similarly, the interviewees in this 
research reported feeling responsible for those who worked on their contracts. The 
research suggests that labour policies were primarily included in procurement because 
those involved thought it was the right thing to do. 
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This lack of concern for commercial factors is important since the business case for CSR 
LV NH\ WR WKH (8¶V VXSSRUW RI &65 DV GLVFXVVHG LQ &KDSWHU  ,W ZDV DOVR VKRZQ LQ
Chapter 6 that several of the arguments regarding the correct interpretation of the 
8WLOLWLHV'LUHFWLYH¶VDSSOLFDWLRQWRODERXUSROLFLHVUHO\RQZKHWKHURUQRW&65FDQEHWDNHQ
to be a commercial concern (see further below, Section IV). Should the CJEU take a 
strict approach to the use of labour policies and hold that such policies are only allowable 
if they provide commercial benefit, it seems that many utilities will thus find that their 
current use of such policies is unlawful under the procurement regulation given this lack 
of commercial motive. 
III. Types of Labour Policies 
The next aim of the thesis was to determine which types of labour policy were included 
in procurement by utilities and if the EU legal regime had any impact on that decision. In 
order to aid this investigation, Chapter 3 set out an overview of the types of labour 
policy which were commonly included in labour codes, which was then followed by an in-
depth examination of the requirements of the largest international labour codes. 
In Chapter 3 it was shown that there were three main types of code, characterised by 
their level of coverage; (1) company codes, which were designed by the organisation 
themselves and only applied to that organisation; (2) industry codes, designed 
collaboratively by organisations operating in a particular industry and applying to a 
number of organisations in that industry; and (3) international codes, which are 
designed by international organisations or NGOs and apply to any companies which 
agree to abide by that code. It was noted that each type of code has a different aim and 
so covers different types of labour policies. Company codes are generally the most vague 
and least comprehensive of labour codes, setting out general aims but no set standards 
and often focusing on high-profile issues which are more likely WRGDPDJHDFRPSDQ\¶V
reputation. International codes, in comparison, are generally the most stringent, setting 
out clear standards to be achieved and covering a broader spectrum of policies.  
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Examination of the most commonly used labour codes in Chapter 3 revealed nine main 
types of labour policy which might be included by utilities. These were: 
x Prohibition of child labour  
x Prohibition of discrimination  
x Prohibition of forced labour  
x Minimum wage rates  
x Maximum working hours  
x Health and safety in the workplace  
x Skills training for employees 
x Freedom of association  
x Recruitment of local labour 
The empirical research showed that only a minority of the utilities interviewed used an 
international code to guide their decisions relating to the use of labour policies, with the 
majority of procurement practitioners choosing the type of policy themselves or using 
the guidance of a company code. It was also shown by the empirical research that 
policies relating to health and safety in the workplace were the most commonly included 
by interviewees. Prohibition of child labour was the next most common, with the 
remaining types of policy (with the notable exception of recruitment of local labour, see 
further below) being included by approximately half of the interviewees. Generally, the 
choice over which types of labour policy were included in procurement was unrelated to 
the influence of EU law but reflected those areas in which the utility felt issues were 
most likely to arise in their contracts (so that, for example, firms which operated mostly 
in the UK were less likely to consider the issue of child labour in their contracts). 
Consistent with the findings in Chapter 3 relating to company codes, the majority of 
interviewees did not set out any precise standards to be met, preferring to set general 
aims or require compliance with national law. For those that did set out precise 
requirements, the emphasis was on requiring suppliers to meet minimum standards 
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rather than working with suppliers towards higher labour standards. This was consistent 
with both the finding above that company codes generally focused on high-profile issues 
likely to damage reputation and also the emphasis on avoiding bad publicity found in the 
empirical research (see Section II above); utilities were more concerned with avoiding 
EDGVXSSOLHUVWKDQLPSURYLQJVXSSOLHUV¶ODERXUVWDQGDUGV 
The most contentious type of labour policy was favouring local firms or labour. The 
analysis in Chapter 3 showed that favouring local labour is a relatively common 
requirement in labour codes, intended to improve the overall standard of living for the 
community in which the company is operating. As was shown in Chapter 6, favouring 
local labour is one of the areas which the EU procurement regime clearly restricts. There 
are three possible situations for favouring local labour; (1) favouring labour based in the 
home state; (2) favouring labour based in another EU state and; (3) favouring labour 
based in a third country. The first scenario is the most clearly unlawful but, as shown in 
Chapter 6 it is likely that all three scenarios are prohibited under the EU free movement 
rules. 
The empirical research showed that the emphasis for interviewees was on the first 
scenario, favouring labour based in the home state and, in particular, favouring labour 
which was based in the specific local area in which the utility operated. This was 
consistent with the sense of duty towards the local area which interviewees cited as 
being their main motivation for including labour issues in their procurement generally 
(see Section II above). Interviewees also noted commercial benefits from using local 
labour, including closer relationships with the firms and faster response times. 
Consistent with this emphasis on the first scenario, this was the area in which 
interviewees felt the most restricted by the EU legal regime and, despite the commercial 
benefits of favouring local labour set out above, the approach was rarely taken in 
practice. A majority of interviewees stated that they had considered favouring local 
labour but had chosen not to do so due to it being unlawful under EU law and overall, a 
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majority of interviewees indicated that if the law were relaxed in this area they would 
favour local labour to a certain extent.  Some interviewees attempted to promote the 
use of local labour in a manner that they considered consistent with the Utilities 
Directive, most often by looking at response times specifically or using non-legally 
binding methods of promoting local labour. However, though the interviewees did not 
wish to breach the EU law using these methods and believed them to be lawful, such 
methods may in fact not be lawful under the Directive, opening up these utilities to the 
possibility of challenge. There was also a small minority of interviewees who felt that the 
issue was important enough that they favoured local labour regardless of the EU law, 
taking the chance that there would be no legal challenge. 
Overall then, the area of favouring local labour is the area in which interviewees most 
favoured reform of the EU legal regime. The EU law in this area significantly restricts the 
commercial desires of utilities in the UK and is the main area in which the restriction was 
felt to be strong enough to push utilities to seek ways of working around the law. 
IV. Labour Policies in the EU Procurement Regime 
Where utilities had made the decision to include some labour policies in their 
procurement, this research then aimed to determine how those labour policies were 
structured and what impact, if any, the EU legal regime had had on that decision. 
Chapter 6 set out a detailed overview of the possible methods for including labour 
policies in procurement and analysed the potential legality of those methods under the 
EU procurement regime, calculating the risk of challenge for each method. Three main 
methods were identified; contract conditions, prequalification criteria, and tender 
evaluation.  
IV.1 Contract Conditions 
As discussed in Chapter 6, utilities may choose to include contract conditions that set out 
labour-related requirements to be completed by the supplier during the contract. 
Contract conditions are useful for ensuring labour issues are complied with throughout 
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the (potentially quite lengthy) contract performance period, unlike the other methods 
discussed below, which simply check the labour policies of the supplier at the time of the 
procurement. The empirical research showed that contract conditions were a relatively 
popular method amongst interviewees for including labour policies in procurement for 
this reason, though they were most commonly used in conjunction with other methods 
rather than as a sole method.    
Contract conditions may be divided into two categories; conditions which require 
compliance with national law, and conditions which go beyond legal compliance. The 
former option is one of the lowest risk options for including labour conditions and its 
legality appears to be assumed in Article 39 of the Utilities Directive. The possibility of 
including contract conditions which set labour requirements going beyond compliance 
ZLWKWKHODZLVVHWRXWLQ$UWLFOHRIWKH8WLOLWLHV'LUHFWLYH7KLVDOORZVXWLOLWLHVWR³OD\
GRZQVSHFLDOFRQGLWLRQVUHODWLQJWRWKHSHUIRUPDQFHRIWKHFRQWUDFW´DQGDOVRQRWHVWKDW
WKRVHFRQGLWLRQV ³PD\ LQSDUWLFXODU FRQFHUQVRFLDODQGHQYLURQPHQWDO FRQVLGHUDWLRQV´
Following this, it was shown in Chapter 6 that such conditions are also a relatively low 
risk approach provided that the conditions are designed to be compliant with the TFEU 
free movement provisions. The conditions must also be limited to the performance of the 
contract rather than looking at more general issues, such as ensuring that the labour 
standards of the entire firm meet a certain level, as opposed to just looking at the 
standards of the part of the firm working on the contract. 
Consistent with the argument that it was the least risky approach, requiring legal 
compliance was the most common use of labour-related contract conditions. The 
empirical research also found, however, that the EU legal regime was not the main 
consideration of interviewees when choosing to limit conditions to legal compliance, with 
the main factor instead being a belief that national law set a high enough standard and 
any contract conditions going beyond this were unnecessary. Equally, while the empirical 
research found that no interviewees included contract conditions covering general labour 
issues unrelated to the contract performance, their decision not to do so was also 
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unrelated to the EU legal restrictions. Instead, the main reasons were either a lack of 
awareness on the part of the procurement practitioners that such conditions could be 
created or a belief that such conditions were unnecessary. 
Overall, the EU legal regime had a very limited impact on the decision over whether or 
not to include labour-related contract conditions, suggesting that the legal regime offers 
utilities enough flexibility in this area to achieve their aims. No major restrictions or grey 
areas in the law were felt to exist in this area by interviewees. 
IV.2 Prequalification 
It was shown in Chapter 6 that utilities may also set prequalification criteria relating to 
minimum labour standards and then exclude those suppliers which do not meet those 
standards from the procurement process. Consistent with the finding discussed above 
(see Section III) that utilities were generally more concerned with avoiding poor 
suppliers than working to improve standards, the empirical research found that 
prequalification criteria setting minimum standards were the most popular method for 
including labour standards. Interviewees noted that this approach meant that poor 
suppliers could be removed from the process early on, allowing the focus for the rest of 
the procurement to be on cost and technical issues. 
It was noted in Chapter 6 that the main query regarding prequalification criteria under 
WKH (8 XWLOLWLHV UHJLPH ZDV WKH SUHFLVH PHDQLQJ RI WKH SKUDVH ³REMHFWLYH UXOHV DQG
FULWHULD´ ZKLFK $UWLFOH  RI WKH 8WLOLWLHV 'LUHFWLYH XVHV WR GHVFULEH DFFHSWDEOH
prequalification criteria. It is generally accepted that there is greater flexibility for 
utilities to include prequalification criteria than there is for public sector bodies, but the 
precise extent of that flexibility is uncertain. Based on analysis by Arrowsmith and 
Maund, three criteria were identified as relevant in Chapter 6; (1) whether the criteria 
are directly related to the particular contract or are wider in scope; (2) whether the 
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criteria are linked to the commercial aims of the utility or not; and (3) whether the 
criteria are linked to the overall procurement policy of the utility or not.999 
The empirical research showed that interviewees generally believe there is no restriction 
on the types of issues which they can consider at the prequalification stage. The majority 
of interviewees stated that their prequalification criteria looked at the supplier in general 
rather than being limited to criteria directly related to the particular contract. Consistent 
with the focus on moral reasons for including labour concerns rather than commercial 
reasons (see above, Section II), interviewees did not consider their labour-related 
prequalification criteria to be linked to the commercial aims or overall procurement 
policy of their company.  
It appears, therefore, that the utilities interviewed generally did not conduct any detailed 
OHJDODQDO\VLVLQWRWKHPHDQLQJRI³REMHFWLYHUXOHVDQGFULWHULD´WDNLQJWKHZRUGVDWIDFH
value as meaning any criteria applied to all parties equally. The utilities thus operated on 
the basis that the most flexible of the potential interpretations of the phrase was the 
correct one. Given the emphasis on the commercial arguments for CSR by the EU, it is 
possible that this will not be the interpretation made by the CJEU should the issue ever 
go to the court, limiting the use of such criteria by utilities. 
IV.3 Tender Evaluation (Award Criteria) 
As discussed in Chapter 6, it is possible for utilities to evaluate labour issues through a 
preference in the award criteria. This method allows the utility to balance the importance 
of the labour issue against other issues such as cost and technical issues and is a useful 
method for determining the supplier who offers the best labour standards. It was also 
shown, however, that award criteria are unsuitable for the main concern of utilities - 
ensuring compliance with minimum standards - as there is no real way of weighting the 
issue (compliance is a yes/no issue). It is also generally considered unacceptable to 
                                          
999$UURZVPLWK6DQG0DXQG&µ&65LQWKHXWLOLWLHVVHFWRUDQGWKHLPSOLFDWLRQVRI(C procurement policy: a 
IUDPHZRUNIRUGHEDWH¶&KLQ$UURZVPLWK6DQG.XQ]OLN3HGVSocial and Environmental Policies in EC 
Procurement Law: New Directives and New Directions, (2009, Cambridge: CUP) at pp. 451-453 
Page 281 of 300 
 
weigh up compliance with minimum standards against cost and technical issues. 
Consistent with this, the empirical research found award criteria were used less 
frequently than the methods previously discussed, though use was still relatively 
common. 
As shown in Chapter 6, the main issue relating to the use of labour-related award criteria 
LV WKH H[WHQW WR ZKLFK WKH\ FDQ EH ³OLQNHG WR WKH VXEMHFW PDWWHU RI WKH FRQWUDFW´ DV
required by Art. 55(1)(a) of the Utilities Directive. It was shown that it is unclear 
ZKHWKHUWKHPHDQLQJLVWKHVDPHDV³WKHSHUIRUPDQFHRIWKHFRQWUDFW´UHTXLUHPHQWIRU
contract conditions or requires a closer link to the contract, with award criteria being 
directly related to the technical specifications of the contract. If the correct interpretation 
is the former, workforce criteria should be lawful. However, if the latter approach is the 
correct one, workforce criteria seem to lack the needed link since the standards of the 
workforce do not impact on the actual characteristics of the product in any way. 
The empirical research showed that, overall, interviewees favoured the first approach, 
considering workforce criteria to be lawful so long as they were linked to the 
performance of the contract rather than looking at the workforce as a whole throughout 
WKHVXSSOLHU¶VEXVLQHVV$PDMRULW\RILQWHUYLHZHHVDOVRGLVDJUHHGZLWKWKH&RPPLVVLRQ¶V
interpretation of the law in this area, which states that workforce award criteria may only 
be lawfully considered where all other aspects of the tender are equal.1000 Interviewees 
felt this was an unduly restrictive interpretation of the law which impacted negatively on 
the autonomy of their company to decide which factors were important enough to 
consider at the award stage. 
Perhaps because of the general acceptance of the more flexible interpretation of the 
³VXEMHFW-PDWWHURIWKHFRQWUDFW´DQGWKHOHJDOLW\RIZRUNIRUFHDZDUGFULWHULDWDNHQE\WKH
majority of interviewees, there were no complaints about the EU law in this area and 
most interviewees stated it had little or no impact on their decision over whether or not 
                                          
1000 European Commission, Interpretive Communication of the Commission on the Community Law applicable 
to public procurement and the possibilities for integrating social considerations into public procurement, 
COM(2001) 566, at para. 1.4.1. 
Page 282 of 300 
 
to look at labour issues through award criteria. The main reason given by those 
interviewees who did not include labour-related award criteria was instead that they felt 
labour issues should be examined earlier in the process and the award criteria stage 
should focus on cost and technical issues.  
IV.4 Overall Conclusions 
Overall, the impact of the EU legal regime on the decision of how to structure labour 
policies in procurement was fairly low. Where there was a lack of clarity in the law, 
utilities tended to assume that an approach was legal, taking the most flexible 
interpretation of the law available.  Perhaps because of this, very few interviewees felt 
that the legal regime was the key issue when they were looking at structure; rather, the 
main factors were practical issues, with interviewees determining which stage of the 
procurement process was the simplest and most effective point to include the labour 
issues they were concerned with. This led to most utilities seeking compliance with 
minimum labour standards to choose the prequalification stage, whereas those who were 
looking at ongoing concerns or wanted to encourage labour standards to be improved 
among their suppliers to choose contract conditions and/or award criteria.  
V. Regulatory and Compliance Issues 
Finally, this thesis aimed to examine any regulatory and compliance issues caused by the 
restrictions and grey areas in the EU procurement regime. In order to do so, Chapter 7 
set out an overview of the aims of regulation and the impact that overly strict 
approaches to regulation might have. It also looked at the impact of indeterminate and 
unclear regulation. 
Chapter 7 discussed the economic model of deterrence, in which compliance with the law 
involves a cost/benefit analysis under which individuals will break the law where they 
feel the benefit to them of that breach outweighs the potential risk of being caught or 
the cost of punishment. It was shown that this economic model, while suffering from 
some flaws when applied to individuals, is applicable to corporations given the rational 
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economic basis of their actions. Following this, it was argued that if the commercial 
pressures on utilities to include CSR were strong enough, the economic model of 
deterrence suggested that they would breach the procurement law if necessary to meet 
those pressures. 
As noted in Chapter 7, however, the economic theory of deterrence relies on the fact 
that the company is aware of the law and that the law is clear about what is prohibited. 
Given the grey areas in the utilities procurement law relating to the use of labour 
policies, the possibility was raised that the lack of clarity might have a significant impact 
on compliance in this area. It was shown that where a law is unclear, there is a spectrum 
of possible behaviour which ranges from behaviour certain to attract liability to 
behaviour certain to not attract liability, with the actual legal requirement being 
somewhere between the two extremes. It was shown that where this is the case, 
companies tend to err on the side of caution and there is in fact a general tendency 
towards over-compliance since this not only reduces the possibility of challenge but also 
increases the chance that any successful challenge will result in a low penalty. It was 
also noted, however, that this only applies to legal provisions with moderate levels of 
uncertainty; the more uncertain a legal provision, the greater the tendency to under-
comply. 
7KHHPSLULFDOUHVHDUFKVKRZHGWKDWWKHUHZDV OLWWOH³FUHDWLYHFRPSOLDQFH´RUHYDVLon of 
the procurement rules by interviewees. In fact, interviewees generally did their best to 
comply with what they thought the legal requirements were. Consistent with the analysis 
discussed above, one of the reasons for this was to reduce the chance of legal challenge. 
Interviewees noted that the numbers of challenges in the UK had been increasing in 
recent years and imposed significant costs on the utility to defend, regardless of the 
ultimate result. It was also found that the majority of the interviewees complied with the 
EU legislation not because they were afraid of what would happen if they did not, but 
because they believed the legislation was fair and improved competition in procurement. 
In addition to these factors, the overall low level of knowledge of the law on the part of 
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the interviewees may also have been relevant. Interviewees did not attempt to evade 
the legal requirements and restrictions set out in the Utilities Directive often because 
they were simply unaware that those restrictions existed. While the actual level of 
compliance is hard to measure due to the lack of clarity in the law, it appears that the 
majority of non-compliance by utilities is due to ignorance of the law rather than 
deliberate wrongdoing. 
The distinction between deterrence and compliance methods of enforcing regulation was 
also discussed in Chapter 7. It was shown that deterrence approaches use punitive 
measures and often hold retribution to be a key aim of the law. By contrast, compliance 
approaches focus on informal methods and emphasise conformity with the law as the 
main aim. While the procurement regime is currently enforced using deterrence 
methods, with punitive civil sanctions for breach, it was shown in Chapter 7 that this 
may be a less efficient approach than using compliance methods would be. Compliance 
approaches lead to less delay than deterrence approaches and also foster a better 
relationship between the company and the regulator.  Given the finding above that most 
breaches of the procurement regulation are from a misunderstanding of the law rather 
than being deliberate breaches, the empirical research suggests that a compliance 
approach might work better in this area for utilities in the UK than the current deterrence 
approach.  Given this, the possibility was raised that a responsive regulation approach to 
enforcing the procurement regulation such as that suggested by Ayres and Braithwaite 
might work well in this area.1001 Under this method parties are subject to increasingly 
formal and punitive methods the more they continue to breach the regulation. Following 
this, those utilities which wish to comply but breach the law by accident would not be 
punished but helped to comply in the future. Equally, the punitive measures for repeated 
breach would continue to deter those utilities who stated they over-complied due to fear 
of challenge. 
 
                                          
1001 Ayres, I. and Braithwaite, J. Responsive Regulation (1992, Oxford: OUP), Ch.4. 
Page 285 of 300 
 
V. General Conclusions 
This thesis has set out the practical impact of the EU procurement regime on the 
LQFOXVLRQRIODERXUFRQVLGHUDWLRQVLQXWLOLWLHV¶SURFXUHPHQWLQWKH8K. The data has shown 
that in fact the impact was relatively low, with most procurement officers interviewed 
feeling that they had enough scope to complete the labour policies that they wished to 
do. It is notable that most labour policies included in procurement were relatively simple 
and often based around compliance with national law, with few utilities attempting any of 
the policies identified as high risk. Procuring officers also rarely examined the 
requirements of the law in any great detail before including labour considerations in 
procurement, tending to simply assume that the approach they were taking was legal. 
Thus, while it appears that the scope for including labour policies in procurement is quite 
wide, the law may be more restrictive than many utilities assume.  
The main area where it was felt that the EU regime was significantly restrictive was the 
area of local labour, with the majority of interviewees feeling constrained by the law in 
this area. It is in this area that many interviewees felt that reform of the law would be 
PRVW DSSURSULDWH EXW WKLV UHIRUP VHHPV YHU\ XQOLNHO\ WR RFFXU JLYHQ WKH (8¶V VWURQJ
focus on preventing national discrimination. Nonetheless, even here there was no real 
deliberate breach of EU law, with the vast majority of interviewees complying despite 
their feeling that the law was preventing their aims in this area.  
Overall, it does not seem that utilities are being driven to breach the law due to 
restrictive procurement rules in this area, with no real risk of creative compliance on the 
parts of procurement officers in the UK in the field of labour considerations in 
procurement. 
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